Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 59 & 164---Electronic Transactions Ordinance (No. LI of 2002), S. 18---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. V, R. 20(b) & O. XVIII R. 4---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 12 & 54---Usage of modern devices and scientific technologies as evidence in courts---Scope---Doctrine of "updating construction of statutes"---Scope---Filing of application in suit for specific performance with permanent injunction by the respondents/defendants for calling scanner/modern device to read out the serial number and barcode of stamp paper used by the petitioner/plaintiff for agreement to sell---Delay in proceedings before Trial Court, plea of---Legality---Application was dismissed by the Trial Court, but accepted by the revisional court---Validity---High Court was not persuaded with such contention as the petition was pending for the last 5 years and no efforts were taken by the petitioner to expedite the proceedings rather delay was caused by him and the petition was filed to undermine the law such as Arts. 59 and 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, O. V, R. 20(b) and O. XVIII R. 4, C.P.C. and the dictum of the Supreme Court of Pakistan on usage of modern devices and scientific technologies as evidence in courts---Status of forensic evidence is corroboration and universally it is not conclusive evidence, but its value is robust explanatory to the direct evidence---Law is guidepost for minimally acceptable behavior in society---In a modern society, the law informs everyday life in a wide variety of ways and is reflected in numerous branches of law with its ultimate object to serve society, as such immense need to use technology with a dynamic and visionary scheme in court proceedings---Petitioner failed to satisfy the High Court as to what prejudice would be caused to him and how he was aggrieved with the order of revisional court in case Art. 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, had been invoked to verify the authenticity of document by usage of modern devices in a transparent manner being helpful to the Trial Court to arrive at just and proper decision to determine the controversy between the parties---Under the doctrine of "updating construction of Statutes" the order of revisional court for the permissibility to use modern device (scanner) to read barcode of disputed document under Art. 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, for determinative steps about birth date, time or seriality order as well as veracity as per Stock Register of Stamps Paper, High Court did not find any illegality or jurisdictional defect in that order---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Federal Shariat Court PLD 2010 FSC 215; Fakir Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1958 SC 118; Azeem Khan v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274; Salman Akram Raja v. Government of Punjab 2013 SCMR 203; 2016 SCMR 2084; Ali Haider alias Pappu v. Jameel Hussain and others PLD 2021 SC 362 and Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199(1)(a)---Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Object and purpose---Objective of Art. 199 of the Constitution is to foster justice, protect rights and correct any wrongs---Constitution empowers the High Court to rectify wrongful or excessive or colorable exercise of jurisdiction by lower courts or to probe the procedural illegality or jurisdictional error or procedural improprieties that may have prejudiced a case of an aggrieved person. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 rel. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199(1)(a)---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Aggrieved person, meaning of---Requirement of being "aggrieved person"---Scope---It is mandatory for a petitioner to demonstrate from the record that he is aggrieved with an order realistically otherwise one should bear in mind that a person cannot be said to be an aggrieved party within the meaning of Art. 199 of the Constitution, if his rights and interests are not adversely affected or if he suffers no loss or injury by a particular order---It is sine quo non for proceeding of writ or judicial review under Art. 199(1)(a) of the Constitution that a person should be aggrieved with an order and in other words a non-aggrieved person does not qualify to invoke extra-ordinary jurisdiction of High Court. Hafiz Hamadullah v. Saifullah Khan and others PLD 2007 SC 52 rel. Rao Faisal Ali for Petitioner. Muhammad Sharif, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No. 6. Date of hearing: 18th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 12(2)---Ex-parte decree---Application for setting aside---Sufficient cause---Concurrent findings of District Judge and High