Summary: Bil granted --- Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)------- S. 497--- Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXII of 2019). Ss. 9(d) & 11(b)--- Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018), Ss. 6 sub-section (1)--- Possession of Narcotics--- Prohibition of methamphetamine--- Release of Juvenile on Bail--- Scope--- Bail, grant of--- Scope--- though petitioner is directly charged in the FIR and considerable quantity of Charas were allegedly recovered from his direct/conscious possession, however, learned counsel for petitioner produced secondary school certificate of the petitioner which shows his date of Birth as 28.04.2007 and as per the said certificate, at the time of alleged offence i.e. on 22.10.2023, his age was 16 years, hence for all practicable purposes he is a juvenile and, therefore, under section 6 sub-section 1 of the Juvenile justice system Act, 2018, he deserve the concession of bail. Record further shows that after the alleged recovery no vediography whatsoever was carried out and, therefore, the judgment passed by this court in Cr. M BA No. 2729-P/2022 has not been compiled. Moreso, the sample parcels were sent to the FSL authorities after 5 days of delay which also provides a ground for consideration of this court at bail stage.(Bail Petition allowed)

Summary: The scope of the expression ?profits from the operation of ships in international traffic? in the context of double taxation conventions. ---- The central question in this case revolved around whether income generated from container detention charges (CDC), container service charges (CSC), and terminal handling charges (THC) could be classified as "profits from the operation of ships in international traffic" within the context of double taxation conventions between Pakistan and Denmark, as well as between Pakistan and Belgium.The respondents, being non-resident companies incorporated in Denmark and Belgium, conducted cargo shipping activities in Pakistan through their authorized agent, M/s Maersk Pakistan (Private) Limited. They sought tax benefits under the Pakistan-Denmark Convention and the Pakistan-Belgium Convention based on their income from freight charges, CDC, CSC, and THC. However, the Deputy Commissioner Inland Revenue disagreed with this assessment, claiming that these charges were not explicitly covered by the relevant conventions.The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondents, stating that CDC, CSC, and THC should be considered as "profits from the operation of ships in international traffic" and therefore eligible for beneficial taxation under Article 8 of the conventions. The Department subsequently sought leave to appeal this decision.In their order, the Supreme Court judges emphasized the importance of interpreting international tax conventions distinctively, guided by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. They noted that tax treaties serve the purpose of avoiding double taxation and require a broad and purposive interpretation, different from domestic tax laws.The judges concluded that profits arising from CDC, CSC, and THC were indeed connected with and ancillary to the operation of ships in international traffic. Therefore, these profits fell within the purview of "profits from the operation of ships in international traffic" as defined in Article 8 of the conventions. Consequently, the petitions were dismissed, upholding the High Court's judgment.This case highlighted the unique nature of international tax treaties and the need for equitable interpretations to prevent double taxation while promoting international cooperation in taxation matters.

Summary: ----Ss. 3 & 4---Contempt of Court---Unconditional apology---Scope---Court issued notice of contempt of Court to respondent, who was President of a political party, on making derogatory remarks against judiciary---Validity---Society in general and legal fraternity in particular expects magnanimity from a Judge in cases where a contemner seeks unconditional apology and Courts have been generous in such cases---It was not only a matter of scornful statement ridiculing Chief Justice of High Court and bringing him to disrepute but the respondent had threatened the Chief Justice with dire consequences notwithstanding that High Court had always strived to uphold the ends of justice without discrimination---Respondent and his lawyers assured that respondent had not consciously made the utterances and that he would make public apology in a manner that respect and honour of the Chief Justice and the judiciary would be emphasized---High Court advised that solemnity of respondent would be believed if he submitted written apology and also expressed his regret publicly through press conference for wide publicity---High Court accepted written apology submitted by respondent and in consideration of extending obeisance/mark of respect to the nanawatey members as a corollary, relieved him of the matter---Contempt petition was disposed of accordingly. Barrister Sarwar Muzaffar Shah for Petitioner. Aamir Javed, Advocate General for the State. Barrister Amir Ullah Chamkani, Ahmad Farooq Khattak and Sangeen Khan for Respondent along with Respondent. Nanawatey members (Pushto word) Ghulam Ahmad Bilour, Muhammud Saleem Khan, Khushdil Khan, Syed Aqil Shah, Zar Badshah, Babar Khan Yousafzai, Mian lftikhar Hussain, Ms. Samar Haroon Bilour and almost hundred other notables. Date of hearing: 11th January, 2024.