Summary: Effect of Repeal of Rule 17-A of the Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974. 334Civil Revision 59135/22 Muhammad Siddique Vs Talib Hussain Mr. Justice Masud Abid Naqvi 01- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 6611

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: During the pendency of the suit, when an interlocutory order authenticated by higher forums attains finality, such order cannot be challenged again alongwith the final order/judgment as same is exception to the general principle that interim order merges into final order. 332Regular First Appeal (R.F.A) (Final Decree) 23970/25 Tahir Javed Vs Muhammad Sharif Mr. Justice Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom 02- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4635 PLJ 2025 Lahore 798 (DB)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Held that the integrity and sanctity of judicial proceedings form the bedrock of the justice system. The authenticity of judicial orders is not a matter of procedural formality?it is the very essence of rule of law. No person?natural or juristic?can be permitted to forge, manipulate, or misuse judicial orders for personal or institutional gain. The Courts are not mere dispute-resolution forums; they are vested with the solemn duty to uphold the public confidence in the administration of justice. Any assault on the credibility of their proceedings strikes at the very soul of justice and cannot be tolerated under any circumstance. The judicial process cannot and shall not be permitted to be reduced to an arena of strategic deceit. Judicial orders carry the imprimatur of the rule of law, and any tampering therewith strikes at the very heart of the institutional integrity. When such tampering is committed and benefit thereof is drawn in a commercial context, the act transcends the bounds of private fraud and becomes a direct assault on the public interest in relation to the function of the judiciary. Therefore, this Court is under a duty not merely to resolve disputes, but to protect the authenticity of its own record and the confidence that litigants and society repose in it. Further held that the newly engaged counsel for the petitioner company has conducted himself with candour by expressly conceding that he finds no ethical or legal ground to justify the fraudulent conduct of his client?petitioner company, and has accordingly tendered an apology on its behalf. While this professional stance is appreciated, it must be underscored that such an apology, however gracefully made, cannot become basis to persuade the Court to overlook deliberate and intentional fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company. The process of administration of justice cannot be compromised through post-facto contrition when the offence strikes at the integrity of the judicial process itself. In present case, the gravity of the fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company transcends private regret and demands institutional response. 330Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 702-24 ZULFIQAR KHAN ETC VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 02- 07- 2025 2025 LHC 4928 2026 YLR 142 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Suit for declaration of an immoveable property---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art.129(g)---Alleged sale of land, challenge to---Dispute regarding execution of sale deed---Onus to prove---Beneficiary of a document to prove the transaction of sale---Principle---Producing revenue officials in order to prove sale transaction, importance of---Producing independent witness in support of an alleged sale---Requirement and importance---Present matter revolved around the dispute as to whether the petitioners/plaintiffs, claiming to be legal heirs of the deceased, could successfully challenge the sale deed in question and the subsequent mutation relating to the suit land---They asserted that the said documents were fictitious, fraudulent, forged, and without consideration---The core issue of the matter was regarding the validity of these transactions and whether the petitioners/plaintiffs were entitled to declaration of ownership and possession of the disputed land---Held: Onus was upon the respondent/ defendant who was beneficiary of the document i.e. sale deed to prove the transaction of sale, payment of consideration, execution of document in the presence of credible witnesses and availability of funds to pay the sale price---It was discernable from the statement of DW-1, special attorney of respondent/defendant and witness of the sale deed that he could not prove cash payment which was shown in the sale deed or claimed to have been paid by the respondent/defendant---The entire statement of DW-1 was unworthy of any credence and was otherwise inadmissible in law---In view of the statement of DW-1 as attorney of respondent/defendant wherein he had not supported the plea of respondent regarding payment of sale price, it was necessary for the respondent to appear as a witness to explain her position which was not done on the plea that she did not appear in the court---Despite admission of DW-1 that for the purpose of execution and completion of power of attorney in his favour she did come to kutchery, therefore, the plea for non-appearance was rightly not accepted by the trial court and as a consequence adverse presumption was rightly drawn against the respondent/ defendant for withholding the best evidence under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---It was manifest from evidence of the respondent/ defendant that no independent witness of the settlement of bargain or execution and registration of sale deed was produced to support and prove the alleged transaction of sale or execution of sale deed---None of the pivotal role-players such as patwari, tehsildar, sub-registrar, stamp vendor or deed writer were produced in evidence---It was a case in which no independent witness was produced in support of the alleged sale---For the above reasons, the impugned judgment of the District Court was set aside and the judgment of the trial court was restored---Present civil revision petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R.7---Evidence beyond pleadings---Admissibility---Prohibition---Evidence can be produced to prove the facts founded in the pleadings and evidence beyond pleadings or different from the pleadings cannot be considered as admissible and even if it is inadvertently brought on record the same cannot be relied upon or considered. Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others 1988 SCMR 1696 and Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21 rel. Saeed Yousaf Khan for Petitioners. Maaz Alam Baig for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd June, 2025. Judgment Rasaal Hassan Syed, J .--- This civil revision assails judgment and decree dated 14.3.2015 of learned Addl. District Judge, Rawalpindi whereby appeal was allowed, judgment and decree dated 13.1.2011 of learned Civil Judge was set aside and suit of petitioner was dismissed. 2. Facts as will be material and relevant for the decision of this revision petition are that petitioners instituted a suit for declaration to the effect that they are owners of suit land by way of inheritance and that sale deed No.1606 dated 02.2.2006 as also mutation No.5873 dated 29.4.2006 based on sale deed, are fictitious, result of fraud, without consideration, forged one and ineffective as against the rights of the petitioners which were liable to be annulled and that the respondent be restrained from further alienation of suit land. Later by permission of court the plaint was amended, and the relief of "possession" was inserted in the prayer clause of the plaint. The suit was contested, issues framed and evidence was recorded, whereafter, the learned Civil Judge decreed the suit of petitioners vide judgment dated 13.1.2011. Appeal filed by the respondent was allowed by learned Addl. District Judge Rawalpindi, in result, the judgment of trial court was set aside and suit was dismissed vide judgment dated 14.3.2015, impugned herein. 3. Heard. 4. Points raised at the time of hearing of the petition have been duly considered in the light of the record, comprised of pleadings, evidence of parties and the judgments of courts below, copies whereof were available with the petition. Perusal thereof reveals that the petitioners filed a suit for declaration to challenge sale deed No.1606 dated 02.2.2006 and mutation No.5873 attested on 29.4.2006 in respect of land measuring 16 kanals and 13 marlas at Ranial Village purportedly claimed from Raja Ali Asghar, deceased predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in favour of respondent, on the grounds of fraud, being fictitious, forged, without consideration and ineffective against the rights of petitioners who were the legal heirs of the deceased. Explaining the relationship between the parties, it was stated that petitioner No.2 was widow of deceased Raja Ali Asghar, while the remaining petitioners were his children and that the respondent Mst. Zamrood Jan was real sister of late Raja Ali Asghar. It was asserted that relations between petitioner No.2 and her husband Raja Ali Asghar were strained and that she was expelled from the house along with her children and was living in the house of her brother Raja Shafqat Khan. It was alleged that Raja Ali Asghar was initially doing his business in Raja Bazar, Rawalpindi but on account of malady of tuberculosis, he could not continue his business, abandoned the same and remained bedridden and that he was unable to move and ultimately died on 22.2.2006. After his demise, when the petitioner contacted patwari halqa for the mutation of inheritance, it transpired that the suit land had been transferred through registered sale deed No. 1606 dated 02.2.2006 in favour of respondent Mst. Zamrood Jan for fictitious sale price of Rs.6,00,000/- and mutation No.5873 dated 29.4.2006 was attested on the basis thereof. Petitioners' case was that the sale deed dated 02.2.2006 was never executed by the deceased Raja Ali Asghar nor was he in any physical health to appear before the sub-registrar or tehsildar and never appeared before any such functionaries or received alleged consideration for the sale of land and that the land was valuable, its real price was far more than the one fictitiously shown in the sale deed. In this backdrop, the petitioners sought annulment of sale deed and the mutation. Written statement was filed by the respondent wherein her response to the material facts was evasive who claimed that she purchased the suit land through registered sale deed and paid the entire consideration amount and that the sale deed was executed by Raja Ali Asghar in complete command of his senses with free will and consent. She denied that the deceased was suffering from any ailment but claimed that he used to visit hospital himself for his medical check-up. 5. Petitioners produced two witnesses including petitioner No.1 as PW-1 and tendered documents Ex.P1 to Ex.P9 and Mark-A to Mark-C in evidentiary support while in rebuttal the respondent produced two witnesses including DW-1 who appeared as her special attorney and also as one of the witnesses of the disputed sale deed and produced a friend of his as DW-2. Documents Ex.D1 to Ex.D4 were also adduced including copy of sale deed Ex.D3 and mutation No.5873 as Ex.D4. 6. In the instant case the sale deed was challenged by legal heirs of late Raja Ali Asghar, who filed the suit on 21.9.2006. Material circumstances of the case which are relevant are that the sale deed was allegedly executed on 02.2.2006 while Raja Ali Asghar died on 22.2.2006 just after twenty days from the date of alleged sale deed. Petitioners in support of their case produced evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 who reiterated the facts as recorded in the plaint viz. deceased used to do his business in the shop which he had abandoned on account of his sickness i.e. acute tuberculosis; relations between petitioner No.2 and the late Raja Ali Asghar were strained, she i.e. petitioner No.2 was living with her brother along with her children and that in the last days the deceased was bedridden and was not in a position to move or to walk nor could he have appeared before the sub-registrar or tehsildar and never agreed to sell the land or appeared before sub-registrar or received any payment and that respondent who was widow of Raja Lehrasip Khan, real brother of petitioner No.2, and was living apart from Raja Lehrasip Khan since the year 1985, did not have any funds to purchase the property and that the price of the land as shown was fictitious and that the fact that Raja Ali Asghar died twenty days after the alleged sale deed but no amount was found in his account, was a proof of the fact that sale deed was fictitious and that no consideration was even paid. In the presence of evidence produced by the petitioners, the onus was upon the respondent who was beneficiary of the document i.e. sale deed to prove the transaction of sale, payment of consideration, execution of document in the presence of credible witnesses and payment of consideration and availability of funds to pay the sale price. DW-1 Raja Mujeeb ur Rehman who appeared as special attorney and witness of the sale deed admitted in cross-examination that petitioner No.2 was living with her brothers along with her children on account of strained relations with late Raja Ali Asghar. He further admitted that late Raja Ali Asghar used to run a shop in Raja Bazar but left the shop and business six to seven years before his death. He also admitted that reason for discontinuation of his shop was affliction of tuberculosis. and that after leaving his shop in Raja Bazar he used to live in the house on account of his sickness and did not do any work/service/business. 7. An important aspect of DW-1 was that he came up with new stance that after leaving the business the creditors of Raja Ali Asghar used to demand the return of their loans due from him and that the respondent paid off the creditors by selling her jewelry. He stated that there were twenty to twenty-five creditors to whom the payment was made and respondent sold her jewelry about fifty tola and paid off the dues of creditors of late Raja Ali Asghar and in this way she paid rupees seven to eight lakh. About the sale deed he stated that late Raja Ali Asghar was paid only one to one and half lakh in cash few days before the sale deed while the remaining consideration was in lieu of the debt discharged by respondent to the creditors on behalf of deceased Raja Ali Asghar. Strangely enough in the written statement the stance of respondent was that rupees six lakh was paid in cash as consideration in the house and that was also so stated in the sale deed but while appearing as attorney of respondent and being one of the witnesses DW-1 totally denied and contradicted the stance of respondent in the written statement and did not support the stance of cash payment of rupees six lakh as consideration to the deceased. On being cross-examined he could not disclose the name of the creditors nor could produce any proof of payment to the creditors. It is settled rule that the evidence could be produced to prove the facts founded in the pleadings and that evidence beyond pleadings or different from the pleadings cannot be considered as admissible and even if it is inadvertently brought on record the same cannot be relied upon or considered. Reference can be made to Mst. Jannat Bibi v. Sher Muhammad and others (1988 SCMR 1696) and Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam (2015 SCMR 21) 8. It is discernible from the statement of DW-1, special attorney of respondent and witness of the sale deed that he could not prove cash payment which is shown in the sale deed or claimed to have been paid by the respondent. The entire statement of DW-1 was unworthy of any credence and was otherwise inadmissible in law. However, from the statement of DW-1 it is evident that he had admitted that the deceased Raja Ali Asghar was suffering from tuberculosis who abandoned the business because of his health and that he did not do any work thereafter till his death. In view of the statement of DW-1 as attorney of respondent wherein he had not supported the plea of respondent regarding payment of sale price, it was necessary for the respondent to appear as a witness to explain her position which was not done on the plea that she did not appear in the court. Despite admission of DW-1 that for the purpose of execution and completion of power of attorney in his favour she did come to kutchery, therefore, the plea for non-appearance was rightly not accepted by the learned trial court and as a consequence adverse presumption was rightly drawn against the respondent for withholding the best evidence under Article 129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. 