Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute between Messrs Kanpur Old Boys Association (Appellant) and Karachi Metropolitan Corporation (KMC) and Karachi Development Authority (KDA) (Respondents) regarding the allocation of an amenity plot by KDA to the appellant. In 1983, the appellant, a charitable institution, applied for a one-acre plot in Gulistan-e-Johar for the establishment of a community hall and library. KDA issued a letter in 1984 allocating the plot, but the appellant only paid 50% of the occupancy value by 1989. Subsequently, in 1995 and 2003, KDA issued show-cause notices threatening to cancel the plot’s allocation due to non-construction on the land. The appellant did not receive the show-cause notices and filed a complaint with the Provincial Ombudsman, Sindh, who ruled in favor of the appellant, stating that KDA’s failure to issue the allotment letter constituted maladministration. The Governor dismissed KDA's appeal, and the case was brought before the High Court, which overturned the Ombudsman's decision. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the Provincial Ombudsman had jurisdiction to decide the case. ------ 2) Whether KDA’s failure to issue an allotment letter and put the appellant into possession constituted maladministration under the Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991. ------ 3) Whether the appellant’s complaint was barred by the limitation period prescribed under Section 10(3) of the Act. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of Ombudsman: The Supreme Court held that the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction in the matter as the issue raised by the appellant related to the alleged transgression of contractual rights, which should have been pursued through a civil court. The Ombudsman unlawfully assumed powers akin to those of a civil court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. ------ Maladministration: The Court found that KDA’s actions did not constitute maladministration as defined under Section 9 read with Section 2(2) of the Act. The petitioner’s complaint was based on contractual disputes, which fell outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. ------ Limitation Period: The complaint was also barred by limitation, as it was filed 17 years after the initial allocation letter in 1984, while Section 10(3) of the Act requires complaints to be filed within three months. The Supreme Court ruled that the Ombudsman’s decision was coram non judice (without jurisdiction), and the Governor had wrongly dismissed KDA’s representation on technical grounds. The High Court's judgment, which set aside the decisions of the Ombudsman and the Governor, was affirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. ------ Citations/Precedents: Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Related to the jurisdiction of civil courts in matters involving disputes over rights. Establishment of the Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1991: Section 9: Defines maladministration. Section 10(3): Prescribes the three-month limitation period for filing complaints with the Ombudsman. The appeal was dismissed, confirming that the High Court had correctly set aside the Ombudsman’s decision, as the matter did not fall under the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ––– ---Order VII, Rule 11---Rejection of plaint---Fresh suit after return of plaint--- Court held that a plaintiff whose plaint has been returned under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. is not obligated to file the same plaint and may present a fresh suit with additional claims, provided it is within the limitation period---This principle aligns with precedents from higher courts, including Mst. Hawabai v. Abdus Shakoor (PLD 1981 Karachi 277) and Abdus Shakoor v. Mst. Hawabai (1982 SCMR 867). (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ––– ---S. 23---Continuing breaches and wrongs--- In cases of recurring infringements, a fresh period of limitation arises with each act of infringement---Court held that alleged infringement of copyright constitutes a continuing wrong under S. 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908, providing a new cause of action for each occurrence. (c) Intellectual Property Law ––– ---Copyright infringement and recurring cause of action--- Plaintiff alleged infringement of copyright in her novels and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages---Court held that recurring acts of infringement provide continuous cause of action, making the suit maintainable despite allegations of being time-barred---Reliance placed on M/S Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. M/S Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company (AIR 1997 SC 1398). (d) Declaratory Relief ––– ---Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C.---Scope and applicability--- Court clarified that a fresh suit for declaratory relief, arising from a recurring cause of action, is not barred under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C., as long as new claims are based on subsequent infringements or breaches. (e) Mixed Question of Law and Fact ––– ---Bar of limitation--- Court determined that whether the suit or specific claims are barred by limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, requiring trial and framing of specific issues---Held, rejection of the plaint at the preliminary stage is unwarranted. ----Cited Cases: Mst. Hawabai v. Abdus Shakoor, PLD 1981 Karachi 277 Abdus Shakoor v. Mst. Hawabai, 1982 SCMR 867 M/S Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. M/S Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company, AIR 1997 SC 1398 ----Disposition: Application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. dismissed; suit held to be maintainable for adjudication on merits.

