Summary: We in the circumstances are constrained to direct Secretary Education, Government of Sindh and Secretary Education Department Government of Punjab, jointly and severally, to pay all her perks and privileges to which she was entitled to by issuance of notification of her retirement, inclusive of her entire pensionary benefits within two (02) months and report compliance through MIT-II of this Court.

Summary: disposed of in the terms of paragraph 35(iii) of the judgment dated 18.03.2016 passed by learned Sindh Service Tribunal maintained by the Honorable Supreme Court vide order dated 26.03.2018 passed in Civil Petition No.266-K and 1074 of 2016, resultantly the competent authority of respondent-WAPDA is directed to comply with the ratio of the aforesaid judgments in its letter and spirit and allow them joining from the date of their repatriation by the Sindh Government vide notification dated 5.7.2018 and the issue of their salary, for the intervening period, shall be decided by the competent authority of respondent-WAPDA accordingly within one month

Summary: 1. Maintainability of appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act 1894 against an order passed on an application under section 12(2) CPC; Held No2. Election of Forum for seeking remedy. Once a party has selected a legal forum for seeking any relief, then it cannot abate such proceedings in between and seek any other remedy for the same relief. Once that remedy was elected, then, by implication of the doctrine of election, the other remedy by was barred.

Summary: [Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011 (Section 23), Securities Act, 2015 (Section 6), Securities Act, 2015 (Section 7), Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization & Integration) Act, 2012), CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN, 1973 (Article- 137)] Stock Exchange is a commercial organization and is engaged in abusiness of providing services for the trading of securities. As perdefinition of the term Stock Exchange it is a market place wherefacilities for trading of securities are provided. The surplus (receiptsover expenses) is distributed regularly as dividend amongst theshareholders. Its shareholders taking part in trading activities as brokersderive profit. Even before demutualization the members of stockexchange were entitled to trading on stock exchange and were alsoprovided services as brokers; they have established their offices andsolicit business and use their membership for earning income thereforeeconomic and commercial activities were the core activities of theerstwhile members and also the present TRE holders (trading rightentitlement). Stock exchanges entertain applications from individualsand corporate entities to issue them such trading certificates for theireconomic/business activity. The stock exchange lacks the importantattribute of lack of commerciality of a members club for applicationof the doctrine of mutuality

Summary: 1.The ratio of the said judgments of the Supreme Court is that where the remedy under section 249-A Cr.P.C. is available before the trial Court, the High Court should not exercise inherent jurisdiction under section 561-A Cr.P.C except in extraordinary circumstances which warrant such an action. In other words, the question is not to the jurisdiction of the High Court, but the manner in which such jurisdiction is to be regulated by the High Court. Ref. Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani (PLD 2016 SC 55); Maqbool Rehman v. State (2002 SCMR 1076); Bashir Ahmed v. Zafar-ul-Islam (PLD 2004 SC 298); Mian Munir Ahmad v. State (1985 SCMR 257).2.It is a misconception to state that in all cases where it is being contended that a civil dispute has been converted into a criminal case, an applicant need not approach the trial Court under section 249-A Cr.P.C. or 265-K Cr.P.C. 3.The argument that section 249-A Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked until a formal charge is framed under section 242 Cr.P.C., is misconceived. Section 249-A Cr.P.C. categorically states that the power thereunder can be exercised at any stage of the case. Rel. State v. Ashiq Ali Bhutto, 1993 SCMR 523.

Summary: Customs:- Amnesty Scheme once granted; no further demand of 1% flood Relief Surcharge can be raised.

Summary: Proforma promotion----The petitioner, a retired Senior Medical Officer (BS-19), argued that his retirement should not preclude him from seeking promotion based on a Supreme Court order and alleged discriminatory treatment compared to colleagues.After considering arguments from both sides and examining the evidence, the Court found that the petitioner's promotion had been delayed unjustly by the Health Department, leading to his retirement before the promotion materialized. It also noted instances where other retired doctors had received proforma promotions, highlighting a violation of the petitioner's rights under Article 25 of the Constitution.Further, the Court observed non-compliance with previous Supreme Court directives regarding promotions. Relying on legal precedents, including Dr. Syed Sabir Ali v. Government of Punjab and Federation of Pakistan v. Amir Zaman Shinwari, the Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, directing the competent authority to grant him proforma promotion to BS-20. Importantly, the Court clarified that this promotion would not affect the seniority of existing employees and entitles the petitioner to emoluments and pensionary benefits.In essence, the Court's decision emphasized the petitioner's entitlement to fair treatment in promotion matters and upheld the principles of justice and equality under the law.

Summary: The sugar mills claim that the penalties imposed on them for allegedly furnishing inaccurate particulars of income are premature and should not be imposed until their appeals against the main assessment orders are decided. The court considered the arguments made by the petitioners and their legal representatives, as well as the responses from the Deputy Attorney General and other advocates representing the respondents. The court's judgment essentially rejects the petitioners' argument that the penalties are premature due to pending appeals and clarifies that penalty proceedings and assessment proceedings are separate. The court emphasized that penalty proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature and that the burden is on the tax authority to prove that the penalties are warranted. The court ordered the petitioners to provide detailed responses to the SCNs and directs the tax authority to consider these responses and pass a speaking order after granting an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. Overall, the court's decision on the matter of penalties imposed on the sugar mills and the requirement for the petitioners to respond to the SCNs.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance,1979 (Limitation)---The case involved a dispute over rent for a 500-yard godown. The landlord initially sought to fix a fair rent for the property through a legal process. Over the course of multiple legal proceedings, the fair rent amount was adjusted several times based on decisions from different courts, including the Supreme Court. Additionally, during the ongoing legal battle, the tenant vacated the premises without paying the rent. The primary point of contention was whether the suit for the recovery of rent, filed by the landlord, was time-barred under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The appellant argued that the suit was beyond the three-year limitation period from the date when the rent became due, which they claimed when the High Court fixed the fair rent. On the other hand, the respondent contended that the suit was within the stipulated time. The judge, in the judgment, discussed a case law precedent (1996 CLC 348) relied upon by the appellant and distinguished it from the present case. The judge noted that in the cited case, there was a clear accumulation of rent owed by the tenant, while in the current case, the exact quantum of rent payable was not definitively settled until the disposal of the tenant's appeal by the Supreme Court.The judge then referred to legal precedents and highlighted that the rent becomes legally recoverable when the amount is definitively determined by the courts. Consequently, the judge ruled that the suit for recovery of rent was not time-barred under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and dismissed the appeal, imposing costs of Rs. 5,000 on the appellant.

Summary: Service Matter; Quo Warranto1. Appointment of an ad hoc appointee / Professor as Principal of a Medical College challenged; Held No2. Exercise of Discretion in such matter; guidelines