Summary: Bail denied --- The case involves several individuals, who was accused in a criminal case for offenses under Section 324/34 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Shahzad had been granted interim pre-arrest bail subject to certain conditions, with Ali Muhammad standing as his surety. However, Shahzad absconded after the trial proceedings had started, leading to a proclamation being issued against him under sections 87 and 88 of the Cr.P.C. The applicant, Ali Muhammad, stood surety for Shahzad and filed an application under Section 514 Cr.P.C to release/discharge him from this responsibility. The trial court dismissed this application, leading to the revision application before the High Court. Mr. Zahoor Shah, representing the State, argues that the surety's responsibility was to ensure Shahzad's presence in court, which they failed to do. The trial court, therefore, had a valid reason to issue the impugned order and forfeit the surety amount. Mr. Shah asserted that there is no ground for reducing or releasing the surety. After considering the arguments and examined the record, the judge, concluded that the trial court's order was justified. He rules that the applicant failed to ensure Shahzad's attendance in court as per the terms of the surety bond, and thus, the trial court had validly issued the order and forfeited the surety amount. The judge cited legal precedent to support the decision and dismisses the applicant's revision application.

Summary: Petitioner's Argument: M/s Al-Tariq Constructors contended that the impugned notifications infringed upon their vested right to the statutory rate of tax and input credit/tax adjustment as provided under Section 8(1) of the Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. They further argued that the power to levy variable tax rates under Section 8(2) could not impose conditions through notifications without specifying the applicable tax period.Legal Framework: Section 8 of the Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, serves as the charging provision for sales tax on taxable services, allowing for adjustments to tax rates under specified conditions by government-approved notifications.Court's Analysis and Conclusion:The court found that the amendment to Rule 42-B, which introduced a mechanism for service providers in the construction sector to opt for a standard tax rate by submitting Form-C, falls within the ambit of Section 8(2) of the Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011. The court noted that the petitioner failed to utilize the prescribed option within the stipulated timeframe, which led to the challenge against the amendment.The court observed that the amendment did not require the specification of a tax period as it was an alteration to an existing notification. Moreover, the provision for service providers to elect to pay tax at the statutory rate with the submission of Form-C was deemed to be within the legal and constitutional boundaries.Holding:The High Court of Sindh concluded that the impugned amendment did not contravene the constitution or the Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, thereby dismissing the petition filed by M/s Al-Tariq Constructors (Private) Limited. The detailed reasoning provided by the court affirmed the legal validity of the amendment and the procedural requirements set forth for opting for the standard tax rate in construction services.

Summary: Arbitration Act (X of 1940)-------Ss. 8, 20, 25, 32 & 34---Suit for recovery of money---Arbitration clause---Referring matter to Arbitrator---After filing of suit, proceedings were stayed and matter was referred to Arbitrator---Subsequently plaintiff filed application for restoration of suit and sought appointment of Arbitrator under Ss. 8 & 20 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Validity---Once parties were referred to Arbitrator, the purpose / object of Arbitration Act, 1940, was effectively achieved and parties were prevented to obtain a decree from Court contrary to their own agreement that their disputes were to be adjudicated by a private party as provided in arbitration agreement---Order on application under S. 34 of Arbitration Act, 1940, and / or on application under S. 20 of the Act, was one and the same---Purpose of both the provisions was to seek enforcement of an 'arbitration clause/agreement' against the party guilty of avoiding / refusing arbitration for resolution of their dispute---High Court declined exercise of discretion under S. 25 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Plaintiff had repeatedly approached the High Court by suppressing arbitration agreement and attempted to obtain a decree from a civil Court despite the fact that the suit was barred under S. 32 of Arbitration Act, 1940---Suit was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (Petition dismiss)---The petitioner, an investigative journalist, challenged the proposed acquisition of 51% of the capital of Invest & Finance Securities Limited (IFSL) by EFG Hermes Frontier Holdings (LLC), Dubai, citing violations of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, and the Foreign Exchange Manual. The petitioner sought declarations that the transaction contravened these laws and requested regulatory authorities to investigate potential money laundering. However, the court, upon examination, found the petition lacked merit. It questioned the petitioner's standing in bringing a public interest litigation, noting that private transactions fall outside the purview of such litigation. The court emphasized the role of regulatory bodies in overseeing financial transactions and dismissed the petition, deeming it misconceived.

Summary: Issue: The petitioner sought implementation of an adjudication order that confiscated its imported consignment but allowed its release upon payment of duties, taxes, a redemption fine, and a personal penalty. The Deputy Collector Air Freight Unit MCC JIAP Karachi demanded an additional amount for the release, which the petitioner contested.Facts:An Order in Original dated 16.07.2021 (Impugned Order) resulted from adjudication proceedings against a consignment imported by the petitioner. This order allowed the release of the consignment upon payment of specified duties, taxes, and penalties, invoking SRO 499(I)/2009.The respondent, Deputy Collector, demanded an additional Rs. 9,895,510/- beyond the amounts specified in the Impugned Order for the release of the consignment.Holding: The High Court dismissed the petition, finding no grounds to invoke its discretionary writ jurisdiction. The court determined that the additional demand by the respondent was in line with the directions of the Impugned Order and SRO 499.Reasoning:The Impugned Order included a directive for the collectorate to re-check the calculation of the fine concerning the value of the goods before release, indicating the fine calculation was not definitive.SRO 499 allows for the redemption of confiscated items against a fine based on the customs value of the goods, not merely the differential in adjudicated duties/taxes and the amount paid.The department's additional demand was based on the customs value discrepancy between the invoice discovered and the value declared, consistent with SRO 499's stipulations. The petitioner had the option to challenge the Impugned Order within the statutory appellate framework if it found inconsistencies or legal discordances.Order: The petition was dismissed, with the court concluding that the petitioner did not establish a case for the exercise of the High Court's discretionary writ jurisdiction.