9. The other witness DW-2 who was friend of DW-1 was not related to the late Raja Ali Asghar nor had any other contact with the deceased. He admitted in cross-examination that he was not resident of the village where the deceased resided and that he did not know the name of lumberdar nor could tell the name of any person living in the village. So much so that he admitted in cross-examination that the deceased was suffering from ailment and used to get hospitalized. He stated that before the sale deed Raja Ali Asghar deceased was sick and remained admitted in hospital but he did not know whether he was admitted in the hospital after the sale deed but stated that he died twenty-two or twenty-three days after the sale deed. It is manifest from the evidence of respondent that no independent witness of the settlement of bargain or execution and registration of sale deed was produced to support and prove the alleged transaction of sale or execution of sale deed. So much so the brother of deceased who was alive as admitted by DW-1 and with whom the deceased was living at that time was produced to support the transaction. Curiously none of the pivotal role-players such as patwari, tehsildar, sub-registrar, stamp vendor or deed writer was produced in evidence. It was a case in which no independent witnesses was produced in support of the alleged sale. These facts were duly examined by learned Civil Judge and on indepth scrutiny thereof it was decided that the respondent had failed to establish the execution of sale deed. In his judgment he took note of all these facts noted supra and also recorded multiple reasons to reach the conclusion that the respondent had miserably failed to prove the execution of sale deed and payment of consideration. In appeal the learned Addl. District Judge opted to ignore these facts on perfunctory reasoning and against the settled law. The evidence was not properly construed rather important facts necessary to prove execution of sale could not be proved. Evidence led by respondent rather proved the case of petitioners and otherwise the plea raised in evidence being contrary to the pleadings and the contents of documents under challenge, the learned Addl. District Judge, illegally set aside the judgment of the learned Civil Judge. 10. For the reasons recorded supra, the revision petition is allowed, impugned judgment dated 14.3.2015 of learned Addl. District Judge, Rawalpindi is set aside and the judgment and decree dated 13.1.2011 of learned Civil Judge, Rawalpindi is restored. UN/M-113/L Revision allowed.

Summary: (Criminal Misc: Bail Petition) (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.—bail refusal of—The petitioner was directly charged in a daylight occurrence with a specific motive and the parties were previously known to each, so no question arose qua mis-identification of the accused. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.—bail refusal of—The allegations contained in the FIR were duly supported by the ocular account, site plan, recoveries effected from the spot in the shape of blood and empties and the FSL report in respect of crime empties and weapon of offence. (c) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.—bail refusal of—Acquittal of co- accused—Acquittal of co-accused would not benefit the petitioner for the reason that evidence collected by the investigating agency against the petitioner was yet to be analyzed by the trial Court. (d) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.—bail refusal of—Acquittal of co- accused—The petitioner remained fugitive from law for a sufficient time and no plausible explanation was forthcoming for such a long abscondence. (Petition was dismissed in the circumstances).

Summary: The High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 in matters of testing the vires of a law is confined to assessing constitutional legality, not the wisdom of legislative policy. However, where statutory design, such as, requiring premarital screening but ignoring its results-as provided in the KP Preventive Health Act, 2009, the law under consideration in this case-undermines the law's preventive purpose. The Court may draw attention to these gaps and urge the legislature to act. Pre-marital care promotes the health of spouses before conception and serves as a primary preventive strategy for safeguarding public health and future generations. Guided by proportionality, any restriction on personal autonomy must serve a compelling interest through the least restrictive means, while the principle of progressive realization of health rights under the International Government of Economic, Social and Culture rights (to which Pakistan is a party), obliges continuous legal and institutional improvement. The provincial legislature should strengthen the law by adding genetic counselling, confidentiality safeguards, NADRA integration, and subsidized treatments. The petitioner's suffering, as a child with thalassemia, underscores the need for a robust preventive framework, especially in Pakistan, where inherited blood disorders impose severe social and economic costs, demanding a compassionate State response.

Summary: (a) The doctrine of implied repeal (leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant) is a concept in constitutional theory which states that where an Act of Parliament conflicts with an earlier one, the later Act takes precedence and the conflicting parts of the earlier Act are repealed, i.e., they no longer remain law . (b) It is a settled proposition of law that the doctrine of estoppel cannot be attracted against the law; even with the consent of the parties, it cannot confer jurisdiction upon any forum which otherwise lacks jurisdiction. The examination and evaluation of jurisdiction at the initial stage is also significant pursuant to the well-settled principle that the parties cannot, by mutual consent, take away the jurisdiction vested in any court of law, nor can they confer jurisdiction upon any court not vested with it by law. Parties cannot confer jurisdiction upon a court or other judicial or quasi-judicial forum through consent where, in law, such jurisdiction does not exist. The same principle applies to waiver and acquiescence in relation to courts or forums lacking jurisdiction; such an inherent defect cannot be cured by the rules of consent, waiver, estoppel, or acquiescence.