Summary: (On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 2 (s), 156 (1) (89) & 211 (2)---Notification SRO 491(I)/85, dated 23-05-1985---Smuggled vehicles---Possession---Lawful excuse, plea of---A uthorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court in exercise of Reference jurisdiction pertaining to confiscation of vehicles in question which were alleged to be smuggled---Validity---Condition precedent for Section 156(1)(89) of Customs Act, 1969 to apply, is that goods in question should be smuggled, in terms of Section 2(s) of Customs Act, 1969, read with applicable notification thereunder---Vehicles in question could be considered smuggled if either (i) at the relevant time, the applicable notification in terms of Section 2(s)(ii) of Customs Act, 1969 included vehicles, or (ii) in terms of Section 2(s)(iii) of Customs Act, 1969 the vehicles were brought in by any route other than a route declared under Section 9 or 10 of Customs Act, 1969 or from any place other than the customs station---In cases of registered vehicles, if at the time the vehicle was intercepted, more than 3 years had elapsed for cases prior to Finance Act, 2007 and 5 years for cases thereafter, the defence of "lawful excuse" was indefeasible---It was reasonable to assume that if a vehicle stood registered, the government was presumed to have exercised due care and diligence with respect to its obligation to see whatever duties and taxes as payable to the government before a vehicle could be registered, stood paid---Vehicles in question were registered, which registration was duly verified, and they were presumed to have been brought lawfully; after completion of notified period in case of used vehicles also---Without any proof it could not be said that a person (last owner) was involved in registration of vehicle knowing fully well that no duties and taxes, as required under the law, were paid, and that therefore the vehicle was fraudulently registered, and the vehicle could be seized from him on his failure to produce documents of import and payment of duties and taxes thereon, and even beyond the period of three years or five years, as the case would be, as required under Section 211(2) of Customs Act, 1969---In most of the cases since first registration, the vehicles had changed many owners on the strength of registration book and no adverse inference could be drawn for the ultimate bona fide owners unless otherwise proved by the authorities, in which exercise they had failed---Verified registration book and official record was enough for bona fide presumption that a valid title existed---Vehicles in question were those which were either auctioned or were brought into Pakistan and were registered through a statutory process and the auction papers or registration papers of some other vehicles were not being used fraudulently---Where it was established that chassis/engine numbers had been tampered with after auction or registration to match the description of auctioned or registered vehicle, the lawful excuse was not available---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by High Court as the questions had been answered cumulatively---Appeal was dismissed. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports 2022 SCMR 1135 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Pari materia provisions---Interpretation---Principle---Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 156 (1)(89)---Expression "lawful excuse"---Scope---Lawful excuse is an expression that is of wider import and (carries) lesser degree of burden than lawful authority---For proving a lawful excuse, which falls short of lawful authority, it is the excuse put forward by accused, rather than handling smuggled goods, that must be shown to be lawful. PLD 1955 PC 29 rel. Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1088 of 2013). M. D. Shehzad Feroze, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Shabbir Hussain, Superintendent Customs for Appelants (in C.As. Nos. 1231, 1233 and 1234 of 2013). Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1232, 1235 and 1236 of 2013). Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 142-K of 2015 and 462-463 of 2022). Kafeel Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 938 of 2018) (via video-link from Karachi). Akhtar Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 453-461 and 464-466 of 2022) (both via video-link from Karachi). Masood Ahmed, Director, Intelligence and Investigation, Customs, Imran Afzal, Additional Director and Shaheer Ahmed, ETO/E&T, Department for Appellant (department) (via video-link from Karachi). M. Younas Thaheem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 458 of 2022). Ex-parte for all other Respondents. Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order dated 28.02.2025 in Crl. Misc. No. 613-B of 2024, passed by the Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497(2) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 337-A(i), 337-F(i), 337-F(vi), 337-L(2) & 34---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.185(3)---Shajjah-i-khafifah, ghayr-jaifah-damiyah, munaqqilah, causin hurt, common intention---Pre-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the petitioner was that he along with co-accused caused fracture on the little finger of the complainant by giving blows with a wheel spanner---Legally speaking, out of the offences with which the petitioner was charged, Sections 337-F(i), 337-A(i) and 337-L(2), P.P.C., were bailable and in such like offences bail was a right, whereas, punishment of the offence under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C. did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C., and in such like offences grant of bail was a rule and refusal thereof an exception---In such view of the matter, if petitioner was denied the extra ordinary concession of pre-arrest bail, he would nonetheless be entitled to post-arrest bail, considering the nature and extent of the punishment prescribed for the offences with which he stood charged---Once the Court concluded that the accused would become entitled to post-arrest bail upon dismissal of his pre-arrest bail application, then requiring him to undergo incarceration would be a mere procedural formality devoid of any meaningful purpose---Petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed, in circumstances, and accused was granted pre-arrest bail. Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State PLD 2017 SC 730; Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another 1986 SCMR 1380 and Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through PG Punjab and another 2021 SCMR 130 rel. Zulfiqar Ahmed Bhutta, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General Punjab for the State. Date of hearing: 17th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 462-I & 322---Abstraction or tampering with electricity distribution or infrastructure, qatl-bis-sabab---Pre-arrest bail, dismissal of---Allegations against the co-accused persons were that they were using LT and HT poles illegally by attaching their network cables on it, without any permission, due to which wiring of some houses received electric current and a child received electric shock and died at the spot---Petitioners being Line Superintendent and SDO WAPDA were alleged to be in line with the co-accused persons for permitting them the use of LT & HT for attaching their cable to it---Cable Network Operators could not use the electricity poles unless LESCO Officials joined hands with them---Both Cable Network Operators had full knowledge that any untoward incident might happen whenever wire of cable network would come into contact with HT wire of LESCO---Both the sets of accused were fully aware that the said lapse/mischief might cause the death of any person due to electrocution---Mischief of both the petitioners was squarely covered by the definition of Qatl-bis-sabab---Petitioner, SDO, who was complainant of the case and later on was treated as an accused, himself mentioned in the application moved for the registration of criminal case that a child met his death due to the unlawful act of Cable Network Operators---In the light of said admission, non-conducting of post-mortem examination of deceased child, was not fatal to the case of prosecution in any manner---Nothing was on record to suggest that death of the child occurred otherwise than through electric shock---No premium could be claimed by petitioners on account of said lapse on the part of prosecution---Prima facie involvement of both the petitioners in the offence alleged against them could not be ruled out---Petitioners failed to establish any mala fide on the part of father of deceased child or Investigating Officer to falsely involve them---Both the petitions were dismissed---Pre-arrest bail already granted to petitioners was recalled, in circumstances. Abdul Rehman v. The State 1998 SCMR 1778; Muhammad Riaz v. The State 1986 PCr.LJ 2233 and Reheem Ullah v. The State 1985 PCr.LJ 463 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497 & 498---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order are tentative in nature and should not influence the Trial Court in any manner. Mian Abid Rasheed, Muhammad Ammar and Aziz Ahmad Bhatti for Petitioner. Amjad Javed, Deputy Prosecutor General along with Ali Abbas, DSP, Hadayat Ali, ASI and Akbar, ASI for the State. Mian Muhammad Javaid for LESCO. Order Tanveer Ahmad Sheikh, J .--- By this consolidated order, Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.75736-B and 75066-B of 2024 are hereby disposed of as both the petitions are result of same FIR. 2. The petitioners (Muhammad Kabeer Tahir, L.S. and Kashif Tanveer, S.D.O.), being arrayed as an accused in case FIR No. 2357 of 2024, dated 11.06.2024 registered with Police Station Batapur, District Lahore for offences under Sections 462-I and 322 P.P.C, seek their pre-arrest bail, after the same was refused by the court of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore vide order dated 27.11.2024. 3. According to FIR Kashif Tanveer, S.D.O. (complainant; later on treated as an accused) Sahafi Colony Sub-Division, LESCO, Lahore submitted an application against Kashif Butt and Majid alias Majhoo, "Star Cable Network" that his Line Superintendent Kabir Tahir reported that Kashif Butt and Majid alias Majhoo (Star Cable Network) are using LT and HT Poles illegally by attaching their cables on it. Several times they were restrained from doing so and their wires were cut down, but they again attached the same. The accused persons also get source of electricity for their Boosters from the LT Poles without any payment, which is causing loss of millions to the WAPDA/LESCO. Both the cable operators have used a lot on Canal Forts II Khaira Pind. On 05.06.2024 at about 09:30 P.M. due to storm the wires of cable network fallen on HT line of WAPDA/LESCO, due to which wiring of some houses in canal forts received current and in House No.120, Block-B one child who put the switch on, received electric shock and succumbed at the spot. It was prayed that against Kashif Butt and Majid alias Majhu strict action be taken for using pols of WAPDA/LESCO illegally and using LT line for said purpose, to avoid loss to WAPDA/LESCO exchequer. 