Summary: (a) It is a well-settled principle of law that where a legal heir, directly aggrieved by a wrongfully recorded inheritance mutation, fails to assail it during his or her lifetime, such prolonged inaction operates to bar the subsequent legal heirs from questioning the mutation. This bar rests on the doctrines of estoppel, abandonment of claim, and extinguishment of the cause of action. (b) Where a suit is ex facie barred by limitation, the recording of evidence is unnecessary, and the Court is fully empowered to reject the plaint at the very threshold and when the primary relief of declaration is time-barred, then any consequential relief irrespective of whether it may appear to be within the prescribed limitation would be of no legal consequence because time-barred declaratory claims cannot be revived through the guise of consequential relief. (c) The object of the powers conferred upon the trial Court under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. is that the Courts must put an end to the litigation at the very initial stage when on account of some legal impediments full-fledged trial will be a futile exercise. (d) The plaintiffs contend that each subsequent entry in the record of rights (Jamabandi) provided them with a fresh cause of action, thereby keeping their suit within limitation. While in certain cases a wrongful mutation or adverse entry may amount only to an apprehended denial of rights—thus giving rise to a fresh cause of action—the position differs where the affected parties had actual knowledge of the disputed entries but failed to challenge them during their lifetime. Once there is an unequivocal denial of rights and the limitation period expires without recourse to legal action, the claim becomes barred. Subsequent repetition of the same adverse entry in later revenue records does not revive or extend the limitation period. Settled law holds that limitation runs from the date of knowledge, and once extinguished, the right cannot be reopened through later entries.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 24 — Regulation of Mines and Oil-fields and Minerals Development (Government Control) Act, 1948 — Ss. 2 & 6 — Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, Rr. 68(2) & 73(3) Delegated legislation — Imposition of markup on unpaid royalty and rentals — Scope of rule-making power — Violation of fundamental rights — Protection against deprivation of property — Petitioners challenged demands raised under Rr. 68(2) and 73(3) of the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002, which levied markup at the rate of 1% per day on outstanding royalties and rentals — Held, the impugned sub-rules had no legal basis in the parent statute, namely the 1948 Act — Power to determine "rates" under S. 2(4) did not include power to impose markup — Imposition of such markup constituted deprivation of property without lawful authority in violation of Art. 24(1) of the Constitution — Rule-making power being a delegated authority must operate within the framework of the enabling statute — Since the 1948 Act neither explicitly nor by necessary implication empowered the Provincial Government to levy markup, the said sub-rules were declared ultra vires — No person can be burdened with financial obligations through subordinate legislation which are not contemplated by the parent statute — Judicial review exercised to strike down such excessive delegation. Held, markup imposed through Rr. 68(2) and 73(3) constituted unjust enrichment and lacked lawful justification. Cited Cases: • Sindh Revenue Board v. Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (2023 SCMR 1776) • Sanam Javaid Khan v. Election Appellate Tribunal (2024 SCMR 819) • Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority v. Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PLD 2023 SC 378) • Messrs Usman Enterprises v. Federation of Pakistan (1997 MLD 3161) • Orient Power Co. v. SNGPL (2021 SCMR 1728) (b) Administrative law — Rule-making power — Limits of delegated legislation — Ultra vires subordinate legislation — Principle of unjust enrichment Rules enacted under delegated powers must not create substantive rights, liabilities, or burdens not authorized by the enabling statute — Rr. 68(2) and 73(3) of the 2002 Rules purported to impose daily compounding markup on late payments without any corresponding authorization in the 1948 Act — Such rules, being beyond the rule-making mandate, were declared ultra vires — Further held, retention of such payments by the State amounts to unjust enrichment in the absence of lawful entitlement — Absence of “juristic reason” for enrichment renders the act constitutionally and jurisprudentially unsustainable. Held, fiscal rules must be strictly construed and cannot impose pecuniary burdens without clear legislative backing. Cited References: • Garland v. Consumers Gas Co. [2004] 1 S.C.R. 629 (Canada) • Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, American Law Institute • Haider Industries v. Federation of Pakistan (2016 PTD 2004) • SNGPL v. Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue (2014 PTD 1939) (c) Statutory interpretation — Fiscal statutes — Strict construction — No taxation or penalty by implication It is a settled rule of interpretation that fiscal burdens cannot be imposed by implication or equity — Any financial levy must arise from express language in the parent statute — Where statute is silent on imposition of markup or surcharge, rule-making authority cannot introduce it under the guise of procedural rules or incidental powers — In present case, “determination of rates” under S. 2(4) did not encompass imposition of daily penalty markup — Rules were accordingly struck down. Held, no fiscal liability can be imposed without express, clear, and unambiguous statutory provision. Cited Authorities: • PLD 1988 SC 370 • Khyal Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490) • Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 630) (d) Disposition Writ petition allowed — Sub-rule (2) of Rule 68 and sub-rule (3) of Rule 73 of the Punjab Mining Concession Rules, 2002 declared ultra vires — Impugned demand notices and orders issued thereunder quashed as without lawful authority and of no legal effect.