Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. XXXVII, R. 4—Ex parte judgment and decree—Application to set aside—Summary suit—Special procedure—Scope—Appellant assailed dismissal of application under O. XXXVII, R. 4, C.P.C. seeking to set aside ex parte decree passed in a summary suit for recovery based on a cheque—Appellant claimed lack of proper service and alleged concealment of facts by Respondent—Held, summary suits under O. XXXVII, C.P.C. follow a special procedure requiring the defendant to file an application for leave to defend alongside the application to set aside ex parte decree—Appellant neither challenged order for ex parte proceedings nor filed leave to defend—Service was duly effected through substituted modes including newspaper publication—Delay in filing application and absence of leave to defend rendered application defective—No special or exceptional circumstances shown—Trial Court rightly dismissed application—Impugned order upheld. Cited Case: Muhammad Mansab v. Muhammad Hanif 2025 SCMR 60 (b) Summary Suits—Nature and scope: ----Requirement of leave to defend—Filing of application—Mandatory procedural safeguard—Appellant failed to file leave to appear and defend suit as required under O. XXXVII, C.P.C.—Held, Rule 4 envisages relief only in rare and exceptional cases—Ordinary excuses such as being abroad, service on alternate address, or pending documentation do not suffice—Delay or negligence on part of defendant cannot be condoned in summary proceedings without a valid explanation supported by documents—Relief under O. XXXVII, R. 4 not available in absence of strict compliance with procedure. (c) Limitation Act, 1908: ----Summary suits—Delay in filing application to set aside ex parte decree—Consequences—Appellant filed application beyond limitation period without plausible justification—Held, delay fatal in absence of leave to defend or any sufficient cause—Mere assertion of being abroad or ignorance of proceedings insufficient—Equity and justice must align with statutory framework to avoid misuse of process and frustration of summary remedy intended by legislature. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed; impugned order refusing to set aside ex parte decree upheld.

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----Ss. 16, 30 & 33---Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908), S. 151---Remission and setting aside of arbitration award---Scope---Variation in contract invoking additional compensation---Appellant [National Highway Authority] awarded construction contract to Respondent No.1 [M/s Husnain Cotex Limited] and later required early completion of part of the project, resulting in increased cost and revised work methodology---Sole Arbitrator held such instructions amounted to a variation under Sub-clause 51.1(f) of the Conditions of Contract, entitling the contractor to compensation under Cl. 52.1---Trial Court dismissed application filed under Ss. 16 & 151, C.P.C., seeking remission or setting aside of award---Contention that Arbitrator failed to distribute burden of proof or decided issues extraneously, found unsubstantiated---Award was based on mutual consent regarding evidence recording and relied on documents placed on record---High Court held that no error on the face of the Award or misconduct was established---Arbitrator is final authority on facts and law, and courts cannot function as appellate authority in arbitration matters unless the award is invalid under S. 30---Discretion exercised by Arbitrator cannot be interfered with merely due to difference in interpretation or reasoning. ----Cited Cases: • Shahin Shah v. Govt. of KPK, 2022 SCMR 1810 • Gerry’s Intl. v. Aeroflot, 2018 SCMR 662 • A. Qutubuddin Khan v. Chec Millwala Dredgging Co., 2014 SCMR 1268 • Federation v. JV Knocks K.G/RIST, PLD 2011 SC 506 • Mian Corporation v. Lever Brothers, PLD 2006 SC 169 • Pakistan Steel Mills v. Mustafa Sons, PLD 2003 SC 301 • JV K.G/RIST v. Federation, PLD 1996 SC 108 • NHA v. Lilley Intl., 2020 CLC 608 Islamabad • Sh. Muhammad Saleem v. Saadat Enterprises, 2009 CLD 390 LHR (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----S. 30---Judicial interference in arbitration proceedings---Scope---Parties bound by selected forum---Where parties voluntarily incorporate arbitration clause, Court’s interference is limited to grounds provided in S.30---High Court emphasized that objections raised after consent to Arbitrator’s procedural decisions could not be termed misconduct---Courts not to disturb factual or legal findings of Arbitrator absent jurisdictional error or fraud---Objections based on non-reading, misreading or "perverse verdict" must reflect a manifest error on face of award to justify intervention---No such grounds established in present case. (c) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----S. 16---Remission of award---Grounds---Award found to be neither indefinite nor incapable of execution---Objections were vague, not meeting threshold for remission under S.16---Court declined to remit matter for fresh arbitration as no error of jurisdiction or unresolved material issues were demonstrated. (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908): ----Art. 158---Objections to arbitration award---Limitation period---Award dated 10.04.2010---No application filed within 30 days of notice of filing award in court---No application for condonation of delay filed---Objection held time-barred---Court relied on precedents to hold that condonation requires specific justification for each day of delay---Purpose of arbitration frustrated where party refuses to honor agreed dispute resolution mechanism. ----Cited Cases: • Airports Development Agency Ltd. v. M.Y Corporation, PLD 2001 Kar 158 • Shahin Shah v. Govt. of KPK, 2022 SCMR 1810 • LDA v. Khalid Javed Co., 1983 SCMR 718 ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed---Findings of Sole Arbitrator upheld---No illegality or jurisdictional error found in the impugned Order and Decree.