Summary: [Service matters (recruitment / examination process)] The petitioners have impugned the recruitment / examination process initiated by the Universities and Boards Department, Government of Sindh, for the posts of Secretary / Controller of Examination Sindh Boards of Intermediate and Secondary Education, inter-alia, on the ground that the examination process was compromised in order to accommodate the beneficiaries / private respondents, who were having influence and/or were selected for extraneous consideration--We in the aforesaid circumstances hold that recommendation of the Search Committee for appointment of unsuccessful candidates for the aforesaid posts and their subsequent appointments was without lawful authority. We direct the competent authority to hold a fresh interview for the subject posts of only successful candidates declared by IBA, and if the posts are leftover, the same shall be filled only through fresh advertisement on merits. All these petitions are allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.

Summary: The main argument from the petitioners' side was that they were seeking regularization based on a decision of the Federal cabinet in 2012 regarding the regularization of contract and daily wage employees. They argued that since they had been working for the PNSC for many years, their services should be regularized, and they should receive all associated benefits. The respondents from the PNSC argued that contractual employees do not have a vested right to be regularized unless provided for in the terms of appointment and the law. They contended that the petitions were not maintainable and that contractual employees could not approach the court for regularization. They highlighted that the PNSC was a state-owned entity and that the regulations governing their employment were non-statutory. They emphasized that contractual employees do not have a right to claim permanent status at the end of their term and that regularization must strictly follow the rules of recruitment in force. They also stated that courts typically refrain from interfering in the policy-making domain of the executive branch unless fundamental rights are infringed. The judges concluded that the case fell within the realm of master and servant relationship, and contractual employees have no fundamental or acquired right to claim regularization. They ruled that the petitions were not maintainable under the law and dismissed the petitions along with all pending applications.

Summary: Recruitment process of Head Master/Head Mistress in BPS-17 and their participation in SPSC.

Summary: The petitioners claim that they were appointed by the SSGCL on a contractual basis in lower grades on various vacant posts starting from 2002 onwards. They argue that they have been performing their duties diligently and honestly. The petitioners contend that they are eligible for regularization under various Office Memorandums issued by the Government of Pakistan, Cabinet Secretariat, Establishment Division. However, the SSGCL is allegedly not regularizing them, stating that they are employees of a third-party contractor rather than direct employees of the company. The respondents, including the SSGCL, denied the allegations and disputed the maintainability of the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. They argued that the petitioners should seek remedy through the labor laws and grievance procedures instead of constitutional jurisdiction. The court rejected the argument regarding maintainability and cited several judgments by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that supported the use of constitutional petitions against state-owned entities even if they were registered as companies. Ultimately, the court held that the petitioners were entitled to the benefits of regularization and cited various legal precedents to support its decision. It directed the Chief Executive Officer of the SSGCL to consider the petitioners' case for regularization within two months based on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Art. 22 & S. 3---Suit for damages---Plaintiff sought damages and compensation for mental torture and harassment caused by the change in medical policy of its employer / defendant---Contention of defendant was that plaintiff retired in the year 2004, and enjoyed medical benefits till 2006, whereafter the medical policy was changed and having filed the suit in 2010, the same was barred by limitation under Art. 22 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1908---Held, that new medical policy was made effective in November, 2006, but the same was declared illegal by the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, in the year 2010, and the present suit was filed three months after order of High Court in the said constitutional Petition---Cause of action was therefore continuing and limitation period for filing suit started running from date of order of High Court in constitutional petition---Suit was, therefore, within time and maintainable. (b) Tort--- ----Agony and mental torture---Suit for damages and compensation---Quantum of damages, determination of---Rule of thumb, application of---Obligation of court to determine damages once it was established that plaintiff suffered mental torture---Scope---Once the Trial Court had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff suffered mental torture and agony for which defendant was responsible, the Trial Court had to grant damages as compensation---Such damages were obviously general damages and discretion was to be exercised in justifying the quantum of compensation to plaintiff---Such quantum of damages was to be determined by following the "rule of thumb", and any accurate and definite answer to the question of quantum of damages was not possible---While sufferings of human beings can be appreciated, but the magnitude / impact of mental torture could not be; and therefore, it was humanly impossible to assess a fair compensation to the satisfaction of a person who had complained of injury---Trial Court, even in absence of any method to determine a fair assessment of damage, was still under an obligation to decide an amount of money as compensation keeping in view facts and circumstances placed on record by the injured/plaintiff, to show how tortuous the conduct of the aggressor was and for how long the plaintiff remained under mental stress---While applying the "rule of thumb":, the conscious of the court should be satisfied that the damages to be awarded, if not completely, then satisfactorily compensate the plaintiff.