Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), 40(c) & 11---Failure of registered person to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the FBR's Computerized System for real-time reporting, offence of---Provision for recovery of tax shortfalls under S. 11 of the Act, 1990, applicability of---Imposition of penalty for violations exclusively covered under other specific provisions of Sales Tax Act, 1990---Whether penalties and default surcharge for non-integration can be imposed under S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, or must be confined to the specific penal mechanism under S. 33 of the Act, 1990?---The Commissioner Inland Revenue(the CIR) sought to impose penalties and default surcharge on Tier-1 retailers for failing to fully integrate their retail outlets with the FBR's computerized POS system---The Department relied on S. 11 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 as the jurisdictional basis to issue show-cause notices and recover such penalties---The Registered Persons challenged this and the Appellate Tribunal set aside the penalty orders---High Court was then called upon to decide as to "whether S. 11 (a machinery provision dealing with recovery of tax shortfalls) could legally be invoked to impose penalties for regulatory breaches under Ss. 2(43A), 3(9A), 40C read with Serial Nos. 24 and 25 of S. 33 (which specifically prescribed penalties for non-integration)?"---Held: While S. 33 of the Act, 1990 governed the creation of liability for specified offences, it did not itself supply the procedural means for recovering such penalty from the Registered Person, if there was no simultaneous tax shortfall---Any proceedings for penalty under serial No.24 or 25 was to be rooted in the express penalty provisions, and the recovery was to follow the adjudication process prescribed by the Act, 1990 or other relevant enabling provisions, but could not default to S. 11 of the Act, 1990 in the absence of a short levied tax---Although S. 33 of the Act, 1990, prescribed various offences and their corresponding penalties, it did not itself provide any independent procedural mechanism for the issuance, adjudication, or recovery of such penalties---Therefore, in the absence of such procedure, reliance could not be placed on a general provision like S. 11 of the Act 1990, which was confined to tax assessment and recovery, to fill that gap by implication---In the present case, the respondents' alleged failure to fully or partially integrate their retail outlet did not, ipso facto, result in a quantifiable shortfall of sales tax that could be brought within the ambit of S. 11 of the Act, 1990---Instead, this default constituted an independent regulatory offence for which a specific penalty was prescribed under Serial Nos.24 and 25 of S. 33 of the Act, 1990---Reliance on S. 11 of the Act, 1990 as the sole jurisdictional basis for issuing a show cause notice to impose penalty and default surcharge for partial or complete non-integration under Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the Act, 1990 was misconceived in law and contrary to the statutory framework---Such action was ultra vires the express scheme of the Act, 1990, which required that the prescribed penalty for these specific regulatory breaches be imposed strictly under the enabling provisions of S. 33 of the Act, 1990, following due process and in accordance with the procedure established by law---Accordingly, the show-cause notice and the consequential order passed pursuant thereto had rightly been set-aside to the extent that they sought to impose penalty and default surcharge solely by invoking S. 11 of the Act, 1990 for violations that were required to be prosecuted exclusively under the specific penal provisions of S. 33 of the Act, 1990---Consequently, the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue was upheld to this extent having correctly appreciated the statutory distinction and the limits of jurisdiction prescribed under the Act, 1990---Present reference applications were decided against the applicant department. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss.2(43A), 3(9A), 40(c) &11---Failure to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the FBR's Computerized System for real-time reporting, offence of---Provision for recovery of tax shortfalls under S. 11 of the Act, 1990, applicability of---Imposition of penalty for violations exclusively covered under other specific provisions of same statute---Legality and scope---Section 11 of the Act, 1990 is a machinery provision and its statutory object is to empower the Officer of Inland Revenue to detect, assess, and recover any tax, which has either escaped assessment, has not been paid, or has been erroneously refunded---The operative words are "tax not levied or short-levied or erroneously refunded" demonstrating that its entire scope is tethered to the quantification and recovery of a shortfall in tax revenue---The legislative intent of S. 11 of the Act, 1990 is clear from its text, it addresses tax revenue shortfall and its recovery, not regulatory penalties imposed for stands alone statutory breaches unrelated to any deficit in the tax payable---The said provision is silent regarding the creation of offences or the independent imposition of penalties for regulatory breaches that do not necessarily result in a quantifiable tax default---Its scope is not punitive but compensatory and restorative in nature, to protect the exchequer from actual revenue loss---Conversely, the offences for failure to integrate a retail outlet fully or partially with the Board's Computerized System for real-time reporting are distinctly prescribed under Ss. 2(43A), 3(9A) & 40C of the Act, 1990, while the penal consequences for such breaches are codified under S. 33 of the Act, 1990, particularly at Serial Nos. 24 and 25 further observed that the Table appended to S. 33 of the Act, 1990 including inter alia Serial Nos.24 and 25, prescribes various statutory offences along with the corresponding penalties for each specific breach---These provisions clearly adopt a specific general legislative framework, the specific provision, i.e., S. 33 of the "Act" defines the nature of the offence and stipulates the quantum of penalty or default surcharge applicable thereto---However, the Act, 1990 is conspicuously silent on any detailed procedure for the assessment, computation, or recovery of such penalties where no ascertainable tax shortfall is determined---Section 33 of the Act, 1990 by its design, is declaratory in nature---It creates liability, but does not itself furnish a procedural machinery for quantification or recovery---This structural distinction is well entrenched in the jurisprudence that machinery provisions must operate within the express confines of the substantive charging provisions they support---Any attempt to expand a machinery provision, such as S. 11 of the Act, 1990 to cover penalties for purely regulatory defaults (as described at Serial Nos.24 and 25, or similar entries in the Table amounts to reading into the statute a jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not conferred. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal/tax statutes---Penal provisions---Applicability and scope---Where a fiscal statute provides a penal consequence for breach of a statutory duty, such penal consequence must be enforced strictly within the four corners of the enabling provision---Where a special provision exists, it overrides the general provision to the extent of any overlap, a principle that applies with even greater force where penal consequences are involved---Tax statutes, particularly those prescribing penalties or default surcharges, must be construed strictly---Penal provisions cannot be broadened by administrative construction or implication---It is incumbent upon the department to establish clear statutory authority for each element of any penalty imposed, and an officer must demonstrate precise adherence to the express language of the statute to justify the levy of any penalty or surcharge---Where the legislature has created a distinct penalty for a regulatory contravention without linking it to an ascertainable tax shortfall, the penalty must be enforced strictly under the special provision, not by resorting to a general recovery mechanism intended for unpaid tax. Government of Punjab through Secretary Irrigation and Power and another v. Kunjah Textile Mills Ltd. and others 2025 SCMR 239 rel. Syed Muhammad Abbas, Malik Ittat Hussain Awan, Barrister Muhammad Ibrahim Khan, Dr. G.M. Chaudhry, Manzoor Hussain along with Yousaf Khan, S.O. I.R. (Hqrs) R.T.O., Rawalpindi for Applicant. Atif Waheed, Ch. Imran-ul-Haq, Muhammad Musawar Gill, Zahid Shafiq and Mehmood Subhani, Bilal-ud-Din Butt, Raja Basit Iqbal, Qazi Hafee-ur-Rehman, Ameer-ul-Azeem and Umair Mehmood for Respondent No.1. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service matters—Special Allowance for higher qualification—HEC equivalence—Scope—Held: Higher Education Commission (HEC) is the competent authority for determining academic equivalence; its Notification dated 23-05-2017 declares MS and M.Phil identical in substance (18 years’ education) with only nomenclature difference—Once academic equivalence is formally acknowledged, the State cannot arbitrarily differentiate between MS and M.Phil for an allowance premised on “M.Phil” qualification—HEC’s academic determination binds for purposes of reasonable classification; contrary executive exclusions are liable to be struck down. (b) Executive instructions vs. constitutional guarantees—Finance Department Circular (26-04-2017)—Validity—Circular predates the HEC clarification and restricts the Special Allowance @ 50% of Ph.D. Allowance to M.Phil holders only—To the extent it excludes MS (18-year) degree holders recognized as equivalent by HEC, the restriction is overbroad and lacks rational nexus; violates equality and non-discrimination guarantees under the AJK Interim Constitution, 1974—Executive financial policy must operate within constitutional bounds and respect authoritative academic equivalence where benefit is pegged to academic qualification. (c) Nature of HEC clarification—Academic vs. employment/finance—Where Government chooses to confer a financial benefit by reference to a degree title/level, authoritative academic equivalence determined by HEC is a relevant and weighty criterion; denial to one group (MS) while granting to an identically placed group (M.Phil) is arbitrary—Parity reinforced by consistent practice in other government departments referenced on record. (d) Precedent distinguished—Muhammad Rizwan-ullah Khan & others v. AJK Govt. (2018 SCR 1161)—Inapplicable—That case concerned M.Sc. (Hons.) (typically 16-year pathway) and not MS/M.Phil (18-year)—No HEC parity existed there comparable to the MS/M.Phil categories (i) & (ii) expressly equated in the 23-05-2017 Notification—High Court’s reliance misplaced. (e) Relief/entitlement—Appellants (MS degree holders) and all similarly placed individuals declared entitled to the Special Allowance @ 50% of Ph.D. Allowance under Government Notification dated 12-07-2016—Entitlement effective from 23-05-2017 (date of HEC clarification)—Departments directed to process and disburse within a reasonable timeframe—No order as to costs. Disposition: Appeal accepted—High Court’s consolidated judgment dated 05-03-2024 set aside—Declaration and directions issued as above.

