Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Background: The appellant was convicted for the murder of her husband, and her four children by the Additional Sessions Judge in Khushab, based on an incident that occurred on July 11, 2018. The conviction was based on the testimony of the complainant and witnesses who claimed to have found the appellant at the crime scene holding a knife. The appellant was sentenced to death on five counts under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). She appealed the decision, and the case was reviewed by the Lahore High Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of the murders. ----2- Whether the delay in reporting the crime raised doubts about the prosecution's case. ----3- Whether the testimony of witnesses, who were classified as chance witnesses, could be relied upon. ----4- Whether the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant was credible. ----5- Whether the medical and forensic evidence supported the conviction. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Delay in Reporting: The court found that there was an unexplained delay in registering the FIR, which raised suspicion about the authenticity of the prosecution’s case. The complainant’s delayed actions were not satisfactorily explained. --Testimony of Chance Witnesses: The court doubted the reliability of the witnesses (the complainant and others) who were not from the vicinity and were classified as chance witnesses. Their presence at the crime scene at an odd hour (3:30 a.m.) without a clear and plausible reason diminished the credibility of their testimony. --Extra-Judicial Confession: The appellant's alleged confession made to family members, who were hostile towards her, was deemed unreliable. The court noted that such confessions are the weakest form of evidence and should be corroborated by strong and independent evidence, which was lacking in this case. --Forensic Evidence: The court found that the prosecution failed to establish a connection between the appellant and the crime through forensic evidence. The absence of a DNA test to match the blood on the weapons and clothes with that of the deceased weakened the prosecution’s case. Additionally, no fingerprints were found on the murder weapons. --Medical Evidence: The court held that the medical evidence did not support the prosecution's case. While the postmortem reports confirmed the deaths, they did not link the appellant to the crime. No significant findings from the forensic reports were brought forward to prove the appellant's involvement. --Motive: The alleged motive, that the appellant committed the murders due to being tortured by her husband, was not supported by any independent evidence. The court noted that the prosecution failed to provide any reason for why the appellant would also kill her children. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction and death sentence were overturned, and the appellant was acquitted. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Asia Bibi v. The State (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 64) Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1068) Muhammad Adnan and another v. The State and others (2021 SCMR 16) Ghulam Mustafa v. The State (2021 SCMR 542) Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others (2015 SCMR 1142) Sajid Mumtaz and others v. Basharat and others (2006 SCMR 231) Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan and others (2016 SCMR 274) Nasir Javed and another v. The State (2016 SCMR 1144) Imran alias Dully and another v. The State and others (2015 SCMR 155) Muhammad Asif v. The State (2017 SCMR 486) Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State (2019 SCMR 652) Muhammad Pervez v. The State and others (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 592) ----Quote: ''If blood group of deceased of the case is noted by the doctor in the post-mortem examination report, then it would be helpful for ascertaining blood group available on blood stained cotton secured from the place of occurrence, blood stained clothes of the deceased and blood stained weapon as well as for D.N.A. test.''

Summary: Background: The State, through the Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF), Rawalpindi, appealed against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated May 30, 2012, which dismissed the State's appeal under Section 43 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977. The appeal concerned properties allegedly acquired through smuggling by Obaid Khan (deceased) and others. The ANF had informed the Special Judge (Central), Customs, Taxation, and Anti-Smuggling in Peshawar about the suspected properties. The Special Judge issued a notice under Section 31 of the Act to the accused to explain the source of their properties. Upon review, the Special Judge declared that 40% of the properties were acquired through smuggling and ordered forfeiture to the Federal Government, allowing the accused to pay a fine equivalent to the market value of the properties instead. ----Issues: Whether the Anti-Narcotic Force (ANF) can be considered a "person aggrieved" to prefer an appeal under Section 43 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977. Whether the Peshawar High Court's interpretation of "person aggrieved" in the context of Section 43 of the Act was correct. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Interpretation of "Person Aggrieved": The Supreme Court focused on the interpretation of "person aggrieved" under Section 43 of the Act. It held that the term refers to a person who has suffered a legal wrong or injury, not merely someone who is disappointed by the outcome of a decision. The ANF, having only furnished information to the Special Judge and not being required to participate further, did not suffer any legal grievance from the judge's decision. Therefore, the ANF could not be considered a "person aggrieved" entitled to appeal under Section 43. Maintainability of the Appeal: The Court concluded that the ANF's appeal was rightly dismissed by the Special Appellate Court and the Peshawar High Court as not maintainable. The ANF, as an informer, had no further role after providing the information, and its legal rights were not infringed by the Special Judge's decision. ----Citations/Precedents: Anti Narcotics Force v. Haji Iqbal Shah [1999 P.Cr.L.J 1125]: This precedent established that the right of appeal under Section 43 of the Act is restricted to a "person" who does not include the State. Federal Government v. Obaid Khan [2012 P.Cr.L.J 1765]: This case upheld the view that the State or its agencies are not considered "persons aggrieved" under Section 43 of the Act. Re Sidebotham [(1880) 14 Ch. D. 458]: Defined "person aggrieved" as one who suffers a legal grievance. Benson v. Northern Ireland Road Transport Board [(1942) All E.R 465]: Emphasized that the right of appeal is a creation of statute and cannot be implied. ----Conclusion: The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the appeal by the State and the ANF, affirming that the ANF, as an informer, did not qualify as a "person aggrieved" under Section 43 of the Prevention of Smuggling Act, 1977. The Court highlighted procedural and substantive lacunas in the Act and suggested legislative amendments to allow the State or Government to appeal against orders of the Special Judge.

Summary: The case revolved around a dispute regarding the acquisition of land in District Malir, Sindh, where Bahria Town claimed a shortfall of 5,149 acres from the agreed-upon 16,896 acres.The court ordered a survey to determine the actual land possession by Bahria Town, which revealed that the company was in possession of 19,931.63 acres, surpassing the agreed-upon acreage. The court dismissed Bahria Town's claims of a shortfall and accused them of using the applications as a pretext to avoid payments. The court emphasized Bahria Town's default in payments, highlighting that it had stopped making payments after the initial installments.Additionally, the court addressed the receipt of foreign remittances into the Supreme Court's account, pointing out that such transactions were not permitted by the consent order. The court ordered the amounts received from abroad, totaling about GBP 136 million and USD 44 million, to be remitted to the Government of Pakistan. Furthermore, the court directed the remaining amounts in the Supreme Court's account, constituting a portion of the cost of land, to be remitted to the Government of Sindh.The court dismissed Bahria Town's application regarding notices from the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and expressed unwillingness to comment on matters pending before NAB. The court also raised concerns about the lack of a legal framework governing allotments by developers/builders, urging the government to establish a record-keeping mechanism to protect allottees and prevent malpractices. The National Bank of Pakistan was instructed to close the account in the name of the Registrar of the Supreme Court, and relevant authorities were informed of the court's decisions.

Summary: Under Article 212 of the Constitution, people can claim damages against public servants over failure to fulfil their constitutional duties --- ''When on account of transgression, wrongful exercise of authority, abuse of power or reckless disregard for or neglect of public duties the constitutional rights are denied or breached, the citizen who has been wronged becomes entitled to claim various remedies including damages in common law for the tortuous acts'' --- The judge emphasizes the significance of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land and underscores the solemn commitment of public office holders to uphold, defend, and protect the rights of citizens as enshrined in the Constitution. --- The judge criticizes the impunity for violations of the Constitution and the failure of the state to ensure citizens' inalienable rights. The case specifically highlights the misfeasance in public office and breach of duties by those responsible for organizing elections within the stipulated time frame. --- The opinion provides a detailed account of the events leading to the delayed appointment of caretaker governments and the subsequent failure to hold timely general elections in Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. It mentions the legal proceedings initiated in response to these delays, including petitions filed in the Lahore High Court and Peshawar High Court. --- The judge emphasizes the role of the Election Commission of Pakistan and the crucial duty it holds in ensuring the timely conduct of general elections. The opinion further discusses the court's role in the matter, highlighting a suo motu case and the decisions made by a nine-member bench. --- The judge argues that any delay in holding general elections beyond the constitutionally mandated period constitutes a serious violation of citizens' rights and the foundational principles of the Constitution. The opinion concludes by asserting the gravity of such violations and the duty of the judiciary to address them, emphasizing the need to ensure the governance of the state by the people through their elected representatives. ---- Foundational Political Right: The Constitution grants citizens the political right to govern the state through chosen representatives. This right is considered fundamental, and its violation would render the Constitution ineffective. --- Violation Consequences: Violation of the foundational political right not only jeopardizes the Constitution but also affects other constitutionally guaranteed rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and dignity. --- Current Situation: The text points out a current violation of the Constitution where provincial assemblies were dissolved, and elections were not held within the prescribed time frame, leading to a constitutional impasse. --- Failures of Authorities: The President, Governors, and the Election Commission are criticized for failing to fulfill their constitutional duties, contributing to the violation. The judiciary's role in resolving the matter is also discussed. ---- Impunity for Constitutional Violations: The text argues that there is a historical pattern of impunity for constitutional violations by those in power, citing instances where martial law and coups were legitimized by the judiciary. --- Lack of Deterrence: Despite the existence of laws against high treason, the text asserts that there has been a lack of deterrence, with perpetrators often going unpunished, contributing to a culture of impunity. --- Remedies and Accountability: The text explores the remedies available to citizens for constitutional torts, emphasizing the need to make public powers accountable and to put an end to the culture of impunity. --- Citizens' Rights: The registered voters are portrayed as victims, deprived of their constitutional rights, and the responsibility is placed on the President, Governors, and the Election Commission for causing this loss. ---- Unique Remedies in Constitutional Tort: The text suggests that the Constitution provides unique rights for citizens to claim remedies for constitutional torts, allowing them to seek damages for violations of their constitutional rights by state authorities. --- "In our Constitution, the framers have expressly created the right to claim remedies for tortuous acts of the government or any person in the service of Pakistan or other authority empowered by law to levy any tax or cess and any servant of such authority acting in the discharge of his duties as such servant'' --- Justice Minallah says that when on account of transgression, wrongful exercise of authority, abuse of power or reckless disregard for or neglect of public duties the constitutional rights are denied or breached, the citizen who has been wronged becomes entitled to claim various remedies including damages in common law for the tortuous acts.The violation of a constitutional right is in itself an independent wrong and its violation is premised on the adage that there is no right without a remedy. In a few jurisdictions the right to seek a remedy for tortuous acts of public authorities is recognised in the Constitution while in most of the countries the jurisprudence has developed under the common law.It is a unique and distinguishable feature of the Constitution because it expressly confers the right to claim public law remedies for tortuous acts of three categories of public authorities. It is a right which appears to have escaped the attention of the courts nor has it been invoked by a victim of wrongful exercise of public power.It can create a formidable deterrence for violations of the Constitution and constitutional rights if the victims are enabled to effectively exercise this right. It is regrettable that no initiative has been made since the promulgation of the Constitution to establish special courts as contemplated by the framers.

Summary: Issue: The petitioners challenged the validity of the insertion of Section 5 TE through the Finance Act, 2022, to the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. This section deemed that for the tax year 2022 and onwards, a resident person would be considered to have derived income equal to 5% of the fair market value of their capital assets situated in Pakistan, chargeable to tax at 20% under Division-VIII C of Part-I of the Ordinance. This specifically targeted immovable property owned by resident persons.---Arguments: The petitioners argued that this deeming clause to tax the fair market value of immovable property as income was not permissible, citing precedents from the Apex Court in the case of Messrs Elahi Cotton Mills and the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Harbhajan Singh Dhillon. They contended that taxing the capital value of an asset, particularly targeting immovable property alone, was beyond the competence of Parliament.---Decision: The court held that:In light of Entry No. 50 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, Parliament did not have the jurisdiction to impose income tax on immovable property.However, Parliament did have the jurisdiction to tax the capital value of assets per Entry No. 47 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution.The court did not agree with the reasoning of the Sindh High Court, which upheld the impugned legislation, nor did it find the curative judgment of the Lahore High Court, which suggested reading down the impugned legislation, appropriate.---Outcome: The court declared the challenged section concerning the taxation of the fair market value of immovable property as income beyond the Parliament's jurisdiction.

Summary: Issues:Whether the Punjab Service Tribunal erred in dismissing the service appeal filed by the petitioner.The applicability and procedure of departmental appeals and revisions under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, and the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975.----Judgment:The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed the Civil Petition, affirming the decision of the Punjab Service Tribunal. The Court found no illegality or perversity in the Tribunal's judgment, holding that the disciplinary action against the petitioner was justified based on the findings of the inquiry officer and the competent authority.----Rationale:The Court observed that the petitioner was provided ample opportunity to defend himself during the inquiry process. The Tribunal meticulously considered the gravity of the allegations and the inquiry proceedings. The Court also clarified the legal framework regarding departmental appeals and revisions under the relevant laws and rules, emphasizing that revisions are not a vested right but are exercised suo motu by the competent authority. The Court referred to precedents to support its interpretation of the legal provisions governing departmental appeals and revisions.----Citations and Precedents Relied on by the Court:Ahmad Ali vs. Inspector-General, Punjab Police and others (1990 SCMR 1450): This case highlighted that the Service Tribunal does not condone delays resulting from the filing of revisions where no right to such revision exists under the special law.--Muhammad Yaqoob vs. District Police Officer, District Sahiwal and others (2006 SCMR 310): This precedent established that a civil servant cannot take advantage of the revision provision under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, to extend the limitation period for filing an appeal before the Service Tribunal, as no such right to file a revision as a matter of right is provided under the special law.

Summary: PLJ 2023 Lahore (Note) 161 -----Elections Act, 2017 - Sections 2(xii), 60(4), 62(9)(b)(i), 63 Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 - Article 189 -----Legal Issues: --Objection on Nomination Papers - The appellant’s nomination papers were rejected as his proposer’s name was not enrolled in the constituency NA-133. The appellant’s proposers or seconders were not registered in NA-133’s Electoral Roll, as required. --Due Diligence Requirement - The appellant did not utilize the option of submitting up to five nomination papers, which could have mitigated the issue. --Interpretation of Section 60(4) with Section 62(9)(b)(i) - These sections stipulate that the rejection of one nomination paper does not invalidate a candidate’s nomination if other valid papers exist. However, a candidate must be proposed by a voter listed in the Electoral Roll of the relevant constituency. --Binding Precedent - The Tribunal, bound by Article 189, upheld the Supreme Court’s prior interpretations and confirmed it could not re-interpret provisions that had already been decided by the Supreme Court. Ruling: The Election Tribunal dismissed the petition, holding that the appellant’s failure to ensure his proposer was a registered voter in NA-133 and to submit multiple nomination papers showed a lack of due diligence. Additionally, the Tribunal affirmed that it could not deviate from the Supreme Court's binding interpretation of the relevant provisions under Article 189. ----Cited Precedents: PLD 2016 SC 944, PLD 2007 SC 277 ----Judgment Result: Petition dismissed. -----Background: This case involves election appeals against the rejection of nomination papers by the Returning Officer for the NA-133 constituency. The rejection was based on the grounds that the proposers or seconders of certain candidates were not enrolled as voters within the same constituency, as required by Section 62(9)(b)(i) of the Elections Act, 2017. The appellants argued that this error should be considered minor and correctable, allowing substitution of the proposers. ----Issues: 1- Whether the nomination papers can be rejected if the proposer or seconder is not enrolled as a voter in the relevant constituency. -----2- Whether such a defect is substantial or curable under the Elections Act, 2017. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeals, concluding that: Under Section 60(1) and Section 62(9)(b)(i) of the Elections Act, 2017, the proposer or seconder must be a voter in the same constituency where the candidate is nominated. This requirement is mandatory, making the defect substantial and not subject to correction. Precedents from the Supreme Court, particularly in cases such as PLD 2016 SC 944 and PLD 2007 SC 277, establish that election laws require strict adherence to constituency-specific voter eligibility for proposers and seconders. The Tribunal is bound by Article 189 of the Constitution to follow these precedents. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2016 Supreme Court 944 - Establishes the requirement for proposers and seconders to be voters in the same constituency. PLD 2007 Supreme Court 277 - Holds that the defect of an ineligible proposer or seconder is substantial and cannot be cured.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(3)-Employees of Canteen Stores Department (CSD)-Not in the service of the Armed Forces-Bar contained under Article 199(3) of the Constitution does not apply - In the present case the letters of appointment of the employees of CSD showed that the posts offered to them were private, and they were not subject to any law relating to Armed Forces of Pakistan-With respect to the terms and conditions of its employees, the CSD cannot put forward the bar contained in clause (3) of Article 199 of the Constitution before the High Court. General Manager, Canteen Stores Department, Karachi v. Abdul Rashid 1983 SCMR 487 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art. 199(5)-Employees of Canteen Stores Department (CSD)-CSD does not comewithin the meaning of-person-provided in clause (5) of Article 199 of the Constitution-CSD is neither a body politic nor corporate nor an authority; as such, a petition against it by its employees before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not competent. Canteen Stores Department (CSD) is not a body politic or corporate. It has not come into being by a statute or under a statute. Entire capital of CSD belongs to it and does not form part of the government money or government funds. It has independent financial resources and is run by its own funds, receives no funds from any source of the Government and is completely autonomous in its internal administration. The Public Accounts Committee does not scrutinise its accounts to include the same in the Public Fund Account of the Federal Government. It is a private commercial organization and does not perform any function of the Government. CSD cannot be held as an authority of the Government. The list of Government Departments is provided in Schedule III to the Rules of Business, 1973. It is important to note that only that can be termed a (Government) Department whose name is mentioned in Schedule III. Since CSD is not mentioned in Schedule III to the Rules of Business, 1973, it cannot be called a government department. It is clear that CSD is neither a body politic nor corporate nor an authority or Government Department; as such, a petition against it by its employees before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction is not competent. The rules contained in the CSD Revised Instructions and Procedures Manual (2006) are non-statutory because these have not been framed under the authority of the Constitution or any statute. In the present case since the respondents were employed when the CSD had ceased to be a government department or undertaking, the inter se relationship of the respondents and CSD was governed by the ordinary law of Master and Servant, and, as such, it follows that respondents being employees of CSD, which does not come within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 199 of the Constitution, could not maintain their writ petition before the High Court to obtain an order of their reinstatement. Under Article 199 of the Constitution, their petition was incompetent. Appeal was allowed. Raja Shafqat Mehmood Abbasi, Deputy Attorney General for Federation.