Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: DEPUTY POSTMASTER GENERAL, SOUTHERN POSTAL REGION, KHYBER PAKHTUNKHWA and others-Respondents (Against the Judgment dated 28.01.2022 passed by Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad in Appeal No. 848(P)CS/2019) Fundamental Rules- -F.R. 54-Civil Service Regulations (C.S.R.), Art. 417-A-Pensionary benefits-Pensionary benefits for intervening period before reinstatement into service-F.R. 54 of the Fundamental Rules provides that in the case of reinstatement of dismissed or removed employee, only the revising or appellate authority may grant him his pay for the period of his absence from duty, and if he is honourably acquitted then, the full pay to which he would have been entitled to, and his period of absence from duty will be treated as a period spent on duty-Though this Rule is not germane to the present controversy, but at the same time, it is a ground reality that neither the department placed anything on the record to show that the Divisional Superintendent, Postal Service Kohat, was actually the revising or appellate authority, nor any document was submitted to show that he was authorised to issue any such letter or take any such decision in the capacity of a revising or appellate authority under the exactitudes of F.R. 54-Petitioner was deprived of his pay for the intervening period, from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015, in view of F.R. 54(a) merely on the ground that he was not honourably acquitted by the Tribunal, and the major penalty was modified in view of the judgment passed on 25.05.2016-Still, in tandem, the department is ignoring that the same Tribunal in the same judgment also set aside the impugned orders, and the petitioner was reinstated into service with consequential back benefits-In another judgment in the case of the same petitioner by the same Tribunal on the very next date, i.e., 26.05.2016, the major penalty of withholding of two steps increment for two years without future effect was modified into withholding one increment for one year only-However, in the judgment dated 25.05.2016, the reinstatement order was passed with consequential back benefits, which order is in the field-When the Tribunal has passed the reinstatement order with consequential back benefits, then, in this particular situation, the revising or appellate authority cannot undo or make ineffective the order or judgment passed by the Tribunal for the payment of consequential back benefits-Penalty imposed on the petitioner was only confined to withholding of an increment for a certain period, which does not otherwise mean to withhold his pay for the period he actually rendered his services to the department, and the principle of "no work, no pay" is not applicable when consequential back benefits have been accorded by the Tribunal-Petitioner retired on 18.05.2015 and the letter for withholding his emoluments from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015 was issued to him on 14.02.2019, whereas, under Article 417-A of the Civil Service Regulations (C.S.R.), the pending disciplinary proceedings could not continue if the officer attains the age of superannuation before the completion of the inquiry-Therefore, in that context too, the pending proceedings if any were abated and there was no justification to issue the letter after considerable period of retirement for withholding the salary with retrospective effect which was totally unjustified and unwarranted-Petition was converted into an appeal and allowed, impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal and the directions issued by the Divisional Superintendent, Postal Service Kohat for withholding the pay of the petitioner were set aside, and he was held entitled to be paid for the period from 01.09.2013 to 17.05.2015 accordingly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: The case revolved around the petitioner's employment history in the postal service, where he was promoted from a postman to a clerk and faced disciplinary action resulting in service penalties. The Tribunal had previously modified his removal from service to a lesser penalty, and upon retirement, there was a dispute over the treatment of his service period and entitlement to pensionary benefits.The core issue in the Supreme Court was the interpretation and application of service rules regarding the petitioner's pay and benefits for a specific period during his employment. The Department's decision to treat a significant period of the petitioner's service as "without pay" was contested, citing previous Tribunal judgments that reinstated the petitioner with back benefits.The Supreme Court scrutinized the application of Fundamental Rules (F.R. 54) and Civil Service Regulations, particularly concerning the treatment of periods of absence from duty and the authority to make such decisions. The Court found the Department's actions, particularly the letter issued by the Divisional Superintendent Postal Service Kohat, to be unjustified, lacking proper authorization, and not in line with the Tribunal's reinstatement order.Ultimately, the Supreme Court converted the civil petition into an appeal and ruled in favor of the petitioner. The Court set aside the impugned judgment of the Federal Service Tribunal and the directives for withholding the petitioner's pay, ensuring he was entitled to his pay for the contested period. This decision underscored the importance of correctly interpreting and applying service regulations and the authority of Tribunal judgments in matters of employee benefits and entitlements.