4. After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner, learned law officer for LESCO, learned Deputy Prosecutor General and perusal of record it was observed by me that Kabir Tahir, Line Superintendent (petitioner) reported the matter to his S.D.O. Kashif Tanvir (petitioner) that cable operators were using the electricity poles of their department without any permission/license and they were also using the electricity for their Boosters without any permission and making payment, and due to the storm wire of the cable network fell on HT Line of WAPDA/LESCO and electricity current entered into the cable network system and one child, who was putting the switch on, received electric shock and succumbed at the spot. 5. Both the above petitioners, being LESCO officials, professed complete innocence claiming that they made a report against cable network operators that they were using electricity poles without any permission/license from LESCO and there was no "mense rea" on their part. 6. Cable Network Operators cannot use the electricity poles unless LESCO officials join hands with them. Both cable network operators and LESCO officials have full knowledge that any untoward incident may result whenever wire of cable network shall come into contact with HT wire of LESCO. Both the above sets of the accused were fully aware that the above said lapse/mischief may cause the death of any person due to electrocution. Mischief of both the petitioners was squarely covered by the definition of "Qatl-bis-Sabab", which under Section 322 of P.P.C was although punishable with 'Diyat' only, but was shown to be non-bailable as per second schedule appended with Code of Criminal Procedure. 7. Main thrust of learned counsel for petitioners was on the point that deceased child was not subjected to postmortem examination. There was nothing to suggest that his death was a result electrocution, hence conviction for offence under Section 322 of P.P.C was not legally possible. The Honourable High Courts laid down in plethora of the judgments that post mortem examination of the deceased is not necessary in each and every case. Where prosecution is in a position to prove factum of the death by convincing material, non-conducting of post mortem report would not be fatal to the case of prosecution. If any reference in this regard was required that can be had from 'Abdul Rehman v. The State' (1998 SCMR 1778), 'Muhammad Riaz v. The State' (1986 PCr.LJ 2233) and 'Reheem Ullah v. The State' (1985 PCr.LJ 463). Kashif Tanveer, S.D.O. (petitioner), who was complainant of the case and later on treated as an accused, himself mentioned in his application moved for the registration of criminal case that a child in House No.120 of B-Block putting the switch-on, met his death due to the said unlawful act of cable network operators. In our country cable network operators are using the electricity poles for the supply of their services. The said fact, being visible to whole of the public, is judicially noticeable by the Courts under Article 111 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and there is no need to prove the same independently. Moreover, when Kashif Tanveer, S.D.O. petitioner, who was complainant and lateron treated as an accused, himself admitted in his own application for registration of the criminal case that one child met his death due to electric shock, has to be treated an admitted fact under Article 113 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and there shall be no need to prove the same. 8. In the light of said admission, non-conducting of post mortem examination of deceased child, was not fatal to the case of prosecution in any manner. There was nothing on record to suggest that death of the child occurred otherwise than of electric shock. I am of the confirmed view that no premium can be claimed by petitioners on account of said lapse on the part of prosecution. 9. In our country such like incidents resulting from the use of electricity poles by cable network operators are increasing day by day and there is a need to meet the same with an iron hand. Courts should not have any sympathy for them. 10. Prima facie involvement of both the petitioners in the offence alleged against them could not be ruled out. They failed to establish any mala fide on the part of Bilal Rasheed (father of deceased child) or Investigating Officer to falsely involve them. All the circumstances and material floating on the surface so far presented a dreadful picture. 11. In sequel to above discussion, both the petitions have no force and are dismissed. Pre-arrest bail already granted to petitioners is recalled. 12. Needless to mention that any observation made in the above order are tentative in nature and shall not influence the learned trial court in any manner. JK/M-72/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: (On appeal from the judgment dated 27.05.