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Elections Act (XXXIII of 2017)--- ----Ss. 62 (5) & 62(9)(d), Proviso (ii)---Scrutiny of nomination papers---Error of substantial nature---Location of properties, non-mentioning of---Effect---Petitioner/candidate was aggrieved of acceptance of nomination papers of respondent/candidate by Election Appellate Tribunal---Validity---Failure to mention location of properties was not an error of substantial nature and it could be remedied by candidate under second proviso to S. 62 (9)(d) of Elections Act, 2017---Returning Officer was empowered under S. 62 (5) of Elections Act, 2017 to require any authority or organization including financial institution to produce any document or record or to furnish any information as could be necessary to determine facts relating to an objection to candidature of a candidate---Returning Officer instead of complying with such requirement straightaway rejected nomination papers of respondent/candidate and this was not warranted by law---When law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner and after fulfilment of certain requirements then it must be done in the very manner and after fulfilment of very conditions as imposed by law---High Court declined to interfere in findings arrived at by Election Appellate Tribunal---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Let. Gen. (R) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 SC 735; Ch. Muhammad Ashraf v. Malik Muhammad Muzaffar Khan and others 2022 CLC 2045 and Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others PLD 2018 SC 189 rel. Sohail Shafiq for Petitioner. Imran Arif Ranjha with Ms. Bushra Rasheed, Deputy Director Law and Hafiz Adeel Ashraf, A.D for Election Commission of Pakistan for Respondents. Abid Saqi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 3. Muhammad Adeel, R.O. NA-58. Date of hearing: 11th January, 2024.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ----R. 11-A—Appointment on deceased quota—Eligibility of legal heir—Mandatory consideration by department—Delay in processing—Effect. Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 provides that where a civil servant dies during service, one of his children shall be provided employment in BPS-1 to BPS-10 in the same department if otherwise eligible. The rule is clear and mandatory in nature, conferring a legitimate right on the surviving legal heir to be considered for appointment, subject to fulfillment of qualifications. Delay in processing or administrative inaction cannot defeat such right once the application is filed within policy terms. (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 4 & Art. 25—Fundamental rights—Right to fair treatment and equality before law—Obligation of public functionaries. The conduct of the respondent department, which failed to act on the petitioner’s application for over a decade despite repeated communications, was held contrary to the principles of fairness, justice, and equality under Arts. 4 and 25 of the Constitution. Government departments are bound to act fairly, promptly, and in accordance with law when dealing with citizens’ rights, particularly those arising from compassionate employment provisions. (c) Service matter ----Appointment against deceased quota—Belated consideration—Whether application time-barred—Effect. The objection that the petitioner’s father died in 2003 and that his application was delayed was rejected. The Court held that the petitioner had applied in 2008 within the policy framework and the delay was entirely attributable to official apathy. Once the petitioner applied within the prescribed policy period, the department was under a continuing obligation to process and decide the case in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law ----Non-filing of comments by respondents—Apathy and neglect—Consequences. The respondent department failed to submit comments despite repeated opportunities. Such inaction demonstrated administrative negligence and disregard of judicial proceedings. The Court observed that government officials cannot evade their statutory duty by simply pleading “policy matters” without substantiating their stance through record. (e) Public service recruitment ----Deceased quota—Consideration for suitable post—Scope of discretion. While the petitioner had sought appointment as Junior School Teacher (JST), the Court directed that he be considered for *any suitable ministerial post* commensurate with his qualifications, provided he fulfilled eligibility requirements under relevant recruitment rules and policies. The discretion to select a suitable post must be exercised fairly, in accordance with Rule 11-A and the law declared by the Supreme Court on the subject. (f) Directions and compliance ----Chief Secretary and Secretary Education Department—Obligation to implement Court’s directive—Timeline for compliance. The Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, and Secretary, School Education & Literacy Department were directed to ensure compliance of this order in letter and spirit within 30 days. They must evaluate petitioner’s eligibility for appointment against the deceased quota, complete all codal formalities, and issue appointment orders if found suitable. (g) Disposition— Constitutional petition allowed. Respondent departments directed to consider the petitioner’s case for appointment against the deceased quota strictly in accordance with Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 and Supreme Court precedents on the subject. Compliance to be reported within 30 days. Held— (i) Rule 11-A creates a mandatory obligation to provide employment to one eligible child of a deceased civil servant. (ii) Delay attributable to administrative neglect cannot deprive the petitioner of his lawful right. (iii) Petition allowed; directions issued for consideration and compliance.