Summary: -----Quote: The petitioner is the lessee of property in question and in said status she applied for conversion of property from residential to commercial firstly in the year 1983 which followed various applications but last application to this effect was moved in the year 2011 upon which sanction was accorded. 2. The moot point involved herein is confined and restricted to the applicability of rates for premium chargeable from the petitioner. 3. After rejection of previous applications when the petitioner instead of challenging the orders of rejection opted to apply afresh in the year 2011, so her case would clearly fall under the policy 2007. The petitioner is thus precluded to claim the benefits of previous policy. In other words, petitioner cannot be benefited for her own wrongs. ------Background: The petitioner challenged the demand for a premium of Rs. 6,79,74,976/- imposed by the respondents for converting a leased property from residential to commercial use under the Cantonments Land Administration (CLA) Rules, 1937. The property, previously used for residential purposes, had been unauthorizedly converted into a commercial clinic. The petitioner claimed that the premium should be calculated based on rates prevailing in 1983, when the initial application for conversion was made, rather than at the time of final approval in 2011. -----Issues: 1- Can the petitioner claim premium rates prevailing at the time of the initial application (1983), despite subsequent rejections and a fresh application in 2011? -----2- Is the petitioner entitled to the benefits of a superseded policy, considering her failure to challenge earlier rejections of her applications? -----3- Does unauthorized use of the leased property and failure to disclose material facts disentitle the petitioner from equitable relief? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The petition was dismissed in limine. The court held that the petitioner was bound by the 2007 Policy, which was applicable at the time of her fresh application in 2011. The demand for premium as per the prevailing rates was deemed lawful. --Rejection of Previous Applications: The petitioner’s earlier applications in 1983 and 1986 were rejected, and she failed to challenge these rejections. The fresh application in 2011 was considered a new request, governed by the policy in force at that time (2007 Policy). --Unauthorized Use of Property: The petitioner violated lease terms by unauthorizedly using the property for commercial purposes without approval. This unauthorized use undermined her entitlement to equitable relief. --Policy Applicability: As per Ministry of Defence directives, premium and charges are to be calculated based on the policy in effect at the time of final approval. The petitioner could not claim benefits under earlier policies. --No Vested Right: The petitioner had no vested right to insist on rates from 1983 or to benefit from superseded policies. Equitable relief was denied due to the concealment of material facts, including unauthorized property use and non-disclosure of prior rejections. --Binding Policies and Procedures: The petitioner’s case fell within the scope of the 2007 Policy, which explicitly governed conversions of this nature. The court dismissed the petition as devoid of merit, upholding the premium demand as per the 2007 Policy. The petitioner was precluded from benefiting from prior policies or earlier rates due to her fresh application in 2011 and unauthorized use of the property. -----Citations/Precedents: 2018 SCMR 1616 – Mst. Saeeda Bano Siddiqui vs. Cantonment Executive Officer, Cantonment Board Malir, Karachi Unreported Judgment – Sindh High Court, Division Bench, dated 30th November 2010 (Constitutional Petitions No. D-2314 and D-2315 of 2008). CLA Rules, 1937 – Governing provisions for lease conversions and policies, including the 2007 Policy.

