Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Inherent powers of High Court---Quashing of FIR---First Information Report,outcome of civil dispute---Scope---Accused sought quashing of FIR registered against himunder Ss. 186, 353, 147, 148 & 149, P.P.C.---Perusal of record reflected that the demolishingof construction of scheme was being carried out in presence of law enforcing agencies, thusthe allegations of interference in the discharge of official duties by the accused was veryillogical---First Information Report seemed to be an outcome of civil dispute in between theparties, thus resulted into criminal litigation---No incriminating material was available onrecord to be based for conviction of accused---Provisions of S. 561-A, Cr.P.C. conferredinherent powers to the High Court to make such orders as were necessary to give effect toany order under the Code or to prevent abuse of process of law to secure the ends of justice---Such powers were very wide and could be exercised by the High Court at any time---Evenfrom the plain reading of FIR, in the present case, no offence was made out---FirstInformation Report was quashed, in circumstances.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 561-A---Inherent powers of High Court---Quashing of FIR---Alternate remedy---Scope--- Court in its inherent powers under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C., ordinarily does not interferewith the police investigation in a cognizable offence and more particularly when alternatecourse of action is available under S. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., before the Trial Court,however, simultaneously it is the prime duty of the High Court to guard the citizen from anyabuse of process of law

Summary: Background: The petitioner sought review of a judgment from the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir dated August 20, 2019, wherein he was convicted of contempt of court. The conviction arose after the Deputy Commissioner of Mirpur reported that the petitioner had encroached on land adjacent to the Supreme Court Rest House in Mirpur, violating a prior court judgment. ----Issues: 1- Whether the disqualification of the petitioner from being elected as a member of the Legislative 2- Assembly for five years was justified under the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions. 3- Whether the court had the authority to pass an order of disqualification for a period less than that specified under Article 24 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Disqualification Justification: The court held that under Article 24(2)(f) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974, a person can be disqualified from being elected if he is disqualified by the Constitution or any other law. Additionally, section 5(1)(f) of The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly (Elections) Ordinance, 1970, states that a person must be sagacious, righteous, honest, ameen, and not profligate to be elected. The court determined that the petitioner's disqualification was justified as he was found guilty of illegal practices. --Court’s Authority: The court confirmed its inherent powers to pass such orders to ensure complete justice. It further noted that the court's power to disqualify a person does not necessarily require a minimum imprisonment term of two years as specified under Article 24 of the Constitution. The petitioner’s disqualification for five years, however, was reconsidered in light of the punishment already served and the overall circumstances. --Modification and Outcome: The petitioner had already served the sentence of imprisonment and had been disqualified from his position, which prevented him from participating in subsequent by-elections. Considering the facts and circumstances, the court reduced the remaining period of disqualification to the period already served. The review petition was disposed of with this modification. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Azeem Dutt and others v. Raja Khadim Hussain and others [2017 SCR 577] Niaz Ahmed v. The State and 2 others [2008 SCR 326]

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42 & 54---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 96---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.5---Suit for declaration, permanent injunction and recovery of damages--- Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Contention of plaintiff was that defendant had violatedterms and conditions of contract---Defendant adjusted security amount deposited by theplaintiff against outstanding amount due against the plaintiff---Suit was dismissedconcurrently---Validity---Defendant had neither given any particular of outstanding amountin his written statement nor given any break-up about the said outstanding---No documentaryevidence had been produced by the defendant to the extent of his claim of outstandingamount---Reason given in the application for condonation of delay that time was spent inobtaining sanction for filing of appeal was not supported by any document---Said reason wasnot sufficient within the meaning of S.5 of Limitation Act, 1908---Trial Court passedimpugned judgment and decree on 28.05.2012 and defendant applied for certified copy on10-07-2012 which was provided on 31-08-2012---Appeal filed by the defendant before theAppellate Court was barred by time---Defendant had failed to point out any illegality orirregularity in the impugned judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Revisionwas dismissed, in circumstances.

