Summary: The court held that if the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay in recording statements under section 161 Cr.P.C and there is a possibility of embellishment in the prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case. In this particular case, the delay in recording statements of important witnesses without reasonable explanation created a reasonable doubt in the court's mind as to the genuineness of the prosecution case, leading to acquittal.---- ''As from the testimony of the witnesses, it reveals that the real genesis of the incident was suppressed. After going through the entire evidence, we come to the irresistible conclusion that both i.e. the appellant and the complainant side suppressed the real occurrence. It is also an admitted fact on record that there existed enmity between the parties. It is evident from the cross-examination of this witness that the deceased were involved in different criminal cases and which fact would show that they were men of questionable character. The motive is a double edged weapon, which can be used for the commission of crime or for falsely implicating the accused. The motive for the commission of crime, by the accused was, therefore, not proved, through cogent and convincing evidence. As per dictates of law, benefit of every doubt is to be extended in favour of the accused. Criminal Appeal is accepted.''

Summary: The plaintiff was seeking a declaration, cancellation of documents, permanent injunction, and damages. The key issues being addressed in the document included whether the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent injunction against enforcing certain documents, whether the plaintiff's obligations to the defendants have been satisfied and the transaction documents canceled, and whether the plaintiff can recover damages. The document discussed the background of the lawsuit, which involved a financial transaction related to Sukuk units. It mentioned the representations made by the defendant regarding Islamic financing, the agreements between the parties, and the alleged default by the plaintiff. The legal arguments presented in the document revolve around the interpretation of the term "obligation" under the Ordinance, 2001 and whether the suit falls within the jurisdiction of the court. The court ultimately decided that it lacks jurisdiction over the matter and returns the case to the appropriate court for further proceedings.