Summary: Background:This case involves a civil revision petition filed by the Province of Punjab (petitioners) against Firm Friends & Engineers Bahawalpur (respondent-contractor) concerning a contractual dispute. The contract, awarded on 16th April 1986, was for the construction of a metalled road from Qaimpur to Baqainwala in Bahawalpur district. Due to an injunctive order delaying the project, the respondent-contractor sought extensions, which were granted with penalties. Despite the extensions, delays persisted, leading to the contractor being declared a defaulter on 24th January 1988. Following disputes over the payment of dues, arbitration was agreed upon but was stalled until 2007 when an award was finally issued. The respondent-contractor sought judicial modification of this award, which the civil court modified in 2012 to include interest payments. Subsequent appeals by the petitioners were dismissed, prompting this civil revision.----Issues:Whether the modifications to the arbitration award by the lower courts were permissible under the Arbitration Act, 1940.Legitimacy of the respondent-contractor's application to the civil court in terms of timeliness and procedural correctness.Assessment of the petitioner?s objections to the lower court decisions, particularly concerning the interest awarded and procedural handling of the case.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. The court determined:The modifications made to the arbitration award by the lower courts were within legal bounds as the courts have the authority under Section 15 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, to modify an award if necessary conditions are met.The application by the respondent-contractor was timely under Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as the respondent was not issued a notice by the arbitrators, altering the usual limitation period.The award of interest on the owed amount was justified as the respondent-contractor was entitled to interest from the date payment was due under Section 29 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.Citations/PrecedentsAscon Engineers (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Punjab (2002 SCMR 1662)Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. v. K.F. Development Corporation Ltd. (2006 SCMR 1555)Province of Punjab through Secretary, Housing and Physical Planning, Lahore v. Ilam Din (1998 SCMR 110)Several other cases cited were distinguished based on their facts or applicability, affirming that the principles established did not directly apply to the issues at hand in this specific revision petition.

Summary: #NAME?

Summary: '' i). Distinction between a suit for cancellation and suit for declaration. ii). Applicability of Articles 91 and 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "Act 1908") iii). Scope and import of Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1872"). iv). Agreement to sell (Exhibit-P1) which was produced in the statement of learned counsel for the "appellant" is not permissible at all.'' Background:The case involves Abdul Ghafoor (appellant) against Babar Sultan Jadoon (respondent) and three other respondents in a legal dispute concerning property transactions that stem from a power of attorney and subsequent sales agreements. Abdul Ghafoor, through a general power of attorney, authorized Babar Sultan Jadoon, who subsequently executed sale deeds of the said property in favor of his brothers (respondents No.2 & 3). Ghafoor contested these deeds and sought their cancellation, claiming misrepresentation and fraud, leading to the initial suit's dismissal by a Civil Judge, prompting the appeal to the Lahore High Court.----Issues:Validity of the sale deeds and general power of attorney based on claims of fraud and misrepresentation.Whether the plaintiff (Ghafoor) was entitled to various compensations and recoveries as outlined in his suit.Applicability of statutes from the Limitation Act concerning the timing of the suit.The legitimacy of Ghafoor's claims under specific articles of the Contract Act regarding the irrevocability of the power of attorney.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial court's judgment. It was determined that:The power of attorney was legitimately executed and became irrevocable because it was coupled with an interest, confirmed by payment and agreements related to the property.The suit filed by Ghafoor was time-barred under the applicable statutes from the Limitation Act.There was overwhelming evidence supporting the respondents' execution of the sale agreements as per the authorized power of attorney.Claims of fraud and misrepresentation brought by Ghafoor were not substantiated adequately, thus affirming the legal standing of the sale deeds.