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Civil Revision No. 1211 of 2011). (a) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss. 2 (s), 156 (1) (89) & 211 (2)---Notification SRO 491(I)/85, dated 23-05-1985---Smuggled vehicles---Possession---Lawful excuse, plea of---A uthorities were aggrieved of order passed by High Court in exercise of Reference jurisdiction pertaining to confiscation of vehicles in question which were alleged to be smuggled---Validity---Condition precedent for Section 156(1)(89) of Customs Act, 1969 to apply, is that goods in question should be smuggled, in terms of Section 2(s) of Customs Act, 1969, read with applicable notification thereunder---Vehicles in question could be considered smuggled if either (i) at the relevant time, the applicable notification in terms of Section 2(s)(ii) of Customs Act, 1969 included vehicles, or (ii) in terms of Section 2(s)(iii) of Customs Act, 1969 the vehicles were brought in by any route other than a route declared under Section 9 or 10 of Customs Act, 1969 or from any place other than the customs station---In cases of registered vehicles, if at the time the vehicle was intercepted, more than 3 years had elapsed for cases prior to Finance Act, 2007 and 5 years for cases thereafter, the defence of "lawful excuse" was indefeasible---It was reasonable to assume that if a vehicle stood registered, the government was presumed to have exercised due care and diligence with respect to its obligation to see whatever duties and taxes as payable to the government before a vehicle could be registered, stood paid---Vehicles in question were registered, which registration was duly verified, and they were presumed to have been brought lawfully; after completion of notified period in case of used vehicles also---Without any proof it could not be said that a person (last owner) was involved in registration of vehicle knowing fully well that no duties and taxes, as required under the law, were paid, and that therefore the vehicle was fraudulently registered, and the vehicle could be seized from him on his failure to produce documents of import and payment of duties and taxes thereon, and even beyond the period of three years or five years, as the case would be, as required under Section 211(2) of Customs Act, 1969---In most of the cases since first registration, the vehicles had changed many owners on the strength of registration book and no adverse inference could be drawn for the ultimate bona fide owners unless otherwise proved by the authorities, in which exercise they had failed---Verified registration book and official record was enough for bona fide presumption that a valid title existed---Vehicles in question were those which were either auctioned or were brought into Pakistan and were registered through a statutory process and the auction papers or registration papers of some other vehicles were not being used fraudulently---Where it was established that chassis/engine numbers had been tampered with after auction or registration to match the description of auctioned or registered vehicle, the lawful excuse was not available---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders passed by High Court as the questions had been answered cumulatively---Appeal was dismissed. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Panther Sports 2022 SCMR 1135 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Pari materia provisions---Interpretation---Principle---Where two provisions are pari materia, by applying doctrine of statutory construction, there cannot be a different interpretation for them. (c) Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 156 (1)(89)---Expression "lawful excuse"---Scope---Lawful excuse is an expression that is of wider import and (carries) lesser degree of burden than lawful authority---For proving a lawful excuse, which falls short of lawful authority, it is the excuse put forward by accused, rather than handling smuggled goods, that must be shown to be lawful. PLD 1955 PC 29 rel. Mrs. Misbah Gulnar Sharif, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 1088 of 2013). M. D. Shehzad Feroze, Advocate Supreme Court, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Shabbir Hussain, Superintendent Customs for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1231, 1233 and 1234 of 2013). Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 1232, 1235 and 1236 of 2013). Raja Muhammad Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court and Moin-ud-Din Ahmed Wani, Collector (Enforcement), Karachi for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 142-K of 2015 and 462-463 of 2022). Kafeel Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.A. No. 938 of 2018) (via video-link from Karachi). Akhtar Hussain, Senior Advocate Supreme Court and K. A. Wahab, Advocate Supreme Court for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 453-461 and 464-466 of 2022) (both via video-link from Karachi). Masood Ahmed, Director, Intelligence and Investigation, Customs, Imran Afzal, Additional Director and Shaheer Ahmed, ETO/E&T, Department for Appellant (department) (via video-link from Karachi). M. Younas Thaheem, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 458 of 2022). Ex-parte for all other Respondents. Sirdar Ahmed Jamal Sukhera, Advocate Supreme Court Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 3rd March, 2025.