Court---Scope of interference by Supreme Court. Appellants filed application for setting aside ex-parte proceedings and decree, contending that their absence was due to the holy month of Ramzan and unavoidable circumstances of counsel’s clerk. Both District Judge and High Court dismissed the application holding that no sufficient cause was shown for non-appearance. Held, that concurrent findings based on evidence ordinarily are not disturbed unless material irregularity or misreading is apparent; however, since decree was found legally non-executable against appellants who had no contractual privity with plaintiff, interference became necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice. (b) Contract Act, 1872 (as applicable to AJK) ----Privity of contract---Agreement executed between Pakistan Red Crescent District Branch Bagh and plaintiff---No contractual relationship with appellants---Liability---Scope. Record revealed that the agreement dated 26.08.2019 was executed solely between PRCS District Branch Bagh and respondent, under which monthly rent of Rs. 80,000/- was payable. Appellants, being officials of Pakistan Red Crescent Islamabad, had neither executed nor authorized the contract and had no administrative or financial control over PRCS Azad Jammu & Kashmir, which is a distinct statutory entity established by Act of 2001. Held, appellants had no privity of contract with respondent and therefore no liability could attach to them under the impugned decree. (c) Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir, 1974 (Interim) ----Art. 42-A---Powers of Supreme Court---Scope of correction of decree partly executable and partly unenforceable. Supreme Court, exercising powers under Art.42-A of the Interim Constitution and O.XLIII, R.5 of Supreme Court Rules, 1978, set aside the decree to the extent of appellants for being legally non-executable against them, while maintaining the decree against PRCS District Branch Bagh which was party to the agreement and had not challenged the ex-parte decree. Held, that decree dated 10.05.2022 was rightly passed against PRCS District Branch Bagh but erroneously extended to appellants having no contractual nexus—appeal accepted and decree modified to the extent that “plaintiff is entitled to receive Rs. 896,000/- from defendant No.1 only.” Disposition: Appeal accepted; decree modified accordingly.

Summary: (a) Family Laws (Enforcement) Act, 1966 (as applicable to AJK) ----Recovery of Dower—Concurrent findings of Family Court and High Court—Scope of interference by Supreme Court. Respondent/wife instituted a suit for recovery of dower comprising a constructed house and land as stipulated in the Nikahnama. Family Court decreed the suit and the High Court affirmed the decree. Appellant contended before the Supreme Court that he had already discharged the dower by paying Rs.200,000 in gold and cash and that the Nikahnama was fraudulent, having been executed while he was abroad. Held, that the plea of payment was unsubstantiated as no documentary proof existed showing that gold ornaments given to the respondent were intended as dower. The burden to establish payment of dower rested on the appellant, which he failed to discharge. Concurrent findings of the courts below, being based on evidence, were not liable to interference. (b) Evidence Act, 1872 (as applicable to AJK) ----Presumption of truth of registered documents—Nikahnama—Challenge to signatures after cohabitation. Nikahnama, being a registered instrument, enjoys presumption of correctness under the law. Appellant’s plea that his signatures were forged was found baseless since he never challenged the document’s authenticity before any forum and had cohabited with respondent as husband and wife for nearly three years after solemnization of marriage. Acceptance of marital relationship while denying the Nikahnama’s contents amounted to approbation and reprobation, which the law does not permit. Belated plea of forgery raised only after matrimonial discord was held to be an afterthought and devoid of merit. (c) Family Law—Nikahnama—Validity—Witnesses and Wali—Close relatives as witnesses. Argument that Nikahnama was invalid because the Wali and witnesses were close relatives of the bride was repelled. It was observed that it is customary and natural for a bride’s father and close relatives to act as witnesses at the time of Nikah. No illegality or irregularity was found in execution of the Nikahnama on that account. (d) Family Law—Caste of parties—Irrelevance to adjudication of dower claim. Appellant’s plea that he was a Syed and that the respondent and her family had falsely claimed Syed lineage was held irrelevant to determination of the legal issue. Court observed that it was not competent to determine caste disputes in family litigation concerning dower recovery, which