----Citations/Precedents:Mst. Izzat vs. Allah Ditta (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 165)Fida Muhammad vs. Pir Muhammad Khan (Deceased) Through Legal Heirs and Others (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 341)Muhammad Ajaib vs. Mughal Hussain and 2 others (2004 YLR 690)Media Max (Pvt) Ltd. through Chief Executive vs. Army Communication Pvt. Ltd. through Chief Executive and another (PLD 2013 Sindh 555)Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi vs. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212)Imam Din and 4 others vs. Bashir Ahmed and 10 others (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 418)S.K. Shah through LRs vs. Jamaluddin and others (2017 SCMR 626)Muhammad Aslam vs. Mst. Ferozi and others (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 213)Manzoor Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs. vs. Misri Khan (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 749)

Summary: (a) Property Law – Title and Possession: ----Registered Title – Prima Facie Ownership – Specific Performance In cases involving conflicting claims over immovable property, a registered title holds primacy unless canceled through proper legal proceedings. The plaintiff (M. Punjwani) held a registered sub-lease and mutation in his favor, which was not disputed by any legal proceeding challenging its validity. The defendant (MK Khan), claiming rights under purported sale agreements, failed to establish a prima facie title as the agreements neither conferred ownership nor justified possession or rental arrangements. (b) Specific Performance – Limitation and Delay: ----Sale Agreements – Delay in Seeking Relief – Evidence of Consideration The defendant (MK Khan) sought specific performance of alleged sale agreements dated 10-12-2019 but failed to justify the delay of nearly five years in filing the suit. Furthermore, the absence of financial instruments corroborating consideration and the non-disclosure of material facts, including tenancy agreements with his wife as a tenant, weakened his case. (c) Tenancy Agreements – Validity in Absence of Title: ----Authority to Lease – Concealment of Tenancy Information The court observed that tenancy agreements executed by MK Khan, in the absence of title or contractual authority under the purported sale agreements, lacked legal standing. The non-disclosure of his wife as one of the tenants during court proceedings was considered a material concealment undermining his case. (d) Appointment of Receiver – Principles and Grounds: ----Preservation of Property – Risk of Dissipation – Equitable Relief The court appointed a receiver under Order XL, Rule 1, C.P.C., emphasizing the need to preserve the property pending litigation. The appointment was justified based on the following principles: Protection of property from waste, mismanagement, or further dissipation. Prevention of third-party rights being unlawfully created. Maintenance of status quo during litigation. The court relied on precedents, including Saeed ur Rehman and Asadullah Mirbahar, reiterating that a receiver acts as an officer of the court, maintaining the property for the eventual successful litigant without determining ownership rights at this stage. (e) Interim Injunction – Grounds for Rejection: ----Prima Facie Case – Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Harm The defendant (MK Khan) failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm necessary for granting interim relief. As he was not in possession of the suit property, the injunction sought to restrain interference in his possession was deemed legally unsustainable. ----Disposition: C.M.A. No. 3820/2024 in Suit 211/2024: Dismissed, as MK Khan failed to demonstrate title, bona fide possession, or grounds for interim relief. C.M.A. No. 18975/2023 in Suit 1921/2023: Allowed. The Nazir of the Court was appointed as the receiver to take exclusive possession of the suit property, seal it, and preserve it pending final adjudication. ----Directions to Authorities: Pakistan Defence Officers' Housing Authority (DHA) and Sub-Registrar Clifton Town were instructed to record the court’s order in property records and ensure no alienation occurs without court approval. ----Cited Cases: Saeed ur Rehman v. Asadullah Mirbahar Zamir Ahmed Khan Lala Roshan Lal v. Ch. Muhammad Afzal (PLD 1949 Lah. 60) Owen v. Homan (94 RR 516) ----Disposition: C.M.A. No. 3820/2024: Dismissed C.M.A. No. 18975/2023: Allowed