Summary: The appellants filed an application under Section 11 of the Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979, in the District Court, claiming ownership of disputed land leased to Syed Hussain Shah under a "Patta Dawami" (perpetual lease). The land was allegedly sold to the appellants through various sale deeds. The appellants sought a declaration that the disputed land was not Waqf property after it was declared as such by a notification from the Auqaf Department on 20.01.2010. The District Court dismissed the application, prompting the appellants to file an appeal, challenging the court’s decision. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the appellants had a perpetual lease over the disputed land and whether it could be transferred through sale deeds. ------ 2) Whether the land in question was Waqf property attached to the Shrine of Hazrat Baba Bhullay Shah. ------ 3) Whether the District Court’s decision dismissing the appellants' claim was legally and factually correct. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ------ Perpetual Lease Argument: The appellants argued that the land was perpetually leased to Syed Hussain Shah and that the sale deeds only transferred the leaseholding rights. However, the court noted that no valid perpetual lease existed because the appellants failed to show that the lease complied with registration requirements under Section 17 of the Registration Act and Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Moreover, there was no evidence of any consideration paid, which is a fundamental element of a valid lease. ------ Waqf Property Determination: The Auqaf Department and the government authorities argued that the land was Waqf property attached to the shrine of Hazrat Baba Bhullay Shah, meant for religious purposes. The court found that the documentary evidence, particularly the records from the Improvement Trust of Kasur, described the land as allocated for religious purposes, confirming it as Waqf property. ------ Inconsistencies in Appellants' Evidence: The court noted inconsistencies in the appellants' stance. Initially, they claimed ownership of the land, but during the proceedings, they shifted to asserting that they were merely leaseholders. The appellants’ witnesses (AW-1 and AW-2) provided weak and contradictory testimony regarding the existence of a perpetual lease and the ownership of the land. ------ Dismissal of Appeal: The court upheld the decision of the District Court, finding that the appellants failed to prove the existence of a perpetual lease or any ownership rights over the disputed land. The appeal was dismissed, and the land was confirmed as Waqf property under the control of the Auqaf Department. ------ Citations/Precedents: Punjab Waqf Properties Ordinance, 1979 (Sections 2(e), 7, and 11) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Section 105) Registration Act, 1908 (Section 17) Government of Sindh and others vs. Muhammad Shafi and others (PLD 2015 SC 380) – Relating to the legal requirements for a lease in perpetuity and the effects of non-registration. Auqaf Department through Chief Administrator Auqaf, Punjab Lahore vs. Secretary, Ministry of Religious Zakat, Ushar and Minorities Affairs (2009 SCMR 210) Chief Administrator Auqaf vs. Allah Bakhsh (deceased) through LRs (2011 SCMR 235)

Summary: Issues: 1) Whether the review petitions filed against the Supreme Court’s short order and detailed judgment should be granted on the basis of claims of valid licenses. ---- 2) Whether the petitioner’s business and other applicants were legally operating within the Margalla Hills National Park, given that licenses had expired or were absent. --- 3) Whether the petitioner’s partner’s commitment to vacate the premises binds the entire partnership firm. --- 4) Whether the non-registration of the petitioner’s firm affected its ability to initiate legal proceedings. --- 5) Whether the petitioners could retract their undertakings to vacate the premises. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Licensing and Occupation of Land: The Court held that the petitioner had been issued a one-year license in 1999, which was not renewed after it expired in 2001. The petitioner’s claim that the Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad (MCI) had extended the license was rejected, as it was the Capital Development Authority (CDA) that issued licenses. The petitioner was found to be in illegal occupation of the land. ---- Commitment to Vacate: The Court ruled that the partner's commitment to vacate the land bound the entire firm, as partners act as agents of the firm under the Partnership Act, 1932. Therefore, the firm's argument that the minority partner’s consent to vacate was invalid was rejected. --- Non-Registration of Firm: The Court found that the petitioner’s firm was unregistered, which barred it from initiating legal proceedings under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. Consequently, the firm could not lawfully file the review petitions or challenge the decision. ---- Environmental Violations: The Court emphasized the severe environmental degradation caused by illegal operations within the protected National Park. It condemned the actions of government officials who had facilitated the illegal businesses and highlighted the need to uphold environmental protections and regulations. Retraction of Undertakings: The Court did not permit the petitioners to retract their previous commitments to vacate the land within three months. The Court noted that reneging on such solemn undertakings would undermine judicial processes, and those attempting to do so would face consequences. ----Outcome: The review petitions were dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that the petitioner and other applicants were illegally occupying land in the National Park. The Court withdrew its previous offer of preferential treatment for future leases and confirmed that no legal right existed for the petitioners to continue operating in the National Park. The Court reiterated the importance of environmental protection and condemned the complicity of officials involved in the illegal occupation of protected land. ----Citations/Precedents: --- Partnership Act, 1932: Section 18: Partner as an agent of the firm. Section 19: Partner binds the firm. Section 69: Requirement for firm registration to initiate legal action. Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979: Law protecting the Margalla Hills National Park. --- Case law cited by the Court: Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group, Pakistan Ltd. and others (PLD 1990 SC 48): Established that issues of fraud, coercion, or undue influence in an agreement are to be decided by an arbitrator appointed by the parties and not by the court. M.A. Ghani Sufi & Sons vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1957 (W.P) Lahore 363): Known interest of an arbitrator does not invalidate the appointment unless the interest is concealed or arises after the appointment.