Summary: (a) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------S. 25---Federal Government (Finance Department) Letter No.(2) DFA (CAB)/2000 dated 6-7-2000---Amount of voluntary return and plea bargaining---Deduction of any portion ofrecovered amount as a share of NAB---Scope---Neither the Constitution nor NationalAccountability Ordinance, 1999 allowed the Federal Government or the NAB to deduct anyportion of the recovered amount---Entire recovered amount on behalf of concerned Governmentshould be deposited in its respective accounts---Any deduction out of such amount would becontrary to the provisions of Constitution and National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---Noauthority, department, organization or any Government was authorized to receive or collect anyamount for any purpose from any person or body corporate or business entity except byenactment promulgated by Parliament or Provincial Government---Instructions and procedureprovided by the Finance Department (vide notification) for deduction of 25% out of recoveredamount had no statutory backing---Such deduction was contrary to the Constitution and wasdeclared void by High Court; NAB authorities were restrained from deducting any amount fromthe amount recovered on account of voluntary return and plea bargaining---High Court directedthat such amount be deposited in the Public Account of the Federation or in the Public Accountof the Province within one month. (b) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)-------S. 25---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.77---Federal Finance Ministry Letter No.2(2) DFA(CAB) 2000 dated 6-7-2000---Deduction of 25% out of recovered amount by NAB authorities;amount received by NAB through voluntary return and plea bargaining under the Ordinance;amount received on behalf of Bank, Financial Institutions, company, body corporate, cooperativesociety statutory body or Authority; amount of fine other than the amount of voluntary return andplea bargaining with assistance of court and any asset and pecuniary resources found to bedisproportionate to the known sources of income of holder of public office; Scope---Instructionsand Procedure provided by the Federal Finance Department for deduction of 25% out of therecovered amount had no statutory backing, therefore such deduction was contrary to Art.77 ofthe Constitution and was illegal---Grant of reward to the Officers/Officials and making the NABself-sufficient with regard to funds was to be managed in accordance with the Rules of the NABauthorities and within its allocated budget, instead of deducting 25% from the amount recoveredunder S.25 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999---High Court issued directions withregard to amount recovered under S.25 of the Ordinance.Following are the directions by the High Court with regard to amount recovered underS.25 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999:-(i) That the procedure/instructions issued by the Finance Ministry for deduction ofamount as NAB's share from the amount recovered on account of voluntary return andplea bargaining is void.(ii) That the NAB authorities are restrained from deducting any amount from the amountrecovered by them on account of voluntary return and plea bargaining as provided byS.25 of the Ordinance.(iii) That the entire amount received by the NAB through voluntary return and pleabargaining as per the NAB Ordinance shall be deposited in the Public Account of theFederation or in the Public Account of the Province as the case may be, within a period ofone month.(iv) That the entire amount received by the NAB authorities on behalf of the concernedbank, financial institution, company, body corporate, cooperative society, statutory bodyor authority concerned shall be transferred in their respective accounts.(v) That the entire amount of fine other than the amount of voluntary return and pleabargaining recovered under the NAB Ordinance with the assistance of Court, shalldirectly be deposited in the Public Account of the Federation and Public Account of theProvince, or any other authority, as the case may be.(vi) That any asset and pecuniary resources found to be disproportionate to the knownsources of income of holder of public office, either in his name or in the name of any ofhis dependants or binamidars shall be forfeited to the concerned Government of which aperson holding such public office belongs.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunal Act (VI of 1989)-------S. 5---Judicial officer---Ad hoc appointment and appointment on regular basis---Seniority---Determination---Procedure---Services of employees (respondents) was regularized and they wereassigned seniority from the date of their initial appointment on ad hoc basis---Contention ofappellant was that ad hoc service of a government employee could not be counted for thepurposes of seniority or promotion to affect the rights of other employee who was regularlyinducted into service prior to regularization of ad hoc employee---Validity---Service rendered bythe employee on ad hoc basis prior to regularization could not be counted for the purpose ofseniority but seniority should be counted from the date of substantive appointment---Ad hocservice unless regularized by the competent authority did not confer any right either for regularabsorption nor same could be counted towards seniority except that it could be counted towardslength of service for the purpose of pension if ultimately regularized---Appellant was appointedon regular basis prior to regularization of services of respondents (employees)---Appellant beingselectee of Public Service Commission was required to rank senior to the respondents(employees) who were regularized through process of Administration Committee of High Court(Balochistan)---Administration Committee had no authority to regularize the services ofrespondents (employees) from the date of their initial ad hoc appointment retrospectively---Government or Administration Committee of the High Court had power to ignore consciouslyany section of Act or any rule that might prohibit or restrain it to do what they were attempting to do provided they limited their action to what was just and equitable---Administration Committeewhile regularizing services of respondents (employees) from the date of their initial ad hocappointment had exercised its discretionary power in an arbitrary, unreasonable and capriciousmanner which had caused injury to the appellant---Illegal acts would remain illegal and wouldnot become legal by efflux of time---Appellant as well as non-appealing judicial officers whowere also appointed on regular basis prior to the regularization of ad hoc services of respondents(employees) were declared senior to the respondents (employees) whose ad hoc services wereregularized retrospectively ---Cases of appellant and as well as non-appealing judicial officerswere referred to the Administration Committee of High Court (Balochistan) for consideration oftheir promotion to the next grade from the date when respondents were promoted---Appeal wasdisposed of accordingly.Wajahat Hussain, Assistant Director, Social Welfare, Lahore v. Province of the PunjabPLD 1991 SC 82 and The State through National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad v. HajiNasim-ur-Rehman PLD 2005 SC 270 rel.(b) Civil service-------"Ad hoc appointment"---Concept and scope.(c) Notification----Void notification---Void notification could not be enforced.(d) Void order/notification-------Limitation---No limitation had been prescribed to competently and successfully challenge avoid order and notification.Senate through Chairman v. Shahiq Ahmed Khan 2016 SCMR 460 rel.(e) Administration of justice-------Repository of executive, judicial or quasi-judicial power was required to act in accordancewith law---Any order which had been passed in violation of law could not be protected simplybecause the repository of such power had the power to pass such order.Fazli Hakeem v. Secretary State and Fronteir Regions Division Islamabd 2015 SCMR795 rel.(f) Judgment-------Judgment in rem---Scope---Where any law or statutory rule on being challenged wasinterpreted and decided one way or the other by the superior court, such interpretation should beapplied by the concerned public, statutory agencies, authorities, bodies and functionaries---Judgment of superior court was not only binding on all the subordinate courts and tribunals butalso on all public and statutory functionaries.Sikandar A. Karim v. State 1995 SCMR 387 rel.(g) Public functionaries-------Public functionaries were required to treat all citizens placed in similar circumstances alike---Public functionaries had to apply law, rule, regularization, notification or the policy asenunciated, interpreted and expounded by the superior courts.(h) Estoppel------Principle of estoppel and limitation would not apply to illegal acts.(i) Words and phrases------"Just"---Meaning(j) Words and phrases-------"Equitable"---Meaning

