Summary: Issue:Whether the execution petition filed by the respondent (Darul Islamia Society) for the decree issued on 17th April 2007 was within the permissible time frame as per the Limitation Act, 1908.---Facts:The Trial Court issued a decree in favor of the respondent on 17th April 2007.The petitioner's appeal against this decree was dismissed as time-barred on 7th October 2009.The revision against the appeal's dismissal was also dismissed on 21st January 2020.The execution petition was filed by the respondent on 3rd June 2020, claimed by the petitioner to be out of time based on the three-year limitation period under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908.---Key Precedents:Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others (2013 SCMR 5): Suggested the execution petition was out of time.Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah (1992 SCMR 241): Supported the respondent's stance that the limitation period for the execution petition begins from the date of the decree issued by the Revision Court.Ruling:The Supreme Court found the petitioner's argument to be without merit, emphasizing that the decree becomes executable only after the Court of last instance (in this case, the Revision Court) has passed its decree.The Court clarified that had the decree/order passed in revision been challenged before the Supreme Court, the principle laid down in Bakhtiar Ahmad would apply, affecting the limitation period. However, since no such challenge was made in this case, the execution petition cannot be deemed barred by time.----Holding:The Supreme Court declined the leave to appeal, thereby dismissing the petition based on the established principle that the execution of the decree is governed by the date of the final decree by the last court of instance, which in this case was not barred by the limitation period.

Summary: This case originated from an agreement on July 20, 2005, where the appellant agreed to buy land from the respondent, paying Rs.5,000,000 as earnest money. Subsequent disputes led to the cancellation of this agreement. Initially, the appellant filed a suit for declaration, possession, and specific performance of the agreement in the Islamabad High Court but later withdrew it, intending to file a fresh suit. This led to the second legal action for the recovery of the earnest money, predicated on the claim that the agreement was mutually cancelled and there was an agreement to refund the earnest money.The Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether it was permissible to file a second suit for the recovery of earnest money after withdrawing the first suit for specific performance. The Court found it permissible, noting that the causes of action in the two suits were distinct. Regarding the limitation period for the second suit, the Court concluded that it fell under Article 97 of the Limitation Act, 1908, with the limitation period starting from the date of the failure of consideration, rather than the initial payment or cancellation date. Contrary to the Islamabad High Court?s earlier revision, which found the second suit barred under Order II, Rule 2 CPC and by limitation, the Supreme Court disagreed. It noted the separate causes of action in the two suits and the applicability of Article 97 for the limitation period.The Supreme Court also addressed the application of the Specific Relief Act, 1877, clarifying that Sections 19 and 29 did not prevent the filing of the second suit since the claim was for the recovery of earnest money and not for compensation. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the Islamabad High Court dated May 27, 2016, and directed the trial court to decide on the merits of the suit in accordance with the law.In its observations, the Supreme Court noted the protracted litigation process stemming from the single agreement and recommended amendments to the Specific Relief Act, 1877. These amendments should allow for additional claims, such as possession, partition, and the refund of earnest money, in cases where specific performance is refused. The Supreme Court found the appeal successful, setting aside the High Court's judgment and dismissing the application filed by defendant No.2 under Order VII, Rule 11 CPC. The trial court was instructed to proceed with the case on its merits, and copies of this judgment were ordered to be sent to relevant legal and governmental authorities for their information and necessary action.

Summary: Issue:The primary issue was whether the appellant's suit for declaration of ownership, recovery of possession, and permanent injunction regarding the disputed property was barred by the statute of limitations.---Judgment:The Supreme Court, presided over by Justices Afridi and Malik, dismissed the appeal, affirming the High Court's decision. The Court found that the appellant's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The appellant had acknowledged certain transactions and partitions concerning the disputed property, which had occurred more than a decade prior to the filing of his suit in 1998. The Court emphasized that the appellant's suit, filed 14 years after the impugned mutation in 1984, exceeded the six-year limitation period prescribed for such claims. Consequently, even if some claims might have been within time, they were rendered legally ineffective since the main relief sought was time-barred.---Legal Principles:The Court relied on the established legal principle that when the main relief sought in a suit is barred by time, any consequential reliefs, even if filed within the limitation period, cannot be granted. The distinction between "actual denial of right" and "apprehended/threatened denial of right" was highlighted, with the Court noting that an "actual denial" triggers the limitation period for filing a suit. The decision also referenced precedents regarding the limitation period for co-owners of joint property to challenge transactions that infringe upon their rights.---Conclusion:The Supreme Court concluded that the appellant's failure to timely challenge the transactions and partitions that effectively denied his ownership rights rendered his subsequent claims for declaration, possession, and injunction legally untenable. The appeal was dismissed on the grounds of being time-barred, underscoring the importance of adhering to the statutory limitation periods in property disputes.

