Summary: Detailed Judgement Merged with Dissent Notes ---- Background: The petitioner, Imran Ahmad Khan Niazi, challenged the National Accountability (Amendment) Acts of 2022, arguing that they were ultra vires to the Constitution for diluting the accountability mechanism against holders of public office, thereby infringing fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.Issue: Whether the amendments made through the National Accountability (Amendment) Acts of 2022 are ultra vires to the Constitution.Decision: The Supreme Court, by a majority of 2:1, held that certain sections of the National Accountability (Amendment) Acts of 2022 were ultra vires the Constitution for being in conflict with Articles 9, 14, 24, and 25. The Court restored the previous provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, as they pertained to the accountability of public office holders, and declared the contested amendments null and void to the extent they diluted the accountability mechanisms.Majority Opinion: The majority held that the amendments compromised the ability of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) to hold public office holders accountable, thereby infringing on the public's fundamental rights to life, dignity, and equality before the law. The Court restored the provisions related to the presumption of guilt for assets beyond means, international cooperation for evidence collection, and plea bargain conditions to their original form.Dissenting Opinion: Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah dissented, emphasizing the supremacy of Parliament and the principle of separation of powers. He cautioned against the judiciary overstepping its boundaries by encroaching on legislative domain and policy-making, which are reserved for the elected representatives of the people.''What Parliament has done, Parliament can undo; the legislative power of the Parliament is never exhausted. If the Parliament can enact the NAB law, it can also repeal the entire law or amend the same.''--- ''(i) Elected holders of public offices are "public servants" and are thus triable for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act;(ii) Challenged amendments have merely changed forums for investigation and trial of certain offences, which falls within the policy domain of legislature (Parliament); (iii) Challenged amendments (law made by the Parliament) do not take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights.''

Summary: BackgroundThis judgment by the Supreme Court of Pakistan consolidates Civil Appeal No. 1191 of 2016 and Constitution Petition No. 18 of 2000 due to common legal and factual questions involved. Both cases concern former military officers, Ex. Col. Muhammad Azad Minhas and Col. Inayatullah Khan, who challenged their convictions by the Field General Court Martial under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. The appellants were accused and convicted of failing to report a conspiracy to wage war against Pakistan and were subsequently dismissed from service and imprisoned.---IssuesThe Supreme Court reviewed several key issues:Whether the proceedings under the Pakistan Army Act against the appellants were conducted with jurisdiction and without mala fides, affecting the appellants' fundamental rights.Whether an accused can be convicted of an alternative charge if the main offense is not proved.The maintainability of Constitution Petition No. 18/2000.The applicability of laches and the reasonableness of the delay in filing the constitutional petitions.The entitlement of dismissed officers to military privileges and benefits post-dismissal.---Holding/Reasoning/OutcomeJurisdiction and Mala Fides: The Court held that the Field General Court Martial had appropriate jurisdiction to try the appellants under the Pakistan Army Act, 1952. There was no evidence of mala fides or jurisdictional error affecting their fundamental rights.Conviction on Alternative Charge: The Court affirmed that the appellants could legally be convicted of an alternative charge under the provisions of the Pakistan Army Act, despite the primary charge not being proven, as sufficient evidence supported the alternative charges.Maintainability of Petitions: The Court ruled that the constitutional petition challenging military court convictions is generally not maintainable unless there is evidence of mala fides or procedural irregularities. In this case, no such evidence was presented.Delay and Laches: The Court found the considerable delay in filing the petitions unjustifiable. It emphasized that constitutional remedies must be sought promptly and that laches can bar relief when there is an unreasonable delay.Entitlement to Privileges: The Court concluded that dismissal from military service validly strips an officer of all associated privileges and benefits, such as housing and memberships, which are contingent upon active service status.