Summary: Sections 561-A CrPC & 5 & 8 of the KP Prosecution Service Act, 2005 have been discussed. Moreover, the only piece of evidence allegedly connecting the accused-petitioner with the offence is the recovery of a portion of the robbed amount. However, this recovery was neither effected at the time of arrest nor pursuant to any pointation made by the accused-petitioner. Instead, it was reportedly produced by one of his relatives. The Investigating Officer neither recorded the statement of the said individual under Section 161 CrPC nor incorporated his name in the recovery memo. This omission is both procedural and substantive in nature, striking at the root of the credibility and admissibility of the recovery itself. In the absence of any cogent corroborative evidence, and keeping in view the overall factual matrix, I am of the view that the accused-petitioner is entitled to the concession of bail in the attending circumstances of the case. Accordingly, this bail petition is allowed. The accused-petitioner is admitted to bail, subject to his furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.100,000 with two sureties each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Illaqa/Judicial Magistrate concerned, who shall ensure that the sureties are local, reliable, and persons of sufficient means. It is a matter of grave concern that, in recent times, citizens are increasingly losing their lives, dignity, honour, valuable movable and immovable properties due to systemic failures in the processes of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. The inadequacies and inefficiencies within these fundamental pillars of the justice system have resulted in gross miscarriages of justice, wherein aggrieved individuals are often unable to obtain appropriate reliefs in accordance with the mandate of law. This pervasive failure not only undermines the rule of law but has also led to an alarming erosion of public trust in the justice delivery system. The situation has deteriorated to such an extent that it borders on a near-anarchical state of affairs, wherein law and order are increasingly becoming unmanageable and beyond the effective control of state functionaries and institutions. Given the gravity of the situation, there is an urgent and compelling need for comprehensive, swift, and result-oriented remedial measures aimed at strengthening the investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative mechanisms. Such measures must be implemented across the board and by all lawful means, with a view to restoring public confidence and addressing / allaying the legitimate grievances and agonies of the citizens. It is imperative that all stakeholders viz. executive, judiciary, and legislature collaborate proactively to undertake necessary legal, institutional, and procedural reforms to ensure the delivery of timely and effective justice, in consonance with constitutional mandates and principles of natural justice. Without prejudicing the merits of the case and bearing in mind that findings at the bail stage are necessarily tentative, it is nonetheless imperative to note, with serious concern that the Investigating Officer failed to investigate essential links in the chain of evidence. Specifically, the omission to conduct an Identification Parade despite the complainant’s declared ability to identify the culprits, and the failure to formally associate or record the statement of the individual from whom the alleged recovery was made, reflect a glaring lapse in investigative diligence. This inaction stands in stark violation of Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934, which mandates that: “It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter under investigation. His object shall be to discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely to any view of the facts for or against any person”. The Investigating Officer is expected to proceed objectively, exploring all material aspects necessary to ensure a fair, thorough, and lawful investigation. In the present case, the investigative omissions have not only diminished the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s case but also raise questions regarding the integrity of the process. Such dereliction of duty warrants appropriate action through the competent authority. Given that this Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), is ordinarily required to confine itself to a tentative appraisal of the material placed on record, but sometime it cannot turn a blind eye to the manifest illegalities, grave procedural improprieties, and conspicuous inaction on the part of the prosecution, notably, the worthy District Public Prosecutor and the Investigating Officer. Such glaring lapses not only undermine the integrity of the investigative process but also pose a serious threat to the administration of justice. In these exceptional circumstances, where the prosecutorial conduct appears to defeat rather than advance the cause of justice, this Court finds it necessary to invoke its inherent jurisdiction in terms of section 561-A CrPC, to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to ensure that justice is truly served in order to secure the ends of justice. Accordingly, the worthy Superintendent of Police (Investigation), Charsadda is directed to look into the matter of defective investigation by the IO, as highlighted hereinabove. Simultaneously, the investigation of the case shall be entrusted to another competent and impartial officer, who shall proceed with due diligence and in accordance with law. A compliance report in this regard shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for the perusal of the Bench in Chamber within one month, positively. This Court is nonetheless constrained to record its concern regarding institutional failures that extend beyond mere police negligence. In