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199; Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 ---- Ss. 4, 28, 31, 40; Punjab Healthcare Commission (Banning of Quackery) Regulations, 2016 ---- Reg. 2(c), 7 Maintainability of fine imposed by Hearing Committee under the Punjab Healthcare Commission framework --- Petitioners impugned order of District Judge, Attock, whereby the appellate court upheld imposition of fine (albeit reduced) for alleged illegal medical practice --- Petitioners alleged that the Hearing Committee lacked statutory competence to levy penalty under the Act, 2010, rendering the action coram non judice --- Held, Punjab Healthcare Commission was established under the Act, 2010 with explicit statutory mandate to improve quality of healthcare services and ban quackery in all forms --- Section 4(2)(g) and Section 28 of the Act empower the Commission to impose penalties for contraventions of the Act, rules, and regulations --- Under Section 40 of the Act, the Commission lawfully framed the Punjab Healthcare Commission (Banning of Quackery) Regulations, 2016, empowering nominated committees as "Competent Authorities" under Regulation 2(c) to exercise delegated powers of the Commission, including the imposition of fines --- Regulation 7 further authorizes such committees to pass various orders, including those necessary for eradication of quackery --- Judicial precedent affirmed that the Hearing Committee acts as a lawful delegatee of the Commission and its exercise of powers, including imposition of penalties, does not violate Section 28 of the Act, 2010 --- No illegality found in the constitution of the Committee or the impugned penalty order. (b) Quackery --- Definition --- Unauthorized healthcare practice --- Scope under Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 Petitioners accused of unauthorized practice of allopathy without requisite qualifications or PMDC registration --- Inspection team of Punjab Healthcare Commission found one petitioner rendering medical services at unlicensed premises styled as M/s Touseef Clinic --- Held, Act, 2010 defines “quack” as any pretender providing health services without registration from PMDC, Council for Tibb, Homeopathy, or Nursing --- Petitioners were proceeded against upon inspection report under Chapter V of the Act (Enforcement and Inspection), and issued notice before imposition of fine --- Determination of whether quackery was in fact committed was a question of fact evaluated by the competent authorities under law --- Petitioners failed to establish any procedural irregularity or violation of statutory safeguards. (c) Administrative Law --- Delegation of powers by statutory body --- Validity --- Hearing Committees under statutory regulations acting as alter ego of the Commission Challenge to Hearing Committee’s authority to impose fine rejected --- Held, Commission is a corporate entity empowered to delegate its functions, and such committees act as alter ego of the Commission --- Relying on Lahore High Court precedent (2025 LHC 3687) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab Healthcare Commission v. Muhammad Tariq Javaid (Civil Petition No. 5355 of 2024), delegation to hearing committees was found to be legally sound and binding --- Imposition of fine in present case fell squarely within lawful exercise of delegated authority. (d) Constitutional Petition --- Scope of judicial review under Art. 199 --- Interference with factual findings by statutory tribunals Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact by statutory authorities unless there is manifest illegality or jurisdictional error --- In present case, petitioners failed to demonstrate any violation of mandatory provisions of the Act, 2010 or Regulations, 2016 --- Findings of inspection team and penalty orders were passed after issuance of notice and due proceedings --- No case for interference made out --- Petition dismissed in limine. Disposition: Constitutional petition dismissed in limine. Cited Case: Muhammad Ahmad v. District Judge Pakpattan (2025 LHC 3687) Punjab Healthcare Commission v. Muhammad Tariq Javaid, Civil Petition No. 5355 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan -------"Imposition of fine by the Hearing Committee is an exercise of the power extended to the Commission and such the act or decision falls within the scope of Section 28 of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010"

Summary: (a) Drugs Act, 1976 ---- Ss. 19(6), 23, 27 & 30; Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 10A & 199 Jurisdiction of Drug Court --- Summoning of accused --- Initiation of prosecution under special statute --- Mandatory procedural safeguards --- Petitioners were summoned by Drug Court on an application filed by Assistant District Public Prosecutor (ADPP) without a statutory complaint by a Federal or Provincial Drugs Inspector as required under S.30 of the Drugs Act, 1976 --- Held, ADPP has no independent authority under the Act to initiate prosecution or revive proceedings once the District Quality Control Board has concluded proceedings by issuing a warning letter --- Section 30 of the Act, 1976 mandates that only an Inspector duly authorized by the Board may institute prosecution, and no deviation is permissible --- Drug Court acted without lawful authority in entertaining the ADPP’s application and summoning the petitioners without a fresh complaint or notice --- Proceedings suffered from jurisdictional defect and violated Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution guaranteeing legal protection and fair trial --- Absence of notice to the petitioners rendered the impugned summoning order void ab initio --- Concurrent administrative decision attained finality and could not be circumvented through collateral judicial action. Cited Cases: • The State v. Iqbal Ahmed Khan (1996 SCMR 767) • Jameel Qadir v. Government of Balochistan (2023 SCMR 1919)

Summary: The pivotal question before us is whether the powers conferred under Section 11 of the "Act" extends to the imposition of penalty and default surcharge for violations exclusively covered under Sections 2(43A), 3(9A), and 40C of the "Act", read with Serial No. 24 & 25 of Section 33 thereof. This structural distinction is well entrenched in the jurisprudence that machinery provisions must operate within the express confines of the substantive charging provisions they support. Any attempt to expand a machinery provision, such as Section 11 of the "Act", to cover penalties for purely regulatory defaults (as described at Serial Nos.24 and 25, or similar entries in the Table) amounts to reading into the statute a jurisdiction, which the Legislature has not conferred. Where a fiscal statute provides a penal consequence for breach of a statutory duty, such penal consequence must be enforced strictly within the four corners of the enabling provision. The Officer must cite and rely upon the specific statutory authority for both the imposition and recovery of penalty. Absent clear words to the contrary, a machinery provision designed to recover tax shortfall cannot be used as a fallback to recover regulatory penalties that do not flow from tax under assessment.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending