Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. II, R. 2 Bar against splitting of claims – Subsequent suit – Maintainability – Cause of action – Resignation pending disciplinary proceedings. Plaintiff/petitioner filed two suits challenging disciplinary proceedings initiated by the respondent/PTCL after he tendered resignation under Clause 10 of his employment contract. The first suit was filed prior to dismissal of service, challenging the initial charge sheet. The second suit pertained to subsequent charge sheets issued prior to the first suit but omitted therein. The Appellate Court dismissed the second suit under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. for non-inclusion of the cause of action in the earlier suit. Held, plaintiff was obligated to include all claims arising from the cause of action existing at the time of filing the first suit. Second suit was barred under O. II, R. 2, C.P.C., as no specific plea was raised that the subsequent charge sheet was unknown at the time of filing the first suit. (b) Contractual Employment – Resignation – Effectiveness – Clause 10 of Employment Contract – Disciplinary proceedings after resignation. Petitioner argued that resignation submitted under Clause 10 of his employment contract terminated his service upon encashment of one month's salary pay order by the respondent, rendering further disciplinary proceedings unlawful. Held, resignation under law does not automatically terminate employment unless expressly accepted by the competent authority. Mere encashment of pay order was insufficient to constitute acceptance. Petitioner’s failure to plead specific irregularities or procedural impropriety in the disciplinary proceedings undermined his case. Reference made to Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan (PLD 2007 SC 852) and Anwar-ul-Haq v. Secretary Ministry of Industries (2010 SCMR 1386). (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) – S. 42 Declaratory suit – Contractual Employment – "Master-Servant" Relationship. Held, declaratory relief under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act is inapplicable to claims arising from “master-servant” relationships in purely contractual employment. Plaintiff could not claim a declaration regarding service rights under contractual employment. Remedy, if any, was limited to damages for wrongful dismissal. Reference made to Aurangzeb v. Gool Bano Dr. Burjor Ankalseria (2001 SCMR 909) and Hasnat Ahmed Bukhari v. Bayer Pakistan (2011 PLC (C.S.) 1607). -----Cited Cases: Hafiz Hamdullah v. Saifullah Khan (PLD 2007 SC 852) Anwar-ul-Haq v. Secretary Ministry of Industries (2010 SCMR 1386) Aurangzeb v. Gool Bano Dr. Burjor Ankalseria (2001 SCMR 909) Hasnat Ahmed Bukhari v. Bayer Pakistan (2011 PLC (C.S.) 1607)

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 12 & 21---Suit for specific performance of agreement---Exchange agreement---Plaintiff filed suit for implementation of agreement for exchange of suit property whichwas decreed---Validity---Suit property was not in the name and possession of defendantsat the time of execution of alleged agreement---Defendants were not party to theimpugned agreement---Alleged agreement was not specifically enforceable against thedefendants---Courts below had committed material illegalities and irregularities whiledecreeing the suit---Defendants were not competent to execute any agreement with theplaintiff in circumstances---Suit was not maintainable against the defendants---Impugnedjudgments and decrees passed by the Courts below being not sustainable were set aside---Suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed---Revision was allowed accordingly.

Summary: The petitioners argue that employment is a fundamental necessity, especially for educated youth, and the government should provide transparent working conditions. They contend that the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act 2013 should apply retroactively, allowing them to be regularized from their initial appointment date rather than the date of the act's promulgation.The Assistant Advocate General of Sindh counters that the petition is not maintainable and that the issue of seniority was not raised by the petitioners when they accepted their terms of service during regularization. He argues that the petitioners were not civil servants until their services were regularized, and their seniority should be determined according to the Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation & Seniority) Rules, 1975.The court decided that the petitioners should be regularized from the date of the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act 2013's promulgation, and seniority cannot be granted retroactively from their initial appointment on a contract basis. However, it directed the competent authority to consider the case of one of the petitioners for regularization without discrimination, following the law and previous court decisions.

Summary: The case originated from a tender issued by the government for the supply of jute bags for wheat storage during the 2005-06 season. The appellant had submitted a tender at a certain price per bag. The government pointed out a deficiency in the tender related to a "Price Reasonability Certificate," which the appellant subsequently provided. The appellant's tender was accepted, and a formal agreement was executed. However, it was later discovered that the appellant had sold the same bags to another entity at a lower price. As a result, the government reduced the payment to the appellant.The appellant challenged this reduction through a constitutional petition, arguing that the reduction was illegal and unjustified since the Price Reasonability Certificate had not been in effect at the time of the sale to the other entity.The appellant contended that the judgment was unsustainable because the government had admitted the disputed nature of Note-1, which the judgment had excluded from consideration. The appellant further argued that the Certificate provided by them did not have a retrospective effect, and the judgment did not appropriately consider this aspect of the case.The Court heard arguments from both sides and examined the record. It found that the Certificate provided by the appellant was a mandatory condition for the tender and had not been in effect until it was provided. Therefore, the appellant could not claim that its effect should retroactively apply. Additionally, the Court referred to a previous Supreme Court decision on a similar matter, which upheld the government's action in reducing the payment to the supplier. Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that there was no merit in the appeal and dismissed it.