addition to the lapses on the part of the Investigating Officer, it is imperative to examine the role of worthy District Public Prosecutor, Charsadda, in light of his statutory duties under Sections 5(d) to (f) and 8 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2005. These provisions were designed to serve not as hollow formalities, but as substantive safeguards to ensure prosecutorial supervision over police investigation, with the object of strengthening justice delivery at the earliest stage of criminal proceedings. Under Section 5(d), it is the express function of the DPP to issue instructions or guidelines to police officers in relation to the conduct of investigations. Section 5(e) empowers him to recommend appropriate disciplinary action where such investigations are found to be defective, negligent, or in contravention of law. Section 5(f) further empowers worthy Director General of Prosecution to initiate proceedings where such recommendations are not acted upon. Most significantly, Section 8(2) mandates that a copy of every FIR registered by the police must be forwarded to the concerned DPP, who is required to scrutinize the investigation and, where lapses are found, report the same to the appropriate authority under Section 8(4). These provisions collectively reflect the legislative intent to institutionalize prosecutorial oversight, not only to assist in the pursuit of justice but also to act as a check on investigative arbitrariness and procedural irregularities. In the present case, the FIR was admittedly registered against unknown accused, and serious procedural failures subsequently marred the investigation, including the failure to conduct an identification parade despite the complainant’s assertion that he could recognize the perpetrators; a dubious recovery process unsupported by legally admissible evidence; and non-recording of statements under Section 161 CrPC. In the investigation, despite these glaring defects, no corrective measure or intervention appears to have been taken by the worthy DPP in the given circumstances of the case. This dereliction not only undermines the statutory function of prosecutorial supervision, but also renders the safeguards built into the criminal justice framework largely illusory. This Court is compelled to note that the establishment of the Prosecution Service under Section 3 of the 2005 Act, comprising the Director General, Deputy Directors, and Assistant Directors, is not a symbolic gesture nor a ceremonial institution. It is a public trust, funded by the exchequer, created to elevate the standard of criminal investigation and prosecution, and to ensure that the investigative process is guided by law and legal acumen at every stage. The failure of the worthy DPP, Charsadda, in the present case thus represents not merely administrative oversight but a breach of statutory obligation. This Court observes with due emphasis that, under the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, the High Court, being the superior Court of the province, is vested with broad supervisory and regulatory powers, both on its judicial and administrative sides. These powers extend to overseeing the performance of all public functionaries who are tasked with exercising authority or discharging duties under the Cr.P.C. In doing so, the Court ensures the rigorous enforcement of legal provisions pertaining to registration of criminal cases, the conduct of investigations, and all matters incidental thereto. The High Court is not only competent but constitutionally mandated to issue directions aimed at securing adherence to the rule of law. Moreover, public officers acting under the framework of the CrPC may, when required, be directed by this Court to perform specific functions necessary to achieve the objectives of justice. Besides, at the heart of a just and functional criminal justice system lies vibrant, active and watchful role of the judiciary, particularly at the district level. Sessions Judges, Additional Sessions Judges, and Judicial Magistrates are not only adjudicators but also entrusted with significant magisterial powers under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, to oversee and guide the investigative process under their respective jurisdictions. These judicial officers are empowered to ensure that police investigations are conducted lawfully, fairly, and without abuse of authority. They may direct the registration of criminal cases, ensure proper investigation, summon investigating officers, and restrain law enforcement agencies from engaging in harassment or acting beyond their lawful mandate. These powers must be exercised proactively to uphold the rule of law and alleviate the suffering of ordinary citizens. In view of the foregoing, the Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court is directed to circulate a copy of this order among all Criminal Courts of the province, so that judicial officers may remain alert and responsive in the exercise of their respective jurisdictions. In these circumstances, the worthy Director General Prosecution, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is directed to initiate an appropriate inquiry strictly in accordance with law into the conduct of the worthy District Public Prosecutor, Charsadda, for his failure to exercise statutory supervision as required under Sections 5 and 8 of the Prosecution Service Act, 2005. The inquiry shall assess whether the DPP discharged his obligations in relation to the present case and shall determine whether disciplinary or corrective action is warranted. A report in this regard shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) of this Court for perusal in Chamber within one month positively. The worthy Director General Prosecution is further directed to submit a detailed and comprehensive report covering a period of the last