Summary: Background: The appellants filed a civil appeal against the judgment and decree dated 11.03.2019 passed by the District Judge Kotli, which upheld the judgment and decree of the Civil Judge Khuiratta dated 21.09.2016. The appellants’ predecessor had filed a suit for declaration claiming ownership of land and challenging the validity of a registered gift deed dated 06.10.1987. ----Issues: 1- Whether the decision of the lower courts was contrary to law or involved a substantial error. 2- Whether the suit filed by the appellants was barred by limitation. 3- Whether the gift deed dated 06.10.1987 was valid and within the share of the donor. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --No Substantial Error or Defect: The court found that the second appeal did not meet the criteria under Section 100 CPC, which permits second appeals only on grounds of a decision being contrary to law, failing to determine a material issue of law, or involving a substantial error in procedure. The findings of the lower courts were based on proper appraisal of evidence and law. --Limitation: The court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The gift deed was registered on 06.11.1987, and the suit was filed after more than 16 years, in 2003. Under Section 3 of the Limitation Act 1908, it is the duty of the court to dismiss suits filed beyond the prescribed period. The court emphasized that the limitation period is a mandatory provision and the suit was rightly dismissed by the lower courts for being time-barred. --Validity of the Gift Deed: The court found that the gift deed did not specify the measurement of the land or the share of the donor. However, the evidence showed that the donor transferred his sole share from different khewats to his sons. The court held that the gift deed was made in accordance with law and within the donor’s share. The claim of the appellants that the gift deed was made in excess of the donor’s share was unsupported by evidence. ----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1996 Peshwar 1 2009 SCR 38 1998 SCR 204 Akhtar Hussain & others Vs. Raja Mohammad Zarin Khan, 1993 SCR 114 PLD 2003 Supreme Court (AJ&K) 14 PLD 2011 Lahore 450 2015 SCMR 380 2017 YLR 229 1993 MLD 2126 2015 CLC 1290 PLD 2016 SC 705 PLD 1985 SC 153

Summary: Background: This civil revision petition was filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) against the judgment of the District Judge, Rawalpindi, dated 1st November 2012, which allowed an appeal by the respondents and overturned the trial court's decree in favor of the petitioners. The case revolves around a land dispute over 101 Kanal and 19 Marla of land (the "suit land") originally owned by Abdul Rehman, who purportedly gifted the land to his son, through mutation No. 633, dated 18th September 1962. The petitioners, as successors of Abdul Rehman's other son, Muhammad Afsar, challenged the gift mutation, claiming it was fraudulent and sought declaration, partition, and injunction against the respondents. -----Issues: 1- Whether the gift mutation was valid or the result of fraud. ----2- Whether the non-challenge of the gift by the donor (Abdul Rehman) during his lifetime affects the case. ----3- Whether the suit was barred by limitation. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Validity of Gift Transaction: The petitioners alleged that the gift mutation was fraudulent, but the court found that the petitioners failed to provide specific details of the alleged fraud as required by law. Additionally, one of the petitioners’ witnesses, Bashir Ahmad (PW2), admitted in his cross-examination that Abdul Rehman had validly made the gift in favor of Muhammad Khan. Since the mutation was incorporated into the revenue records and the donee (Muhammad Khan) enjoyed ownership and possession without challenge, the court held that the gift was valid. --Non-challenge of the Gift by the Donor: Abdul Rehman, the donor, did not challenge the gift mutation during his lifetime, even though he lived for several years after the mutation was effected. The court noted that under the principle of acquiescence and estoppel, the petitioners (as successors of Muhammad Afsar) were precluded from challenging the gift since neither Abdul Rehman nor Muhammad Afsar contested it during their lifetimes. The court cited multiple precedents affirming that the donor's failure to challenge the gift precludes the successors from doing so later. --Limitation: The court held that the suit was barred by limitation. The gift mutation was effected in 1962, and the suit was only filed in 2003. Under the Limitation Act, the right to challenge such a mutation would have accrued when the petitioners became aware of it. The petitioners, however, failed to prove that they were unaware of the mutation for several decades. Additionally, the petitioners had benefited from the donee's land through a gift, further supporting the conclusion that they had knowledge of the gift mutation. The court dismissed the civil revision petition, affirming the appellate court's decision that the suit was barred by time, the gift was valid, and the petitioners were estopped from challenging it. The appellate court’s