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XLVII, R.1 & S.114---Review---Object and scope---Applicant had failed to point out any apparent error or mistake in the order under review---Object of power of review was to enable correction of error alone and nothing else.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973------Art. 199--Civil Procedure Code, (V of 1908), Ss. 117, 114, O. XLVII, R. 1--Review application--Scope of review--Jurisdiction of High Court by virtue of S. 117, CPC.

Summary: Section 9 of Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997) ---Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001, Rr. 5 & 6---Seizure of narcotic---Appreciation of evidence---Report of test or analysis.

Summary: Legal Issue:The main issue was whether the appointment process of Dr. Razia Sultana as Vice Chancellor was conducted transparently and in accordance with the law.---Judgment:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the Peshawar High Court's judgment. The Court found that the appointment process was transparent and conducted by a competent Search Committee. The discretion exercised by the Chief Minister and Governor/Chancellor in appointing Dr. Sultana was found to be lawful.---Reasoning:The Court observed that the marks allocated for shortlisting were distinct from the interview process conducted by the Search Committee. The Committee's unanimous recommendations were not based on any preference, and the appointment decision by the Chief Minister and Governor/Chancellor was within their legal discretion. The Court also noted that administrative decisions should not be interfered with by the judiciary unless there is evidence of malice or lack of qualifications, which was not the case here.

Summary: Legal Issue:The central legal issue was whether a second FIR could be registered for the same incident, presenting a different version of events.---Judgment:The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's decision to allow the registration of a second FIR to ensure a fair investigation and justice.---Reasoning:The Court observed that there is no legal prohibition against registering a second FIR if it presents a different narrative of the same incident. The Court emphasized the need for a fair investigation, especially when the initial FIR may have been manipulated or does not accurately reflect the incident. The judgments in cases like Wajid Ali Khan Durani and Mst. Anwar Begum were referenced to support the decision.

Summary: Facts:The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) advertised 53 posts in the PMS, which were initially open to a wider range of government employees, including those from attached departments, under a 10% reserved quota. Subsequent amendments restricted this quota to Civil Secretariat employees only, excluding employees from attached departments like the respondents. The High Court found this exclusion discriminatory and in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, and thus struck down the amendment.---Legal Issue:The main issue was whether the amendment to the PMS Rules, which restricted the 10% reserved quota to Civil Secretariat employees, was discriminatory and whether it was within the government's authority to make such amendments.---Judgment:The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The Court held that the government had the authority to amend the rules in the interest of service expediency and to clarify anomalies. The amendment did not create a vested right for the respondents to challenge, as they had not yet undergone any selection process. Therefore, the amendment did not warrant judicial interference.---Reasoning:The Court reasoned that the government is entitled to amend service rules to improve efficiency and address anomalies. No vested right in promotion or eligibility for promotion exists unless an individual has already undergone part of the selection process. The amendment aimed to clarify the eligibility for the 10% quota, which falls within the government's policy-making domain. The Court also noted that judicial intervention in administrative matters, especially those involving policy decisions, is generally unwarranted.