five years, within the stipulated time, regarding the submission of challans in criminal cases on a district-wise basis. The report shall include the fate of such cases, specifying the number of convictions and acquittals, including those decided by the superior courts. Furthermore, the report must particularly highlight the reasons and causes for acquittals, especially in instances where the prosecution failed to establish the charges against the accused. Special emphasis shall be laid on cases where the failure to secure a conviction was attributable to poor or defective investigation, so as to ascertain the lapses and ensure remedial measures. Furthermore, the worthy Additional Inspector General (AIG) Investigations, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, is hereby directed to prepare and submit before this Court a consolidated, district-wise report encompassing: (i) the total number of criminal cases reported during the last five years in which the investigation was declared defective, deficient, or found to be non-compliant with statutory requirements, along with the final outcome of such cases; and (ii) the nature and extent of remedial or disciplinary actions initiated or taken against the delinquent investigating officers whose negligence or misconduct resulted in the failure of prosecution cases. This exercise is essential not only for ensuring accountability but also for enabling institutional reflection and systemic reforms. The report shall be submitted through the worthy Additional Registrar (Judicial) within the same timeframe. Copy of this order be endorsed to the worthy Inspector General Police, worthy Additional Inspector General (Investigation) and worthy Director General Prosecution Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for information and further necessary action at their end. The Additional Registrar (Judicial) is also directed to open a separate file till the submission of the compliance reports. Above are the reasons of this court’s short order of even date.

Summary: (a) It is a settled principle of law that khula, being a form of dissolution of marriage initiated by the wife, cannot be granted by a court unless it has been explicitly and unequivocally sought by the woman herself. The rationale behind this requirement lies in the fact that khula entails relinquishment of the woman`s financial right, particularly the dower (mahr), and such relinquishment cannot be presumed or inferred without a clear and voluntary demand by the wife. Therefore, in the absence of a specific prayer or request for khula, the court has no lawful authority to unilaterally pass a decree for khula on its own motion. Any such act would amount to overstepping its jurisdiction and interfering with the substantive rights of the parties, particularly when the wife has not consented to forego her dower in exchange for dissolution. (b) The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, in Section 2(ii), explicitly provides that a wife is entitled to seek dissolution of marriage if the husband has neglected or has failed to provide maintenance for a period of two years. This provision recognizes the hardship caused to a woman when she is deprived of her right to sustenance, a right that is integral to the marital relationship and guaranteed under both Shariah and family law. The consistent denial of this right amounts to an inexcusable act of cruelty and justifies the dissolution of the matrimonial bond. (c) It is a settled principle of law that an appeal is considered to be a continuation of the original proceedings, unless the right to appeal has been specifically barred by the legislature through express words or necessary intendment.

Summary: (a) When a party asserts that a transaction is benami, the initial and primary burden of proof lies squarely upon that party. It must be established through cogent, reliable, and independent evidence that the ostensible owner was merely a name-lender, while the actual ownership and consideration belonged to the claimant. (b) In determining whether a transaction is benami, the courts have laid down certain guiding factors, which include: (i) the source of purchase money relating to the transaction; (ii) possession of the property, (iii) the position of the parties and their relationship to one another, (iv) the circumstances, pecuniary or otherwise, of the alleged transferee, (v) the motive for the transaction, (vi) the custody and production of the title deed, and (vii) the previous and subsequent conduct of the parties. Each of the above- stated circumstances, taken by itself, is of no particular value and affords no conclusive proof of the intention to transfer the ownership from one person to the other. But a combination of some or all of them and a proper weighing and appreciation of their value would go a long way towards indicating whether the ownership has been really transferred or where the real title lies. Since the very object of a benami transaction is secrecy, the evidence adduced in cases of this character should stand the test of strict scrutiny and satisfy the tests mentioned above. In other words, the evidence must be reliable and acceptable impelling the Court to take a view contrary to the recitals in the impugned document. The consideration of such evidence should be in a proper manner and in the right perspective. (c) The burden of proof initially rests upon the party alleging that the ostensible owner is a benamidar. The weakness or insufficiency of the defence case does not absolve the claimant of this burden. However, during the course of trial, the burden of proof may shift from one party to the other. Once the plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case and the burden shifts to the defendant, failure of the defendant to discharge this shifted burden would result in the plaintiff’s success.

