Summary: i) The party to a suit cannot be allowed to lead evidence beyond its pleading and if led the same could not be considered in its favor, as it is settled that a party has to alleged a facts) and then it has to be allowed to prove the same. ii) The production of a document, proof of execution of documents and proof of contents of a document are distinct phenomenon and a beneficiary of a document could only be succeeded to get a favorable decree, if he succeeded to prove all of them. iii) There is no cavil that u/s 118 of The Negotiable instrument Act, 1881, a negotiable instrument has a statutory presumptions to the effect that the same has been made/ drawn for a valid consideration, however, such presumptions is rebuttable and if the defendants succeed to establish that no negotiable instrument was drawn or that there exist no considerations for issuance of the same then, the said statutory presumptions would automatically lose its significance and as such in such eventuality, the plaintiff would not be entitled for the decree on the basis of a negotiable instrument. iv) Where in a suit filed on the basis of a negotiable instrument and a direct trustworthy and confidence inspiring evidence is brought on record especially, from the statements of the marginal witnesses of the said negotiable instrument then in such state of affairs too, the plaintiff would not be entitled to get a favorable decree on the basis of the said negotiable instrument.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 324 & 334 – Qatl-i-Amd, Attempted Murder, Arsh – Acquittal on Benefit of Doubt: Prosecution case involving charges of murder and attempted murder—Conviction based on testimony of related witnesses with delayed FIR and contradictions—Held, significant delay of nearly 3 hours in FIR registration without plausible explanation, contradictions in ocular and medical evidence, unexplained delay of 15 hours in postmortem, and 126-day delay in recording injured witness’s statement under S.161 Cr.P.C. created serious doubt—Motive unproven, presence of eyewitnesses questionable, and no forensic linkage to firearms established—All doubts resolved in favour of accused—Convictions set aside—Accused acquitted. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 161, 342 & 374 – Delay in Witness Statements and Postmortem – Impact on Credibility: Delayed postmortem and recording of statements—Effect—Held, unexplained delay in conducting autopsy and recording statement of injured witness renders prosecution version doubtful—Statements recorded after 126 days without any medical certification or justification regarding witness’s unavailability—Raises presumption of deliberation and fabrication—Benefit of doubt extended—Conviction reversed. (c) Evidence – Ocular vs. Medical Conflict – Forensic Gaps: Discrepancy between eyewitness account and medical evidence—Held, prosecution claimed deceased received two firearm injuries from two accused, but postmortem revealed only one entry and one exit wound—Contradiction undermined credibility of ocular account—Further, blood-stained cots and weapons were not properly sent for forensic analysis or recovered according to standard protocol—PFSA report deemed inconsequential due to same-day deposit of weapons and empties—Forensic evidence not supportive—Conviction set aside. (d) Criminal Trial – Motive – Burden on Prosecution to Prove Specific Allegation: Motive based on earlier murder case allegedly pursued by deceased—Held, deceased not complainant or witness in that case—Prosecution failed to establish any direct nexus between deceased and motive case—Motive was exaggerated and unproven—Once motive is alleged but not proved, prosecution must suffer—Motive discarded. (e) Benefit of Doubt – Standard of Criminal Justice: Principle—Held, single material doubt sufficient for acquittal—Multiple doubts arising from procedural lapses, inconsistent testimonies, and weak motive—Court reiterated that benefit of such doubts must go to the accused—Convictions set aside—Death sentence not confirmed. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Abbas v. The State (2021 SCMR 23) • Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid (2017 SCMR 54) • Amin Ali v. The State (2011 SCMR 323) • Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal (2011 SCMR 527) • Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486) • Abdul Jabbar v. The State (2019 SCMR 129) • Sarfraz v. The State (2023 SCMR 670) • Tariq Parvez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) • Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230) • Muhammad Imran v. The State (2020 SCMR 857) Disposition: Criminal Appeals No. 27076-J and 27077-J of 2022 allowed. Convictions and sentences set aside. Appellants acquitted. Murder Reference No. 58 of 2022 answered in the negative. Death sentence of Alam Sher not confirmed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan––Art. 9A [inserted via 21st Constitutional Amendment]––Right to clean and healthy sustainable environment––Scope and enforceability––Untreated sewerage discharge by Municipal Committee Khanpur into Khanpur Minor Canal used for drinking and irrigation purposes––Violation of fundamental rights––Maintainability of constitutional petition. Petitioner, a resident of Khanpur, invoked constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution on the ground that untreated sewerage effluent was being discharged by Municipal Committee Khanpur into Khanpur Minor Canal, a vital water source used for drinking and agricultural irrigation, particularly in areas where groundwater was saline and unfit for consumption––Record revealed the disposal was made without obtaining No Objection Certificate (NOC) from Punjab Irrigation or Environmental Departments––Municipal Committee admitted existence of a secondary emergency outlet near the canal but failed to rebut ongoing contamination or produce evidence of regulatory compliance––High Court held that Art.9A guarantees every person the right to a clean and healthy sustainable environment and such contamination posed a grave threat to public health, agricultural sustainability, and ecological balance––Petition was held maintainable under Art.199 for enforcement of Art.9A as a fundamental right––Petition allowed with directions. Cited Cases: • Raja Zahoor Ahmed v. Capital Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1411 • D.G. Khan Cement Co. Ltd. v. Government of Punjab 2021 SCMR 834 • Shahab Usto v. Government of Sindh 2017 SCMR 732 (b) Environmental law––Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997, S.5––Duties and powers of Director-General EPA––Failure of regulatory oversight––Duty to assess and prevent contamination. Court examined statutory role of the Punjab Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under S.5 of the PEPA, 1997––Director-General of EPA was found to have failed in initiating timely environmental assessments and enforcing regulatory mechanisms against illegal discharge––In exercise of constitutional jurisdiction, High Court directed the Director-General to visit the site forthwith, conduct an environmental assessment of the Khanpur Minor Canal, and take appropriate remedial action––Compliance report was ordered to be submitted within 30 days. (c) Common law––Water pollution––Right to unpolluted water––Judicial precedents––Discharge of sewage as nuisance and actionable wrong––Scope. High Court drew from English common law and precedent to reinforce that discharge of untreated sewage into natural water bodies constitutes an actionable nuisance––Referring to Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, Pride of Derby v. British Cleanese Ltd., and Overseas Tankship v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. I), Court reiterated that even public benefit or lack of alternate disposal options do not justify environmental degradation––Principle that each polluter is liable regardless of prior contamination upheld––Discharge into Khanpur Minor Canal held to be unlawful and injurious to public health and property rights. Referenced Authorities: • Goldsmith v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners (1865) • Pride of Derby v. British Cleanese Ltd. (1953) • Overseas Tankship Ltd. v. Morts Dock (Wagon Mound No. I) (1961) • Dell v. Chesham Urban District Council (1921) 3 KB 427 • Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th Ed., Environmental Quality and Public Health) (d) Public health––Environmental degradation and waterborne diseases––Duty of the State––Preventive obligations. Court held that untreated sewerage discharge not only violates environmental rights but also endangers public health by exposing communities to waterborne diseases including cholera, hepatitis, and typhoid––Noted that biodiversity collapse and pollution-related illnesses are escalating due to anthropogenic negligence––Directed that preventive measures must be urgently taken by the State to avert an imminent public health crisis in Khanpur and surrounding villages. Disposition: Writ petition allowed. Director-General of EPA Punjab directed to conduct environmental assessment and take remedial steps within 30 days.

