Summary: Public interest litigation---The petitioner's counsel filed the petition, claiming that the mentioned documents were illegal and sought for them to be quashed using the court's writ jurisdiction. However, issues related to the maintainability of the petition were raised, including the petitioner's locus standi (legal standing), the absence of an alternative remedy to challenge the MOU, and the potential application of the doctrine of laches (unreasonable delay in filing a claim). The petitioner's counsel acknowledged that the petitioner wasn't personally aggrieved by the matters being challenged but argued that the petitioner's status as a Member of Parliament allowed her to invoke the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner alleged that the MOU violated public procurement rules but had not pursued remedies available under those rules or elsewhere. The court noted that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that she qualified as an aggrieved person for the purposes of invoking writ jurisdiction and that no justification for the delay in filing the petition was provided. The court explained that Article 199 of the Constitution grants discretionary writ jurisdiction to the court, to be exercised upon the invocation by an aggrieved person and in the absence of an adequate remedy. The court found that the petitioner did not meet the definition of an aggrieved person and had not exhausted available remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction. The court also noted that the allegations made by the petitioner were based on disputed questions of fact, which are not typically entertained in writ jurisdiction. The court further emphasized that public interest litigation should be pursued for genuine public interest and not for publicity or personal motives. Given the lack of legal standing, absence of an alternative remedy, and potential delay in filing the petition, the court concluded that the petitioner's case did not justify invoking the discretionary writ jurisdiction. Consequently, the court dismissed the petition.

Summary: whether a person is legally qualified for appointment or promotion to a particular post and grade is relatable to the factum whether he possesses the requisite qualifications for consideration, whereas the question of fitness pertains to the competency of the person concerned, which is to be decided by the competent authority.

Summary: Issue: The petitioner sought the implementation of Sections 9 and 10 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, particularly concerning the establishment and functioning of Juvenile Justice Committees (JJC) for case disposal through diversion.Facts:Sections 9 and 10 of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, outline the process of disposing of juvenile cases through diversion and the establishment of Juvenile Justice Committees, respectively.The petitioner argued that without the establishment of JJCs as per Section 10, effective implementation of Section 9's diversion process cannot be achieved.The court was informed that JJCs had been established in 26 out of 29 districts, with nominations pending for Korangi, Sujawal, and Khairpur districts.Concerns were raised about the operational diligence of these committees in fulfilling their duties as prescribed by the Act.Holding: The High Court directed all District & Sessions Judges in Sindh to ensure compliance with the law and the diligent performance of duties by JJCs. The Judges are also instructed to establish mechanisms for regular JJC meetings for case disposal through diversion and to submit compliance reports regularly.Reasoning:The court emphasized the importance of implementing the law in letter and spirit. Given that the government has established JJCs in most districts, it is now the responsibility of District & Sessions Judges to ensure these committees are functioning effectively.The court highlighted the specific functions of JJCs as per the Act, including disposing of cases through diversion, inspecting observation homes and Juvenile Rehabilitation Centres, and giving necessary directions for the welfare and social re-integration of juveniles.Order: The petition was disposed of with directions to ensure law compliance and diligent performance by JJCs. The Registrar of the High Court was instructed to circulate the order to all District & Sessions Judges in Sindh for compliance.

Summary: [Public Sector Companies (Corporate Governance Rules 2013 (Section 13)] The Competent Authority of HBFCL is directed to forthwith initiate the process for selection of an eligible person to be appointed against the aforesaid public office / posts in HBFC, inter alia, having regard to the principles and law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases

Summary: Issue: The validity of a notification issued by the Government of Sindh Agriculture Supply and Prices Department, fixing the minimum price of sugarcane for the crushing season 2018-19 at Rs.182 per 40 Kg, was challenged.Facts:The Government of Sindh issued a notification setting the minimum price for sugarcane for the 2018-19 season. Some petitioners challenged this notification, seeking its invalidation, while one petitioner sought enforcement.The main contention was that the notification was issued without proper cabinet approval and in violation of judicial precedents, specifically the Mustafa Impex case, which mandates cabinet approval for such decisions.Holding: The High Court of Sindh set aside the impugned notifications due to their issuance in violation of legal requirements for cabinet approval, as established in the Mustafa Impex case. The court directed the Government of Sindh to issue a fresh sugarcane price notification for the 2018-19 season within fifteen days.Reasoning:The court found that the notification was issued without a decision by the Sindh Cabinet or the Chief Minister prior to its issuance. Subsequent post facto ratification by the cabinet was deemed impermissible according to the Supreme Court's ruling in Mustafa Impex.The court also noted that procedural lapses in the issuance of the notification rendered it invalid, emphasizing the requirement for cabinet decision-making in matters involving executive authority.Order: The court directed the Government of Sindh to issue a new notification for the sugarcane price for the 2018-19 season, ensuring compliance with legal requirements for cabinet approval. Pending the issuance of a fresh notification, sugarcane growers were to continue being paid a minimum price of Rs.182 per 40 kg, as per the joint statement of counsel for the petitioners.