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO) ----S. 15-A—Restoration of possession—Personal use—Failure to occupy premises within one year—Effect—Standard of landlord’s conduct—Scope of penalty and tenant's right Where a landlord secures possession under S.15(2)(vii) SRPO for personal bona fide use but fails to occupy the premises within one year, S.15-A becomes operative—In the present case, landlord obtained possession on grounds of personal need, but instead of using the premises personally, inducted an employee and his family—Landlord’s plea of unfit condition due to tenant’s damage was unsupported by repair evidence—Employee's occupation was held not equivalent to personal use—Held, under S.15-A, such conduct constitutes misuse triggering both penal consequences and tenant’s right to restoration—Application by tenant within a reasonable time after one year satisfies the requirement; limitation under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act does not apply—Doctrine of laches governs timeliness—Restoration of possession directed. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 29(2), Art. 181—Application under special tenancy law—Applicability of general limitation—Scope—SRPO as special law Held, SRPO is a special law, and its internal provisions govern limitation—General limitation under Art. 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, does not apply—Tenant’s application for restoration under S.15-A is not barred if filed within a reasonable period—Determination of laches is to be made by Rent Controller based on facts—Tenant’s effort to seek direction from District Judge within time was sufficient to rebut allegation of delay—Courts below erred in mechanically applying limitation principles without due regard to special law framework. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ghaffar v. Mst. Mumtaz PLD 1976 SC 572 • Ali Muhammad v. Fazal Hussain 1983 SCMR 1239 • Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah 2001 SCMR 286 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Rahim Jan v. SECP 2002 SCMR 1303 • Dr. Mobashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2010 SC 265 • Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 923 (c) Interpretation of Statutes ----Principles—Penal statutes—Special law vs. general law—Purposeful interpretation—Ejusdem generis—Expressio unius est exclusio alterius Court emphasized that S.15-A SRPO must be construed in its intended penal and remedial framework—Literal interpretation rejected in favour of purposive construction to give effect to legislative intent—Reliance placed on principles such as ut res magis valeat quam pereat, generalia specialibus non derogant, and ex visceribus actus—Personal need of landlord cannot be diluted by attributing occupation to servants or third parties—Law must be enforced to prevent false eviction on mala fide grounds—Judiciary’s role is to ensure remedial provisions remain effective and not merely symbolic. (d) Landlord & Tenant ----Personal bona fide need—Definition—Good faith—Requirement of actual use—Employee’s occupation not valid substitute Held, "personal use" under S.2(g) SRPO means occupation by landlord, spouse, or children—Standard of “good faith” requires honest and diligent intention to occupy—Merely placing employee in premises violates the intent—Reliance on Section 182 of the Contract Act, 1872 (agent definition) was misplaced—Court held that landlord’s actions were not in good faith and inconsistent with the purpose of eviction. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Judgments of Appellate Court and High Court set aside—Order of Rent Controller restoring possession to tenant reinstated for execution—Directions issued to inspect premises under S.20 SRPO for verification before execution.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Limitation in filing Income Tax Reference—Effect of failure to comply within prescribed period ----S. 114, S. 122C, S. 122(5), S. 111, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Failure to comply with limitation period under the law renders an appeal time-barred—In the present case, the Income Tax Reference (ITR) was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, and the High Court did not explicitly decide the application for condonation of delay—Court held that limitation is not a mere technicality but a substantive legal right that cannot be disregarded—Reliance placed on Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 SC 736). (b) Limitation Act, 1908—Application for condonation of delay—Duty of the court ----S. 5, Limitation Act, 1908—Where an appeal is filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, the court must decide the application for condonation of delay as a preliminary issue—In the present case, the Department admitted that the ITR suffered from defects that were remedied after 8-9 days, making the appeal time-barred—Court held that the High Court erred in not addressing this issue explicitly and failed to determine whether the delay was condoned—Reliance placed on Asad Ali v. The Bank of Punjab (PLD 2020 SC 736). (c) Tax Law—Assessment proceedings—Jurisdiction of Tax Authority—Effect of incorrect jurisdiction ----The petitioner challenged the legality of the assessment on the grounds that he was being assessed in a different tax zone—Court held that if an assessment is initiated by an authority lacking jurisdiction, the proceedings are coram non judice and legally void—The matter required a factual determination, which was not considered by the High Court. (d) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Undisclosed income—Treatment of purchases as income—Burden of proof ----S. 111, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Petitioner was assessed on undeclared purchases amounting to Rs. 21,033,395/-—Court held that merely making purchases from a verifiable entity does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the amount constitutes undisclosed income—Petitioner, as a dealer/distributor earning a small profit margin, was not liable for taxation on the entire purchase amount—Burden of proof rested with the Tax Department to establish concealment of income. (e) Appellate Jurisdiction—High Court's duty to decide preliminary objections—Failure to decide limitation issue—Effect ----The High Court upheld the assessment order without addressing the preliminary objection regarding limitation—Court held that failure to decide a fundamental legal issue regarding limitation rendered the judgment flawed—Matter remanded to the High Court for a fresh decision on limitation before proceeding to merits. ----Disposition: Civil Petition No. 2100/2024 allowed—Order of the High Court set aside—Case remanded to the Lahore High Court to decide the limitation issue first before proceeding on merits.

Summary: (a) Limitation—Challenging a Sale Mutation After 42 Years—Lack of Legal Standing: ---Sale mutation No. 1542 (Ex.PW-3/3) was sanctioned on 30.07.1961—Plaintiffs challenged it through a declaratory suit filed on 28.07.2003, more than 42 years later—No challenge was made by the original owner, Sher Baz Khan, during his lifetime—Court held that legal heirs lacked standing to challenge the transaction after such a long lapse—No evidence was provided to justify why the original owner or his siblings did not contest the sale earlier—Reliance placed on Gauhar Rehman v. Jan Ashbi (1990 SCMR 1586) and Abdul Haq v. Mst. Surrya Begum (2002 SCMR 1330). (b) Missing Person and Presumption of Death—Application of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984: ---Legal principles regarding missing persons examined—Under Article 124 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, if a person is missing for seven years, the presumption arises that he is dead, shifting the burden of proof onto those claiming he is alive—Court reaffirmed that inheritance rights only arise from the date of legal presumption of death, not from the date of disappearance—Relied on Jeshankar Revashankar v. Bai Divali (1919 22 B.L.R 771) and Muhammad Sarwar v. Fazal Ahmad (PLD 1987 SC 1). (c) Inheritance Mutation—Predeceased Heirs Have No Right to Claim Property: ---Inheritance mutation No. 2045 (Ex.PW-3/4) was sanctioned on 26.09.1988 for the property of Sher Baz Khan, presumed dead—Court found that Shad Ali Khan (one of the brothers) died in 1973, five years before Sher Baz Khan’s presumed death in 1978—Since a predeceased heir cannot inherit, his children (plaintiffs) had no legal right to claim a share in the inheritance—Reliance placed on Mst. Rakhi Bivi v. Rahat Bibi (7 N.W. 191) and Perveen Shoukat v. Province of Sindh (PLD 2019 SC 710). (d) Burden of Proof—Failure to Establish Date of Death: ---Plaintiffs failed to prove that Sher Baz Khan was alive at the time of inheritance mutation No. 2045 (Ex.PW-3/4)—Court held that in cases where no clear date of death is established, the missing person is presumed to have died on the date the suit was instituted, unless proven otherwise—The plaintiffs could not provide any such evidence—Relied on Lal Hussain v. Mst. Sadiq (2001 SCMR 1036). Disposition: ---Civil Appeal No. 44-P of 2012 dismissed—Sale and inheritance mutations upheld. ---Civil Appeal No. 62-P of 2012 allowed—Plaintiffs' suit dismissed entirely. ---No order as to costs.

Summary: Acquittal granted----(a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Art. 121----Burden of proof----Presumption of innocence----Accused’s failure to explain circumstances surrounding the alleged crime does not absolve the prosecution from proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt----Mere rejection of an accused’s plea (suicide) does not shift the burden of proof nor create an adverse presumption against him----Conviction cannot be sustained on suspicion alone. (b) Criminal trial: ----Medical evidence----Scope and limitations----Medical evidence alone cannot identify the assailant----It may confirm the nature, location, and cause of injuries but cannot establish the identity of the perpetrator----In the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence linking the accused, reliance solely on medical evidence is insufficient to sustain conviction----Cases relied upon: Zakir Hussain v. State (2008 SCMR 222) and Ata Muhammad v. State (1995 SCMR 599). (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----Motive----Significance in criminal cases----Motive plays a crucial role in cases lacking direct evidence----Prosecution failed to establish a direct motive against the accused while co-accused, against whom a dispute was alleged, were discharged without challenge----Failure to prove motive weakens the prosecution’s case. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 103----Recovery of weapon----Recovery of alleged crime weapon from the petitioner’s room was inconsequential as it was not stained with blood, and no chemical examiner’s or serologist’s report was available----Absence of forensic evidence further diluted the prosecution’s case. (e) Administration of justice: ----Benefit of doubt----Acquittal in cases of reasonable doubt----Even a single reasonable doubt regarding the prosecution’s case is sufficient to entitle the accused to acquittal----No need for multiple doubts; any flaw in the prosecution’s case that pricks judicial conscience must favor the accused----Reliance placed on Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345). -----Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Conviction and sentence set aside. Petitioner acquitted and ordered to be released forthwith if not required in any other case. -----Cited Cases: Zakir Hussain v. State (2008 SCMR 222) Ata Muhammad v. State (1995 SCMR 599) Tariq Pervez v. State (1995 SCMR 1345)

Summary: (On appeal against the order dated 14.06.2011 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Crl. A. No. 825 of 2010 and M. R. No. 31 of 2010). (a) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ----Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S. 5---Jail appeal---Condonation of delay---Jail appeal was barred by 2511 days---Supreme Court condoned the delay as reasons mentioned in application seeking condonation of delay were valid and sufficient for the purpose---Application was allowed. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ----Ss. 7 (a) & 7(e)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302 (b)---Qatl-i-amd and abduction for ransom---Re-appraisal of evidence---Voice recognition, reliance on---Blind murder---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons were convicted and sentenced to death for allegedly abducting a minor child for ransom whose dead body was recovered later on---Held, that alleged murder remained unwitnessed and at some subsequent stage accused persons had been implicated on the basis of suspicion---Claim of complainant in respect of recognizing voice of one accused during ransom demand made over telephone, particularly in high stakes scenarios, was fraught with significant risks of error, bias and misinterpretation---Voice recognition, unlike fingerprints or DNA evidence, lacked standardized scientific framework for verification---Telephone calls, especially those made under duress, could suffer from poor audio quality, background noise or distortions, making it difficult to accurately identify the speaker---In absence of additional corroborative evidence (e.g., call records, witness testimony, or forensic analysis), relying solely on voice recognition was inherently unreliable---There was no evidence of recovery and discovery, legally incriminating in nature to connect necks of accused with crime in question---Retracted confession could not be made basis for conviction and that too on a capital charge entailing death penalty---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to both the accused persons and acquitted them of the charge, as prosecution failed to prove its case against accused persons beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal was allowed. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Retracted confession---Effect---Retracted confession, especially when it stands as the sole basis for conviction, raises significant legal, ethical and practical concerns---When coupled with dismissal of oral evidence furnished by complainant, relying on a retracted confession to secure a conviction becomes even more precarious. Arshad Hussain Yousafzai, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Kausar Ali Shah, Additional Advocate General for the State. Nemo for Complainant. Date of hearing: 25th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service Law – Proforma Promotion – Principles and Entitlement---Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, R. 13(i)---Punjab Subordinate Judiciary---Proforma promotion---Right of consideration---Appellant was terminated in 2004 but later reinstated in service in 2014 with back benefits and continuity of service---His junior was promoted as Senior Civil Judge in 2013, whereas he was promoted in 2019 after clearance of adverse reports---Held, once all impediments to promotion had been removed and appellant was deemed continuously in service, he was entitled to consideration for promotion from the date his junior was promoted---Failure to grant such relief would amount to unfair treatment and denial of legitimate career progression---Reliance placed on Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Government of Sindh (1996 SCMR 850), Chief Secretary, Sindh v. Riaz Ahmed Massan (2016 SCMR 1784), and Nazir Ahmed Langah v. Lahore High Court, Lahore (2024 PLC (C.S.) 1566).(b) Administrative Law – Officiating Promotion – Effect on Proforma Promotion---Officiating promotion v. regular promotion---Whether officiating promotion precludes a civil servant from claiming proforma promotion---Held, an officiating promotion, if made in accordance with eligibility criteria and not rescinded later, does not permanently preclude a civil servant from receiving proforma promotion if his junior was promoted to a substantive post---Respondents failed to show that the junior’s promotion was not made against a regular vacancy, thus the appellant’s claim was valid---Reliance placed on Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department v. Muhammad Khalid Usmani [2017 PLC (C.S.) 373].(c) Service Law – Limitation – Joinder of Necessary Parties---Limitation Act, 1908, S. 22---Whether an appeal is barred due to impleading necessary parties at a later stage---Held, if an appeal is filed in time against the primary department, subsequent joinder of necessary parties does not render the entire appeal time-barred---Where administrative inefficiency or procedural delays cause a civil servant to be deprived of his rightful claim, he cannot be non-suited merely due to a technical procedural lapse---Reliance placed on Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) and Chami Narayanan v. V.R. Krishna Iyer (AIR 1998 Kerala 365).(d) Administrative Justice – Doctrine of Bona Fide Mistake – Effect on Procedural Compliance---Principle Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act alone does not make one liable unless there is wrongful intent)---Bona fide mistakes in procedural matters such as misjoinder or non-joinder of parties should not hinder substantive justice---Held, where an appellant makes a genuine procedural mistake without mala fide intent, courts should prioritize substantive justice over technicalities---Reliance placed on Pitt v. Holt [(2013) UKSC 26], Barclays Bank Ltd v. W J Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [(1980) QB 677], and Guruvayya v. Dattatraya [(1903) ILR 28 Bom. 11].(e) Fundamental Rights – Fair Treatment in Service Matters---Right to equal opportunity in service progression---Failure to consider a civil servant for proforma promotion despite removal of adverse remarks constitutes denial of fair treatment and violates principles of equality and justice---Reliance placed on Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb [2023 PLC (C.S.) 336] and Wadhu Mal v. Province of Sindh [2023 PLC (C.S.) 1310].--- Disposition:Appeal allowed – Impugned orders dated 15.11.2021 and 18.12.2021 set aside.Respondent authority directed to reconsider the appellant’s proforma promotion from the date his junior was promoted, in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition & Compensation: --- Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Ss. 18 & 23 --- Enhanced compensation claim --- Equal treatment for similarly situated landowners --- The respondents sought enhanced compensation for land acquired under Award No.155 (1995), arguing that similarly situated landowners under Award No.290 (2011) received higher compensation. Held, the principle of equal compensation for land of the same vicinity and nature applies if proven. However, due to the time gap (16+ years) between the two acquisitions, further investigation is required to determine whether the market value of the land was the same at the relevant times. Reliance placed on Saddadat Ali Khan v. Collector Land Acquisition (PLD 2010 SC 878). (b) Estoppel & Waiver of Right to Challenge Compensation: --- Effect of accepting compensation without filing reference --- Whether respondents are estopped from claiming enhancement --- The respondents accepted the compensation fixed in 1995 without objection and did not file a reference under Section 18 of the Act. Held, the doctrine of estoppel may apply, preventing them from seeking enhanced compensation after 16 years. The key issue is whether their inaction at the relevant time bars their claim now. (c) Limitations on Filing Fresh Execution Applications: --- Whether a new execution application is maintainable after decree satisfaction --- The respondents’ initial execution