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 142, 184, 270-A, Fourth Schedule (Entries 2 & 50), Eighteenth Amendment—Legislative competence—Levy and collection of tax on immovable property—Jurisdiction of Federation and Cantonment Boards—Effect of constitutional amendments. Tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value, has historically been a provincial subject. The legislative competence to levy, charge, or recover such tax was never vested in the Federation except during the Martial Law period through the promulgation of the *Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainment Duty) Order, 1979 (P.O. 13 of 1979)*. The Sindh High Court, tracing legislative history from the Government of India Act, 1935 to the Constitution of 1973, held that after the restoration of the Constitution in 1985 and the 18th Amendment, the subject of property tax reverted exclusively to the Provinces. Consequently, the Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence to impose any such tax, the field being expressly excluded from the Federal Legislative List (Entry 50) and reserved for the Provinces under Art. 142(c). (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 270-A—Validation of laws enacted during Martial Law—Scope and limitation—Protection of Presidential Orders—Applicability of Benazir Bhutto case. Presidential Orders issued between 1977 and 1985 were granted temporary protection under Art. 270-A and the Seventh Schedule but lost their efficacy after the restoration of the Constitution and the 18th Amendment. Following the principle laid down in *Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan* (PLD 1988 SC 416), laws protected by Art. 270-A could not override the Constitution or survive beyond the cut-off date. The Court reaffirmed that P.O. 13 of 1979, enacted when the Constitution was in abeyance, stood eclipsed and could not continue to authorize taxation in cantonment areas after constitutional restoration. (c) Cantonment Act, 1924 ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109—Scope—Taxation powers of Cantonment Boards—Requirement of federal sanction and publication—Effect of August 2023 amendment. Section 60 empowers Cantonment Boards to impose only those taxes which may lawfully be imposed by a municipality in the province and only with the *previous sanction of the Federal Government* and publication in the official gazette. In the absence of an existing provincial levy, such power cannot be exercised. The 2023 amendment inserting the term “fee” into Section 60 did not expand the scope to authorize new levies; fiscal statutes must be strictly construed. Moreover, as per *Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan* (PLD 2016 SC 808), prior sanction of the Federal Cabinet, not a Division, is mandatory. The amendment delegating such sanction to a Division was held inconsistent with democratic and constitutional principles. (d) Constitutional interpretation ----Entry 2, Fourth Schedule—Not a taxing entry—Entry 50 exclusive field—Distinction between taxes and fees. Entry 2 of the Fourth Schedule, often cited by Cantonment Boards, is a general administrative entry concerning federal subjects and does not include power to tax. Taxing entries are exhaustively enumerated from 43 to 53. The levy under discussion being a charge on immovable property clearly falls under Entry 50, which, post-18th Amendment, excludes immovable property from federal jurisdiction. Argument that the levy was a “fee” under Entry 54 or S.200 of the Cantonment Act was also rejected as the exhaustive list of permissible fees therein does not cover annual rental value of property, and the principle of *quid pro quo* was not satisfied. (e) Provincial legislation ----Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958—Continuity and supremacy—Applicability to cantonment areas. The Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, enacted prior to the 1979 Presidential Order, remains the governing statute for property tax within the province, including cantonment areas. Following *Pakistan v. Province of Punjab* (PLD 1975 SC 37) and *Gulzar Cinema v. Cantonment Board* (PLD 1978 Kar. 500), cantonment areas located within a province are subject to provincial taxation statutes, as they do not constitute federal territory. (f) Fiscal jurisprudence ----Distinction between tax and fee—Purpose of levy—Cantonment funds—Effect of routing revenue. The fact that amounts collected were deposited into Cantonment Funds