Summary: High Court allowed the appeal filed by Muhammad Iqbal, setting aside the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Ombudsperson's order directing the Deputy Commissioner, Swat, to incorporate an inheritance mutation for the legal heirs of late Asil Khan. The Court held that the Ombudsperson lacked jurisdiction under Section 4 of the KP Enforcement of Women's Property Rights Act, 2019, as a civil suit filed by the respondent (Mst. Badrai) over the same property was already pending before the Civil Judge, Khwaza Khela. Further, the Ombudsperson violated mandatory procedure under Section 7 of the Act by failing to refer the matter to the civil court or seek suspension of proceedings before issuing the mutation order. The Court also noted that complex disputes including whether properties were self-acquired by the appellant or inherited, and the applicability of pre-1962 Swat State inheritance laws required evidence-based civil adjudication, not summary proceedings. Criticizing the Ombudsperson's use of coercive tactics (e.g., non-bailable warrants) in a civil matter, the Court directed the civil court to conclude the pending trial within three months.

Summary: (a) Under Rule 11 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017, the eligibility of candidates shall be determined in accordance with the advertisement of the post, the service rules governing appointments to the relevant post, and such other ancillary instructions as may be issued by the Government and/or the Commission from time to time. Furthermore, Rule 3(2) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, provides that the method of appointment, qualifications, and other conditions applicable to a post shall be as laid down by the department concerned in consultation with the Establishment and Administration Department and the Finance Department. Rule 10(3) of the ibid Rules further stipulates that a candidate for initial appointment to a post must possess the prescribed educational or technical qualifications and requisite experience. Rule 28 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017, stipulates that the acceptability of a diploma or degree shall be determined by the Commission on the basis of academic relevance, as certified by the Higher Education Commission, the Pakistan Medical & Dental Council, the Pakistan Engineering Council, or the Pakistan Veterinary Medical Council, as the case may be . (b) The expression employee, as defined in clause (b) ibid, means an ad hoc or contract employee appointed by the Government on an ad hoc or contract basis, or on a second-shift/night-shift basis, but excludes employees appointed against project posts, on a work-charge basis, or those paid out of contingencies. Appointments of any nature — whether initial, ad hoc, permanent, or temporary — if made in violation of the principles of transparency and competitive selection, including appointments made without inviting applications from the public, are contrary to the Constitution and, therefore, void. The selection of a qualified, eligible, and most deserving person is a sacred trust, to be discharged honestly, fairly, and transparently, in a manner that serves the best interests of the public.

Summary: Legal set-off, under Order VIII Rule 6 CPC, applies to ascertained sums within the court's jurisdiction, while equitable set-off, rooted in fairness and equity, covers closely connected cross-demands even if unascertained. Order XX Rule 19 serves as a statutory acknowledgment of the remedy of equitable set-off. However, both require that the claim falls within the court's pecuniary jurisdiction. Any counter-claim, other than those permitted under Order VIII Rule 6 or qualifying as an equitable set-off, is not a recognized form of defence under the CPC. -- As a general rule, the pecuniary jurisdiction of a civil court is determined based upon the value of the suit as stated in the plaint. However, a plea of set-off under Order VIII, Rule 6 CPC constitutes an exception to this rule. Since a claim of set-off constitutes an exception to the general rule, the court, while entertaining such a plea, must ensure that it does not exceed its pecuniary limits.--- A plea of set-off, whether legal or equitable cannot exceed the pecuniary limits of the court's jurisdiction, but in the same vein, neither could a plaint be returned for the reason that a written statement filed thereto carry excessive plea of set-off. ---When a plea of set-off exceeds the pecuniary jurisdiction of the court, the proper course is to direct the defendant to file a separate suit instead of returning the plaint.