Summary: The pivotal question before us is whether the powers conferred under Section 11 of the "Act" extends to the imposition of penalty and default surcharge for violations exclusively covered under Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the "Act", read with Serial No. 24 & 25 of Section 33 thereof. This structural distinction is well entrenched in the jurisprudence that machinery provisions must operate within the express confines of the substantive charging provisions they support. Any attempt to expand a machinery provision, such as Section 11 of the "Act", to cover penalties for purely regulatory defaults (as described at Serial Nos.24 and 25, or similar entries in the Table) amounts to reading into the statute a jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not conferred. Where a fiscal statute provides a penal consequence for breach of a statutory duty, such penal consequence must be enforced strictly within the four corners of the enabling provision. The Officer must cite and rely upon the specific statutory authority for both the imposition and recovery of penalty. Absent clear words to the contrary, a machinery provision designed to recover tax shortfall cannot be used as a fallback to recover regulatory penalties that do not flow from tax under assessment.

Summary: Effect of Repeal of Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974.

Summary: When a Cheque is Admitted, the Law Presumes the Truth Liability Cannot Be Escaped by Mere Words. Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (S. 118); Contract Act, 1872 (S. 126); CPC, 1908 (Order XXXVII) Where execution of a cheque is admitted, Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 raises a statutory presumption that it was issued for consideration. The burden to rebut this presumption lies on the drawer, who must do so through independent, cogent, and reliable evidence. A cheque issued by the drawer himself cannot be termed a ?guarantee? in the absence of a third-party principal debtor, and such defence is legally untenable under Section 126 of the Contract Act, 1872. Similarly, the defence that the cheque was issued blank carries no weight in law, as execution implies authority to complete the instrument, unless fraud or coercion is proved. A cheque voluntarily issued during arbitration or panchayat, in acknowledgment of liability, is valid and enforceable. In this case, the appellant admitted issuance of the cheque, receipt of foreign remittances, and failed to produce any FIR, complaint, or substantive document to rebut the statutory presumption. Mere oral assertions and unauthenticated documents were insufficient. The trial court rightly decreed the suit under Order XXXVII CPC, and the appellate court found no legal or factual infirmity in its reasoning. Appeal was thus dismissed. Ratio Decidendi: An admitted cheque invokes statutory presumption of consideration under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The drawer cannot escape liability by claiming the cheque was a mere guarantee, especially where no third-party debt exists. Rebuttal requires credible proof, not unsubstantiated assertions.

Summary: During the pendency of the suit, when an interlocutory order authenticated by higher forums attains finality, such order cannot be challenged again alongwith the final order/judgment as same is exception to the general principle that interim order merges into final order.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held that the integrity and sanctity of judicial proceedings form the bedrock of the justice system. The authenticity of judicial orders is not a matter of procedural formality?it is the very essence of rule of law. No person?natural or juristic?can be permitted to forge, manipulate, or misuse judicial orders for personal or institutional gain. The Courts are not mere dispute-resolution forums; they are vested with the solemn duty to uphold the public confidence in the administration of justice. Any assault on the credibility of their proceedings strikes at the very soul of justice and cannot be tolerated under any circumstance. The judicial process cannot and shall not be permitted to be reduced to an arena of strategic deceit. Judicial orders carry the imprimatur of the rule of law, and any tampering therewith strikes at the very heart of the institutional integrity. When such tampering is committed and benefit thereof is drawn in a commercial context, the act transcends the bounds of private fraud and becomes a direct assault on the public interest in relation to the function of the judiciary. Therefore, this Court is under a duty not merely to resolve disputes, but to protect the authenticity of its own record and the confidence that litigants and society repose in it. Further held that the newly engaged counsel for the petitioner company has conducted himself with candour by expressly conceding that he finds no ethical or legal ground to justify the fraudulent conduct of his client?petitioner company, and has accordingly tendered an apology on its behalf. While this professional stance is appreciated, it must be underscored that such an apology, however gracefully made, cannot become basis to persuade the Court to overlook deliberate and intentional fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company. The process of administration of justice cannot be compromised through post-facto contrition when the offence strikes at the integrity of the judicial process itself. In present case, the gravity of the fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company transcends private regret and demands institutional response.

Summary: Summary pending