application was satisfied and consigned to the record room. Held, it must be determined whether a fresh execution application is maintainable after the decree has been executed and closed, particularly in light of the long delay. (d) Limitation Period for Seeking Enhanced Compensation: --- Delay of 16+ years --- Maintainability of delayed claims --- The respondents’ claim was raised more than a decade after receiving their compensation. Held, a crucial issue is whether such a claim is time-barred under the applicable limitation provisions, and whether the judgment in Award No.290 (2011) can be retrospectively applied to claims from 1995. (e) Disposition: Appeal disposed of. Case remanded to Executing Court for further investigation on market value, estoppel, and limitation issues. To be decided expeditiously.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act ( IX of 1908)--- ----S. 5---Limitation--- Condonation of delay---Sufficient cause--- Scope ---Delay of each day in approaching the court for filing a lis or an appeal etc. against the order etc. has to be explained --- In the present case, the appellants' attorney has miserably failed to account for the delay of each day in filing the appeal--- Appellants' failure in contacting their advocate or pursuing the matter posits indolence and negligence on their part for which the opposing party cannot be penalized nor certain rights created in their favour thus taken away---Law of limitation has to be construed in strict sense because due to negligence and indolence of one party in pursuing the matter in the court, the valuable rights are accrued in favour of the other party which cannot be done away with on flimsy and unsubstantiated grounds---Delay in filing appeal etc. against the order etc. cannot be condoned without being satisfied about validity and sufficiency of the grounds raised for condonation of such delay--- In the present case, the vague and generalized statement has been given by the attorney in his affidavit regarding gaining knowledge of the dismissal of the suit---Appellants who have purportedly executed power of attorney in favour of their attorney have not come forward to file affidavits confirming the story narrated by their attorney---There is nothing on record to show as to why for a long time the appellants failed to pursue the case and did not produce evidence despite so many chances given by the Single Judge of this /High Court--- Thus, the appeal was hopelessly time barred---High Court dismissed application under S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908 --- Appeal, being time barred, was dismissed accordingly. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ---- S. 5 --- Limitation --- Condonation of delay --- Sufficient cause---Instances --- A counsel's neglect to inform his client about fate of the case would not per se be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay when valuable rights accrue in favour of opposition party---Ground of living of the petitioner in a far off village and his lack of knowledge regarding dismissal of the appeal by High Court being a matter purely between him and his counsel, cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay---Non supply of cause list to counsel for a party would not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay in absence of affidavit of the person concerned---On account of dismissal of the suit, valuable rights accrued in favour of defendants which could not be taken away unless justifiable strong and convincing cause was shown to the court. Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 1974 SCMR 223; Ahmed Din v. Ghulam Muhammad through legal heirs and others 2000 SCMR 647; Mst. Hajra Bibi and others v. Abdul Ghani 2002 SCMR 1405 and Irshad Ahmed v. Pervez Akhtar and others 2000 MLD 1 ref. Muhammad Taseer Khan and M. Amin Motiwala for Appellants. Fahad Hussain for Respondents. Syed Hussain Shah, A.A.G. Date of hearing: 17th February, 2025. Judgment Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, J .--- Appellants filed a suit before this court on original side against respondents for declaration, cancellation and permanent injunction seeking following reliefs:- A. For a Declaration that the Suit property has always been and is still the property of the partnership firm/plaintiff No.3, and that the deceased defendant No.3 was never the sole or absolute owner of the Suit property: B. For a Declaration that the plaintiffs 1 and 2 are the lawful co-owners of the Suit property having 1/3rd share each therein, and that the remaining 1/3rd share in the Suit property belongs to the defendants 2(a) to 3(h) being the legal heirs of the deceased defendant No.3: C. For a Declaration that the defendants 3(a) to 3(h) had no right, power, authority or locus standi to enter into any Agreement in respect of the Suit property with the defendant No.2, and that such Agreement was mala fide, collusive and void ab initio; D. For a Declaration that the defendants 3(a) to 3(h) had no right, power, authority or locus standi to transfer or convey the rights, title or interest in the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.2, and that the defendant No.2 has not acquired any right title or interest whatsoever in