Summary: Service matters (Appointment)

Summary: NAB (pardon order we have found the same in accordance with law, therefore, CP is dismissed.)

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---Bail Matters (After Arrest---497, under S.9(C))----S. 497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), Ss. 9(c), 14 & 15---Bail, grant of---Case of further inquiry---Delay in conclusion of trial---Knowledge of accused---Proof---Accused was arrested for having 'Bilty' (Bill of Lading) seeking release of consignment of leather goods which allegedly contained 3.200 kilograms of heroin---Validity---Accused had only come with 'Bilty' (Bill of Lading) and consignment was not handed over to him---Accused was arrested only because he had 'Bilty' (Bill of Lading), in which consignment was mentioned as leather jackets---Prima facie it was a case of further inquiry as to whether accused himself was involved in change of consignment from leather jackets into contraband items recovered in said consignment by prosecution before even disclosing to accused---Accused was already behind the bars since 2014 and was not required for investigation---Bail was allowed in circumstances.

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged the order passed by the Civil Judge, Lahore, dated 30.05.2022, which dismissed his application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for the rejection of a subsequent suit for specific performance filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. The case originated from an agreement to sell dated 19.02.2011, allegedly executed by the petitioner in favor of the respondents, who initially filed a suit for specific performance on 02.01.2014. While the first suit was pending, the respondents filed another suit for specific performance on the same agreement, withdrew the earlier suit, and sought permission to refile the case. -----Issues: 1- Whether the second suit filed by the respondents during the pendency of the first suit is maintainable under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC? ----2- Does the filing of a subsequent suit after the withdrawal of the first suit without permission invoke the doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC? ----3- Whether the trial court correctly dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Maintainability of the Second Suit: The court held that Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC does not preclude a plaintiff from filing multiple suits on the same subject matter, as long as the earlier suit has not been withdrawn or abandoned without permission from the court. In this case, since the respondents withdrew the first suit with the court's permission and included additional relief (damages) in the second suit, the second suit was maintainable. --Application of Res Judicata: The court noted that Section 11 CPC (res judicata) would only apply if the earlier suit was decided on its merits. Since the first suit was withdrawn at a preliminary stage without any adjudication on merits, it did not bar the filing of the second suit under the doctrine of res judicata. --Dismissal of Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC: The trial court correctly dismissed the petitioner’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as the second suit was valid and not barred by either Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC or Section 11 CPC. Additionally, the changed circumstances and the claim for additional relief in the second suit provided further justification for its maintainability. The court relied on Ghulam Nabi v. Seth Muhammad Yaqub (PLD 1983 SC 344) to affirm that a subsequent suit on the same subject matter is not barred if the earlier suit is withdrawn with permission. The court distinguished this case from others cited by the petitioner, noting that they were not considered in light of the Supreme Court judgment in Ghulam Nabi. The civil revision petition was dismissed as devoid of merit, upholding the trial court’s decision to dismiss the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. -----Citations/Precedents: Shahbaz Khan v. Additional District Judge, Ferozewala (2017 SCMR 2005) Abdur Rashid v. Mst. Akbar Jan (2003 YLR 2775) Ghulam Rasool v. Shana (2001 MLD 661) Karamat Ali Khan v. Sardar Ali (PLD 2001 SC (AJ & K) 30) Ghulam Nabi v. Seth Muhammad Yaqub (PLD 1983 SC 344) Mustafa Kamal v. Daud Khan (PLD 2004 SC 178) Mrs. Irene Wahab v. Lahore Diocesan Trust Association (2002 SCMR 300)

Summary: Background: The petitioners, owners of brick kilns, challenged penalties and proposed sealing of their businesses for allegedly violating the requirement to use zigzag technology instead of the traditional BTK technology. The action against them was taken under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 (“Act of 1997”). The petitioners contended that the enforcement of zigzag technology was not compliant with the provisions of the Act, and that sealing their businesses and imposing fines without following the proper legal procedures was unlawful. The case arose after a Commission was appointed by the courts to suggest measures to combat smog, with the brick kiln association agreeing to adopt zigzag technology to mitigate smog, particularly during the winter. -----Issues: 1- Was the imposition of zigzag technology and penalties in compliance with the Act of 1997? ----2- Did the respondent authorities follow the proper legal procedures under the Act of 1997 before taking action against the petitioners? ----3- What is the appropriate course of action when environmental violations are identified under the Act of 1997? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Failure to Follow Legal Procedures: The court found that the respondent authorities, including the Environmental Protection Agency, had not followed the correct legal procedures outlined in the Act of 1997 before taking action, such as sealing the petitioners' businesses or imposing fines. Specifically, the authorities failed to issue Environmental Protection Orders as required under Section 16 of the Act, which mandates due process, including a hearing and a written order, before enforcement actions are taken. Environmental Protection Order (Section 16): The court emphasized the importance of following the procedure under Section 16 of the Act. This section empowers the authorities to take action after giving the concerned party an opportunity to be heard. If the violation continues, further enforcement, including criminal action, can be taken. The court highlighted that immediate and lawful action should be taken to curb environmental violations, but due process must be followed. Opportunity for Hearing: The court ordered that the petitioners be provided an opportunity to be heard on 02.12.2022, and if necessary, an Environmental Protection Order under Section 16(1) of the Act should be issued. The court reiterated that environmental violations cause recurring damage and require timely and proper legal actions to prevent further harm. The court disposed of the petitions with directions to follow the legal procedures under the Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997. The authorities were instructed to provide the petitioners an opportunity for a hearing and to proceed strictly in accordance with the law. -----Citations/Precedents: Punjab Environmental Protection Act, 1997 Section 16 - Environmental Protection Order Section 17 - Criminal Action for Violations Sections 21 & 22 - Right to Appeal before Environmental Tribunal

Summary: Background: Respondent No. 3 had filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 02.10.1989 against petitioner (deceased). The suit was initially dismissed by the trial court on 17.07.1994. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties entered into a compromise, and the appeal was partially accepted on 24.12.1998. Respondent No. 3’s legal heirs filed an execution petition in 2014 for the enforcement of the decree. The petitioners objected, claiming that the execution petition was time-barred, which was upheld by the executing court. However, the appellate court set aside this decision and restored the execution petition. The petitioners then filed this civil revision to challenge the appellate court’s judgment. -----Issues: 1- Whether the execution petition filed by the legal heirs of respondent No. 3 was time-barred? ----2- Whether the compromise between the parties and partial fulfillment of the decree impacted the maintainability of the execution petition? ----3- Was the appellate court justified in setting aside the executing court’s decision and restoring the execution petition? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Limitation and Execution: The petitioners argued that the execution petition filed in 2014 was barred by the limitation period, as more than 15 years had passed since the decree was issued in 1998. The court, however, emphasized that the consideration had been paid, and possession of the property had already been delivered to respondent No. 3 during the compromise. Therefore, the title had vested in the respondent, and the execution petition was aimed at enforcing the remaining part of the decree, specifically the transfer of the property, which the judgment debtor failed to perform. No Requirement to File for Possession: Citing case law, the court noted that in suits for specific performance, once the consideration is paid and possession is given, the decree holder becomes the rightful owner of the property. As possession had already been given to the respondents, they did not need to file an execution petition for possession, only for the formal transfer of title. Justice vs. Technicality: The court referred to Islamic principles and prior case law, stressing that justice should not be sacrificed due to technicalities. The petitioners had already received the consideration, and possession had been transferred to the respondents, so it was unfair to bar the respondents from obtaining full relief on the basis of a technicality like limitation. The appellate court was correct in setting aside the executing court’s order. The civil revision was dismissed. The appellate court’s decision to restore the execution petition was upheld, allowing the legal heirs of respondent No. 3 to continue the process for the transfer of the decreed property. No costs were awarded. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Hakam Bibi through L.Rs v. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs (2007 SCMR 983) Moulvi Abdul Qayyum vs. Syed Ali Asghar Shah (1992 SCMR 241) Syed Phul Shah v. Muhammad Hussain (PLD 1991 SC 1051) Trustees of the Fort of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCMR 2213)

Summary: Article 199- Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Section 2, 4, 27 & 37 of UHS Ordinance, 2002---- Section 4 & 11 of PMDC Ordinance, 1962 ---- Every medical college/ institution intending to impart medical education within the territorial boundaries of the Province of Punjab is required under Section 37 of the University of Health Ordinance 2002 to affiliate itself with University of Health Sciences, Lahore before commencement of any educational activities. The Federal Government or its any other authority has no jurisdiction to grant exemption or No Objection Certificate or issue Notification in derogation of the above said mandatory requirement of Section 37 of UHS Ordinance, 2002.

Summary: This case highlights an important aspect pertaining to how the license for stamp-vending is being issued across the Province of Punjab, under the Stamp Act, 1899 and the Stamp Rules, 1934 made thereunder, by exercise of unfettered and unstructured discretion and without any guiding principles and policy framework in place, inter alia, without any advertisement. Held that such unfettered and unstructured discretion in grant of the license, for stamp vending, needs to be structured through issuance of proper instructions by the Board of Revenue, which is the administrative department, under the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011 having responsibility to administer the Stamp Act, 1899. Therefore, office is directed to transmit a copy of this judgment to the Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab who, being administrative head, of the Revenue Department, under the Rules of Business, is directed to look into the matter holistically and ensure that proper policy guidelines regarding creation of the seats for the stamp vendors as also regarding qualifications and the manner in which the license for stamp vending is to be granted be prepared that, inter-alia, may include advertisement for inviting applications from public to ensure that every person eligible has fair opportunity to apply for the same. Once such policy is prepared and approved in accordance with the Rules of Business, the same should be strictly followed. In the meanwhile, any fresh stamp vending license required to be granted across the Province of Punjab must be granted after advertisement in the newspaper.

Summary: Specific Relief Act, (Section 27 - Relief against subsequent buyer )---Since the applicanthas failed to prove that the respondents No.1 & 2 had the knowledge ofany sale transaction, the act of purchasing the property without publicnotice cannot be pressed into service to prove the mala fide of therespondents No.1 & 2. It could be a careless approach being less seriousbut not at par with mala fide / dishonesty. Hence specific performancecannot be enforced against subsequent buyer in view of facts of case.Similarly with respect to other issue which concerns with the willingness ofapplicant, which also on facts ended against applicants, no claim of anyalternate relief of damages could be granted.

Summary: Maintainability of suit to challenge an action taken without issuing the prescribed show-cause notice. Rate of Federal Excise Duty applicable to insurance services under section 10 of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 and the effect of Rule 40 of the Federal Excise Rules, 2005.