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 182 & 209---Large Taxpayers' Office---Jurisdiction, determination of---Petitioner, being Chief Executive Officer of Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (FESCO), filed constitutional petition calling into question order passed under S. 182 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') by the Commissioner Inland Revenue, Large Taxpayers Office, Faisalabad (respondent No.3) whereby he had been awarded a penalty in his personal capacity i.e. Chief Executive Officer of FESCO ('the Impugned Order')---Submission of the petitioner was that in view of Federal Board of Revenues (FBR) own notification FESCO fell under the jurisdiction of LTO, Multan---Validity---The fact that the automated system of the FRR did not recognize and entertain the appeal of the petitioner was enough to hold the (present) constitutional petition maintainable and the petitioner could not be left remediless---Even otherwise, the serious question of jurisdiction was involved as to the authority and powers to issue the Show-Cause Notice-in-question (dated 16.06.2023) and the impugned order passed on the basis thereon, therefore, the petitioner had rightfully invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Record (including the documents appended by both sides) clearly led to an ineluctable conclusion that the petitioner was caught within the mischiefs of confusion of jurisdiction of the relevant LTOs created by FBR without there being any default, malice or wrong doing attributable to the petitioner--- During the pendency of the present petition, FESCO also approached FBR by means of a representation under the provisions contained in the Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007, in order to lay its grievance qua the overlapping and conflicting claims of jurisdictions by two offices of FBR, however, no definite findings were handed down owing to the pendency of the present petition---The reliance of the respondents Nos. 3 and 5 on a notification/circular dated 03.10.2019 was apparently in contradiction with subsequent circulars/orders dated 12.10.2020 (relied upon by the petitioner) and dated 01.07.2021 (relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No.4)---Considering the petitioner's unrefuted claim that no loss or evasion of revenue was involved in the case, which claim was also substantiated from the Show-Cause Notice and impugned order, the treatment meted out to the petitioner was untenable under the law---However, in order to streamline the question of jurisdiction of the relevant RTOs qua FESCO and for further verification qua possibility of any loss or evasion of the revenue, the intervention and a definite finding by the FBR was inevitable---High Court set-aside the impugned order, and the matter (present petition) was transmitted to the Chairman FBR as a representation under the provisions contained in Federal Board of Revenue Act, 2007, who shall hear the petitioner as well as concerned LTOs and pass a speaking order for final determination of the controversy qua the jurisdiction in clear terms---Constitutional petition, filed by Chief Executive Officer of Faisalabad Electric Supply Company, was allowed accordingly. Mian Ashiq Hussain for Petitioner. Qamar Hanif, Assistant Attorney General. Abdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondents Nos.3 and 5. Muhammad Yahya Johar for Respondent No.4.

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 (as adapted by AJK Act, 2001) ----S. 9(c), read with S. 29---Recovery of Charas weighing 1080 grams from exclusive possession---Presumption and burden of proof---Once lawful recovery and possession are established through cogent evidence, the statutory presumption under S. 29 is attracted and the onus shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account for possession---Held, prosecution successfully proved recovery and safe custody; defence failed to rebut the presumption or create reasonable doubt. (b) Criminal trial---Chain of custody---Forensic report---Evidentiary value---Safe transmission of sealed sample (60 grams) to FSL proved through consistent testimonies of the carrier (Waqar Ahmed, P.W-5) and Moharrar (P.W-6), contemporaneous entries, and receipt at FSL the same day---Minor variation in outer packaging described by FSL (khaki envelope/polythene) vis-à-vis initial sealing in white cloth---Held, such discrepancy, in the face of otherwise unbroken chain, does not vitiate the prosecution case; at best, it is a mitigating circumstance for sentence. (c) Evidence Act (general principles)---Minor discrepancies---Place of occurrence described as “F.W.O. Turn” and “near Revenue Complex”---Whether material---Held, not material where locations are proximate and witnesses are otherwise consistent on core facts (interception, recovery, weights, sealing, dispatch); hyper-technical approach deprecated. (d) Criminal trial---Ocular account---Number and quality of witnesses---Seven prosecution witnesses, including recovery and transmitting witnesses, supported each other on material particulars; defence statement on oath under S. 340(2), Cr.P.C. and two defence witnesses failed to dent the prosecution’s consistent narrative---Held, conviction sustainable. (e) Sentencing---Mitigating circumstance---Packaging discrepancy in the sample noted; while not fatal to conviction, it warrants some leniency---Sentence under S. 9(c) reduced from six years’ S.I. to five years’ S.I., fine of Rs. 40,000 maintained; in default, five months’ S.I. Cited cases: • Khursheed Hussain Shah v. The State (2022 SCR 334) (minor contradictions not fatal). • 2021 P.Cr.L.J. 1294 and 2012 YLR 126 (distinguished on facts). Disposition: ---Appeal partly allowed; conviction maintained; sentence modified to five years’ simple imprisonment with fine of Rs. 40,000 and five months’ S.I. in default.