the Suit property: E. For a Declaration that the alleged transfer of the Suit property in the name of the defendant No.2 by the defendant No.4 is illegal and void abinitio, and similarly, the alleged sale and/or transfer of the Suit property by the defendant No.2 in favour of the defendant No.1 and to defendants Nos. 6 to 11 is also illegal and void ab inios; F. For Cancellation of the alleged Sale Deed of the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.2, and/or all such Agreement/Deeds transferring the Suit property in favour of the defendants Nos. 1, 6 to 11 and/or in favour of any third party: G. For Permanent Injunction restraining the defendants 1,2 and 3(a) to 3(g), 6 to 11 from claiming any right, title or interest in the Suit property, and/or from raising construction thereon, and/or from creating any type of third party interest therein. The defendants 4 and 5 may also be restrained from transferring the Suit property in favour of the defendant No.1 and/or in favour of any third party; H. For any other / additional relief(s) that this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of this case; and I. Costs of the Suit. 2. In response to a notice, respondents filed written statement contesting merits and challenging maintainability of the suit. However, issues were framed and appellants were called upon to lead evidence but they failed to respond. Finally, on 06.12.2019, noting consistent and regular absence of the appellants demonstrating lack of interest on their part to produce evidence, learned single judge of this court proceeded to dismiss the suit for want of evidence vide impugned order dated 06.12.2019 and decree drawn on 13.12.2019. This order and decree have been challenged by the appellants through the instant appeal filed on 13.07.2020 after the limitation of 20 days prescribed under Article 151 of Limitation Act for filing appeal from the decree or order of the High Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal, the appellants have filed an application under section 5 of Limitation Act supported by affidavit filed by attorney of appellants namely Sadiq. 3. A perusal of his affidavit shows that the reason for filing the appeal with delay is absence of the appellants from the country and their living in Dubai since long. In the said backdrop, attorney of the appellants has alleged that when on 19.06.2020 he was passing by the area, he found the building and houses standing on the property No.86 situated in Depot Lines/N.I. Lines Cantonment Area, Karachi (Suit property) were demolished by the respondents, hence he immediately informed appellant No.2 who instructed him to contact his advocate Mr. Raja Qureshi. On inquiry, he was found long dead and no one left to attend his cases, hence he rushed to the relevant staff of the court, who informed him about dismissal of the suit by the impugned order for want of evidence. Then, after getting special power of attorney from the appellants, on their instructions, he filed the appeal after obtaining certified true copies of the order and decree. It is further stated in the supporting affidavit that before dismissal of the suit, no notice was issued to the appellants to appear and produce evidence and since the appellants were residing in Dubai, they were not aware of either death of their advocate or process of the court requiring their appearance for evidence. It is further stated that the subject property is owned by M/s Charan Enterprises, appellant No.3 which is a partnership firm formed by appellants Nos.1 and 2 and the deceased Muhammad Ismail, the predecessor of respondents. The suit property was not the sole and absolute property of deceased Muhammad Ismail as alleged by respondents, therefore, limitation would not be a hurdle in the case to defeat merits of the case. This application under section 5 of Limitation Act has been vehemently opposed by the respondents by filing written objections to it. 4. Learned counsel for appellants in his arguments has reiterated the grounds already encapsulated in supporting affidavit of the attorney of the appellants. While, his arguments have been opposed by learned counsel for respondents. 5. We have considered submissions of the parties and perused material available on record. Admittedly under Article 151 of Limitation Act, period for filing the appeal against an order or a judgment of High Court exercising original jurisdiction is 20 days. The impugned order was passed on 06.12.2019 and then on 13.12.2019 the decree was drawn. An application for obtaining certified true copies thereof was filed on 11.07.2020 which is almost after seven months of the order and decree. The grounds to justify such delay postulated by attorney in his affidavit is that the appellants are residing in Dubai and were not in contact with their counsel Mr. Raja Qureshi, who had assured them of looking after their interest in the suit in their absence and intimate them if their presence was ever required for evidence. These facts however, have been stated by the attorney in his own affidavit and not by the appellants themselves through affidavits. Although, the attorney has filed special power of Attorney but to support his aforesaid statement, has not filed the affidavits of appellants to the effect that they were not aware of either death of their advocate or the dismissal of the suit for want of their evidence. If the attorney can file the power of attorney executed by the appellants living in Dubai, he could have easily filed their affidavits to support the facts narrated by him. Failure to do so has cast a dark spell on the story revealed by the attorney in his affidavit. 