Summary: Background: The appellant, filed a summary suit against Nazir Ahmed, the respondent, based on a promissory note claiming an owed amount of Rs.800,000. The respondent contested the claim, arguing that being illiterate, he had thumb-marked some blank papers in business dealings with the appellant, which were later falsely converted into a promissory note. The trial court dismissed the suit based on the inadmissibility of the promissory note due to uncancelled revenue stamps and the absence of a second witness, a decision upheld by the Lahore High Court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ----Issues: 1- The admissibility of the promissory note, considering objections about the uncancelled revenue stamps and the non-production of a second witness. 2- The authenticity and execution of the promissory note, especially in light of the respondent's claim of never having executed such a document or receiving the alleged amount. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court found that the trial and appellate courts erred in their treatment of the promissory note's admissibility. However, the Court also held that the appellant failed to prove the legitimate execution of the promissory note and the actual transaction of Rs.800,000. It was determined that the circumstances suggested the respondent's thumb mark was obtained on blank papers, which were later filled to construct the promissory note. The evidence presented by the appellant, including the testimonies of the witnesses, failed to establish the genuineness of the transaction or the payment of the alleged amount. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed, not for the reasons provided by the lower courts but due to the appellant's inability to substantiate the claim effectively. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881Article 17(2)(a) and Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984Section 2(5)(b) of the Stamp Act, 1899Section 36 of the Stamp Act, 1899Shiekh Muhammad Shakeel v. Shiekh Hafiz Muhammad Aslam (2014 SCMR 1562)Muhammad Ashraf v. Muhammad Boota (PLJ 2016 SC 169)Javer Chand and others v. Pukhraj Surana (AIR 1961 SC 1655)Rehmat Ali v. Wahid Bux (NLR 1979 Civil (SC) 809)Union Insurance Company of Pakistan Ltd. v. Hafiz Muhammad Siddique (PLD 1978 SC 279)Mian Rafique Saigol v. Bank of Credit & Commerce (PLD 1996 SC 749)Muhammad Arshad v. Citibank N.A. (2006 SCMR 1347)Muhammad Azizur Rehman v. Liaquat Ali (2007 SCMR 1820)Johnson v. The Duke of Marlborough (2 Stark. Rep 313)Henman v. Dickinson (5 Bing. 183)Simpson v. Stackhouse (9 Barr. 186)Galloway v. United States (319 US 372)Popken v. Formers Mut. Homes Ins. Co. (180 Neb.250)Reverend Mother Marykutty v. Reni C. Kottaram and another (2013) 1 SCC 327

Summary: Background:The appeal (C.A.271/2015) arises from a judgment dated September 11, 2014, rendered by the Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench, in WP No. 326-B of 2013. The dispute revolves around a suit for possession under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987 (the Act), concerning land measuring 1-Kanal, 9-Marlas, and 4? sarsahi. The land was initially sold to Mst. Gul Zahira Bibi, now represented by her legal heirs (respondent No. 2), through mutation No. 1809 on November 28, 2012. Subsequently, Mst. Gul Zahira Bibi gifted the land to her sons, who are the appellants herein, through mutation No. 1810.---Issues:Whether the subsequent transaction of gift, recorded in mutation No. 1810, could be preempted under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987.Whether the High Court erred in remanding the case to the Trial Court for deciding the suit afresh.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Court observed that under the Act, the right of pre-emption arises with the sale of land, excluding gifts as per the Act's definition of "sale." In this case, the land was first sold to Mst. Gul Zahira Bibi and subsequently gifted to the appellants. The plaintiff failed to preempt the second transaction, alleging it was sham and illegal, without fulfilling the requisite procedures. Moreover, the nature of the transaction, whether a devise or disguise, needs to be determined. While lawful devices to evade pre-emption are permitted, disguise to evade third-party rights is impermissible. The plaintiff neither made a demand to preempt the second transaction nor sent notice of Talb-i-ishhad to the appellants. The Court concluded that the High Court overlooked critical facts and reinstated the Trial Court's order dated September 20, 2013.---Citations/Precedents:Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pre-emption Act, 1987Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)Section 115 of the CPC

Summary: Background: The case revolves around a patent infringement lawsuit wherein the plaintiff holds a patent for a design related to an automotive part. The plaintiff accuses the defendant of producing and selling a product that infringes on this patented design. The central argument of the plaintiff is that the defendant's product is substantially similar to the patented design, thus constituting infringement. The defendant, in turn, contends that the design lacks distinctiveness and that their product does not infringe on the patent. ----Issues: 1- Whether the plaintiff's design patent is valid and enforceable. 2- Whether the defendant's product infringes upon the plaintiff's design patent. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the plaintiff's design patent is valid and enforceable. The reasoning was based on the assessment that the design in question met the requisite criteria for patentability, including novelty and non-obviousness. Additionally, the court found that the defendant's product did indeed infringe on the plaintiff's design patent. The court's analysis focused on the substantial similarity between the plaintiff's patented design and the defendant's product, concluding that an ordinary observer would find the two designs to be substantially similar, thus supporting the claim of infringement. The outcome of the case was in favor of the plaintiff, with the court granting relief for the patent infringement claim, which likely includes monetary damages and possibly an injunction against the defendant to cease production and sale of the infringing product. ----Citations/Precedents: Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511 (1871): This case established the "ordinary observer" test for determining design patent infringement. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665 (Fed. Cir. 2008): Reinforced the "ordinary observer" test and clarified the test's application in design patent cases. Apple Inc. v. Samsung Electronics Co., 678 F.3d 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2012): This case provided further insight into the application of the "ordinary observer" test and issues of design patent infringement. International Seaway Trading Corp. v. Walgreens Corp., 589 F.3d 1233 (Fed. Cir. 2009): Discussed the concept of obviousness in design patents and its impact on the validity of a design patent.