Summary: Issues: 1) Whether the lease agreements entered by the petitioner with CDA and the RV&FD were valid. ---2) Whether the construction and operation of restaurants within the Margalla Hills National Park violated environmental and land use laws. The legality of actions taken by the CDA and the RV&FD in relation to the Margalla Hills National Park. ---3) Whether the Islamabad High Court's ruling regarding the protection of the National Park and the demolition of illegal structures was justified. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the Islamabad High Court's decision, declaring that: The lease agreement with the CDA had expired, and the subsequent lease with the RV&FD was void ab initio as the Directorate lacked the legal authority to lease out the land. The construction and operation of restaurants within the Margalla Hills National Park were illegal and violated multiple environmental laws, including the Islamabad Wildlife Ordinance, the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, and other related statutes. The CDA and RV&FD's actions in leasing and allowing construction within the National Park were unlawful, and those responsible were to face legal consequences. The court ordered the immediate cessation of all commercial activities within the National Park, the demolition of illegal structures, and the restoration of the land to its natural state. The Wildlife Board was directed to take over the premises with the assistance of CDA and the Islamabad Capital Territory Police. ----Citations/Precedents: Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979 Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 Islamabad (Preservation of Landscape) Ordinance, 1966 Human Rights Case No. 318 of 1993 S.R.O. 443(I)/80 - Notification declaring Margalla Hills National Park Summary: The Supreme Court's decision emphasized the importance of protecting natural habitats and upheld the constitutional right to a healthy environment, reinforcing the principle that no individual or entity, regardless of influence, is above the law when it comes to environmental conservation.

Summary: The appellant, Karachi Properties Investment Company, sought to evict the respondent, Habib Carpets (Pvt) Limited, from rented premises based on alleged defaults in maintenance charges and unauthorized alterations. The eviction was initially approved by the Rent Controller and upheld by the Appellate Court. However, the High Court of Sindh reversed these decisions, prompting the appellant to file this civil appeal. The key legal question revolves around whether "maintenance charges" unmentioned in the lease agreement can be included under "rent" as defined by the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. ---Issues: 1. Whether maintenance charges, not specified in the lease agreement, constitute "rent" under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. 2. The appropriateness of the High Court's role in re-evaluating evidence considered by the Rent Controller and Appellate Court. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, affirming that maintenance charges not explicitly agreed upon in the written lease cannot be deemed as "rent" under the Ordinance. The Court highlighted that for any charges beyond basic rent and utilities to be enforceable, they must be clearly articulated in the lease agreement. The absence of such specifics means the respondent was not legally bound to pay the additional maintenance charges claimed. The Court also validated the High Court's intervention in writ jurisdiction, emphasizing that factual misreadings and legal errors by lower courts justified the re-evaluation of evidence. Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's tenancy was maintained. ----Citations/Precedents: Hakim Ali vs. Muhammad Salim and another, [1992 SCMR 46], clarifies the need for explicit agreement on rental terms to avoid disputes. Mst. Fakhra Begum and others vs. Mst. Sadia Ashraf and others, [2012 SCMR 1931], reinforces that unexpected charges not previously agreed upon cannot be grounds for eviction. The legal principles surrounding the interpretation of "rent" and tenancy agreements are grounded in ensuring clear, mutual consent and understanding of all charges and obligations, as articulated in the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979.

