Summary: (a) Balochistan Development Authority Act, 1974 ----S. 18(2)(d),(e); S. 30—Balochistan Ship-Breaking Industry Rules, 1979, R. 15(2)—Levy of “tonnage fee/charges”—Scope and pre-conditions—BDA may impose tonnage charges/royalty only with the *previous sanction of Government*; rule-making under S.30 operates within the statute and cannot bypass the sanction requirement—Cabinet approval of Rs.800 per ton (with escalation) validly authorized the levy; any unilateral departure by BDA without such approval lacked legal efficacy. (b) Executive approval & cabinet doctrine ----Mustafa Impex principle—Notification dated 23-02-2018 initially issued with Chief Minister’s approval was later cured by Provincial Cabinet approval on 29-05-2018; second Notification dated 24-07-2018 implemented cabinet decision—Challenge to competence on this score misconceived. (c) Settlement/administrative order inter se BDA and industry ----Chairman BDA order dated 29-03-2019 fixing Rs.350/LDT pursuant to “amicable settlement”—Legal effect—Absent *prior Government sanction*, such reduction created no crystallized right in favour of ship breakers; internal correspondence (27-06-2022) admitted lack of endorsement; settlement could not override cabinet-approved rate under the statutory scheme. (d) Construction of prior litigation history ----C.P. No. 411/2018, order dated 14-12-2018; C.P. Nos. 195/2020 etc., judgment dated 04-05-2023; C.P. No. 121/2023, judgment dated 20-12-2023; Review dismissed 16-05-2024—Courts recorded the cabinet-approved Rs.800 rate and noted that BDA was, by mutual arrangement, charging less; however, no judicial direction either mandated an increase to Rs.800 or validated Rs.350—Reliance by Director (Finance) in letter dated 27-02-2024 on the 04-05-2023 judgment as *source* of authority was out of context. (e) Administrative communication—Validity & directions ----Director (Finance) letter dated 27-02-2024 withdrawing the 29-03-2019 order and demanding Rs.800/ton “from the date of judgment 04-05-2023”—Misplaced reliance on court judgment identified; nevertheless, BDA is bound to act strictly under the BDA Act/Rules and cabinet-approved framework—Chairman BDA directed to charge tonnage fee strictly per statute/rules (i.e., with requisite Government sanction), uninfluenced by stray observations in earlier judgments. (f) Contract/estoppel against statute ----Claim that BDA’s Rs.350 rate created vested rights rejected—No estoppel where arrangement conflicts with the Act’s requirement of prior Government sanction; private settlements cannot dilute statutory/cabinet decisions. (g) Disposition — Petitions disposed of with directions: Chairman BDA to levy tonnage fee strictly under the BDA Act and Rules as sanctioned by Government; interim orders dated 15-03-2024, 03-04-2024 and 17-04-2024 recalled. No costs.