Summary: The appellant had filed the appeal against the dismissal of his suit for obtaining a declaration and possession of a house. The appellant sought a declaration of ownership and possession of the house, along with a permanent injunction against the respondent from interfering with the property. The trial court framed issues based on the pleadings of the parties. The appellant presented evidence including witnesses and documents, and the respondent presented his statement and a witness. The trial court dismissed the suit mainly due to the findings on issue No. 6, which related to the appellant's claim. The appellant then filed applications for amendment of the suit to add specific performance of the deed as a relief and for framing additional issues. During the appellate process, the arguments focused on whether the issues framed by the trial court were sufficient and whether the amendment of the suit should be allowed. Both parties cited relevant case law in their arguments. The judgment emphasized that if there was an agreement between the parties, the suit for declaration would not be competent; rather, a suit for specific performance should be instituted. Therefore, the court returned the plaint to the appellant, allowing him to file a fresh suit for specific performance based on the agreement.

Summary: -----1. Breach of Contractual Obligations: ---Facts of the Case: The petitioner was awarded a scholarship by COMSATS Institute for his PhD at the University of Bristol. Upon completion, he was required to serve the institute for five years. However, after receiving permission for a one-year post-doctoral fellowship in Saudi Arabia, the petitioner overstayed for two years and nine months without returning or responding to repeated show cause notices. COMSATS declined his rejoining request and demanded reimbursement of the PhD expenses. ---Legal Context: Clauses viii and ix of the service bond explicitly required the petitioner to return and serve for five years after his studies. Breach of these obligations entitled the institute to seek reimbursement of expenses. -----2. Contractual Terms and Bond Obligations: --Statutory and Contractual Protection: The petitioner was bound by the terms of the agreements dated 19.06.2006 and 05.01.2012, as well as an affidavit affirming compliance with these conditions. ---Judicial Observations: Failure to comply with the terms of a service bond, particularly for educational expenses, is a breach of contract. Courts have consistently upheld institutions' right to recover such expenses if terms are violated. ------3. Non-Compliance with Leave Provisions: ---Breach of Leave Terms: The petitioner was granted ex-Pakistan leave for one year (16.01.2012 to 15.01.2013) for his post-doctoral fellowship, which was not extended. Despite repeated notices, he overstayed without formal approval or response. ---Petitioner’s Case: The petitioner claimed that delays were due to external factors, such as retention of his passport by PSATRI, and sought reinstatement as a contractual employee. ------4. Judicial Precedents on Service Bonds and Employment Contracts: ---Precedent: In Dr. Muhammad Usman v. COMSATS (W.P. No. 1316/2016), the court dismissed a similar petition, holding that failure to return upon the expiry of leave is a serious breach that disentitles the petitioner from equitable relief. ---Legal Position: The court emphasized that contractual obligations must be honored, and discretionary relief cannot be granted in cases of clear non-compliance with employment terms. ------5. Court’s Findings and Ruling: ---Dismissal of Petition: The petitioner breached contractual obligations by overstaying his post-doctoral fellowship and failing to respond to show cause notices. The court rejected his plea for reinstatement and salary for the disputed period. ---Denial of Relief: The petitioner’s claims for reinstatement and waiver of expenses were denied, as no statutory or procedural violations were established in the institute's actions. ------6. Disposition: ---Petition Dismissed: The High Court dismissed the writ petition with no order as to costs, upholding COMSATS' decision to deny reinstatement and demand reimbursement of educational expenses.