Summary: Doctrine of indoor management---The plaintiff, Total Parco Pakistan Limited, sought renewal of the lease, claiming that they had a contractual agreement with the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) for the renewal. The plaintiff's case was based on a letter issued by an officer of the CAA, which the plaintiff argued constituted a valid agreement. However, the CAA contested this claim, stating that the plaintiff had no right to seek renewal and that the lease could only be renewed through an open bidding process as per the Land Lease Policy. The CAA further argued that the letter issued by the CAA officer was unauthorized and that the plaintiff was not entitled to specific performance of the alleged contract. The court reviewed the arguments and evidence presented by both parties. It noted that the letter issued by the CAA officer did not have the necessary approval of the CAA Board, and the renewal terms did not follow the Land Lease Policy. The court also examined the lease agreement's provisions and found that the proviso for renewal did not constitute an automatic renewal but required mutual agreement. The court dismissed several applications filed by the parties, including one seeking rejection of the plaintiff's claim, an intervention application by another party, and a contempt application related to an interim order. Ultimately, the court concluded that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a valid contract for renewal and did not have a prima facie case for the grant of a temporary injunction.

Summary: [Licence]The petitioner being licensee/dealer of Respondent-PSO sought direction against the respondents including PSO not to dispossess him from the property in question.It was taken into consideration that license is a personal privilege to do some particular act or series of acts on the land without possessing any estate or interest therein, and is ordinarily revocable at the will of the licensor and is not assignable. Thus a license is not a contract between the licensor and licensee but a mere personal permit therefore a license is distinguishable from an easement, which implies an interest in the land and a "lease" or right to take the profits of land. Whereas a legal right in its strict sense is one which is an ascertainable claim, enforceable before Courts and administrative agencies. In its widest sense, a legal right has to be understood as any advantage or benefit conferred upon the person by a rule of law. Thus license with respect to property is a privilege to go on premises for a certain purpose, but does not operate to confer on, or vest in, licensee any title, interest, or estate in such property. It was opined that the petitioner being a licensee did not have any locus standi to maintain the petition and as such the same was not maintainable. Petition was dismissed in limine with no order as to cost.

Summary: In the present case it was a heavy burden upon the appellant to disprove the execution of such lease or to prove a collusive execution of lease but failed in such attempt. In terms of Articles 70 and 72 of the Qanoon-e-Shahdat Order, 1984 the registered instrument must yield in favour of oral evidence. The registered instrument would always carry a presumption of truth and a very strong and exceptional evidence is needed to dislodge the inference of truthfulness and genuineness of such document. It may have been said by the Deputy Director Land, Lyari that the issue can be resolved by summoning the officer from Excise & Taxation Department who may verify the number but it was not satisfactorily established by the appellant by summoning the witness.

Summary: Evidence (Standard of Proof), Constitution of Pakistan (199)--The petitioners through instant petition sought direction to respondent to issue 99-years lease in their favour on the basis of their possession.In this case, it was observed that question of title and possession cannot be resolved except through proper trial and evidence, which exercise cannot be gone into writ jurisdiction of this Court. Furthermore controverted question of fact, adjudication on which is possible only after obtaining all types of evidence in power and possession of the parties can be determined only by the Courts having plenary jurisdiction in the matter.

Summary: "a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---Words and phrases-------""Lease"" and ""licence""---Distinction---Lease was transfer of interest in property whereas in a licence such element was excluded; exclusive right of possession was granted to the lessee and the lessor was totally excluded from such right; right granted to the lessee was assignable and transferable while in a licence it was not so; licence was a personal right which was purely permissible right; notwithstanding the permission, the grantor would retain control over the property."----O. VII, R. 11---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 56---Lease agreement---Scope---Suit for permanent injunction , recovery of amount incurred on the maintenance and renovation of suit property and security deposited for the same---Rejection of plaint---Scope---Contention of plaintiff was that defendant had assured that he would not be evicted from the suit property and licence would be extended for another three years and he had incurred amount on the maintenance and renovation of premises and security for the same was also paid to the defendant---Validity---Neither declaration to the effect that plaintiff was a lessee was made nor he could maintain the present suit as a licensee---Expenses incurred on the renovation of premises would not give any cause of action to the plaintiff as agreement was silent with regard to construction or renovation work---Claim of damages was maintainable only in case the defendant had withheld the permission to use the premises without notice which was not the matter in the present case---Alleged claim of compensation/damages was not maintainable as plaintiff was given notice not to enter into the suit property---Plaintiff had no cause of action and no injunction could be granted of any nature---Present suit was hit by Ss. 42 & 56 (f) of Specific Relief Act, 1877---Application for rejection of plaint was accepted and plaint was rejected in circumstances.