Summary: Background: The petitioners, inhabitants of Village Bainan, filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu & Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974. They sought a direction against the respondents to implement an approved scheme for a 1 km road in Village Bainan, linking Nali Morr to Mohalla Gali. The petitioners contended that the map attached to the scheme was erroneously marked for another village, Maldaie, and they requested the court to rectify this mistake. ----Issues: 1- Whether the court should intervene to correct the alleged error in the road construction plan, which the petitioners claim was erroneously altered to benefit another village. 2- Whether the writ petition is the appropriate remedy for the petitioners, given the disputed facts and the administrative nature of the decision. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, reasoning that the court, in its extraordinary jurisdiction, cannot interfere with policy or administrative decisions made by government functionaries, particularly regarding welfare projects. The court noted that the official respondents had clarified the basis for the road construction plan, which was prepared following the proposal of the concerned MLA and approved by the relevant authorities. The court also emphasized that such matters, involving disputed facts and requiring evidence, should be addressed through a civil suit rather than a writ petition. The petitioners' rights were not deemed to have been violated by the partial modification of the road scheme, as the original plan was never fully executed.

Summary: (1) In Muslim Law when a minor girl is entered into contract of marriage by her father or guardian during her minority she has the option to repudiate this marriage called KhiarulBaloogh on attaining puberty before the age of eighteen years. Provided that the marriage has not been consummated. It may be noted that as per Article 195 from the book 'Principles of Mohammedan Law by Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla', EveryMohammedan of sound mind, who has attained puberty, may enter into a contract ofmarriage, and Puberty is presumed, in the absence of evidence, on completion of the ageof fifteen years.(2) According to Paragraph-274 of Mahommedan Law, "when a marriage is contracted for a minor by any guardian other than the father or father`s father, theminor has the option to repudiate the marriage on attaining the puberty. This is technically called the "option of puberty" (KhiarulBaloogh).(3) The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, however, gives her the rightto repudiate the marriage before attaining the age of eighteen years, provided that the marriage has not been consummated. But in the case of a male the right continues until he has ratified the marriage either expressly or impliedly as by payment of dower orby cohabitation." ----Background: The petitioner, through a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenged the judgment and decree dated 10.09.2021 by the Judge of the Family Court, D.I. Khan. The petitioner sought dissolution of her marriage on the basis of Khula, claiming that the marriage was contracted during her childhood and had not been consummated. The petitioner also contended that she had repudiated the marriage upon reaching puberty, exercising her right under Islamic law. ----Issues: 1- Can a minor girl repudiate a marriage contracted by her guardian before the age of puberty under Islamic law? ---2- Is the repudiation of the marriage by the petitioner valid under Section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, given that she was married as a child and the marriage had not been consummated? ---3- Did the Family Court err in decreeing the dissolution of the marriage based on Khula? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found no error in the judgment of the Family Court, which decreed the dissolution of the marriage based on Khula. Upon review, the court noted that the marriage was contracted when the petitioner was a minor (approximately 10-11 years old) and had not been consummated. The court also confirmed that the petitioner had exercised her right of Khiar-ul-Baloogh (option of puberty) by repudiating the marriage before turning 18. The court affirmed that under Muslim law, a girl who is married during her minority can repudiate the marriage upon reaching puberty, provided the marriage has not been consummated. Section 2(vii) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, allows a woman who was married before the age of 15 to repudiate the marriage before she turns 18, without the need for court intervention, as long as the marriage has not been consummated. As the conditions for repudiation were met, the petition was dismissed, and the dissolution of marriage based on Khula was upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, Section 2(vii) Mst. Farangeza v. The State (1995 MLD 1439) Mst. Janat v. Additional District Judge Principles of Mohammedan Law by Sir Dinshah Fardunji Mulla Fatawa Alamgiri (Vol-V, Page 93) for the definition of puberty in Islamic law