Summary: Background: An appeal was filed under Section 114 of the Trade Marks Ordinance, 2001, against an order passed by the Intellectual Property Tribunal, Lahore. The respondent instituted a suit claiming to be the bona fide owner and prior user of the trademark "SAMSARA" or "SAMSARA by Khadija Batool." The respondent alleged that the registration and use of the mark "SAMSARA Couture House (Pvt.) Limited" by the appellants infringed her rights. The Tribunal granted an interim injunction restraining the appellants from using the disputed mark. ----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent has established a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." 2- Whether the requirements for granting an interim injunction, such as prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss, are met. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of prior use and goodwill of the trademark "SAMSARA." The documents provided by the respondent, including invoices and Facebook pages, need to be verified during the trial. The court noted that the partnership agreement between the parties, which is undisputed, indicates that the business name "SAMSARA" was agreed upon by both parties, with no mention of prior use by the respondent. The court concluded that the three necessary elements for granting an interim injunction (prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss) were not co-existing in this case. The order of the Intellectual Property Tribunal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. The Tribunal was directed to decide the suit on its merits within five months. ----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Unique School vs. Messrs Unique Group of Institutions, 2015 CLD 1297 Pioneer Cement Limited through Company Secretary vs. Fecto Cement Limited through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2013 CLD 201 Qadeer Ahmed vs. The Assistant Registrar of Trade Marks, The Trade Marks Registry and another, 1999 YLR 96 Muhammad Kashan vs. Coca Cola Export Corporation through Chief Executive Officer and 3 others, 2015 CLD 1513 Yaqoob vs. Additional Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and 2 others, 1973 SCMR 116 Kohinoor Soap and Detergents (Private) Ltd through Chief Executive of the Company vs. Basra Soap Factory and 4 others, 2002 CLD 1223, Karachi

Summary: The case pertains to a dispute over the payment of Rs.31,65,640 for building material supplied by the respondent, Misri Khan & Company, to Pakistan Railways. The trial court decreed the suit in favor of the respondent, and the appellate court affirmed the decision. The petitioners, dissatisfied with the judgments, filed a revision petition.The petitioner's argument centered around the contention that the respondent's claim was time-barred, and both lower courts did not properly address this issue. The petitioner relied on Article 56 of the Limitation Act, 1908, asserting that the respondent should have filed the suit within three years from the date of the work done. The petitioner cited precedent cases to support their position.Conversely, the respondent argued that the suit was filed within the stipulated time, considering the time spent in proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman. They contended that Article 115 of the Limitation Act, 1908, applied to the case. The respondent emphasized that there were concurrent findings of fact, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate any misreading or non-reading of evidence by the lower courts.The court, after hearing the arguments, focused on the core issue of determining which provision of the Limitation Act, 1908 applied to the case. The court highlighted Articles 56 and 115 of the Act, stating that Article 56 governed claims for the price of work done, while Article 115 applied to compensation for breach of contract not otherwise provided for in the Act.The court noted that the contract was awarded in 1999, and the respondent approached the Federal Ombudsman in 2000. The crucial question was whether the time spent before the Federal Ombudsman could be excluded from the limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The court concluded that Section 14 did not apply to proceedings before the Federal Ombudsman and cited relevant case law to support this interpretation.In light of the above, the court allowed the petition, set aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts, and dismissed the respondent's suit. The court emphasized that its decision was based on correcting legal errors and irregularities in the lower court's findings.--- ''The moot point thus before this Court is as to "which provision of the "Act, 1908" would apply to the facts and circumstances of the case". Articles 56 & 115 of the "Act, 1908. From the bare reading of the above referred provisions of law it is manifestly clear that for the claim relating to the price of work done, suit is to be governed by Article 56 of the "Act, 1908" whereas Article 115 of the Act ibid caters the suit for compensation for the breech of any contract, express or implied, not in writing registered and not therein specially provided for in the Act. Admittedly the contract was awarded in the year 1999. The respondent in the first instance laid his grievance before the Federal Ombudsman on 12th January, 2000 in the shape of complaint, who allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners to make immediate payment by way of order dated 06th March, 2000. The petitioners being aggrieved challenged the order of the Federal Ombudsman before the President of Pakistan, who allowed the representation by way of order dated 26th October, 2000 and the respondent was directed to approach the Civil Court. Suit was then instituted on 16th March, 2006. The question which now emanates is as to "whether time consumed before the Federal Ombudsman can be excluded from being counted towards the limitation for instituting the suit under Section 14 of the "Act, 1908"."