Summary: (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 – Section 14(2): ---- Filing of arbitration award in court – Party's authority to file Section 14(2) allows either the arbitrator or the parties to file the arbitration award in court. If a party files the award, the court must verify its authenticity by requesting the arbitrator to file the original award and supporting documents if needed. The dismissal of a Section 14 application solely because the award was not filed by the arbitrator constitutes a jurisdictional irregularity. (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 – Procedural safeguards: ---- Court’s duty upon filing of an award Upon the filing of an award, the court must issue notices to all parties, enabling them to raise objections. Failure to require the arbitrator to file the award while dismissing an application under Section 14 undermines procedural fairness and contravenes the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940. (c) Rules under Arbitration Act, 1940: ---- Rule 10(a) of Lahore High Court Rules – Filing by parties Under Rule 10(a) of the Lahore High Court Rules, a party to an arbitration may file the award in court. This provision complements Section 14(2) by allowing flexibility in filing the award when arbitrators have already provided copies to the parties. (d) Limitation Act, 1908 – Article 158: ---- Timeliness of objections to arbitration awards Under Article 158, a limitation period of 30 days applies for filing objections to an award after notice of its filing. Courts may consider objections filed after this period only in exceptional circumstances. (e) Jurisdictional irregularity: ---- Improper dismissal of Section 14 application Dismissing an application under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, without directing the arbitrator to file the award constitutes a jurisdictional irregularity. Courts are obligated to facilitate the enforcement process by ensuring procedural compliance. (f) Ex-parte proceedings: ---- Proceeding ex-parte against unresponsive respondents Where respondents fail to appear despite proper service of notices, including publication, courts may proceed ex-parte. However, the court must evaluate the application and evidence presented by the appellant before deciding. ----Disposition: The appeal was allowed, and the impugned judgment of the civil court was set aside. The case was remanded for further proceedings, requiring the trial court to process the application under Section 14 and verify the award's authenticity if necessary.

Summary: Background: The case involves an appeal filed by Tranzum Courier Service (TCS) Private Limited and another party against the judgment of the District Consumer Court, Sialkot, which directed them to refund the booking price of a parcel and pay damages amounting to Rs. 150,000. The respondent, a government school teacher, had hired TCS to send her original educational certificates to the Higher Education Commission (HEC) for attestation, which were lost during transit. The respondent filed a claim under the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005, which was allowed by the trial court. The appellants challenged this decision on the grounds of limitation and failure to comply with mandatory legal notice requirements. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent’s claim was barred by limitation under Section 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. 2- Whether the legal notice required under Section 28(1) of the Act was properly issued and delivered to the appellants. 3- Whether the respondent was entitled to damages, despite having received duplicates of the lost certificates. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation Issue: The Lahore High Court held that the respondent's claim was not barred by limitation. The court determined that the cause of action accrued on July 21, 2022, when the respondent was informed by TCS that her documents were lost. The legal notice was issued on August 3, 2022, and the claim was filed on August 18, 2022, within the statutory period. The plea that the claim was time-barred was therefore rejected. --Legal Notice Compliance: The court found that the respondent had fulfilled the requirement of serving a legal notice under Section 28(1) of the Act. The evidence presented showed that the notice was issued and delivered to the appellants, and the appellants did not effectively challenge the authenticity of the notice during the trial. --Damages Awarded: The court upheld the award of Rs. 150,000 in damages, ruling that this amount was reasonable and proportionate to the mental agony and inconvenience suffered by the respondent due to the defective service provided by TCS. The court referred to a similar case (TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum, PLD 2022 Lahore 524) to support the reasonableness of the damages awarded. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another (PLD 2023 SC 482) Muhammad Khalil Khan and others v. Mahbub Ali Mian (PLD 1948 Privy Council 131) TCS (Private) Limited v. Mst. Haseena Begum (PLD 2022 Lahore 524) The appeal was dismissed, and the judgment of the District Consumer Court was upheld. The appellants were required to comply with the original order, including the payment of damages.