Summary: 1. The Courts generally, and the higher Court, particularly don trelinquish their jurisdictional competency if they see that an action ororder under attack is beyond the remit of law and there is no alternateremedy available to an individual to redress his/her grievance.2. While delimiting constituencies, regard has to be paid to suchprinciples as: the distribution of population in geographically compactareas, physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units,facilities of communication and public convenience and other cognatefactors to ensure homogeneity in the creation of constituencies.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 10 & 199 Fundamental Rights—Inclusion of petitioner’s name in the Fourth Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997—Validity—Petitioner challenged the inclusion of his name in the Fourth Schedule under Section 11-EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, alleging a lack of justification and violation of fundamental rights—Held, the respondents failed to provide any valid reasons or material evidence justifying the placement of the petitioner’s name in the Fourth Schedule—Petitioner had not been convicted in any criminal case and had been acquitted in most of them—For a person to be included in the Fourth Schedule, it must be shown that he is involved in terrorism-related activities, or is an office-bearer, activist, or associate of a proscribed organization—Failure to meet the prerequisites for placing a person under Section 11-EE renders such inclusion unreasonable and without application of mind—Under Article 4, every citizen has the inalienable right to be treated in accordance with the law, and no action detrimental to life, liberty, or reputation shall be taken except under due process—Articles 9 and 10 further safeguard against arbitrary actions impacting life and liberty—Impugned notification was declared unreasonable and set aside by the Court. Cited Cases: • Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Rafiq (PLD 2018 SC 178) • Ghulam Hussain v. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) • Muhammad Nadeem Arif v. Inspector-General of Police, Punjab (2011 SCMR 408) • Capital Development Authority v. Mrs. Shaheen Farooq (2007 SCMR 1328) • Mian Ayaz Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 Lah. 2730) • Ismaeel v. The State (2010 SCMR 27) (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997) ----S. 11-EE—Scope and prerequisites for inclusion in Fourth Schedule—Burden on the State—State must demonstrate with reasonable grounds and material evidence that the person is involved in terrorism-related activities or associated with a proscribed organization—Mere registration of criminal cases without conviction does not justify inclusion—In the absence of sufficient evidence, the inclusion is arbitrary and unlawful. (c) Administration of Justice ----S. 24-A, General Clauses Act—Exercise of power by public authorities—Good faith and reasonableness—State authorities must act in good faith and in a reasonable manner while exercising discretionary powers—Failure to provide justification for actions against citizens renders the exercise of such powers unlawful and liable to be set aside by the courts. Disposition: Writ petition allowed—Impugned notification placing petitioner’s name in the Fourth Schedule set aside—Respondents directed to remove petitioner’s name from the Fourth Schedule under intimation to the Court—Writ petition converted into an appeal under Section 11-EE(3-A) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, to secure the ends of justice.

Summary: Sections 3, 4, 6 and 14 of the Galiyat Development Authority Act, 2016 and Section 29 of the Public Private Partnership Act, 2020, Section 29 of the Wildlife and Biodiversity (Protection, Preservation, Conservation and Management) Act, 2015.(a) Provisions of GDA Act and PPP Act were harmoniously interpreted and as a result thereof, it was concluded that it is optional for a fully autonomous body to opt for undertaking a project in the Public Private Partnership mode or under its own legal regime.(b) Construction of public amenities is not totally banned in public parks, but it should be compliant with accepted environmental standards.

Summary: [ Scope of Art. 199] Without exhausting alternate remedy provided by a Statute, petitioner could not bypass the said statutory remedy, which is more suitable and efficaciious, and recourse to proceedings under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, without availing that remedy is bound to show sense of distrust in the statutory Tribunal. No doubt, rule of exhaustion of alternate/available remedy, though not prescribed by Article 199 of the Constitution, however, it is statutory criterion by which the High Court regulates its proceedings. There are two well-recognized exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal or public functionary under a provision of law, which is ultra vires, it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution for appropriate writ for quashing the proceedings firstly, on the ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to wait until these proceedings run their full course and secondly, that the doctrine has no application unless the impugned order has been made in violation of principles of natural justice or where the proceedings themselves are an abuse of process of law.

