Summary: The case involved a legal dispute over the rectification of the register of members or debenture-holders of a company under Section 152 of the Companies Ordinance. The petitioner argued that remedies are available under Section 152 for challenging the fraudulent omission of one's name from the company register, but such remedies should be invoked within the provided limitation period or within a reasonable period. The petitioner contended that the filing period for the suit is six years under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, while the respondent argues for a three-year period under Article 181. The absence of a definitive precedent in the jurisdiction regarding the applicability of either Article 120 or Article 181 to a petition under Section 152 is highlighted. The court discussed various judgments and legal provisions, examining whether the petition is akin to a suit and whether the limitation period should be governed by Article 120 or Article 181. The court delved into the evolution of jurisprudence on the limitation period for Section 152 applications in Pakistan and India, citing divergent views in different cases. The court ultimately concluded that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, specifying a three-year limitation period, is applicable to a petition under Section 152 of the Companies Ordinance. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that the limitation period started from the date of knowledge, asserting that the petition, filed after more than fifteen years, is time-barred under Article 181.

Summary: The petitioner, who was previously the Vice Chancellor of the respondent-university, had his term end in January 2017. The petitioner contested this appointment, arguing that it violated the law laid down by the Supreme Court and the directions of the court in a contempt petition. The petitioner claimed to have scored the highest marks, and objections related to mismanagement and poor financial controls were not raised by the Search Committee. The petitioner also defended his handling of audit paras, stating that their reduction during his tenure demonstrated effective management. The petitioner challenged the contention that Syndicate meetings were not held as required, arguing that the relevant rule was directory, not mandatory. On the other hand, the Assistant Advocate General argued that the writ petition was not maintainable and emphasized the severity of audit paras as a valid reason for refusal. The court found that the appointment process deviated from the Supreme Court's directives. The court observed that the objections raised against the petitioner lacked cogency and noted the absence of valid reasons for rejecting the candidate with the highest merit. The court declared the appointment of respondent No.8 as illegal and directed the competent authority to notify the candidate with the highest merit according to the law. The Pro-Chancellor was appointed as a stop-gap arrangement until the new notification.

Summary: Background:The petitioners, purchasers from the legal heirs of the original allottee, filed a suit challenging an order regarding land allotment for maintenance allowance to Jammu & Kashmir refugees.The civil suit was rejected and the appeal dismissed.Subsequently, a writ petition was filed challenging the order, which was dismissed by the Lahore High Court.---Issues:Whether the writ petition was competent after the rejection of the civil suit.Whether the principle of laches applied considering the delay in filing the writ petition.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the rejection of the civil suit did not automatically confer jurisdiction upon the High Court to entertain a writ petition.Jurisdiction of the High Court is only invoked if the authority exercises its powers in excess or without jurisdiction.Since the civil suit rejection was not due to jurisdictional issues, the writ petition could not be entertained solely on the basis of the civil suit's rejection.The principle of laches was rightly applied due to the significant delay of 32 years in filing the writ petition.No defects were found in the impugned judgment, and thus, the petition was dismissed.---Citations/Precedents:Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973

Summary: Background:This case involves an appeal by the Federation of Pakistan against a decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi regarding an amendment to section 79(1) of the Customs Act, 1969. The amendment restricted certain importers' ability to seek examination and declaration of imported goods.---Issues:The main issue in this appeal is whether the amendment to section 79(1) of the Customs Act, 1969 was discriminatory.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court held that the amendment was not discriminatory. It emphasized the presumption of constitutionality of laws enacted by the legislature and the need for courts to adopt a view favoring constitutionality. The Court noted the importance of judicial deference in preserving fiscal statutes and respecting economic policies. It found that the amendment aimed to ensure accurate declaration of imported goods for assessment and payment of duties and taxes, especially for used goods whose age and previous use might be unclear. The Court deemed the classification of used goods as reasonable and in line with the Act's objectives. Additionally, the Court rejected the argument that the lack of reasons for the amendment in Budget Instructions rendered it discriminatory, stating that it is for the courts to determine constitutionality based on the law itself.---Citations/Precedents:Sui Southern Gas Company Limited v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 SCMR 802)Elahi Cotton Mills v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582)East India Tobacco Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1962 SC 1733)R.K. Cargo v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 675)P. Laxmi Devi v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2008) 4 SCC 720)Morey v. Doud (354 US 457)