Summary: Background:This judgment by the Islamabad High Court involves appeals under section 17(13) of the Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ("ADD Act"), filed by various appellants, including M/s Amal Steel, against the Anti-Dumping Appellate Tribunal and other entities. The appeals fall into two categories: Category-A includes those who did not appeal to the Tribunal under section 70(1) of the ADD Act but filed a second appeal directly to the Court, and Category-B includes appeals against Tribunal judgments dismissed due to being filed beyond the limitation period.----Issues:Whether the Tribunal has authority under the ADD Act and the Limitation Act to condone delays in filing appeals beyond the prescribed period of limitation.Can the High Court condone delay in filing an appeal against a Tribunal's final determination and direct the Tribunal to hear the appeal on merit?Can the High Court entertain a direct appeal against a Tribunal's final determination where the appellant did not avail the first appeal right, or decide an appeal on merits dismissed by the Tribunal on grounds of limitation?Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeThe High Court dismissed the appeals, finding them not maintainable based on the principles of law and limitations. It was determined that:The Tribunal does not have the authority to condone delays in filing appeals.The High Court cannot condone delays on behalf of appellants and direct the Tribunal to hear such appeals on their merits, as it would alter the adjudicatory scheme prescribed by the ADD Act.Parties who have not availed the right to file a first appeal before the Tribunal or whose appeals were dismissed on grounds of limitation do not have the right to a hearing in the High Court.-----Citations/Precedents:Mohammad Ashraf and others Vs. UBL and others (2019 SCMR 1004)M/s Spirit Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. Vs. National Tariff Commission, Islamabad and 2 others (2021 PTD 647)M/s Al-Ahad Steel Vs. National Tariff Commission and others (C.M.A. No.64/2023)Khushi Mohammad through LRs. and others Vs. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 872)Taufiq Asif Vs. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others (Civil Petition No.3797 of 2020)Mohammad Hussain Vs. Walayat Shah (PLD 1959 LHR 526)H.M. SAYA & Co. Karachi Vs. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd. Karachi and another (PLD 1969 SC 65)Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary Quetta Vs. Dr. Mohammad Tariq Jafar (2020 SCMR 1689)Hameed Akhtar Niazi Vs. Secretary, Establishment Division Government of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1185)

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908—Right to File Leave to Defend—Violation of Statutory Period----Summary proceedings under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.—Mandatory 10-day period for leave to defend—Effect of premature striking off defenceHeld, under Article 159 of the Limitation Act, 1908, read with Order XXXVII, Rule 2, C.P.C., a defendant in a summary suit is entitled to 10 days from the date of service of summons to file a Leave to Defend application—The Trial Court acted prematurely by striking off the defence of the Appellant on the 9th day instead of allowing the full statutory period to elapse—Such curtailment of time is a violation of due process and deprives the defendant of his right to contest the suit—Court must ensure that procedural safeguards are upheld before taking any coercive action—Reliance placed on Order XXXVII, Rules 2 & 3, C.P.C.(b) Service of Summons—Failure to Verify Essential Documents—Effect----Summons validity under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.—Trial Court’s reliance on incomplete serviceHeld, Order XXXVII, Rule 2, C.P.C., mandates that summons in summary suits must be served using Form No. 4 of Appendix B—Trial Court erroneously validated service despite the absence of courier receipts and acknowledgment of delivery (AD)—Simultaneously, the Trial Court continued directing the submission of these documents even after holding service as valid, raising serious concerns about the thoroughness of its evaluation—Failure to verify these essential documents before declaring service "good" violates procedural fairness and compromises the legitimacy of ex parte proceedings.(c) Summary Suits—Principle of Fair Hearing and Due Process----Fundamental right to present defence—Implications of procedural irregularitiesHeld, the right to be heard and present a defence is a fundamental due process requirement—When a statute grants a defendant a fixed period to exercise his legal rights, the court must uphold that period and not curtail it arbitrarily—Prematurely striking off the defence deprived the Appellant of his procedural right to contest the claim—Failure to follow proper service verification further weakened the Trial Court’s ex parte decision, making it legally unsustainable.(d) Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court—Intervention in Procedural Violations----Trial Court’s procedural lapses—High Court’s corrective roleHeld, the High Court has the authority to review and set aside decisions that violate procedural fairness and statutory requirements—Since the Trial Court’s actions contravened Order XXXVII, C.P.C., by striking off defence prematurely and validating incomplete service, the ex parte judgment and decree, as well as the order rejecting the defendant’s application, were set aside—Appellant granted a fresh opportunity to file Leave to Defend within 10 days.---- Disposition:First Appeal allowed—Ex parte judgment and decree set aside—Case remanded to the Trial Court for fresh proceedings in accordance with law.