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act (XXVIII of 2013)--- ----S. 40---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Ordinance (XIV of 2001) S.124---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 47---Consent decree---Execution---Fresh lease of property---Suit for declaration was filed by respondents/plaintiffs challenging notice issued by petitioners / Local Government relating to enhancement of rent/ lease amount---Trial Court decreed the suit and during execution of decree, petitioner / Local Government offered to issue fresh lease contract---Respondents/ plaintiffs objected to issuance of fresh lease---Executing Court and Lower Appellate Court allowed objections of respondents / plaintiffs---Validity---In the present case the consent decree was not executable---Decree passed in favour of respondents / plaintiffs was a nullity in the eye of law and its operation ran contrary to express provisions of law---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders passed by two Courts below and relief was moulded to the effect of giving declaration, that judgment and decree of Trial Court could not be executed against express provisions of law i.e. S.124 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Ordinance, 2001 and S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Messrs Haji Ahmed and Co v. Muhammad Siddique and others PLD 1965 (W.P) Karachi 293; Cantonment Board v. Kishan Lal AIR 1934 All. 609; Fakir Abdullah and others v. Government of Sindh through Secretary to Government of Sindh, Revenue Department, Karachi and others PLD 2001 SC 131 and Haji Sher Muhammad and others v. Aftab Ahmad and another C.O.C. No.105/2022, decided on 31.11.2022 ref. Sabah-ud-Din Khattak for the Petitioners. Hassan U.K. Afridi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 10th October, 2023.

Summary: Background: The National Highway Authority (NHA) awarded a contract for the rehabilitation of a national highway. After the completion of the project, road rutting occurred, leading to a dispute between the NHA and the Contractor. The NHA argued that the rutting was due to defective workmanship by the Contractor, while the Contractor contended it was due to design flaws and premature opening of the road by the NHA. The Contractor agreed to carry out repair works and submitted a payment claim, which was rejected by the Engineer and the Dispute Adjudication Board (DAB) but allowed by the Arbitrator. The Contractor filed an application to make the arbitration award a rule of the Court, which the NHA objected to but was dismissed by the Civil Judge for being time-barred. ----Issues: 1- Whether the NHA's objections to the arbitration award were dismissed correctly for being time-barred. 2- Whether the Arbitrator extended the scope of Clause 20.1 of the contract by accepting a claim filed beyond the stipulated timeline. 3- Whether the Arbitrator had the power to award financing charges prior to the date of the award. 4- Whether the rutting was due to the Contractor's defective workmanship or NHA's premature road opening. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Dismissal of Objections: The Court held that although the NHA received notice on 17.11.2021 and filed objections on 07.01.2022 (beyond the 30-day limitation), the NHA was aware of the award's existence. Therefore, the dismissal was appropriate, and NHA suffered no prejudice as the Civil Court scrutinized the award before making it a rule of the Court. ---Scope of Clause 20.1: The Arbitrator's interpretation of Clause 20.1 was upheld. The clause's timeframe for submitting a fully substantiated claim was not violated since the repair works were ongoing, and the ---Contractor had kept the NHA informed. The Arbitrator found that the spirit of Clause 20.1 was satisfied. ----Financing Charges: The Arbitrator awarded financing charges at the rate stipulated in the contract. The Court found this to be in line with Clause 14.8 of the FIDIC Contract, which allows for such charges without formal notice or certification. The Arbitrator’s award of financing charges from the date when the payment certificate should have been issued was deemed correct. ----Defective Workmanship vs. Premature Road Opening: The Arbitrator concluded that the rutting was due to NHA's premature opening of the road and design flaws, not the Contractor's defective workmanship. This conclusion was based on a meticulous analysis of the evidence, and the Court found no error apparent on the face of the award. ----Citations/Precedents: M/s Joint Venture KG/Rist vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 108) Oil and Gas Development Company Limited vs. M/s Marathon Construction Company and another (2013 CLD 1483) Mian Corporation vs. M/s Lever Brothers of Pakistan Limited (PLD 2006 SC 169) Henry Boot Construction Ltd vs. Alstom Combined Cycles Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3850 CA Lahore Development Authority vs. Khalid Javed Co. (1983 SCMR 718) Defence Housing Authority, Islamabad vs. Multi-National Venture Development Private Limited (2019 CLD 566)

Summary: Background: The Lahore High Court dealt with two writ petitions (W.P. No. 28679/2023 and W.P. No. 33077/2023) involving M/s Computer Tips, M/s Kingly Solutions (Pvt) Limited, and other respondents including the Province of Punjab and various government officers. The petitions concerned the procurement of PC tablets and Early Childhood Education (ECE) kits by the Program Monitoring & Implementation Unit (PMIU), Punjab Education Sector Reform Program, following the Punjab Procurement Regulatory Authority Act, 2009, and related rules. The main issue revolved around the non-payment and forced rebate deductions in the execution of the contracts. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners were entitled to full contract payments without deductions for rebates that they claimed were coerced. 2- Whether the procurement processes were conducted fairly and in compliance with statutory requirements. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court ruled in favor of the petitioners, directing the respondents to release the complete contract prices within 30 days. It held that:The procurement processes were initially compliant with the legal requirements; however, the coercion for rebates upon full performance of the contracts by the petitioners constituted an unfair and non-transparent practice.The forced rebates were deemed arbitrary and against the principles of fair procurement. The non-payment of full contract prices was seen as an undue pressure tactic against the petitioners.The petitions were upheld due to the clear statutory and contractual breaches by the respondents in failing to make timely payments, compelling the petitioners to accept reduced payments under duress. ----Citations/Precedents: Punjab Procurement Regulatory Authority Act, 2009: Sets the legislative framework for public procurement in Punjab.Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014: Provides detailed procedures and requirements for public procurement.Messrs Ramna Pipe and General Mills (Pvt.) Limited v. Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipe Lines (Pvt.) and others (2004 SCMR 1274): Reinforces the principle that contracts involving public interest must be transparent, fair, and free from malpractice, subject to judicial review.

Summary: (a) Contract Act (IX of 1872) –----Specific performance---Buyer's obligation to tender sale consideration---Burden of proof---Respondent No.1 sought enforcement of a sale agreement dated 11.11.2014 but failed to deposit the outstanding balance of Rs.30,00,000/- either before or after filing the suit---Held, a buyer seeking specific performance must demonstrate readiness and willingness to pay the agreed consideration by depositing it in court or proving that the amount was set aside for payment---Failure to fulfill this essential obligation disentitles a party from seeking relief under contract law.----Cited Cases:Nazar Hussain v. Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri (2022 SCMR 1216)Mst. Noor Jehan v. Saleem Shahadat (2022 SCMR 918)Muhammad Yousaf v. Allah Ditta (2021 SCMR 1241)Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque (2017 SCMR 2022)Liaqat Ali Khan v. Falak Sher (PLD 2014 SC 506)(b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –----Suit for declaration and specific performance---Failure to establish ownership of seller---Respondent No.1 based his claim not only on the sale deed but also on a prior family partition deed dated 16.09.2014, which was disputed by the petitioners---Petitioners denied any agreement to sell the property and asserted that Respondent No.2 had no independent ownership of the suit property to execute such a transaction---Held, in cases of specific performance, the plaintiff must prove that the seller had clear title and authority to sell the property, which Respondent No.1 failed to do.(c) Civil Law –----Possession without valid title---Illegality of possession without a registered transfer---Respondent No.1 admitted to occupying the disputed house since 2014 despite lacking any valid title or sale mutation in his favor---Mere possession does not confer ownership rights, particularly when the claimed transaction remains legally unproven---Held, a person in possession without a lawful transfer of ownership cannot claim declaratory relief against the true owners.(d) Appellate Review –----Scope of interference with lower court decisions---High Court set aside concurrent findings of lower courts, holding that both courts failed to apply the correct legal principle regarding a buyer's obligation to tender sale consideration---Held, where lower courts misinterpret legal principles and ignore the settled jurisprudence, appellate intervention is warranted to correct legal errors and prevent injustice.----Disposition: Civil revision allowed; judgments of lower courts set aside; suit for specific performance dismissed.