Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199 Scholarship Policy for Ph.D. Law under Balochistan Education Endowment Fund (BEEF) — Retrospective Application — Legality — Vested Rights — Doctrine of Past and Closed Transactions — Validity of Policy Changes. The petitioner, a practicing advocate, applied for a Ph.D. Law scholarship under the Balochistan Education Endowment Fund (BEEF) in response to an advertisement inviting applications for LLM, Bar-at-Law, and Ph.D. scholarships for the Fall 2023 session. Despite meeting the eligibility criteria and securing an unconditional offer letter from a UK university, the petitioner was denied the scholarship based on a retrospective policy change introduced on 24th August 2023, requiring a five-year gap between scholarships. The court held that such a retrospective policy was ultra vires, lacked statutory backing, and violated the doctrine of past and closed transactions. Once a candidate has applied and vested rights accrue under an existing policy, subsequent policy changes cannot adversely affect those rights. The retrospective application of the policy was declared unlawful, and the petitioner's eligibility under the earlier policy was upheld. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Moizuddin v. Mansoor Khalil, 2017 SCMR 1787 Hussain Badshah v. Akhtar Zaman, 2007 PLC (C.S.) 157 Province of Sindh v. M.Q.M., PLD 2014 SC 531 (b) Doctrine of Past and Closed Transactions ----Vested Rights — Retrospective Effect of Policy — Protection Against Adverse Consequences. The court reaffirmed the principle that once vested rights are accrued under an existing legal framework, subsequent policy amendments cannot retroactively nullify or infringe those rights. The principle of past and closed transactions protects such rights, and any subsequent change must apply prospectively unless explicitly declared otherwise by the court. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Moizuddin v. Mansoor Khalil, 2017 SCMR 1787 Hussain Badshah v. Akhtar Zaman, 2007 PLC (C.S.) 157 (c) Administrative Discretion: ----Policy Amendment — Mala Fide Intention — Abuse of Authority — Validity of Board Decisions. The retrospective policy amendment introduced during the 13th Meeting of the Board of Directors on 24th August 2023, imposing a five-year bar on availing subsequent scholarships, was held to be tainted with mala fide intention and contrary to the established principles of fairness, equity, and transparency. Such amendments, when applied retrospectively to concluded or ongoing processes, violate constitutional guarantees and administrative fairness. ----Disposition: The petition was allowed. The retrospective policy change was declared inapplicable to the petitioner. The Chairman, Board of Directors (BEEF), was directed to convene a board meeting within two weeks to approve the petitioner’s Ph.D. scholarship. Compliance was to be reported to the Registrar of the Court.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: The syntax concerning the slash (/) sign repeatedly used in the General Power of Attorney has, context and deeper meaning, is a tool of interpretation and provides a signpost to the person relying on it to plead his rights. Therefore, there is merit in spending some time with the slash (/) sign to decide this Petition. The Orders of the trial court and the District Court, both forums have not given importance to the slash ( / ) sign appearing in the General Power of Attorney.???. The use of slash (/) meant that the word ???case??? and ???property??? should be read interchangeably. As discussed hereinabove as ???case and/or property???. This meant that all the powers set out in the General Power of Attorney related to both the Suit and the Subject Property. A restrictive meaning could not be read into the General Power of Attorney. A power of attorney, which is related to the accretion of the right to the properties and assets of the principal, has to be interpreted liberally and not in a restrictive and stringent manner. Petition allowed. Application under Section 12(2) remanded to the trial court.

Summary: Brief Facts --- ARY News aired a news bulletin on 19.01.2022 and 20.01.2022 related to Supreme Court proceedings.The appellant, a journalist, claimed her image was deliberately associated with false remarks, causing reputational harm.Appellant filed a complaint with PEMRA under Rule 8 of PEMRA (Council of Complaints) Rule, 2010. --- PEMRA Council dismissed the complaint, stating it didn't violate PEMRA's Code of Conduct and advised the appellant to seek defamation remedies elsewhere --- Held: The appellant's image was wrongly associated with news content. --- PEMRA failed to consider the fundamental principles of its Code of Conduct ---- Defamation Ordinance, 2002, is not barred by PEMRA Ordinance, and both can be applied independently ----- PEMRA's inaction and ARY News' conduct warranted nominal damages of Rs. 50,000 and a broadcasted apology ---- The appellant retains the right to seek further damages under defamation law.