Summary: Discussion: (1) Writ Jurisdiction of High Court in election disputes. (2) Expression ìCoram non judiceî. (3) Doctrine of ëper incuriamí (4) Doctrine of ìfunctus officioî. (5) Section 37, 38, 39 & 41 of Balochistan Local Government Act, 2010. (6) Section 139 & 140 of Elections Act 2017. Rule 63(3), 72, 74, 78 & 80 of Balochistan Local Government (Election) Rules, 2013. --- he High Court had set aside orders issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) and declared two private respondents, Inayatullah and Abdul Rahim Kurd, as the returned candidates for local government positions in the Municipal Corporation of Khuzdar, Balochistan.The case involved two civil petitions, C.P. No. 2270/2023 and C.P. No. 2272/2023, related to election disputes in the Municipal Corporation of Khuzdar. The election results were challenged due to issues with the counting of votes, specifically the invalidation of certain ballots.The petitioners argued that the High Court's judgment was contrary to the law, as the ECP's decisions should have been challenged through the election petition process, and there was a statutory bar against using Article 199 of the Constitution to contest election matters. They contended that only the Election Tribunal had the authority to resolve election disputes, in accordance with the Balochistan Local Government Act of 2010.In response, the private respondents argued that the issues stemmed from problems with the ballot papers, which were not printed correctly according to the relevant rules. They had initially approached the Provincial Election Commission and the ECP, but their complaints were dismissed with the advice to approach the Election Tribunal. Therefore, they filed constitutional petitions in the High Court seeking redress.The ECP supported the petitioners' argument regarding the jurisdiction and statutory bar against using Article 199 of the Constitution.The Supreme Court found that the High Court had not properly addressed the question of jurisdiction, which was a crucial issue in the case. It noted that the ECP had directed the parties to approach the Election Tribunal, as it had already become functus officio, and the High Court should have taken this into account. The Court converted the civil petitions into appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment and remanding the case back to the High Court for a proper determination of its jurisdiction.

Summary: The petitioner had submitted his nomination papers, which were accepted by the Returning Officer. However, the respondent, Muhammad Rafique, challenged the acceptance of the petitioner's nomination papers, arguing that the petitioner was ineligible due to his age, as he was less than 21 years old, which is a requirement under the Balochistan Local Government Act of 2010.The case went through various stages, including an appeal to the District & Sessions Judge, Chaman/Election Tribunal/Appellate Authority, and the petitioner was declared the returned candidate. However, the respondent filed a constitutional petition in the High Court, and the High Court directed him to approach the Appellate Authority once again, leading to the cancellation of the petitioner's returned candidate status.The petitioner then filed a constitutional petition before the High Court, which was ultimately dismissed, leading to the current appeal.The Supreme Court, after hearing arguments from both sides, dismissed the petition, citing the clear legal requirement that a candidate's age is determined by their Computerized National Identity Card (CNIC) and that alterations or corrections to the CNIC made after the election schedule has been announced cannot change the candidate's eligibility. The Court emphasized that statutory requirements must be upheld and that the CNIC takes precedence over school records in determining a candidate's age.As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the petition had no merit, and leave to appeal was refused.

