Summary: Background: The respondent (Plaintiff) instituted a suit for declaration and possession with a perpetual injunction, asserting ownership of land measuring 12 Kanals 14 Marlas and 06 Sarsahi. The respondent had initially appointed an attorney, later canceling the power of attorney and appointing a new one. The respondent alleged that his attorneys, in collusion with revenue authorities, committed fraud by transferring the land to Gulzar Butt (Respondent No. 2) through Sale Mutation No. 836, attested on 26.05.2004. The respondent’s suit was decreed on 06.03.2013, but the appellants, who had purchased the same land through Sale Mutation No. 952 attested on 10.12.2005, were neither included as defendants in the original suit nor notified of the proceedings. Upon learning about the decree, the appellants filed an appeal which was dismissed by the appellate court, stating that they were not party to the original suit. The appellants then filed the current Regular Second Appeal (RSA) challenging the previous court decisions. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellants, who were not parties to the original suit, could file an appeal challenging the decree? ----2- Whether the lower courts erred in dismissing the appellants’ appeal on the basis that they were not party to the original proceedings? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Right to Appeal by Non-Party: The court held that the appellants, who became owners of the disputed property via Sale Mutation No. 952 (attested after the fraudulent mutation challenged by the respondent), were directly affected by the decree. Therefore, they had the right to file an appeal even though they were not parties to the original suit. The court emphasized that the principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) is fundamental to justice, and no one should be condemned unheard. --Error by Lower Courts: The appellate court’s decision to dismiss the appellants' appeal was incorrect because the appellants were adversely affected by the judgment, making them eligible to challenge it. The court referenced the Supreme Court cases H.M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi (PLD 1969 SC 65) and Sahib Dad v. Province of Punjab (2009 SCMR 385), which allow appeals by non-parties who are adversely affected by a judgment. --Remand for Fresh Trial: The court set aside the previous judgments and decrees, remanding the case back to the trial court. The trial court was directed to implead the appellants as defendants, amend the plaint accordingly, and allow the appellants to file their written statements. The trial court was ordered to re-decide the case after considering the appellants’ involvement. The appeal was accepted, and the judgments and decrees passed by the lower courts were set aside. The case was remanded to the trial court for fresh adjudication with the appellants properly impleaded as defendants. -----Citations/Precedents: H.M. Saya & Co., Karachi v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., Karachi and another (PLD 1969 Supreme Court 65) Sahib Dad v. Province of Punjab and others (2009 SCMR 385) Jamila Pirzada and 3 others v. Col. (R) Mansoor Akbar and 2 others (2011 CLC 1619)

Summary: Article 189 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973- Land Reforms Ordinance, 1978- Order VII Rule 11 CPC and Order XXXIX Rule 1 read with Section 144 of CPC. Declarant excess land was resumed, allotted further and lis went upto Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan who finally decided the matter and that decision is binding on all the organs of State---- Federal Land Commission has no authority to entertain a 2nd Revision Petition and decide the matter rather second revision on the same subject suffers from the principle of res judicata and deserves straightway summarily rejection under Order VII Rule 11 CPC---- If in violation of active status quo order the possession of land has been changed, the said court which has passed the injunctive order, has jurisdiction under Section 144 CPC to restore the status as it was at the time of passing of status quo order.

Summary: [Service matters (Termination from service), Sindh Industrial Relations Act (SIRA) , 2013, (Section 77), Sindh Industrial Relations Act (SIRA) , 2013, (Section 34)] Since the discretion was exercised by the Tribunal in condoningthe delay within frame of SIRA Act 2013, we cannot replace ourdiscretion with that of the Tribunal as this petition is neither statutorynor efficacious remedy. We are not sitting in appeal against order ofappellate labour tribunal. The petitioners have already exhausted theremedy of appeal before Appellate Tribunal.

Summary: Where the application for leave to defend in a summary suit under Order XXXVII C.P.C. requires resolution of certain disputed facts for allowing the said application, the said application must be accompanied by an affidavit otherwise Court would be justified to dismiss the same. Limitation is a mixed question of law and fact and Court has to decide the question despite the fact that same has been raised as defence or not.

Summary: CNS Act, 1997 ((No legal bar or restriction to consider statement of official witnesses)) while awarding the conviction in cases of capital punishment also has no force as thereluctance of the general public to become a witness in such cases has become a judicially recognized fact and there was no way out but to consider the statement of the official witnesses as no legal bar or restriction has been imposed and even then there was no time to collect independent witnesses.

Summary: The proviso to rule 1 of Order VIII C.P.C. provides discretion to Court to bind defendants to file written statement within thirty days or permit them to file the same beyond the said time period but the same does not curtail, in any manner, the power of the Court to allow a party to file written statement beyond thirty days.

Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute over the classification of a business entity for tax purposes under the Sales Tax Act, 1990. The tax department issued a show-cause notice to a registered entity, arguing that the entity did not qualify as a "Manufacturer-cum-Exporter" because it did not own its manufacturing facility. Instead, the entity was using a leased facility, which the department contended disqualified it from claiming sales tax refunds. As a result, the department modified the entity’s status to "Commercial Exporter," effectively denying the sales tax refund. The entity challenged the department’s decision before the Appellate Tribunal, which ruled in favor of the entity. The tax department then filed a reference before the Lahore High Court, raising three questions of law. -----Issues: 1- Whether a manufacturer using leased premises qualifies as a "Manufacturer-cum-Exporter" for sales tax refund purposes under the Sales Tax Act, 1990? ----2- Whether the tax department’s interpretation of "owning a manufacturing facility" as a precondition for receiving a sales tax refund was correct? ----3- Whether the tax department had the authority to unilaterally modify the entity’s registration status from "Manufacturer" to "Commercial Exporter"? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --First Issue: The court held that the phrase "owns or has his own manufacturing facility" under Section 2(17) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not strictly require full ownership of the facility. The court interpreted the phrase in a disjunctive manner, stating that legal possession and control over a leased facility can satisfy the requirement for "having" a manufacturing facility. Since the entity had made substantial investments in construction and machinery on the leased premises, it qualified as a "Manufacturer-cum-Exporter" and was entitled to claim the refund. --Second Issue: The court rejected the department’s interpretation that "owning" a manufacturing facility was a strict requirement. It clarified that the statute allowed for different forms of control or possession over the manufacturing facility, and the entity’s use of a leased facility met the criteria under the law. --Third Issue: The court found that the tax department did not have the authority to unilaterally change the registration status of the entity from "Manufacturer" to "Commercial Exporter" under the applicable laws and rules. Specifically, Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, and Rule 5 of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 do not empower the Commissioner to alter the registration status without following a defined process. The court ruled in favor of the entity, confirming its status as a "Manufacturer-cum-Exporter" and reversing the department's decision. -----Citations/Precedents: Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-I, Large Taxpayer Unit-II, Karachi v. Messrs ORI Tech Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. (2019 SCMR 875) ORI-Tech-Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. Through CEO v. Manager Registration, Central Registration Office and 3 others (2017 PTD 1497) Suo Motu Case No.8 of 2018 and Civil Misc. Application No.649-L of 2018 (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 201) Commissioner of Income-Tax v. Muhammad Kassim (2000 PTD 280) CM Pak Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PLD 2018 Islamabad 243) Inam-ul-Rahiem v. Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and another (PLD 2018 Islamabad 251) Sheikh Kashif Imtiaz v. Faysal Bank Limited and another (2020 CLD 904)