Summary: Background: In this writ petition challenged the decision of the Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJ&K) to terminate its agreement for the installation and operation of a CT scan machine at the Divisional Headquarters Teaching Hospital in Mirpur. The petitioner sought to annul the order dated 18.07.2022, which required them to vacate the space by 31.07.2022, arguing that the agreement was valid until 14.12.2022. The petitioner also requested that after the agreement's expiry, the government should follow the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA) Act & Rules and allow the petitioner to participate in the bidding process. ----Issues: 1- Whether the writ petition is maintainable for enforcing a contractual obligation. 2- Whether the cancellation of the agreement before its expiry was lawful. 3- Whether the petitioner's failure to challenge prior relevant orders, particularly the order dated 18.10.2018, impacts the petition's validity. 4- Whether the doctrine of laches applies in this case. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the writ petition, upholding the decision of the Government of AJ&K. The key points of the court's reasoning were as follows: Non-Maintainability of Writ Petition: The court emphasized that the writ jurisdiction is not meant to enforce contractual obligations, particularly when the contract itself includes provisions for termination. The court cited precedents where it was held that disputes related to contractual liabilities should not be addressed through writ petitions, as they do not involve violations of law but rather pertain to the terms of the contract itself. Failure to Challenge Relevant Orders: The court noted that the petitioner had not challenged the critical order dated 18.10.2018, through which the Secretary Health of AJ&K had directed the petitioner to vacate the premises within six months. Since this order was never contested, it remained in effect, making the petitioner's current challenge baseless. Additionally, the petitioner did not challenge the fresh agreement made with respondent No. 6 on 09.06.2022. Doctrine of Laches: The court invoked the doctrine of laches, which bars relief to those who sleep on their rights. The petitioner waited nearly five years to file the writ petition, which undermined their claim. The court emphasized that delays defeat equity and that those seeking equitable relief must act promptly and come with clean hands. Factual Controversy Not Suitable for Writ Jurisdiction: The court highlighted that writ jurisdiction is not appropriate for resolving disputed questions of fact, which require detailed evidence. The petitioner’s case involved factual disputes over the terms and execution of the contract, which are more suitably addressed through ordinary civil proceedings rather than a writ petition. ----Legal Precedents: The court referred to several legal precedents, including: Muhammad Hassan Vs. Zafar Iqbal & others (1999 SCR 77): Emphasizing that discretionary writ jurisdiction should not be exercised in favor of those who have been indolent in asserting their rights. Azad Govt. Vs. Neelum Floor Mills Muzaffarabad (1992 SCR 381): Holding that grievances based on contractual obligations are outside the scope of writ jurisdiction.

Summary: The petitioner, M/s Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd., challenged the order of the High Court, which directed the formation of a committee to review prices of livestock and poultry products and imposed a ban on the export of dairy and poultry products. The petitioner argued that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by exercising suo motu powers and issuing orders on policy matters that fall within the domain of the executive. They contended that the High Court's interference in fixing prices and forming committees to regulate prices of livestock and poultry products was unwarranted and against the constitutional separation of powers. The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments from both parties, concluded that the High Court did not have the authority to exercise suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court stated that the High Court's orders went beyond the prayers made in the writ petition and constituted an encroachment on the executive's jurisdiction. They emphasized that the power to exercise suo motu jurisdiction solely rests with the Supreme Court under Article 184 of the Constitution. The Court also noted that import and export are federal subjects, and the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by issuing directions to the provincial government regarding the prohibition and restriction of exports. They cited relevant laws that grant the federal government the power to regulate imports and exports. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Peshawar High Court, declaring it unsustainable and legally unsound.

Summary: [ Principle of locus poenitentiae] . . . withdrawal of advertisement of posts. . . Government or concerned authority is competent to withdraw or revoke before taking any decisive step. As no decisive step is taken pursuant to the advertisement, creating any right in favour of petitioner hence the respondents were competent to recall the earlier advertisement. Writ petition dismissed in limine.

Summary: The constitution of Islamic Republic Of Pakistan (1973) Article. 199 Land Acquisition Act, 1894, Section 4, 11 & 17. Non observance of the procedure provided by the Act of 1894. Issuance of Award under S. 11 without adopting procedure. Non issuance of notification under S. 4 and its non publication in the official gazette is violative of the mandatory provisions of Law. Award issued under S. 11 and 17 of the act of 1894 declared without jurisdiction and set aside.