Summary: ''Review in Tasneem Jalal case dismissed - regarding conviction by a foreign court and forfeiture of property in Pakistan. Scope of Article 12 of the Constitution.'' --- Facts:The State sought review of the Supreme Court's judgment dated January 15, 2020, in Criminal Appeal No.01-L of 2015, which had declared the forfeiture of properties of Tasneem Jalal unlawful and set it aside. Jalal had been convicted and sentenced in the District Court of New Jersey, USA, in 1993 for possessing and distributing heroin. Based on this conviction, the High Court had confiscated Jalal's properties under section 37 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Ordinance, 1995.---Procedural History:Following Jalal's conviction in the USA, his properties were confiscated by the High Court in 2002. After his murder in 2003, related criminal petitions filed by him abated. Subsequent legal battles ensued between Jalal's legal heirs and the Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) over the forfeiture of properties, leading to multiple petitions and reviews. The Supreme Court's 2020 judgment overturned the forfeiture, prompting the State to file the current review petition.---Issue:Whether the Supreme Court's 2020 judgment declaring the forfeiture of Jalal's properties unlawful was correctly decided, and whether the State's review petition has merit.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, finding no merit in the State's argument and expressing regret that the State's counsel attempted to mislead the Court.---Reasoning:The Court clarified that the matter had not been previously decided as claimed by the State and that the legal counsel for the State misled the Court regarding the case's procedural history. Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument that Jalal's assets could have been forfeited under the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930, as this Act does not consider foreign convictions, unlike section 37 of the Ordinance introduced in 1995. The Court emphasized that the offence committed in 1993 in the USA could not attract the provisions of an Ordinance enacted in 1995.---Disposition:The review petition was dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- imposed on the petitioner's counsel for misleading the Court. The costs were ordered to be donated to a charitable organization.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----Ss. 497(1), 497(2), 498---- Pre-arrest bail—Rule of consistency—Judicial discretion in bail matters. Petitioner was accused of purchasing stolen goods from co-accused who worked in the complainant’s factory, allegedly causing a loss of approximately two and a half crore rupees—Co-accused, including the principal accused, were granted post-arrest bail—Petitioner was denied pre-arrest bail by the Lahore High Court—Supreme Court held that the considerations for pre-arrest and post-arrest bail are distinct but not absolute, and where an accused would be entitled to post-arrest bail following arrest, the denial of pre-arrest bail would serve no legal purpose—Court reaffirmed that bail in non-prohibitory offenses is the rule, and refusal is an exception, emphasizing the fundamental right to liberty—Reliance placed on Muhammad Ramzan v. Zafarullah (1986 SCMR 1380), Kazim Ali v. The State (2021 SCMR 2086), Muhammad Kashif Iqbal v. The State (2022 SCMR 821), and Javed Iqbal v. The State (2022 SCMR 1424)—Pre-arrest bail granted. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 381, 411---- Applicability of theft and receiving stolen property charges—Evaluation of allegations. Petitioner was not an employee of the complainant, thus the applicability of S. 381, PPC (theft by servant) was questionable—Only allegation against petitioner was purchasing stolen goods from co-accused, which falls under S. 411, PPC (dishonestly receiving stolen property)—Supreme Court noted that the entire transaction allegedly occurred over four years, yet the FIR was lodged with a delay of 13 days without explanation—Court held that mere financial loss, no matter how substantial, does not automatically justify denial of bail—Since S. 411, PPC carries a maximum punishment of three years and falls outside the prohibitory clause of S. 497(1), CrPC, the accused was entitled to bail. (c) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 185(3)---- Scope of Supreme Court’s jurisdiction—Binding effect of precedent. Petitioner invoked Art. 185(3) of the Constitution to challenge the Lahore High Court’s denial of pre-arrest bail—Supreme Court reiterated that it has the authority to correct lower courts' misapplication of bail principles—Court reaffirmed its precedents that pre-arrest bail can be granted where the accused is prima facie entitled to post-arrest bail upon arrest—Court emphasized that personal liberty cannot be curtailed arbitrarily, especially in non-prohibitory offenses—Lower courts must ensure that bail decisions align with Supreme Court precedents to prevent wrongful detention. (d) Bail Conditions & Judicial Safeguards---- ----S. 498, CrPC---- Pre-arrest bail granted—Requirement of bail bond and surety—Legal safeguards. Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order, and granted pre-arrest bail—Petitioner directed to furnish bail bonds of Rs. 200,000/- with one surety—Court reaffirmed that bail does not mean acquittal, and the trial court retains authority to decide the case on merits—Observations in the bail order were tentative and not binding on the trial court—Court emphasized that prosecution retains the right to seek bail cancellation if the petitioner misuses the concession. Disposition: Appeal allowed—High Court’s order set aside—Pre-arrest bail granted. Petitioner admitted to bail subject to furnishing surety of Rs. 200,000/-. Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that pre-arrest bail may be granted where post-arrest bail would inevitably follow. Liberty of an accused cannot be restricted arbitrarily—Mere financial loss is not a sufficient ground to deny bail. Trial court to proceed without being influenced by observations in the bail order.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 184(3), 188, 191 & Entry 55 of the Fourth Schedule Review jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Scope and limitations—Competence of Parliament to legislate on judicial review—Vires of the Supreme Court (Review of Judgements and Orders) Act, 2023 The petitioners challenged the vires of the Supreme Court (Review of Judgements and Orders) Act, 2023 (Act No. XXIII of 2023) on the ground that it was ultra vires the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The petitioners contended that review jurisdiction under Article 188 is distinct from appellate jurisdiction under Article 185, and the 2023 Act improperly merged the two by permitting an appeal against Supreme Court judgments in the guise of an "enlarged review" mechanism. It was further argued that Parliament lacks legislative competence to alter the Supreme Court's jurisdiction through ordinary legislation since the Constitution grants the power to regulate the Court’s practice and procedure exclusively to the Supreme Court under Article 191. The Court reaffirmed that finality is a fundamental principle of Supreme Court judgments, and permitting appeals under the guise of review would lead to judicial uncertainty. The 2023 Act was declared repugnant to and ultra vires the Constitution, being beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and was struck down as null and void​ . (b) Separation of Powers & Judicial Independence ----Arts. 175, 189, 191 & Doctrine of Separation of Powers Judicial autonomy—Limits on legislative interference in judicial functions—Basic structure of the Constitution The Court held that the independence of the judiciary is a foundational principle of the Constitution and is beyond the reach of ordinary legislation. The Supreme Court reasoned that the authority to interpret the Constitution is exclusively vested in the judiciary, and any legislative attempt to transform review jurisdiction into appellate jurisdiction amounts to a direct encroachment on judicial independence. The principle of separation of powers dictates that Parliament cannot interfere with judicial functions except through a constitutional amendment. The Court emphasized that allowing an appeal against Supreme Court judgments would undermine judicial finality, creating an unprecedented legal anomaly. Consequently, Sections 2 and 3 of the 2023 Act were declared unconstitutional, rendering the entire statute void​ . (c) Fundamental Rights & Due Process ----Arts. 10-A, 25 & 8 Right to a fair trial—Judicial review as a safeguard against arbitrary decisions—Constitutionality of review mechanisms The petitioners contended that the 2023 Act violated fundamental rights under Article 10-A (Right to a Fair Trial) by removing the finality of Supreme Court judgments and introducing a quasi-appellate review mechanism that undermined procedural fairness. The Court examined whether the absence of an appeal from judgments under Article 184(3) amounted to a denial of due process and concluded that the Constitution does not provide for an appeal against Supreme Court judgments under Article 184(3), except for a limited review under Article 188. Allowing Parliament to convert review jurisdiction into an appeal would distort the constitutional scheme and create an imbalance in judicial hierarchy. The Court reaffirmed that the Supreme Court’s decisions must be final and binding, as mandated by Article 189​ . Disposition: The Supreme Court (Review of Judgements and Orders) Act, 2023 was declared unconstitutional and struck down in its entirety as being beyond the legislative competence of Parliament and violative of the independence of the judiciary​ . Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 923) Muhammad Azhar Siddiqui v. Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 774) Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324)

Summary: The petition, heard by a Full Bench, challenged the exclusion of 10 votes in favor of Chaudhry Parvez Elahi by the Deputy Speaker, resulting in Hamza Shahbaz Sharif being declared the winning candidate. The judgment emphasized the agreement between the petitioner and respondent No. 2 (Hamza Shahbaz Sharif) to hold the runoff election on July 22, 2022, after by-elections on 20 general seats in the Punjab Assembly.After a detailed analysis, the Court concluded that the Deputy Speaker's ruling was incorrect and erroneous. It declared the ruling void, without lawful authority, and of no legal effect. Consequently, Chaudhry Parvez Elahi was declared the duly elected Chief Minister, Punjab, having secured 186 votes compared to Hamza Shahbaz Sharif's 179 votes.The Court directed the Chief Secretary, Punjab, to issue the necessary notification declaring Chaudhry Parvez Elahi as the duly elected Chief Minister. It also invalidated the oath of office administered to Hamza Shahbaz Sharif and directed the Governor, Punjab, to arrange for the petitioner's oath of office promptly. The judgment protected acts done by Hamza Shahbaz Sharif and the Provincial Cabinet under the de facto doctrine, subject to any review by the incoming Chief Minister.