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877: ---Ss. 12, 21(a), 21(b), and 56(f)--- Specific performance of contract---Works contract---Temporary injunction---Relief in damages--- The appellant sought specific performance of a works contract for constructing a gas processing facility, despite the termination of the contract by the respondent due to delays. Held, the contract was not specifically enforceable as the performance could be compensated in damages under S. 21(a), Specific Relief Act, 1877. The contract entailed intricate details requiring continuous supervision by the court, barring specific performance under S. 21(b). Consequently, injunctive relief against the respondent was barred under S. 56(f). Damages remained the appropriate remedy. ----Cited Cases: Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. (2004 CLD 1530) Pakistan Associated Construction Ltd. v. Asif H. Kazi (1986 SCMR 820) (b) Easements Act, 1882: ---Ss. 60, 62(c), (f), and 63--- Revocation of license---Termination of contract---Possession of project site--- The appellant’s possession of the project site was as a licensee under the works contract, which was terminated. Held, the license was deemed revoked under Ss. 62(c) and 62(f) of the Easements Act, 1882. The appellant could retain possession for a reasonable time under S. 63 only to vacate the site, not perpetuate its possession. (c) Arbitration and contractual disputes---Assessment of works---Burden of proof--- An independent third-party engineering firm (NESPAK) conducted an assessment of the works completed by the appellant under court supervision. Held, such assessments satisfy the requirement of gathering evidence for claims of damages. The appellant's demand for further technical audits was unnecessary and unjustified. Burden of proving damages remains on the appellant. ----Disposition: Appeals dismissed; interim order vacated.

Summary: Enforceability of an interim award rendered under the ICC Rules and its implications under the New York Convention (NY Convention) --- arbitration dispute between the National Highway Authority (NHA) and CWE --- The case involves a dispute between the National Highway Authority (NHA) and China Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) arising from a construction contract. The dispute was subject to arbitration under the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Rules.The primary issue revolves around the enforceability of an interim award rendered under the ICC Rules and its compatibility with the provisions of the New York Convention (NY Convention). ---- The court ultimately decides to recognize and enforce the Interim Award, directing NHA to pay a specified amount along with interest. The court concludes that the Interim Award shall be executed as though it is a decree, and NHA is ordered to comply by a specified date. --- The court, after meticulous consideration of the arguments presented by both parties, rendered a decision that significantly shapes the landscape of arbitration enforcement within the jurisdiction. The crux of the court's decision lies in its interpretation of the enforceability of the Interim Award under the New York Convention (NY Convention) and the pertinent domestic legislation, the 2011 Act.Firstly, the court emphasized the absence of any explicit provisions in the 2011 Act or the NY Convention that categorically preclude the enforcement of interim awards. This crucial observation served as the foundational premise for the court's subsequent analysis. It countered the argument that only final awards could be subject to recognition and enforcement, asserting that the silence in the legal framework did not preclude interim awards from the ambit of enforcement.The court delved into the nature and scope of the Interim Award, dissecting its role in the overall arbitration process. It underscored that the Interim Award specifically addressed the question of whether NHA was obligated to promptly implement the Dispute Board's decision, setting it apart from the final determination of underlying merits. This distinction, the court argued, aligned with the contractual obligation (clause 20.4 of the General Conditions of Contract) that required the prompt implementation of the Dispute Board's decision, irrespective of the pending arbitration proceedings on the merits.Building on this foundation, the court rejected the notion that the binding nature of the Interim Award was offset by the fact that the arbitration proceedings were still pending. It drew a parallel with analogous cases, such as the Persero case, which involved FIDIC-form contracts and similar obligations for prompt implementation of Dispute Board decisions. The court underscored that, akin to the contractual obligation to promptly give effect to a Dispute Board's decision, an interim award mandating prompt payment was equally binding.Moreover, the court referenced various legal precedents from different jurisdictions, including the United States, Singapore, and Egypt, where interim awards were recognized and enforced, even if they did not conclusively settle the entire dispute. This international perspective, the