Summary: Background: The petitioner sought the registration of a criminal case against the proposed accused (Respondents No. 3 to 6), alleging that they prepared a bogus power of attorney and agreement to sell by forging the petitioner’s signatures and thumb impressions to usurp his property. The petitioner’s application for registering the FIR was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, Narowal on the ground that the dispute appeared to be of a civil nature. The petitioner then filed this writ petition challenging the order of the Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and sought directions for the registration of the FIR. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace erred in declining the registration of an FIR, citing the civil nature of the dispute? ---2- Whether the petitioner has alternate remedies available under the law, and if so, should the writ petition be entertained? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Civil Nature of the Dispute: The court found that the dispute between the parties primarily involved civil proceedings. The alleged forged agreement to sell had already been used in a civil suit, which was decreed in favor of one of the respondents. The petitioner had challenged this decree through an application under Section 12(2) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), and that application was still pending. Given that the issue of the forgery would be addressed in the pending civil proceedings, the court held that it was inappropriate to interfere through criminal proceedings at this stage. --Availability of Alternate Remedies: The court pointed out that the petitioner had alternative legal remedies available, including filing a private complaint under Section 200 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) or approaching the magistrate under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.. The court also observed that criminal proceedings should not be pursued when the ultimate liability depends on the outcome of a civil dispute, as reiterated in Akhlaq Hussain Kayani v. Zafar Iqbal Kayani (2010 SCMR 1835). --Multiplicity of Litigation: The court highlighted that entertaining criminal proceedings on matters already under civil litigation could lead to unnecessary complications and multiple legal actions, which should be avoided. --No Legal Infirmity in the Decision of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace: The court concluded that the decision of the Additional Sessions Judge/Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to decline the registration of the FIR was correct and in line with the law, as the case did not justify criminal proceedings while civil litigation was ongoing. The petition was dismissed in limine, and the court found no legal infirmity, irregularity, or jurisdictional error in the order passed by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace. The petitioner was, however, granted the liberty to pursue alternate remedies available under the law. -----Citations/Precedents: Jamal Khan v. Secretary Home Department (2021 SCMR 468) Muhammad Shafi v. Deputy Superintendent of Police (PLD 1992 Lahore 178) Akhlaq Hussain Kayani v. Zafar Iqbal Kayani and others (2010 SCMR 1835) Ch. Feroze Din v. Dr. K.M Munir (1970 SCMR 10) Ghulam Ali alias Sadoro v. S.H.O., Police Station Veehar (2003 YLR 2168)

Summary: Background: This case involves an appeal filed by the legal heirs of a deceased judgment-debtor, challenging the dismissal of their objection petition by the Banking Court. The objection was filed under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking to set aside the sale of a residential property conducted through auction. The property had been sold in execution of a decree obtained by the respondent bank for loan recovery. The deceased judgment-debtor had earlier challenged the auction on the grounds of irregularities and fraud under Order XXI, Rule 90 of the Code, but his objections were dismissed, and the sale was confirmed by the Banking Court. The legal heirs of the deceased judgment-debtor then filed fresh objections, which were also dismissed by the Banking Court. They filed this appeal against that dismissal. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Banking Court should have issued notices to the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor before confirming the sale? ----2- Whether the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor could file an objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 89 of the Code after the auction had been confirmed? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: First Issue: The court held that the Banking Court was not obligated to issue fresh notices to the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The deceased had already exhausted his remedies by challenging the auction under Order XXI, Rule 90, which had been dismissed, and that order was maintained up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Once the sale was confirmed, there was no requirement for fresh notices under Order XXI, Rule 22. Second Issue: The court found that the legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor could not file an objection petition under Order XXI, Rule 89. The deceased had already chosen to challenge the sale under Order XXI, Rule 90 during his lifetime and had failed to withdraw that objection. As per Order XXI, Rule 89(2), an application under this rule can only be entertained if the applicant has withdrawn any application filed under Order XXI, Rule 90, which did not happen in this case. The appeal was dismissed, and the Banking Court’s decision to confirm the sale was upheld. The court reasoned that the legal representatives stepped into the shoes of the deceased and could not claim fresh rights to challenge the auction when the deceased had already exercised his legal remedies unsuccessfully. The objection under Order XXI, Rule 89 was therefore not maintainable. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Khalil v. M/s Faisal M.B. Corporation and Others (2019 SCMR 321) Zakaria Ghani and Others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and Others (2016 CLD 480) Mir Wali Khan and Another v. Manager, Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan, Muzaffargarh and Another (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 500) Muhammad Hussain v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan, Hyderabad and Another (2014 MLD 192) Janak Raj v. Gurdial Singh and Another (1967 AIR (SC) 608) R. Rajamma v. Avula Saraswathamma and Others (1973 AIR (A.P.) 132) Minor Smt. Shanti Devi v. Khandubala Dasi and Others (AIR 1961 Cal 336)

Summary: Special Criminal Anti-Terrorism Appeal (Sat aside on the ground 4 bullits produced though 1 sent forensic. )