issue lay entirely outside the scope of the proceedings. (e) Family Law—Dower—Unpaid—Presumption from Nikahnama entries. Entries in the Nikahnama being uncontroverted and unchallenged carried presumption of correctness. Dower as recorded therein remained unpaid, and decree for its recovery by Family Court, affirmed by High Court, was maintained. Held: Appeal dismissed. No illegality or material irregularity found in concurrent findings of courts below. Disposition:Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978--- ----O.XLVI, R.6---Substitution of counsel in review petition---Scope and limitation---Under Rule 6 of Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1978, a review petition must be drawn and argued by the same Advocate who appeared at the hearing of the case in which the judgment or order sought to be reviewed was made---Special leave to substitute a counsel may be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as death, incapacity, or unavoidable absence of the original counsel---The rule ensures that the advocate who argued the original case, being fully conversant with the record and reasoning of the judgment, is best placed to assess and present the permissible grounds for review---Practice of filing review petitions with changed counsel, without compelling reasons, has been strongly deprecated by the Court. Cited Cases: • Sana Latif’s case (Civil Misc. No. 57 of 2023, decided on 13.04.2023) • Amjad Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad and others (PLD 2023 SC 22) • Muhammad Sabeel Khan v. Muhammad Ayoub Khan and others (2015 SCR 1464) • Muhammad Younas and others v. The State (PLD 2005 SC 93) • Ghulam Rasul and others v. Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Gujranwala (1980 SCMR 962) • Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and others v. N. Raju Reddiar and others (AIR 1997 SC 1005) (b) Administration of justice--- ----Exercise of judicial discretion under procedural rules---Requirement of sufficient grounds---Although Rule 6 does not expressly stipulate the requirement of “sufficient grounds,” the discretion to allow substitution of counsel is not mechanical or automatic---Such discretion must be exercised judiciously and only upon valid and compelling reasons---Absence of such circumstances renders the application liable to dismissal---Held, that indiscriminate permission for change of counsel at the review stage would render the rule redundant and encourage endless litigation. Disposition: ---Application dismissed; no compelling circumstances established to justify substitution of counsel at the review stage.

Summary: (a) Evacuee Property Law--- ----Allotment of evacuee land---Challenge to allotment and proprietary rights---Scope of interference---Petitioners claimed entitlement to evacuee land as local destitutes and sought annulment of the allotment and PRTO issued in favour of private respondents---Record revealed that land in dispute, comprising Khasra Nos. 141 and 144, had been allotted to respondents’ predecessor-in-interest as migrants in 1982, and proprietary rights were conferred upon them through Order No.13611 dated 23-09-1999---Earlier litigation before District Rehabilitation Court and revisional forums had upheld the validity of the allotment---Petitioners neither challenged the allotment within the prescribed time nor explained the extraordinary delay of nearly two decades in filing review petition before the Custodian---Held, that the challenge being hopelessly time-barred and unsupported by any plausible justification, was rightly dismissed by the Custodian and affirmed by the High Court. (b) Evacuee Property Act--- ----Claim of local destitutes---Burden of proof and contradictions in pleadings---Petitioners’ claim of being local destitutes contradicted by their own averments that they had constructed houses worth crores of rupees on the disputed land---Such contradictory stance rendered their plea devoid of credibility---They also failed to establish their status as migrants or local destitutes through any documentary evidence---Held, that findings of the forums below were based on proper appreciation of evidence and did not warrant interference. (c) Civil Procedure--- ----Concurrent findings of fact---Interference by Supreme Court---Scope---Where concurrent findings of Custodian and High Court are based on proper appraisal of evidence and no question of law of public importance arises, Supreme Court ordinarily does not interfere---Held, that no error of law, jurisdictional defect, or misreading of evidence was demonstrated---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed. Disposition: ---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed. ---Concurrent findings of fact maintained.