court argued, aligned with the objectives of the NY Convention, promoting predictability in international commercial dealings and consistency among jurisdictions.In dissecting the arguments put forth by the parties, the court scrutinized the decision in Resort Condominiums International Inc. v. Ray Bolwell and Resort Condominiums Pty. Ltd., where the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia, refused to enforce an interim award. The court distinguished this decision, asserting that the Australian court's approach, emphasizing the finality of awards, was inconsistent with the prevailing trend in other jurisdictions, including the United States.The court elucidated the nuanced difference between interim measures and interim awards. It noted that while interim measures could be rescinded, suspended, varied, or reopened by the tribunal, interim awards were not inherently subject to such modifications. The court deemed this distinction pivotal in understanding the enforceability of interim awards, especially in cases where the arbitration process was still ongoing.Furthermore, the court highlighted the commercial sensibility of interpreting contractual clauses, such as those empowering arbitrators to render interim awards, in a manner that upholds their enforceability. It rejected the argument that only those interim awards that conclusively decided a dispute without susceptibility to change in the final award could be enforced. Such an interpretation, the court contended, would essentially nullify the parties' agreement to adopt the ICC Rules, which specifically empower arbitrators to issue interim awards of a temporary nature.Having laid down these foundational principles, the court navigated through the specifics of the case. It noted that the burden of proof lay with NHA to demonstrate the grounds listed in Article V(1) of the NY Convention for refusing recognition and enforcement. Crucially, the court found that NHA had failed to discharge this burden. As a result, the court concluded that the Interim Award should be recognized and enforced, treating it as though it were a decree.The court did not consider the rendering of the final award as rendering the Interim Award infructuous. Instead, it opted to independently decide CWE's application for the enforcement of the Interim Award, reinforcing the principle that the enforceability of interim awards is distinct from the finality of the entire arbitration process.In its conclusive directives, the court ordered NHA to pay a specified amount along with interest, emphasizing that this amount shall be executed by the court as though it were a decree. The court set a timeline for the payment, ensuring that NHA promptly complied with the obligations stipulated in the Interim Award.This comprehensive decision by the court, rooted in a nuanced interpretation of domestic and international arbitration laws, contractual obligations, and a pragmatic understanding of the commercial context, marks a significant precedent. It provides clarity on the enforceability of interim awards, particularly those dealing with preliminary issues, and sets a precedent for the recognition of such awards as binding and executable. This decision, with its thorough legal analysis, establishes a framework that harmonizes international arbitration practices with domestic legal principles, contributing to the evolution of arbitration jurisprudence in the jurisdiction.

Summary: Facts: Ijaz ul Haq negotiated with Mrs. Zahida Parveen Ahmed, the owner of the property, through her mother and attorney, Begum Maroof Ahmed, to purchase an industrial plot in Islamabad. A contract was executed, with a part payment made, and the balance was due by a certain date. The balance was not paid, leading to a dispute and subsequent suit for specific performance initiated by Ijaz ul Haq. During the trial, it was realized that Zahida Parveen Ahmed, the property owner, was a necessary party to the suit and was subsequently added, though after the statute of limitations for her inclusion had expired.Issue 1: Whether the suit was time-barred concerning the property owner, Zahida Parveen Ahmed, who was added as a defendant after the prescribed limitation period.Holding on Issue 1: The Supreme Court held that the suit was indeed time-barred concerning Zahida Parveen Ahmed, as she was added as a defendant after the expiration of the limitation period. Therefore, the suit could not be maintained against her or the attorney, Begum Maroof Ahmed.Issue 2: Whether Ijaz ul Haq proved his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract.Holding on Issue 2: The Court found that Ijaz ul Haq failed to prove his readiness and willingness to perform his obligations under the contract. The Court noted that the plaintiff did not testify personally to establish his readiness and willingness, and his attorney's testimony was deemed irrelevant to this issue. Additionally, there was no evidence to show that the plaintiff had sufficient funds or arrangements to pay the balance at the appointed time.