Summary: (a)An administrative or executive action results in civil consequences, and particularly where the rights of property or possession are involved, the jurisdiction of civil courts cannot be lightly excluded. ln the absence of a statutory bar and in view of the nature of the relief sought, the suit is therefore maintainable under section 9 0f the CPC. (b)If in any statute there is a bar of plenary jurisdiction of civil court, the bar will be applicable if the authority acts in accordance with the said statute and its acts, orders do not violate the jurisdiction conferred upon that authority under the said statute then the bar of jurisdiction contained in the said statute applies and if the authority acts or passes any order in violation of the jurisdiction vested in it under the said statute and transgresses jurisdiction or the orders or action if scrutinized keeping in view the jurisdiction available under the said statute and the orders or action is found without jurisdiction then certainly the bar contained in the said statute on the plenary jurisdiction of the civil court is not applicable and the suit would be competent.

Summary: Bail denied ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 322 & 462-I; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ---- Ss. 497, 498 & Second Schedule; Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ---- Arts. 111 & 113 Electric shock resulting in death --- Illegal attachment of cable wires to electricity poles --- Criminal liability of WAPDA/LESCO officials --- Pre-arrest bail, refusal of --- Scope --- Petitioners, both LESCO employees (Line Superintendent and SDO), were accused in FIR under Ss. 462-I & 322 PPC for criminal negligence causing death of a child by electrocution after cable wires illegally attached to HT poles collapsed during a storm --- Held, petitioners themselves had reported the illegal use of electricity poles by cable operators, but did not take effective action to disconnect or prevent reattachment despite repeated violations --- Petitioners' knowledge of hazard and their inaction established prima facie recklessness --- Under S. 322 PPC, though punishment is Diyat, offence is non-bailable per Second Schedule Cr.P.C. --- Death of child was admitted by SDO in complaint; post-mortem not essential where death by electrocution is otherwise convincingly established --- Courts may take judicial notice under Art. 111 QSO of widespread illegal use of power infrastructure by cable operators --- Admission by SDO treated as proof under Art. 113 QSO --- Petitioners failed to establish malafide or false implication --- No case for pre-arrest bail made out --- Bail denied and interim relief recalled. Cited Cases: • Abdul Rehman v. The State (1998 SCMR 1778) • Muhammad Riaz v. The State (1986 PCrLJ 2233) • Raheem Ullah v. The State (1985 PCrLJ 463)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 10-A & 199---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 74---Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005), S. 43(2)---Condonation of delay---Requirement of hearing and reasons---Maintainability of writ petition---Impugned condonation order passed under S.74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by the Federal Board of Revenue permitting Inland Revenue officer to take belated action against taxpayer---Held, such order was not appealable under S.45-B or S.46 of the Act, therefore, constitutional petition was maintainable---Order passed without affording petitioner notice or opportunity of hearing and without recording reasons---Condonation of delay under S.74 is not automatic but must be supported by exceptional circumstances and cogent reasoning---No such reasons were provided in the impugned order---Violation of fundamental rights of fair trial and due process guaranteed under Arts.4 and 10-A of the Constitution---Impugned condonation order and all subsequent proceedings based on it declared unlawful---Show cause notices issued pursuant thereto also held to be void. Cited Cases: • Federal Board of Revenue v. Abdul Ghani and another 2021 SCMR 1154 • M/s. Mehr Dastgir Leather and Footwear Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 PTD 16 • Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Eden Builders Ltd. 2018 SCMR 991 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders 2022 SCMR 1333 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders 2025 SCMR 341 • Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. v. Mst. Fazal Bibi PLD 2016 SC 872 • Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC 104 • Mir Wali Khan v. Manager ADBP PLD 2003 SC 500 • Moulana Atta-ur-Rehman v. Sardar Umar Farooq PLD 2008 SC 663 • Vice Chancellor Agriculture University, Peshawar v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 527 • Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831 • Ghulam Mustafa Lund v. NAB PLD 2024 SC 54 • Government of Pakistan v. Dada Amir Haider PLD 1987 SC 504 • Bahadur v. The State PLD 1985 SC 62 • Messrs Airport Support Services v. Airport Manager Karachi 1998 SCMR 2268 • Ch. Zahur Illahi v. Secretary Govt. of Pakistan PLD 1975 Lahore 499 • S.S. Miranda Ltd. v. Chief Commissioner Karachi PLD 1959 SC 134 • Khalid Iqbal v. Shahid Iqbal 2021 CLC 1880 • Fozia Mazhar v. ADJ Jhang PLD 2024 SC 771 (b) General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24A---Statutory duty to give reasons---Administrative discretion---Scope---Held, section 24A of the General Clauses Act imposes a legal obligation on public functionaries to act fairly and provide written reasons when exercising discretion under any statute---Omission to provide reasons renders the administrative order arbitrary, opaque, and amenable to judicial review under Art.199 of the Constitution---Duty to give reasons is an essential attribute of fair administration and rule of law---Unreasoned orders violate both statutory duty under S.24A and constitutional guarantees under Arts.4 and 10-A---Court reaffirmed that quasi-judicial or administrative orders without reasons are unsustainable in law and liable to be struck down. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S.74---Finance Act, 2022---Retrospective application---Limitation---Past and closed transaction---Scope---Held, limitation under S.11(5) of the Sales Tax Act and S.14(1) of the Federal Excise Act, 2005 is substantive in nature and cannot be overridden without express statutory language---Amendment to S.74 through Finance Act, 2022 cannot revive past and closed matters where no proceedings were pending at the time of amendment---Even if retrospective, the amendment cannot affect vested rights without proper reasoning and opportunity of hearing---Implied retrospective effect cannot cure jurisdictional defect of an unreasoned and ex parte order. Disposition: Constitutional petition allowed. Impugned order dated 09.02.2023 passed under section 74 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 set aside. Show cause notices issued on its basis declared void and of no legal effect.

Summary: Bail granted ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3) Maintainability---Pre-arrest bail---Grant of leave to appeal---Petitioner sought leave against High Court order declining pre-arrest bail in offences under Sections 337-F(vi), 337-F(i), 337-A(i), 337-L(2), and 34, P.P.C.---Supreme Court held that offences under Sections 337-F(i), 337-A(i), and 337-L(2), P.P.C. are bailable, while the offence under Section 337-F(vi), P.P.C., although non-bailable, does not fall within prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.---Grant of bail, therefore, was a rule and refusal an exception---Petitioner would otherwise be entitled to post-arrest bail, thus, no meaningful purpose would be served by requiring his incarceration merely to satisfy procedural formality---Petition converted into appeal and allowed accordingly---Petitioner granted pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing surety. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 497 & 498---Pre-arrest bail---Scope and principle---Where offence does not fall within prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C., grant of bail is a rule and refusal an exception---Court reiterated that where an accused has a strong case for post-arrest bail, denial of pre-arrest bail would be unjustified and would merely result in unnecessary incarceration---Court emphasized that meaningful administration of justice requires avoiding mechanical detention when entitlement to bail is apparent from record. Cited Cases: • Khalil Ahmed Soomro v. The State (PLD 2017 SC 730) • Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafar Ullah and another (1986 SCMR 1380) • Khair Muhammad and another v. The State through PG Punjab and another (2021 SCMR 130)