findings were deemed correct, and no legal irregularity or material error was found in the judgment. -----Citations/Precedents: FAQIR ALI vs. SAKINA BIBI (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 85) NOOR DIN (DECEASED) vs. PERVAIZ AKHTAR (2023 SCMR 1928) GHULAM ABBAS vs. MOHAMMAD SHAFI (2016 SCMR 1403) MUHAMMAD RUSTAM vs. Mst. MAKHAN JAN (2013 SCMR 299) Mst. RABIA GULA vs. MUHAMMAD JANAN (2022 SCMR 1009) MUHAMMAD NAWAZ vs. HAJI MUHAMMAD BARAN KHAN (2013 SCMR 1300) AMJAD IKRAM vs. Mst. ASIYA KAUSAR (2015 SCMR 1)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Article 199: --- Maintainability of writ petition—Relief against Bar Councils and Associations. The Islamabad High Court dismissed the writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution, holding that writ petitions against Bar Councils and Bar Associations are not maintainable, as per the precedent established in Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani vs. Pakistan Bar Council (2021 SCMR 425). Bar Councils and Associations are private autonomous bodies and not State institutions, thus fundamental rights are not enforceable against them under Article 199. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction – Requirements for Maintainability: --- Existence of legal or constitutional right—Violation of law or rules required. The Court reiterated that a writ petition under Article 199 can only be entertained if the petitioner demonstrates a personal legal or constitutional right that has been violated. Mere inconvenience or personal grievances without a corresponding legal right are insufficient to invoke constitutional jurisdiction, as held in N.W.F.P Public Service Commission vs. Muhammad Arif (2011 SCMR 848). (c) Fundamental Rights – Applicability Against Private Entities: --- Fundamental rights enforceable primarily against the State. The Court emphasized that fundamental rights are generally enforceable against the State and not private entities. Exceptions to this rule require compelling circumstances and are subject to judicial discretion. (d) Bar on Parking Facilities – Absence of Statutory Duty: --- No statutory obligation on State or Bar Associations to provide parking facilities. The petitioner failed to establish a statutory duty on the respondents to provide parking facilities for lawyers or litigants, rendering the petition meritless. Reliance was placed on Owais Shams Durrani vs. Vice-Chancellor, Bacha Khan University (2020 SCMR 1041). (e) Disposition: --- Petition dismissed in limine. The writ petition was dismissed for being meritless and non-maintainable, as no violation of law, rule, or regulation was established by the petitioner.

Summary: The crux of the matter revolved around the respondent's dismissal from service, which led to a grievance petition filed with the NIRC. The petitioner initially participated in the proceedings but subsequently failed to appear, leading to an ex-parte judgment against them. Efforts to set aside this judgment, including an appeal to the Full Bench of the NIRC and a constitutional petition to the Lahore High Court, were unsuccessful. One key precedent cited was "Pir Bakhsh v. the Chairman, Allotment Committee" (PLD 1987 SC 145), which the Court used to discuss the principle of res judicata, emphasizing that a judgment becomes final if not appealed within the prescribed time frame.The Court also referred to "Mukhtiar Hussain versus Mst. Shafia Bibi" (2023 SCMR 159) to illustrate the consequences of a party's deliberate abstention from proceedings and the implications for seeking relief from an ex-parte decree.In discussing the doctrine of election and the consequences of choosing one legal remedy over others, the Court cited "Trading Corporation of Pakistan versus Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others" (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 828), highlighting that once a legal route is chosen, the petitioner is barred from pursuing alternative remedies for the same cause.Furthermore, the judgment addressed the application of the Limitation Act, referring to "Allah Dino and another versus Muhammad Shah and others" (2001 SCMR 286) to clarify the conditions under which the provisions of the Limitation Act apply, particularly in relation to statutory periods of limitation.The Supreme Court also underscored the public interest in finality and certainty in legal matters, citing "Ghulam Rasool and others versus Ahmad Yar and others" (2006 SCMR 1458), "Collector Sales Tax (East), Karachi versus Customs, Excise and Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and another" (2008 SCMR 435), and "Messrs SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors through Regional Director versus Water and Power Development Authority and others" (2022 SCMR 1615) to emphasize the importance of adhering to limitation periods and the principle that rights accrue to the other party upon the expiry of such periods.In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds to grant leave to appeal. The judgment reinforced the principles of due diligence, the finality of legal decisions, and the careful selection of legal remedies, as guided by the cited precedents.