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898) ----Ss. 249-A & 265-K---Scope and exercise of power of acquittal at any stage of proceedings---Trial Courts possess inherent jurisdiction under Ss. 249-A and 265-K, Cr.P.C. to acquit an accused at any stage of judicial proceedings, whether before or after framing of charge or recording of evidence, provided reasons are recorded and both parties are heard---The phrase “at any stage” covers all stages of the trial and empowers the Court to act when continuation of proceedings would constitute an abuse of process or when the available material is insufficient to warrant conviction---In the present case, substantial evidence was lost due to the 2005 earthquake which destroyed all record, several prosecution witnesses including the complainant had died, and remaining witnesses were untraceable---Under such circumstances, the trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. to prevent purposeless prosecution and wastage of judicial resources---Held, that the power conferred under S. 265-K is designed to preserve the integrity of criminal justice by preventing vexatious trials where conviction is improbable. Cited Cases: • Ammad Yousaf v. The State & another (PLD 2024 SC 273) • Abbas Haider Naqvi & another v. Federation of Pakistan & others (PLD 2022 SC 562) (b) Criminal Law---Principle of double jeopardy / autrefois acquit ----Re-trial of an accused after acquittal---Bar against second prosecution for same offence---Once an accused has been tried and acquitted, whether on merits or on legal technicalities, he cannot be retried for the same offence---Re-trial of an acquitted person would offend the doctrine of autrefois acquit and the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy---The rationale behind this rule is to ensure finality of judicial proceedings and to protect citizens from repeated harassment and abuse of process---Held, that the acquittal of the accused having attained finality, no justification existed for further proceedings---Reliance placed on Sherin Bacha & others v. Namoos Iqbal & others (PLD 1993 SC 247). (c) Administration of justice---Abuse of process---Inherent powers of Court ----Continuing proceedings when conviction is improbable amounts to abuse of process---Courts are under a duty to prevent misuse of the criminal justice system and to safeguard the accused from frivolous and futile prosecutions---Exercise of jurisdiction under S. 265-K, Cr.P.C. is not discretionary but mandatory in exceptional circumstances where the record demonstrates impossibility of conviction---Held, that the findings of the High Court affirming the acquittal were based on sound reasoning and called for no interference. Disposition: ---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed; acquittal maintained. ---No question of public importance was established to justify grant of leave.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) –– Ss. 12 & 22 –– Specific performance –– Contract unenforceable for want of mutuality and limitation. ---- Plaintiff sought decree for specific performance of an unregistered agreement to sell dated 15.11.1973 regarding a small parcel of land with two shops. Agreement contained no survey or khewat numbers and was executed on plain paper. Suit for enforcement was filed in 2008, nearly thirty-five years after execution and one year after the death of the alleged vendor. Held, limitation for a suit for specific performance under Art.113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 is three years; suit filed beyond such period is hopelessly time-barred. The trial court decreed the suit but the first appellate court rightly set it aside, holding the claim unenforceable. High Court affirmed that doctrine of mutuality governs suits for specific performance –– contract cannot be enforced unless obligatory on both parties. Execution not proved through competent witnesses; no mutual obligations shown; therefore, no decree could be granted. (b) Registration Act, 1908 (as adapted in AJ&K) –– Ss. 17 & 49 –– Unregistered instrument –– Effect. An agreement to sell immovable property, when intended to create or declare rights in such property, requires compulsory registration. Document relied upon by the appellant being unregistered, not bearing details of the land, and not executed on stamp paper, could neither create nor convey any right or title, nor be received in evidence to prove transfer of ownership. Unregistered sale deed confers no enforceable right at any stage of proceedings. (c) Limitation Act, 1908 –– Art.113 –– Limitation for specific performance –– Computation. Limitation begins to run from the date fixed for performance or, where no date is fixed, from the date the plaintiff first has notice that performance is refused. Filing of the suit after thirty-five years from alleged execution, and after death of the vendor, was far beyond the prescribed period. Courts are not empowered to entertain a lis which is barred by limitation; such barrier is absolute unless an exception under Art.5 is established. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– Arts.79 & 81 –– Proof of execution of attested document –– Admission by executant –– Exception to general rule. Under Art.79, execution of attested document must ordinarily be proved by calling attesting witnesses; Art.81 creates an exception permitting proof through admission by executant. Since alleged vendor never admitted execution and had died long before institution of suit, exception under Art.81 was inapplicable. Unproved agreement could not be relied upon to decree specific performance. (e) Doctrine of mutuality –– Essential ingredient for equitable relief. Court reaffirmed that mutuality is a fundamental condition for granting specific performance. A contract will not be specifically enforced unless both parties could have been compelled to perform their obligations thereunder. Mere recital of sale words in an unregistered agreement does not vest ownership rights. (f) Disposition –– Appeal dismissed –– Findings of First Appellate Court upheld. Held, agreement to sell dated 15.11.1973 neither proved nor enforceable; suit filed after 35 years barred by limitation; document unregistered and devoid of particulars; trial court misdirected; appellate judgment dated 24.05.2018 sustained. Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs. Cited Cases: • AIR 1933 Pat 306 • AIR 1965 All 83 • 2003 MLD 410 • 2003 MLD 453 • AIR 1946 PC 97 • AIR 1917 Cal 693 @ 694 Held: Unregistered and stale agreement to sell cannot confer ownership or be specifically enforced; limitation and want of mutuality bar relief. Findings of District Judge upheld. Case Reference: Raj Wali & others v. Resham Jan & others –– Civil Appeal No.141-A of 2018 –– High Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir –– Before Syed Shahid Bahar, J. –– Decided on 18-02-2025.

Summary: (a) Elections Act, 2017 —- Ss. 144, 145(1) — Election petition — Verification and attestation requirements — Non-compliance with mandatory provisions — Petition rejected Petitioner challenged the validity of election results through an election-petition accompanied by verification and affidavits that were found to be materially deficient. The verification lacked a date, and the attestation certificate erroneously identified an unrelated individual (Raja Rashid Hafeez) instead of the petitioner. Affidavits submitted to cure defects were attested by the same oath commissioner who was also the deponent — a clear violation of S. 139 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and High Court Rules, which mandate that oath must be administered before and attested by an independent authority. The Election Tribunal held that one cannot administer or attest their own affidavit and emphasized that these were not minor technical defects but substantive violations of mandatory legal provisions. The petition was, therefore, rejected under S.145(1) of the Elections Act. Cited Cases: • Abdul Wahab Baloch v. Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi PLD 2019 Lahore 119 • Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Ghazanfar Abbas Shah v. Mehr Khalid Mehmood Sargana 2015 SCMR 1585 • Ubaidullah v. Haji Atta Muhammad Bangulzai C.P. No. 1394/2024 • Muhammad Iqbal v. Nabi Ahmad 2017 YLR 2019 • Mir Mujib-ur-Rehman Muhammad Hassani v. Returning Officer PB-41 Washuk PLD 2020 SC 718 (b) Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 —- S. 139 — Affidavit — Who may administer oath — Self-administered affidavits held invalid Affidavits annexed to the petition were attested by an oath commissioner who himself was the deponent — an act violative of S. 139, CPC. The Court held that the person administering the oath and the deponent must be distinct. A self-attested affidavit, even by an authorized officer, is contrary to law and non-est. The affidavits submitted to rectify earlier defects in the petition were therefore rejected and not considered admissible. (c) High Court Rules and Orders —- Ch. 12, Vol. IV, Rr. 12 & 14 — Attestation of affidavits — Language barrier — Duty of attesting officer — Effect of defective verification Petitioner’s counsel attempted to justify attestation defects by citing the oath commissioner's lack of fluency in English. The Tribunal rejected this argument, holding that ignorance of language cannot justify statutory non-compliance. As per Rule 14, if the attesting officer or deponent is unfamiliar with the affidavit’s language, it must be explained and properly certified. No such certification was present. Improper verification and attestation render the petition defective and liable to dismissal. (d) Elections Act, 2017 —- Ss. 144, 145(1) — Affidavits