Summary: Background:The petitioner, Allah Dino Khan Bhayo, contested the general elections in 2008 but was disqualified by the Returning Officer based on a finding that his educational certificate was fake.The disqualification was under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, which required candidates to be sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest, and ameen.In 2010, Article 62(1)(f) was amended to require a declaration by a court of law for disqualification.In 2013, the petitioner was again disqualified by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) for the 2013 general elections based on the earlier finding.The petitioner challenged this decision, but the Supreme Court upheld the ECP's order in a judgment dated 09.07.2013.---Issues:Whether the finding by the Returning Officer during scrutiny of nomination papers qualifies as a declaration by a court of law under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution.The effect of the 18th Amendment on the disqualification imposed by the Returning Officer's finding.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court reviewed its earlier judgment and considered whether the finding by the Returning Officer constituted a declaration by a court of law.It noted that Article 62(1)(f), as amended, required a court declaration for disqualification.The court emphasized that a disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) could only be imposed by a court of law based on evidence, as established in various precedents.The finding by the Returning Officer in 2007 did not meet these criteria as it was not based on evidence recorded in court proceedings.Therefore, the disqualification imposed by the Returning Officer ceased to be effective after the 18th Amendment, constituting an error in the previous judgment.However, the court noted that the allegation of dishonesty based on the certificate from Shah Abdul Latif University remained, and the petitioner would need to address this to contest future elections.The review petition was allowed, and the observation of disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) was recalled.---Citations/Precedents:Malik Iqbal Ahmad Langrial v. Jamshed Alam (PLD 2013 SC 179)Abdul Ghafoor Lehri v. Returning Officer, PB-29 (2013 SCMR 1271)Sami Ullah Baloch and others v. Abdul Karim Noursherwani and others (PLD 2018 SC 405)Sardar Yar Muhammad Rind v. Election Tribunal Balochistan, Quetta (PLD 2020 SC 137)Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (PLD 2017 SC 265)Roshan Ali Buriro v. Syed Murad Ali Shah (2019 SCMR 1939)Tariq Transport Co., Lahore v. Sargodha Bhera Bus Service (PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 437)Mollah Ejahar Ali v. Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1970 SC 173)Muhammad Saleem Ullah v. Additional District Judge, Gujranwala (PLD 2005 SC 511)

Summary: Bail granted --- Background:Muhammad Hasnain and Sahib Ali, residents of Hoppar District Nagar, filed a bail petition under Section 497 Cr.PC after being accused of theft and arson at Hunza Medical Center, as per FIR No. 13/2019 registered at Police Station Aliabad District Hunza. The allegations stemmed from an investigation into a separate case (FIR No. 10/2019) where a co-accused named Talib Hussain implicated the petitioners.----Issues:Whether the petitioners are entitled to bail despite being directly charged in the FIR based on the statement of a co-accused.Whether the absence of eye-witnesses, lack of recovery, and juvenile status of the petitioners at the time of the alleged offense warrant their release on bail.Whether the rule of consistency applies, given that another co-accused, Karar Hussain, was discharged under Section 169 Cr.PC.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:Judge Ali Baig granted the bail petition, emphasizing several key points:The FIR was lodged based on the statement of co-accused Talib Hussain during an investigation into a different case (FIR No. 10/2019). No eye-witnesses saw the occurrence, no stolen money was recovered from the petitioners, and they did not confess or were identified in any identification parade.Both petitioners were juveniles at the time of the alleged offense. According to their birth registration certificates, Sahib Ali was born on 05-01-2007 and Muhammad Hasnain on 03-03-2007, making them 12 years old at the time. Under Section 83 of the PPC, an act committed by a child above 10 and under 14 years of age is not considered an offense if the child has not attained sufficient maturity to understand the nature and consequences of their conduct.The co-accused, Karar Hussain, was discharged under Section 169 Cr.PC, which supports the rule of consistency in favor of the petitioners.Given these factors, the court accepted the bail petition and admitted the petitioners to post-arrest bail, subject to furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with two sureties each to the satisfaction of the Duty Judicial Magistrate at Gilgit.----Citations/Precedents:Section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC)Section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC)Section 83 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)Key Points:The FIR against the petitioners was based solely on the statement of a co-accused without direct evidence or recovery.The petitioners were juveniles at the time of the alleged offense, and under Section 83 PPC, their actions do not constitute an offense if they lacked sufficient maturity to understand the consequences.The discharge of a co-accused under similar circumstances supports the application of the rule of consistency.Conclusion:The petitioners were granted bail, with the court acknowledging the lack of direct evidence, their juvenile status, and the discharge of a co-accused as significant factors supporting their release.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending