Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 498-Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 147, 148, 149, 427 & 504-Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)-Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, rioting, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace-Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, confirmation of-Further inquiry-Possibility of fabricated injuries-There were inconsistencies between the injuries mentioned in the FIR and the initial medico-legal report-In the FIR, the petitioner (accused) had been assigned the specific role of causing a firearm injury to the injured, however in the final medico legal report, the alleged injuries were said to have been caused by a "sharp cutting"object, and subsequently the injured was examined by the Special Medical Board, which, vide a medico-legal report found the injuries to be fabricated-Even the Investigation Officer ("IO") informed the Court that he did not find the petitioner guilty and also submitted a report under Section 168 Cr.P.C to the Station House Officer ("SHO"), but the SHO ignored the report without any rhyme or reason and a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted in the Trial Court-Based on the divergence and obvious contradiction in the initial medico-legal report vis-Ã -vis the seat of injury mentioned in the FIR, as well as the opinion subsequently rendered by the Special Medical Board comprising six doctors, and the statement of the IO made before the Court (which was not controverted by the complainant or the prosecution), it appeared that the case of the petitioner required further inquiry and there were reasonable grounds to confirm his pre-arrest bail-So far as the culpability of the petitioner in the commission of offence, if any, was concerned, that would be better adjudged by the Trial Court after production of pro and contra evidence-However, at present stage, on the basis of a tentative assessment of the material placed before the Court, the possibility of mala fide intention or ulterior motive on the part of the complainant to implicate the petitioner in the case could not be ruled out and required further inquiry-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the petitioner by the Supreme Court was confirmed. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 498-Pre-arrest bail-Principles and grounds-Grounds for grant of pre-arrest bail stated. While considering the petition for bail, the Court has to ascertain the gravity and seriousness of the accusation. The precise role of the accused must be determined and the Court must also gauge the existing material in order to reach a tentative assessment on whether the accused has been indicted with the object of injuring, demeaning or disgracing his image and reputation. No doubt, anticipatory bail can be granted in the exceptional circumstances. The jurisdiction to consider the grounds of bail in pre-arrest and post-arrest are different. The remedy of pre-arrest bail is meant to safeguard and shelter an innocent person who has been dragged into a case with mala fide intention or ulterior motives by the complainant or prosecution. While entreating the exercise of discretion of the Court for the grant of anticipatory bail, the accused is obligated to demonstrate that the case against him is based on mala fide and must divulge reasonable grounds to substantiate that he is not guilty of the offence and that sufficient grounds are available to lead further inquiry. The concepts of mala fide, ulterior motives or false implication are elementary and indispensable constituents for enlarging the accused on pre-arrest bail with the imminent apprehension of his arrest if the bail is declined. The mere gravity of the allegation does not impede the grant of prearrest bail if reasonable grounds are otherwise available on a tentative appraisal of the evidence. Petitioner in-person (via video link from Karachi). Zafar Ahmed Khan, Addl. PG Sindh, Ali M. Bajeer, SI, Yar Muhammad, ASI and M. Hussain, ASI for the State. Complainant in person (via video link from Karachi).

Summary: Finance Act (XXX of 2018)- -S. 10 [as amended by the Finance Act (XIII of 2022)]-Mobile handset levy on imported phones-Levy on ordinary phones other than smart phones-Legality-Respondents had imported mobile phones and were aggrieved by the imposition of mobile handset levy under section 10 of the Finance Act, 2018 ("Act") on mobile phones that were admittedly not smart phones-Section 10 of the Act imposed mobile handset levy on smart phones supported by a table which gave categories of smart phones and the rates of levy per set-Subsequently in the Finance Act, 2022, the table of section 10 was amended and the amended table replaced the words"category of smart phone"with the words"Mobile Phones having C&F Value (US Dollars)"-Stance of the department was that by changing the table, it had been conferred the power to recover the said levy not only on the smart phones but also on the ordinary phone which did not fall in the category of smart phones-High Court came to the conclusion that without amending the charging section, i.e. section 10 and merely by amending the table, the levy could not be recovered-Validity-Right to recover any levy rests in the charging section and not in the table that specifies the rates at which such charge is to be recovered-Power to recover a levy is anchored in the charging section and the table is merely meant to prescribe the rates at which such levy is to be recovered on various goods/items-Unless the charging section confers a power to recover a levy on an article or class of goods, mere mention of a different class, types or category of goods clearly goes beyond the scope of the charging section-This cannot be done-Schedule/table is merely a supplement of the charging section and cannot go beyond it and create a new and altogether different levy on a different class of goods not mentioned or contemplated by the charging section-Impugned order of the High Court was in-line with settled principles of law on interpretation of fiscal statutes and tax laws-Petitions were dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 10-A---Right to a fair trial---Transfer of criminal case---Allegations of bias against Presiding Officer---Scope---Applicant sought transfer of a criminal case from the Court of Ist Additional Sessions Judge Karachi (MCTC) West to another Court, alleging loss of faith in the Presiding Officer due to his purported adverse inference against the applicant and his counsel---Trial Court, in its comments, denied allegations of bias or religious extremism, asserting that its intervention during cross-examination was in accordance with Articles 18, 19, and 113 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Trial Court further stated that it had no objection to the transfer of the case---Held, that courts must function without bias or discrimination, ensuring that justice is dispensed in a manner that maintains public confidence in the judiciary---While a transfer of a case is an exceptional remedy, it may be granted in circumstances where the interest of justice so demands---Reliance was placed on Government of NWFP v. Dr. Hussain Ahmed Haroon and others 2003 SCMR 104 and All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2012 SC 1---Prima facie, the applicant’s concerns were tenable to the extent of ensuring confidence in the trial process---In the interest of justice and judicial propriety, the case was ordered to be transferred to the Court of the learned Sessions Judge West Karachi for a fair and impartial trial. (b) Administration of Justice: ----Judicial impartiality---Fair trial---Presiding Officers of Courts are duty-bound to maintain high moral standards and ensure that parties appearing before them have full confidence in the judicial process---Justice should not only be done but also be seen to be done---Held, that while allegations of bias must be supported by cogent material, even a reasonable apprehension of bias may warrant transfer of proceedings in exceptional cases to uphold public confidence in the judiciary---The Sessions Court was directed to ensure swift disposal of the case while maintaining fairness in all respects. ----Disposition: Criminal Transfer Application allowed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Post-arrest bail---Principle of consistency---Absence of specific role in FIR--- Petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Ss. 147, 324/34, 337-D, P.P.C., and Ss. 6/7, 21-L of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The petitioner was neither directly nominated in the FIR nor assigned any specific role in the alleged offense. Investigation was complete, and no ocular evidence was available to substantiate the charges against the petitioner. Co-accused, having a similar role, had already been granted bail by the trial court and the High Court. Applying the principle of consistency, the court held that the petitioner was also entitled to post-arrest bail. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997--- ----Ss. 6/7, 21-L---Allegations of terrorism-related activities---Absence of evidence--- The prosecution failed to provide ocular evidence connecting the petitioner to the alleged offense of firing during a public disturbance. The petitioner's confessional statement under S. 21-H, ATA, was insufficient to justify denial of bail, as the evidence did not conclusively prove the petitioner's role in spreading terror or causing harm. The court observed that allegations of serious offenses alone do not warrant indefinite pre-trial detention without substantial evidence. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Bail is not punishment---Presumption of innocence--- The court reiterated the principle that bail is not to be withheld as a form of punishment. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental right, and detention before trial must be justified by reasonable grounds showing clear involvement of the accused in the alleged offense. In the absence of such grounds, continued detention would amount to an infringement of the accused's rights. (d) Rule of consistency--- ----Similar role of co-accused granted bail---Entitlement to bail--- The petitioner’s role was on par with co-accused who had already been granted bail by the trial court and the High Court. The court held that the principle of consistency must be applied, and the petitioner should not be treated differently without a valid legal basis. ----Cited Provisions: Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (S. 497) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (Ss. 6, 7, 21-L) Disposition: Petition allowed. Petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail upon furnishing bail bonds of PKR 500,000 with two sureties each in like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court. Observations made in the judgment are tentative and shall not prejudice the trial's outcome.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: --- Issues: 1) Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the petitioner’s application to summon and examine Allah Bachaya under section 540 Cr.P.C. ---2) Whether the statement of the accused, Riaz (Respondent No. 4), recorded via video link under section 342 Cr.P.C., caused any prejudice to the prosecution. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the trial court’s order. The court reasoned as follows: Summoning of Allah Bachaya: The petitioner's application for summoning Allah Bachaya was rightly rejected. The fact that Allah Bachaya was unavailable due to being abroad until 2021 was not relevant, as the prosecution had sufficient time to summon him after his return. Moreover, his presence at the crime scene was already attested by two other witnesses, Mst. Haseena Mai (PW-1) and Mst. Fatima (PW-2), making his testimony redundant. Examination under section 342 Cr.P.C. via video link: The petitioner raised concerns about the statement of Respondent No. 4, Riaz, being recorded via video link. However, the court found no prejudice was caused to the prosecution, as Riaz himself did not object to the manner in which his statement was recorded. Thus, the court found no merit in the petition and dismissed it. ---- Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Ashraf Sangri vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2014 SCMR 157) The court reiterated that judicial bodies cannot substitute their judgment for that of a trial court regarding procedural decisions unless there is manifest illegality. ----- The Secretary Punjab Public Service Commission, Lahore and others vs. Aamir Hayat and others (2019 SCMR 124) Courts are not to interfere with procedural decisions unless a clear violation of law is proven. ----- Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others vs. Hayat Hussain and others (2016 SCMR 1021) Emphasized the importance of courts respecting the procedural judgments of lower courts unless there is evident illegality. ---- Chief Executive Officer, Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. Khanewal Road, Multan vs. Muhammad Ilyas and others (2021 SCMR 775) Established that summoning of witnesses is within the trial court’s discretion, especially when the testimony is not pivotal to the case.