of witnesses — Identical and deficient affidavits — Failure to provide particulars of illegal practices — Consequences Affidavits of four witnesses annexed to the election-petition were identical and lacked specifics about corrupt or illegal practices, including dates, places, or responsible individuals. The Supreme Court in PLD 2020 SC 718 reiterated that under S.144, failure to provide full particulars and supporting documents makes an election-petition legally deficient. Relying on this principle, the Tribunal held that vague, repetitive, and improperly attested affidavits do not meet the statutory threshold. Disposition: Election petition rejected under S.145(1) of the Elections Act, 2017; C.M. No. 01 of 2025 dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 9 & 14 –– Right to life and dignity –– Pension as a fundamental right –– Delay in payment of pension amounts to violation of fundamental rights –– Held, right to life under Article 9 includes the right to livelihood, sustenance, and security, particularly for the legal heirs of deceased government employees––Refusal or delay in disbursement of pensionary benefits to a retired employee or their legal heirs amounts to inhumane and degrading treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution––Government departments must ensure timely processing and disbursement of pension and retirement dues to uphold dignity and constitutional protections. (b) Service Law –– Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 –– Date of birth –– Rectification –– Scope and limitation –– Date of birth once recorded in official service records at the time of appointment is final and cannot be altered except where a clerical error is proved––No rectification can be made posthumously or after decades of service unless established through timely application by the employee during service––Petitioner, being legal heir, could not seek posthumous correction in deceased husband’s service record after 29 years of service and post-retirement. Relied on: Chief Secretary Government of Balochistan v. Asmatullah Kakar (2020 SCMR 1678) Qamaruddin v. Pakistan (2007 SCMR 66) Dr. Muhammad Aslam Baloch v. Govt. of Balochistan (2014 SCMR 1723) Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) Dr. Zulfiqar Ahmed Malik v. Federation of Pakistan (2019 SCMR 1973) Muhammad Khaliq Mandokhail v. Government of Balochistan (C.P. No. 4428 of 2019) (c) Service Law –– Pension and Retirement Benefits –– Entitlement of Legal Heirs –– Delay in processing –– Direction to Government departments –– Legal obligation –– Held, the petitioner (widow of deceased civil servant) was entitled to family pension and other retirement benefits of her late husband––Respondent department failed to process dues despite acknowledgment of employment and retirement––Court directed respondents to release all outstanding pensionary benefits based on service book records within 30 days, along with arrears––Departments directed to establish transparent and efficient mechanisms to avoid bureaucratic delays in future. (d) Government Duty –– Accountability in Pension Processing –– Public servant rights –– Legal and moral responsibility of the State –– Court emphasized that unnecessary procedural hurdles that delay pensions violate principles of justice and governance––Retired civil servants and their families deserve prompt disbursement of pensions as a matter of right, not privilege––Court directed all government departments to avoid systemic inefficiencies and respect the constitutional rights of retirees. Disposition: Petition disposed of with directions to disburse all pensionary dues within 30 days.

Summary: 1. Where statements of prosecution witness are not trustworthy and confidence inspiring being not consistent rather material contradictions exist therein on material points of the prosecution case prosecution case cannot be proved beyond shadow of reasonable doubt. 2. If name of Seizing Officer does not tally with the abbreviation / monogram of seal affixed on the parcels it casts a reasonable doubt of his presence on the spot as it is the mandate of the relevant rules that the Seizing Officer shall affix the seal/monogram carrying the abbreviation of his own name. 3. For giving benefit to an accused it is not essential that there should be many circumstances creating doubts even a single doubt is sufficient to extend its benefit to an accused person. 4. Once an accused succeeds to earn an acquittal order then double presumption is attached to his innocence and as such while hearing an appeal against acquittal the appellate Court cannot disturb or reverse or set-aside such an acquittal order unless the same is found to be perverse shocking artificial and over and above suffering from jurisdictional defect or non-reading of evidence or misreading of evidence.