Summary: (Against the order dated 12.09.2019 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in E.F.A. No. 50073 of 2019). Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss. 19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. XXI, Rr. 89 & 90---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 166---Execution of decree---Objections---Limitation---Petitioners filed objections against sale of mortgaged property which objections were dismissed---Validity---Property was auctioned on 19-07-2016 while petitioners filed objections in Executing Court on 14-05-2019---Compliant with Article 166 of First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908, only thirty days' time was provided for making any application for setting aside a sale in execution of decree, including any such application filed by judgment debtor---Petitioners filed their objection petition to sale after more than three years, and thus, the same was time barred---Supreme Court declined to interfere in order passed by High Court as there was no illegality in it---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave was refused. Rai Azhar Iqbal Kharal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 1. Abdul Hameed Chohan, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 15th January, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908---- ----S. 115---Scope of revisional jurisdiction---Interference in concurrent findings---Two Courts below concurrently dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs challenging revenue entries and claiming ownership of ancestral property. Held, revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C. is limited to instances of misreading, non-reading of evidence, or jurisdictional errors. Findings based on proper appraisal of evidence cannot be disturbed merely because another interpretation is possible. Referred cases: Nasir Ali v. Muhammad Asghar (2022 SCMR 1054) Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) Muhammad Sarwar v. Hashmal Khan (PLD 2022 SC 13). (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Art. 117---Burden of proof---Plaintiffs failed to prove ownership of property through documentary evidence and relied solely on oral assertions. Held, burden of proof rests on the party seeking relief, and a case cannot be built on the weaknesses of the adversary's evidence. Referred cases: Nisar Ali v. Muhammad Asghar (2022 SCMR 1054) Qahaim Khan v. Amar Khan (2022 CLC 335). (c) Revenue Law---- ----Presumption of correctness of first-ever settlement record---Plaintiffs challenged entries made during the first-ever settlement of the area (1981–1986). Held, strong presumption of correctness attaches to first settlement records, and extraordinary evidence is required to dislodge such entries. Referred cases: Nawab Khan v. Said Karim Khan (1997 SCMR 1840) Mazloom Hussain v. Abid Hussain (PLD 2008 SC 571) Haji Allah Bakhsh v. Abdullah Khan (2001 SCMR 363). (d) Limitation Act, 1908---- ----Art. 120---Declaratory suits---Limitation period---Entries in revenue records made during the first settlement (1981–1986) were challenged in 1999, well beyond the six-year limitation period prescribed under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. Held, plaintiffs’ suit was time-barred. Referred case: Khushi Muhammad v. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 SC 872). (e) Documentary vs. Oral Evidence---- ----Preference of documentary evidence---Revenue records indicated ownership by defendants, while plaintiffs relied on oral assertions. Held, documentary evidence recorded by public officials prevails over oral assertions. Referred cases: Shamshad v. Arif Ashraf Khan (2010 SCMR 473) Muhammad Rasheed v. Mst. Saeeda Bano (2014 CLC 990). (f) Judicial Findings---- ----Reliance on evidence---Judicial pronouncements must be based on evidence and reasoning. Courts cannot base decisions on assumptions or evidence beyond pleadings. Referred cases: Hyderabad Development Authority v. Abdul Majeed (PLD 2002 SC 84) Government of West Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad (PLD 1976 SC 469). -----Disposition: The revision petition was dismissed, and the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts were upheld.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 – Sections 2(s), 16, 168, and 171: Seizure of Goods – Limitation for Issuance of Show-Cause Notice – Time-Barred Proceedings Appeal challenging the legality of proceedings initiated under the Customs Act, 1969, following the seizure of goods (foreign-origin cooking oil and ghee) on allegations of smuggling. The appellant contended that the show-cause notice was served beyond the time prescribed under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, rendering the proceedings illegal. Held: Section 168(2) mandates that a show-cause notice must be issued within two months of the seizure, extendable by an additional two months for reasons recorded in writing. In the present case, the notice was issued after nearly ten months, exceeding the permissible time limit. Consequently, the show-cause notice and all subsequent proceedings were declared void ab initio. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. ----Cited Cases: Assistant Director Intelligence and Investigation v. M/s B.R Herman PLD 1992 SC 485 M/s. Skindar A. Kharim v. The State 1995 SCMR 387 PLD 1974 SC (sic) PLD 1988 Lahore 177 1991 SCMR 1753 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. The proceedings and impugned order were quashed as being time-barred under the Customs Act, 1969.