Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): —O. VI, R. 15—Verification of pleadings—Failure to verify plaint by all plaintiffs—Effect. The appellants contended that the suit was incompetent as it was neither instituted nor verified by all plaintiffs, and only one plaintiff affixed thumb impressions on behalf of the others. The Court held that under O. VI, R. 15, C.P.C., every pleading must be verified by the party or a person acquainted with the facts of the case. When such an objection is raised, the trial court must summon all plaintiffs to verify whether they filed the suit. Mere reliance on the depositions of two witnesses without proper verification was an error, and such an omission cannot be overlooked. (b) Evidence Law—Forgery Allegations: —Tampering with thumb impressions—Requirement of proper inquiry. The appellate court held that the appellants had superimposed thumb impressions on the plaint and Wakalat Nama without conducting any proper inquiry. The High Court ruled that no party can be held guilty of forgery or tampering without a fair trial, scrutiny, and evidence. The appellate court’s findings, based on assumptions rather than an investigation, were legally unsustainable. (c) Appellate Jurisdiction: —Scope of second appeal—Misreading of evidence—Failure to exercise vested jurisdiction. The appellate court disregarded material evidence (Ex.D1 to Ex.D3) based on unverified assumptions regarding thumb impression tampering. The High Court held that such findings were self-conceived and lacked legal backing. Misreading or non-reading of evidence, leading to an erroneous conclusion, constitutes a jurisdictional defect that warrants appellate interference. (d) Remand of Case: —Improper adjudication at appellate stage—Need for fresh decision. The appellate court’s failure to properly address verification of the plaint and conduct an inquiry into allegations of tampering necessitated a remand. The High Court directed the appellate court to redecide the case afresh within three months, ensuring compliance with due process and proper inquiry into the issues raised. ----Disposition: Regular second appeal allowed. Judgment and decree of the appellate court set aside. Case remanded for fresh adjudication.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a flour mill, filed a writ petition challenging Clause 6 of the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) issued by the Director Food, Punjab. The petitioner argued that this clause restricted their ability to receive a wheat quota from the government during the grinding of wheat for the Pakistan Army, with whom they had a contract. The petitioner contended that this restriction was contrary to the Wheat Release Milling Policy 2022-2023, which allowed flour mills to grind private wheat stocks, including for the Army. -----Issues: 1- Whether Clause 6 of the SOP issued by the Director Food, Punjab, which restricts the issuance of wheat quota to flour mills during Army grinding, violates the petitioner’s rights under the Wheat Release Milling Policy 2022-2023. ----2- Whether the SOP is lawful and in accordance with the Rules and Constitution. ----3- Whether the petitioner is entitled to government-subsidized wheat quotas during the days of Army grinding. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the SOP, including Clause 6, is lawful and within the authority of the Food Department. The Director Food, Punjab, is empowered to issue such SOPs to ensure proper monitoring and management of wheat distribution. The court emphasized that the petitioner mill is obligated to comply with the SOP, which requires providing the monthly grinding schedule approved by the Pakistan Army to the District Food Controller before receiving subsidized wheat. The petitioner had failed to provide this information, and as a result, the government wheat quota was withheld during Army grinding days. The court found no violation of the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Article 18 of the Constitution, as the petitioner’s rights to trade and business are subject to compliance with lawful regulations, such as the SOP in question. The court also noted that while the petitioner’s contract with the Pakistan Army restricted the disclosure of certain sensitive information, the SOP only required the submission of the grinding schedule, which does not fall under the prohibited category of information. The petition was dismissed as the petitioner failed to provide sufficient grounds to declare the SOP unlawful or violative of fundamental rights. The court concluded that the petitioner must comply with the SOP for the issuance of government wheat quotas and that the SOP was lawfully issued by the relevant authority. -----Citations/Precedents: SUI NORTHERN GAS PIPELINES LIMITED vs. FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN (2022 MLD 1158) ATTAULLAH KHAN vs. ALI AZAM AFRIDI (2023 PLC (C.S) 182) ASADULLAH MANGI vs. PAKISTAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES CORPORATION (2005 SCMR 445)

Summary: Petitioner applied for BPS-18 post in NACTA. He is aggrieved that posts are being directly filled instead of through FPSC.

Summary: ---Quote: "Every citizen has a right of political and social justice, freedom of speech and thought. Print and electronic media are the means of receiving and providing such information to and from the people. Upon exercise of right of freedom of speech and expression, politically motivated FIRs are being registered for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, 505 of the PPC, without following the procedure, as provided in section 196 of the Cr.P.C., which is an illegality. The Government must tolerate the criticism of its political opponents being the chosen representatives of the people, instead of considering them as enemy of State." -----Background: ---- The High Court had dismissed his criminal revision for acquittal in a case involving allegations of conspiracy and incitement against the state. The FIR, No. 691 dated 09.08.2022, was registered against Shahbaz Gill and others, including the petitioner, under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) based on views expressed by Gill during a live telecast on ARY News. -----Issues: 1) Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC without a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government as required by Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. ---2) Whether the registration of the FIR and subsequent proceedings against the petitioner were valid. ---3) Whether there was sufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction and Section 196 of the Code: The court emphasized that Section 196 of the Code mandates a complaint by the Federal or Provincial Government for offences under sections 121-A, 124, 153-A, and 505 of the PPC. The FIR was registered with the permission of the Secretary, Ministry of Interior, which did not satisfy the requirements of Section 196, as the Secretary was not authorized to delegate this power further. Thus, the Trial Court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of these offences based on the FIR. -----Registration of FIR and Proceedings: The court found that the FIR was registered without adhering to the mandatory procedure prescribed by Section 196. The petitioner was not initially named in the FIR but was implicated later based on the investigation. The main evidence against the petitioner, a transcript allegedly obtained from the main accused, was contested and lacked clear evidentiary value. -----Material for Framing Charges: The court held that there was insufficient material to frame charges against the petitioner. The petitioner could not be held responsible for the actions of the main accused without prima facie cogent evidence. The court highlighted the misuse of authority and the potential chilling effect on media freedom, stressing the importance of protecting constitutional rights. ----Outcome: The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed. The judgments of the High Court and the Trial Court were set aside. The proceedings initiated against the petitioner based on FIR No. 691 were quashed. The petitioner was acquitted from the case. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 196 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan; PLD 2016 SC 808. The State v. Raja Abdul Rehman; 2005 SCMR 1544. Zahoor-ud-Din v. Khushi Muhammad; 1998 SCMR 1840.

Summary: Section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 lays down the grounds for eviction of a tenant from the rented premises. Personal bonafide need is one of the recognized grounds for eviction. Sub-section 4 (b) of section 17 of the "Act, 1963" deals with the ground of personal bonafide need in case of commercial building It is an oft repeated principle of law that whenever a landlord pleads that the "rented premises" are required to him for his personal need bonafidely, assertion on oath by the landlord that he requires the property in good faith for his personal use shall be sufficient to accept his bonafides if such assertions are consistent and in conformity with the averments of the ejectment petition. Such statement cannot be discarded in vacuum. Even otherwise, it is always the landlord, who is vested with the prerogative to exercise his choice for the "rented premises" and if he needs it bonafidely for his personal use, his claim cannot be rejected outrightly.

Summary: Background:This case involves Civil Appeal No. 377 of 2014 brought before the Supreme Court of Pakistan, challenging the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, dated 19.12.2013, which dismissed a constitution petition filed by the appellant under Article 199 of the Constitution. The appeal arises from a dispute between the Muslim Commercial Bank Limited (the appellant) and Muhammad Anwar Mandokhel (the respondent) regarding the respondent's termination from employment.---Issues:Whether the Balochistan Labour Court had jurisdiction over disputes that are trans-provincial in nature.Whether the respondent's classification as a workman by the lower courts was appropriate.Whether the expired Industrial Relations Act of 2008 and subsequent legislation affected the respondent's legal recourse.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The appellant argued that disputes trans-provincial in nature fall outside the jurisdiction of the Balochistan Labour Court, citing a recent precedent. However, the respondent contended that the nature of the duties performed determines workman status, not designation or salary. The Court determined that this appeal exceeded the scope of Article 185(3) of the Constitution.The appellant challenged the respondent's classification as a workman, arguing that his primary responsibility was business development, not manual or clerical work. The respondent countered that his duties qualified him as a workman. The Court found that the respondent's role and evidence presented were properly considered by the lower courts.The respondent sought remedy under the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, before its expiration. Despite subsequent legislation, the Court held that the respondent acted within the legal framework available at the time. The Court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Labour Court and dismissed the appeal.---Citations/Precedents:Air League of PIA C Employees through President v. Federation of Pakistan (2011 SCMR 1254)Cases: Civil Appeal No. 407/2013, Civil Petition Nos. 1150/2011, 127/2013, 1754, and 1755 of 2012.---Quote:It is not the nature of the dispute but it is the status of the employer or the group of employers, which would determine the jurisdiction of the Provincial Labour Court and that of the National Industrial Relation Commission.

Summary: Background: This civil appeal was filed by the appellants against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Mirpur, dated 31.03.2008, which upheld the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge, Mirpur, dated 10.08.2006. The case involves the inheritance of land originally owned by Allah Ditta and Karam Allahi. After Allah Ditta's death, his widow, Inayat Begum, married Muhammad Sadiq and transferred the entire property to herself, later gifting it to Sadiq. The appellants, claiming to be the legal heirs of Karam Allahi, contested this transfer. ----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court properly identified and considered the legal heirs of Karam Allahi. 2- Whether the property transfer and subsequent gift to Muhammad Sadiq were legally valid. 3- Whether the trial court's judgment and decree were sustainable under Islamic inheritance laws. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Identification of Legal Heirs: The court found that the trial court failed to properly identify and consider the legal heirs of Karam Allahi. According to Islamic Law, specifically under Section 44 of Muhammadan Law, inheritance must be divided among heirs at the moment of death of the deceased. The appellants, as distant kindred, should have been considered for inheritance. --Validity of Property Transfer and Gift: The court held that the transfer of property to Inayat Begum and the subsequent gift to Muhammad Sadiq were not legally valid. The trial court did not adequately address the devolution of property according to Islamic inheritance laws, particularly given Karam Allahi's status as a lunatic. --Sustainability of Trial Court's Judgment: The court determined that the trial court's judgment and decree were not sustainable. The trial court had not followed the proper legal procedures in identifying the heirs and determining the inheritance. The decision was made in a hasty manner without due consideration of the evidence and the applicable legal principles. The appeal was accepted, and the judgments and decrees of both the District Judge and the Senior Civil Judge were set aside. The case was remanded to the trial court to decide on the specific issue of identifying the legal heirs of Karam Allahi. The trial court was directed to include the public at large as parties in the case under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC and to adjudicate the matter strictly according to Islamic inheritance laws. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 44 of Muhammadan Law Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC PLD 1963 SC 382 - Imtiaz Ahmed vs. Gullam Ali Islamic Law on Distant Kindred: Descendants of the deceased other than sharers and residuaries. Ascendants of the deceased other than sharers and residuaries. Descendants of parents other than sharers and residuaries. Descendants of ascendants how highsoever other than residuaries. This decision emphasized the importance of adhering to Islamic inheritance laws and proper legal procedures in determining the rightful heirs and distributing the inheritance accordingly.