Summary: Conversely, the case law relied upon by Applicants counsel is relevant, wherein bail was granted, inter alia, considering the earlier Court case. Both male members of a family are behind bars who are bread earners. There is no record of earlier conviction. Guilt of accused is yet to be determined in the above circumstances, because at this stage a deeper appreciation of facts cannot be made.

Summary: 1.Effect of disclaimer made under section 21 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001 from exclusive use of a name. 2.The principle that registration of a trade mark gives rise to a prima facie case, balance of convenience and likelihood of irreparable loss, that principle would be applicable where the trade mark was registered without a disclaimer. 3.In view of section 42(3) of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, the use of the disclaimed feature of the mark in question would not constitute trade mark infringement. 4.An action for passing-off is essentially to protect property in goods based on the reputation of those goods, as distinct from an action to protect a trade mark which is a property in itself. ---- Issue: Whether the use of "by Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods constitutes trademark infringement or passing-off against U&I Garments' "JunaidJ.Jamshed" trademark.Holding: The court dismissed U&I Garments' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 933/2020) and granted Jazaa Foods' application for a temporary injunction (CMA No. 745/2020), thereby allowing Jazaa Foods to continue using "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."Reasoning:The court noted that U&I Garments' trademark registration included a disclaimer denying exclusive rights to the use of the name "Junaid Jamshed," indicating that the name could be used by others in a non-deceptive manner.The court found no substantial similarity in the use of "Junaid Jamshed" by Jazaa Foods to that of U&I Garments, thus no trademark infringement occurred.The court also found no evidence of passing-off since U&I Garments had not established a reputation in the food products market that could be confused with Jazaa Foods' products.The balance of convenience and potential for irreparable harm favored Jazaa Foods, as they had been using "by Junaid Jamshed" since 2016 without objection, and Junaid Jamshed himself had authorized the use of his name for Jazaa Foods during his lifetime.Order: The Defendants in Suit No. 94/2020 (U&I Garments and others) are restrained from interfering with Jazaa Foods' use of "by Junaid Jamshed" in conjunction with their registered trademark "Jazaa."

Summary: It would be seen that it has been consistently held by the Honble Supreme Court that if the tenant asserts that he is no more a tenant as he had purchased the property, even then he has to vacate the property and file a Suit for specific performance of the sale agreement, and he would be entitled to possession of the property in accordance with law only if he succeeds in his Suit. It is also well-settled that till such time the Civil Court passes a decree against the landlord in a Suit for specific performance, landlord would be entitled to recover rent. In the present case, it is an admitted position that compliance of the tentative rent order was not made by the petitioner, therefore, the Rent Controller had no option, but to strike off his defence as held by the Honble Supreme Court in Safeer Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. V/S Muhammad Khalid Shafi through legal heirs, PLD 2007 S.C. 504. The impugned orders are in accord with the law laid down by the Honble Supreme Court. Accordingly, the petition and listed application are dismissed in limine with no order as to costs.

Summary: The Impugned Order dismissed an appeal that was filed with a delay of 106 days in challenging a judgment. The Appellate Board held that the appeal was time-barred and that the application for condonation of delay did not provide sufficient grounds to justify the delay. The petitioner's counsel argued that the dismissal of the condonation application was unmerited, while the respondents' representatives contend that the appeal was clearly time-barred and that the petitioner's arguments lack merit. The Judges clarify that their role is not to sit in appeal over the Impugned Order but to determine whether there are any manifest infirmities that warrant interference through the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Court. They examined the relevant provisions of the FER Act, which deal with appeals and the condonation of delay. Ultimately, the Judges find that the petitioner failed to adequately explain the delay of 106 days in filing the appeal and that the affidavit filed in support of the condonation application lacked sufficient grounds. They uphold the dismissal of the appeal by the Appellate Board, and as a result, they dismiss the present petition.

Summary: [Service matters (Proforma Promotion)] proforma promotion in the rank of SEVP--NBP--Thus in our opinion, the impugned action taken by the competent authority of the respondent-bank was proper and based on reasonable grounds as well as in the terms of the promotion policy in vogue--it is a well-established principle in service jurisprudence that promotion from the backdate to the retired Public Servant cannot be granted until and unless he meets the criteria prescribed under the law; and, after his retirement from the respondent-bank in the light of the decision of Honorable Supreme Court rendered in the case of Government of Pakistan and others v. Hameed Akhter Niazi and others (PLD 2003 SC 110)