Summary: Appeal allowed---The respondent's case centered around Zaka-Uddin seeking their architectural and engineering services for a property acquisition through auction proceedings. The respondent claimed an agreement for partnership in a construction project and subsequent oral agreements for architectural services. The appellant contested the claim's limitation, stating that the respondent's claim was time-barred. While the limitation defense wasn't raised throughout the proceedings, the appellant argued that it could be raised at any stage, including the Second Appeal. It emphasized that the point of limitation could indeed be raised at any stage and that the limitation was mandatory, not subject to waiver. It examined the relevant articles of the Limitation Act and observed that the suit was filed after the prescribed limitation period, considering the date of the loan and various amounts owed. The Court found that the respondent failed to provide written acknowledgments of the debt, which would have triggered Section 19 of the Limitation Act. The Court also noted that the respondent couldn't justify their claimed loss of Rs. 2 Million, given the actual loan amounts and the expenses incurred. In conclusion, the Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the lower courts' judgments and dismissing the respondent's suit for recovery. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the limitation laws and following established legal precedents.

Summary: Specific Performance of Contract (Lack of Privity of Contract)

Summary: The brief facts of the case involved a financial facility extended by Respondent No.1 in the form of a "Sale & Lease Back Facility" to Respondent No.2, involving leased CNG station equipment as collateral. Various securities were provided for this facility, including a mortgage of a property owned by the appellant.However, Respondent No.2 failed to make the required lease payments, resulting in legal proceedings. Respondent No.1 filed a suit for recovery against the appellant and Respondents No.2 to 4. During the proceedings, the appellant filed an application under Section 10 of the Ordinance to defend the suit, but the application was dismissed. Subsequently, judgments and decrees were passed against the appellant and Respondents No.2 to 4, leading to this appeal.The primary argument of the appellant was that the Leased Assets constituted the main security for the facility, and their loss and misappropriation by Respondent No.1 should discharge the appellant's liability under Sections 139 and 141 of the Contract Act. Additionally, the appellant argued that since the value of the Leased Assets exceeded the outstanding debt, he should be discharged under Section 141 of the Contract Act.The court examined the legal provisions in question and noted that the Leased Assets legally belonged to Respondent No.1, making them the prime security. As such, Sections 139 and 141 of the Contract Act did not apply in this case. The court also reviewed previous judgments and highlighted that the surety's discharge would require an active act of negligence by the creditor, which was not present here. The court rejected the appellant's arguments on this ground.Regarding the objection to the revival of execution proceedings, the court found that while proper notice should have been given, the appellant was already involved in the proceedings, and no prejudice resulted from the lack of notice.

Summary: Background:Saifuddin, the respondent (seller), had entered into contracts with a British buyer for the export of copper, aluminum, and brass scrap. The customs authorities imposed regulatory duty on such exports through a notification dated March 13, 2010. Saifuddin challenged the imposition of duty, and the High Court ruled in his favor.----Key Issues:Whether regulatory duty was leviable under Section 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969.Determination of the relevant date for the imposition of regulatory duty on exported goods.The applicability of Section 31A in determining the rate of duty.----Decision:Regulatory duty was validly imposed under Section 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969.The relevant date for determining the rate of duty on exported goods is the date of delivery of the goods declaration under Section 131.Section 31A does not apply to the determination of the rate of duty as the decisive factor remains the delivery of the goods declaration.The appeal was partly allowed, dismissing it for goods declarations filed before March 13, 2010, and allowed for those filed on or after that date.-----Disposition:Civil Appeal No. 1079 of 2011 partly allowed. C.M.A. No. 2273/2013 disposed of accordingly.----Precedents and Citations:Messrs Sh. Abdur Rahim, Allah Ditta Vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 198 SC 670): Discusses the rationale behind conferring power to impose regulatory duty.Al-Samrez Enterprise Vs. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 SCMR 1917): Held that if a binding contract was concluded or steps were taken creating vested rights, the benefit of an exemption could not be destroyed.Section 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969: Authorizes the Federal Government to impose regulatory duty.Section 31 of the Customs Act, 1969: Determines the rate of duty applicable to exported goods.Section 131 of the Customs Act, 1969: Deals with the clearance of goods for exportation.-----Quote: ''Subsection (2) of S. 18 of the Customs Act, 1969 provides the general rule that all goods exported from Pakistan shall not be charged with export duty whereas subsection (3) provides the exception to such general rule in that it specifically authorizes the Federal Government to impose a regulatory duty by notification in the official Gazette on all or any of the goods imported or exported. A combined reading of both the sub-sections makes it abundantly clear that neither do they conflict with each other nor does either have supremacy over the other. Notification issued by the Federal Government under S. 18(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 imposing a regulatory duty on certain export items is valid and legal and such duty would be chargeable from the date of the notification. Relevant date for determination of the rate of regulatory duty on exported goods is the date when the "goods declaration" is delivered or filed. Exported goods for which the declarations are filed on or after the date of the notification imposing regulatory duty are liable to regulatory duty as envisaged by the notification.''