Summary: Background: Four constitutional petitions were filed under Article 44 of the Interim Constitution, 1974, by petitioners who were candidates for Primary and Junior Teachers positions. They challenged the non-extension of the validity period of merit lists for these positions, arguing that the delay in their appointments was due to external factors like the ban on appointments during elections and the COVID-19 pandemic. The petitions were consolidated for adjudication. ----Issues: 1- Whether the validity period of merit lists for Primary and Junior Teachers should be extended. 2- Whether the petitioners should be appointed to the vacant posts of Primary and Junior Teachers based on their merit positions. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Extension of Validity Period: The court noted that the validity period for merit and waiting lists was one year. Due to external factors like the ban on appointments and the pandemic, the selection process was delayed. The court held that the doctrine of reasonable expectations and administrative justice applied. The pause in the selection process should not penalize the petitioners who were in the merit lists. --Appointments Based on Merit: The court found that the petitioners had acquired a right to be considered for appointment within the prescribed one-year timeline. The official respondents' failure to make appointments due to the ban and pandemic should not adversely affect the petitioners. The court directed the respondents to appoint the petitioners based on their merit positions within two months. The court also ordered that the remaining vacant posts be filled through a denovo process in accordance with the law. ----Citations/Precedents: The principle that administrative orders and decisions must be reasonable and justifiable as per Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The maxim "Generalia Specialibus non derogant" indicating that special rules override general rules. "2006 YLR 2271" "PLD 2005 Lah. 381" "2005 YLR 177"

Summary: Scope of constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court while hearing petitions against appellate decisions, particularly in family cases. --- The case involved a dispute between the petitioner, M. Hamad Hassan, and Respondent No. 1, Mst. Isma Bukhari, who had filed a suit for the recovery of dower, maintenance allowance, and dowry articles, among other claims, following her marriage to the petitioner in 2014.The trial court decreed the suit in favor of Respondent No. 1, granting her various rights and benefits, such as dower, property shares, maintenance, and medical expenses. The petitioner challenged this decision in the district court, which upheld the judgment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a writ petition before the High Court, alleging factual errors in the lower courts' decisions.The Supreme Court's judgment emphasized the limited scope of the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, especially in cases involving appellate decisions. The court clarified that the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction was intended to rectify wrongful or excessive exercise of jurisdiction by lower courts and address procedural irregularities. It should not be used to re-examine or reconsider the facts of a case already decided by lower courts.The judgment also cited relevant case law to establish the legal position that the High Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appellate court, except in cases of jurisdictional errors, misreading or non-reading of evidence, arbitrary exercise of powers, or violations of the law.In this specific case, the High Court had wrongly adjudicated on the facts, essentially acting as an appellate court, despite being tasked with constitutional oversight. The Supreme Court pointed out that allowing such re-argument amounted to entertaining a second appeal, which was not the intent of the legislature, particularly in family cases where expedient dispute resolution is paramount.Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and declined to grant leave for further appeal, stressing the importance of finality in appellate court decisions and the need to prevent unnecessary litigation. This judgment highlighted the need for legal proceedings to provide definitive resolutions and uphold the legislative intent for efficient legal dispute resolution.