Summary: Defamation & perjury route differently for trial; concept of judicial proceeding during investigation --- The case involves Sumera Rasheed, the petitioner, seeking special leave to appeal against the acquittal of Abida Shahid and Muhammad Sajjad (respondents No.2 & 3) in a private complaint under sections 500, 193, 195, 196, 211, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The petitioner alleges defamation and malicious prosecution due to false accusations made in an FIR related to a property dispute.Abdul Razaq, Sumera Rasheed's husband, had purchased two plots in Evergreen Housing Colony, Haroon Abad. The dispute arose when suspicions arose that the plot was sold to multiple individuals by Shahid Iqbal, the owner of the colony. Legal actions were taken, including securing status quo through a civil court and a subsequent FIR against the petitioner's family.The petitioner contends that the lower court's order, dated 15.12.2022, under section 265-K of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), which led to the acquittal of the respondents, was not correctly interpreted. The petitioner's counsel argues that the lower court failed to appreciate the law, emphasizing that statements made during investigation also constitute giving or fabricating false evidence.The prosecutor counters, citing section 502-A of the PPC, which grants the Court of Session the authority to entertain complaints directly, and that other offenses can be tried along with the offense under section 500 PPC.The judge, after reviewing the legal arguments, discusses the nature of perjury and the distinctions between lying and perjury. The judge emphasizes that the mode of trial is a crucial aspect, questioning whether offenses under sections 193/195/196/211 PPC can be tried along with section 500 PPC.The judge concludes that the lower court's order was justified, dismissing the special leave to appeal and declining leave to appeal. The decision is based on the understanding that statements made during the investigation, at this premature stage, cannot be the basis for defamation, and the lower court correctly applied the law.The detailed order delves into legal interpretations, emphasizing the importance of eradicating perjury and ensuring justice. The judge expresses concern about the manipulation of cases by powerful elites and the need for a study to understand how cases are structured with the help of police.

Summary: Bail denied ---- Issues:The legality of marrying two real sisters concurrently.The permissibility of marrying a sister of the divorced wife during her Iddat period.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court dismissed Musawar Hussain's bail application, reasoning that the marriage with Sumaira while Humaira's Iddat was ongoing, parallels the unlawful act of marrying two sisters simultaneously, incurring criminal liability. Despite Musawar's claims of divorcing Humaira, the divorce deed's authenticity was questionable as it lacked proper registration and was not found in the stamp vendor's register. The court also addressed the initial registration of FIR under section 365-B PPC, clarifying that the complainant's allegations of abduction justified the FIR's cognizance. The court's observations are tentative, and the trial court is to decide the case based on trial evidence, uninfluenced by these preliminary findings.------Citations/Precedents:Surah Al-Nur (24:32) and Surah Al-Rum (30:21): Highlight the sacredness of marriage in Islam.Iftikhar Nazir Ahmad Khan and others v. Ghulam Kibria and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 587): Discussed the prohibitions on marriage within Islamic law.Adeela Bibi and another v. The State and others (PLJ 2012 Islamabad 140): Addressed the legal consequences of fasid (irregular) marriages.Surah Al-Nisa (4:23) and Sunan Tirmazi (Hadith No. 1129): Explicitly forbid marrying two sisters simultaneously.Muhammad Arif v. The State (PLD 1982 FSC 292): Emphasized the continuation of marital obligations during the Iddat period.Section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961: Outlines the conditions under which Talaq becomes effective.Kundan Mai v. The State (PLD 1988 FSC 89) and subsequent cases: Reinforced the legal principles concerning Talaq and remarriage during Iddat.

Summary: Background:The petitions before the Supreme Court stem from various appellants, including Ayaz, the Province of Sindh, and Abdul Aziz, challenging the decision of the High Court to set aside the selection process for posts in the Forests and Wildlife Department, Sindh. The High Court directed that these posts be re-advertised due to procedural irregularities in the hiring process.---Issues:Whether the age relaxation of up to 15 years granted by the Government of Sindh adheres to the legal and regulatory framework.The appropriateness of the selection process adjustments made after the initial advertisement.The legality of selecting stipendiary candidates for the roles of Assistant Conservator of Forests and Range Forest Office.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court, led by Justice Qazi Faez Isa, has not yet rendered a final decision on these petitions. However, the court raised significant questions regarding the legality and propriety of the age relaxation granted, the selection process's adjustments post-advertisement, and the overall transparency and adherence to established rules in the recruitment process.The court questioned whether such extensive age relaxation defeats the purpose of setting age limits for posts and whether it serves the public interest given the high unemployment rates and the availability of qualified younger candidates. The court also queried the rationale behind selecting stipendiary candidates contrary to the initial job advertisement's specifications.---Citations/Precedents:Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1974, specifically Rule 12(1) regarding the stipulation of qualifications and age limits for posts, and the extent to which age can be relaxed as outlined in Rule 12(2).Procedural Orders:The court has deferred the final decision pending responses to its queries from various stakeholders, including the Advocate-General Sindh, the Chief Secretary of Sindh, and the Sindh Public Service Commission. The court ordered these parties to file concise statements addressing the questions raised, with a deadline set for 31 December 2023, and scheduled further hearings for January 2024.This case highlights the judiciary's oversight in ensuring that government recruitment processes are conducted transparently, fairly, and in accordance with the law, particularly concerning age relaxations and the modification of advertised job criteria.

Summary: Summary pending