under Ss.106–109 of the Cantonment Act does not alter the nature of the levy. A tax remains a tax regardless of the fund in which it is credited. Reliance on *Workers Welfare Fund* and *GIDC* cases was misplaced, as those levies were upheld as fees due to specific quid pro quo mechanisms, which are absent here. (g) Discrimination and equality before law (Arts. 25 & 77) ----Differential taxation between municipalities and cantonments—Classification—Validity. Different rates of taxation for identical properties situated across municipal and cantonment boundaries were held discriminatory and violative of equal protection principles. A uniform regulatory framework under provincial supervision was necessary to prevent arbitrary classifications and ensure parity in valuation and assessment. (h) Disposition— Petitions allowed. It was declared that— (i) After the Eighteenth Amendment, the Federation and Cantonment Boards have no competence, power, or jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose, or recover any tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value. (ii) The Province of Sindh alone has legislative and fiscal authority over the subject. (iii) All amounts collected under the impugned levy since the 18th Amendment are liable to accounting and reconciliation by the provincial government. (PLD 1975 SC 37; PLD 1978 Kar. 500; PLD 1988 SC 416; PLD 2016 SC 808; 2022 Peshawar 46; 2023 SCMR — Cantonment Board case, 13.10.2023, followed).

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), Arts. 7 & 78; Fourth Schedule, Part-II, Entry 6; Fourth Schedule, Part-I, Entry 30 Maintainability—Stock exchange as “person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation”—Held, Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) is a voluntary corporate entity and not a statutory creation; the 2012 Act corporatizes/demutualizes/integrates existing exchanges but does not establish PSX as a State instrumentality; mere regulatory oversight by SECP does not convert PSX’s commercial activities into sovereign/public functions; PSX does not utilize or receive public funds and any charges/penalties accrue as its income and are not credited to the Federal Consolidated Fund under Art. 78—Consequently, PSX is not amenable to writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii). Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 (b) Securities laws—nature of “regulations” and penalties ----Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012; Securities Act, 2015, Ss. 2(x), 2(xlvi), 2(xlix), 2(lv), 5, 7, 11, 160 & 161 Statutory “regulations” under the 2015 Act are those made by SECP; PSX’s “regulations” are internal instruments governing its marketplace and do not confer statutory power to impose penalties; no appeal lies under S. 161 against PSX-imposed measures; such amounts are not statutory exactions but form part of PSX’s income distributed per corporate law—PSX therefore not performing sovereign/regulatory functions of the State. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (c) Judicial review—scope of “person” and “functions” ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) read with Art. 199(5) Even where a respondent qualifies as a “person,” judicial review lies only if the impugned act was performed in connection with the “affairs” of the Federation/Province/local authority; PSX’s privately funded, profit-maximizing operations and internal disciplinary regime do not satisfy that test. Cited Cases: • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (d) Necessary party—SECP ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) SECP impleaded without any “act done,” “proceeding taken,” or order passed against the petitioner in the arbitral matter—No cause of action or maintainable prayer made out—SECP neither a necessary nor a proper party. (e) Arbitration—alternative remedy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz ----PSX Rule Book (Chapter 18: Investors’ Claims, Securities Brokers’ Disputes and Arbitration Regulations) Ongoing institutional arbitration provides an adequate and efficacious remedy; objections on limitation and tribunal jurisdiction fall within the arbitral tribunal’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz and must be decided in that forum; constitutional writ not ordinarily invocable to interdict pending arbitration absent exceptional grounds, none shown. (f) Constitutional benches—post-26th Amendment framework ----Arts. 175, 175-A, 199(1)(a)(ii) & 202-A; Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024 Court records that reasons are rendered by the Constitutional High Court for the short order dated 13.11.2024; applying the “dominant relief” test, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) governed the petitioner’s prayer for declarations (“without lawful authority,” “of no legal effect”), thus falling within the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction to issue reasons for the earlier short order. (g) Disposition --- Constitutional petition not maintainable; writ does not lie against PSX; no grounds made out against SECP; parties relegated to the agreed arbitral mechanism under PSX Regulations; petition dismissed vide short order dated 13.11.2024—present judgment contains reasons.

Summary: Summary pending