Summary: The respondent, who was employed as an Officer Grade-II with the National Bank of Pakistan, absented himself from duty starting from October 31, 2014. The bank issued several notices to the respondent, requesting him to report for duty and justify his absence. However, the respondent did not join duty and instead claimed that he could not work due to a tribal feud and threats to his life. He requested an additional year of leave without pay. The court noted that the respondent did not provide any evidence or material to support his claim of a tribal feud or the threats to his life. The court concluded that since the respondent's absence from duty was admitted and no disputed facts were involved, there was no need for a regular inquiry. The court referred to a previous judgment and held that when the fact of absence from duty is admitted, a regular inquiry is unnecessary. Regarding the High Court's observation that the respondent's absence period was condoned and his joining report was accepted with a stern warning, the Supreme Court found no document on record to support this claim. Instead, it was evident from the record that the respondent's service was terminated through a memorandum dated April 7, 2016, and the period of absence was treated as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) without pay. The court clarified that treating the absence period as EOL without pay is not a punishment but a treatment given by the employer. The court referred to previous judgments on similar cases to support this interpretation. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's assumption that the termination order was passed under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1980, was incorrect. The court found that the memorandum did not mention any such rule and criticized the High Court for relying on the respondent's counsel's submission without verifying its accuracy. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was erroneous and unjustified. The court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal.

Summary: The respondent, who was employed as an Officer Grade-II with the National Bank of Pakistan, absented himself from duty starting from October 31, 2014. The bank issued several notices to the respondent, requesting him to report for duty and justify his absence. However, the respondent did not join duty and instead claimed that he could not work due to a tribal feud and threats to his life. He requested an additional year of leave without pay. The court noted that the respondent did not provide any evidence or material to support his claim of a tribal feud or the threats to his life. The court concluded that since the respondent's absence from duty was admitted and no disputed facts were involved, there was no need for a regular inquiry. The court referred to a previous judgment and held that when the fact of absence from duty is admitted, a regular inquiry is unnecessary. Regarding the High Court's observation that the respondent's absence period was condoned and his joining report was accepted with a stern warning, the Supreme Court found no document on record to support this claim. Instead, it was evident from the record that the respondent's service was terminated through a memorandum dated April 7, 2016, and the period of absence was treated as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) without pay. The court clarified that treating the absence period as EOL without pay is not a punishment but a treatment given by the employer. The court referred to previous judgments on similar cases to support this interpretation. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's assumption that the termination order was passed under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1980, was incorrect. The court found that the memorandum did not mention any such rule and criticized the High Court for relying on the respondent's counsel's submission without verifying its accuracy. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was erroneous and unjustified. The court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal.

Summary: The respondent, who was employed as an Officer Grade-II with the National Bank of Pakistan, absented himself from duty starting from October 31, 2014. The bank issued several notices to the respondent, requesting him to report for duty and justify his absence. However, the respondent did not join duty and instead claimed that he could not work due to a tribal feud and threats to his life. He requested an additional year of leave without pay. The court noted that the respondent did not provide any evidence or material to support his claim of a tribal feud or the threats to his life. The court concluded that since the respondent's absence from duty was admitted and no disputed facts were involved, there was no need for a regular inquiry. The court referred to a previous judgment and held that when the fact of absence from duty is admitted, a regular inquiry is unnecessary. Regarding the High Court's observation that the respondent's absence period was condoned and his joining report was accepted with a stern warning, the Supreme Court found no document on record to support this claim. Instead, it was evident from the record that the respondent's service was terminated through a memorandum dated April 7, 2016, and the period of absence was treated as Extra Ordinary Leave (EOL) without pay. The court clarified that treating the absence period as EOL without pay is not a punishment but a treatment given by the employer. The court referred to previous judgments on similar cases to support this interpretation. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court's assumption that the termination order was passed under the National Bank of Pakistan (Staff) Service Rules, 1980, was incorrect. The court found that the memorandum did not mention any such rule and criticized the High Court for relying on the respondent's counsel's submission without verifying its accuracy. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's judgment was erroneous and unjustified. The court set aside the impugned judgment and allowed the appeal.