6. Not the least, when nothing has been brought on record to establish that appellants Nos. 1 and 2's permanent residence in Dubai. Prima facie no documentary evidence in this regard has been filed to support such fact. Besides, the story narrated by the attorney that on 19.06.2020 when he passed by the suit property, he found the same to have been demolished by the respondents is not without a suspicion in that he has not provided substantial details in this regard relating to the time when he was passing by the property and the reason of his visiting the same area on that particular day and whether he was alone or in company of some body, and he was travelling in a vehicle or walking through it. It is also strange to note that he got alarmed on seeing the suit property, when admittedly he was neither party nor was even acting as attorney in the suit on behalf of the appellants. Even his own affidavit does not suggest that he had any knowledge about pendency of the suit between the parties. 7. Without having any nexus or interest in the suit property, attorney of the appellants getting alarmed on seeing the suit property that too by chance does not seem credible enough to believe him. Particularly in the context when he has neither described the reason of his visit nor other details as to why on that particular day he happened to be in the area leading him to spot its demolition and causing him alarm. That said, his statement: he saw the property having been demolished by the respondents on 29.06.2020 is generalized in tenor and at the best vague for want of necessary details. 8. It is a settled proposition of law that delay of each day in approaching the court for filing a lis or an appeal etc. against the order etc. has to be explained. In this case, the appellants' attorney has miserably failed to account for the delay of each day in filing the appeal. Appellants' failure in contacting their advocate or pursuing the matter posits indolence and negligence on their part for which the opposing party cannot be penalized nor certain rights created in their favour thus taken away. 9. The Supreme Court in case of Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others (1974 SCMR 223) has laid down that even a counsel's neglect to inform his client about fate of the case would not per se be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay when valuable rights accrue in favour of opposition party. In the case of Ahmed Din v. Ghulam Muhammad through legal heirs and others (2000 SCMR 647), the Supreme Court has held that petitioner's ground of living in a far off village and his lack of knowledge regarding dismissal of the appeal by High Court was a matter purely between him and his counsel, cannot be considered a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the case of Mst. Hajra Bibi and others v. Abdul Ghani (2002 SCMR 1405), it has been held that non supply of cause list to counsel for a party would not constitute a valid ground for condonation of delay in absence of affidavit of the person concerned. Finally, in the case of Irshad Ahmed v. Pervez Akhter and others (2000 MLD 1), a Division Bench of this court has held that on account of dismissal of the suit, valuable rights accrue in favour of defendants which could not be taken away unless justifiable strong and convincing cause was shown to the court. 10. The reason to cite aforementioned case law on the point is to emphasize that the law of Limitation has to be construed in strict sense because due to negligence and indolence of one party in pursuing the matter in the court, the valuable rights are accrued in favour of the other party which cannot be done away with on flimsy and unsubstantiated grounds. The superior courts have been very strict in condoning the delay in filing appeal etc. against the order etc. without being satisfied about validity and sufficiency of the grounds raised for condonation of such delay. 11. In this matter as observed above, the vague and generalized statement has been given by the attorney in his affidavit regarding gaining knowledge of the dismissal of the suit. The appellants who have purportedly executed power of attorney in favour of their attorney have not come forward to file affidavits confirming the story narrated by their attorney. Then, there is nothing on record to show as to why for a long time the appellants failed to pursue the case and did not produce evidence despite given so many chances by the learned Single Judge of this court. This and in the light of reasons given supra, We, find this appeal hopelessly time barred. Consequently, we dismiss application under section 5 of Limitation Act and as a result dismiss the appeal being time barred along with pending applications. The appeal is accordingly disposed of along with pending applications. MQ/S-25/Sindh Appeal dismissed.