Summary: Background: The respondent a permanent civil servant working as a Chowkidar in the Veterinary and Animal Husbandry Department, was removed from service on January 20, 2014, due to continuous absence. His removal was under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001. After his removal, the proforma respondent, Syed Azhar Hussain Shah, was temporarily appointed to the position. Muhammad Shabbir challenged both his removal and the subsequent appointment of the proforma respondent before the Service Tribunal. The Service Tribunal ruled in Shabbir's favor, setting aside the orders of removal and temporary appointment, and restoring Shabbir to his position with back benefits. The department appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Did the department lawfully remove the respondent from service following the procedures outlined in the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001? -----2- Was the Service Tribunal correct in setting aside the respondent’s removal and restoring him to service? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Service Tribunal's decision. The Court emphasized that under Section 5 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Removal from Service (Special Powers) Act, 2001, the authority must appoint an inquiry officer or inquiry committee before removing an employee from service. This procedure was not followed in the respondent's case. No inquiry officer or committee was appointed, nor was a proper inquiry conducted before issuing the removal order. The department’s argument that the competent authority had reviewed the case and decided the respondent’s fate without the need for an inquiry was rejected. The Court found that failure to comply with the mandatory statutory provisions of the law rendered the removal order void. The Court affirmed that the Service Tribunal acted correctly in restoring the respondent to his position, and there was no legal basis to interfere with its decision. The appeal was dismissed with costs, and the respondent was restored to his position with all back benefits.

Summary: Background: The appellant rented two shops from the respondent under a tenancy agreement dated February 1, 2009. The rent was set at Rs. 4000 per month for two years. The respondent claimed that the appellant defaulted on rent payments and violated the terms of the agreement. On May 21, 2009, the respondent filed an application for ejectment and recovery of rent before the Senior Civil Judge, who was empowered as Rent Controller. The Rent Controller ruled in favor of the respondent, ordering the appellant to vacate the premises and pay outstanding rent. This decision was upheld by the District Judge (Appellate Authority). The appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed in limine. He then appealed to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant had defaulted on rent payments and violated the terms of the tenancy agreement. ----2- Whether the relationship between landlord and tenant, and other related facts, were properly established in the lower courts. ----3- Whether the appellant’s writ petition raised any questions of law or jurisdiction that would warrant intervention by the High Court. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority had correctly found that the appellant was in default on rent payments and had admitted the landlord-tenant relationship in his pleadings and statements. The court found that the lower courts had properly applied judicial minds and made well-reasoned judgments based on the evidence. The court rejected the appellant's argument that the ongoing civil suit regarding the title of the property affected the tenancy case, affirming that the tenancy agreement was separate from the title dispute. The court emphasized that the Rent Restriction Act, 1986, is a special law meant for the speedy resolution of rental disputes. The appellant's appeal was seen as a misuse of the legal process, intended only to delay the inevitable outcome. The Supreme Court found no violation of law or jurisdiction in the lower court decisions, and upheld the High Court’s decision to dismiss the writ petition in limine.

Summary: Background: The appellant respondent were both permanent employees of the Revenue Department of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK). On September 11, 2012, Nazir Ahmed was promoted to the position of Girdawar based on the recommendations of the Departmental Selection Committee. Muhammad Iqbal Mir, senior to the appellant in the seniority list, challenged this promotion before the Service Tribunal, claiming that as the senior employee, he should have been promoted instead. The Service Tribunal ruled in favor of Muhammad Iqbal Mir, setting aside the appellant's promotion. Nazir Ahmed appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of AJK. -----Issues: 1- Was the Service Tribunal correct in setting aside the promotion of the appellant on the basis of seniority alone? ----2- Does the Departmental Selection Committee have the authority to consider factors such as experience and fitness, apart from seniority, when making promotions? ----3- Can the Service Tribunal substitute its findings for those of the Departmental Selection Committee regarding the suitability and fitness of candidates? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court of AJK ruled in favor of the appellant, setting aside the decision of the Service Tribunal. The Court held that seniority alone is not the sole criterion for promotion. Promotions are based on seniority-cum-fitness, meaning that fitness, experience, and suitability must also be considered. In this case, the Departmental Selection Committee found that while the respondent was senior, the appellant had more experience and was found to be more suitable for promotion to Girdawar. The Supreme Court emphasized that the Service Tribunal cannot substitute its judgment for the findings of the Departmental Selection Committee regarding the suitability and fitness of candidates unless there is clear evidence of illegality or arbitrariness. The Tribunal had overstepped its jurisdiction by focusing solely on seniority. The Court cited prior cases to reaffirm that the decision on fitness for promotion lies with the competent authority (in this case, the Departmental Selection Committee) and is not subject to review by the Service Tribunal unless there is a violation of law or a demonstrable error in the process.The appeal was accepted, and the judgment of the Service Tribunal was set aside. The promotion of Nazir Ahmed was reinstated, with the Supreme Court confirming that the Departmental Selection Committee had appropriately considered the appellant's fitness and experience, in addition to seniority. ----Citations/Precedents: Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Sulehria vs. Azad Govt. & 4 others [2008 SCR 230] Muhammad Arif vs. Raja Muhammad Farooq Niaz [2009 SCR 140] Basharat Hussain and 2 others vs. Muhammad Imtiaz & 6 others [2009 SCR 530]

Summary: Background: The appellant was involved in a murder case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code. During the trial, the Public Prosecutor initially gave up a witness (PW.5) as unnecessary. However, on June 6, 2013, the complainant filed an application requesting the court to summon the same witness for a fair decision. The trial court accepted the request on August 19, 2015, under Section 540 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which allows the court to summon witnesses at any stage for the just decision of a case. The appellant challenged this decision in the Shariat Court through a criminal revision petition, but it was dismissed on October 21, 2016. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's decision to summon a previously given-up witness under Section 540, Cr.P.C., was lawful. ----2- Whether the court’s action amounted to filling a lacuna in the prosecution’s case or unjustly favoring the complainant. ----3- Whether the Public Prosecutor's earlier decision to give up the witness should bind the trial court from summoning the witness later. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding both the trial court’s and the Shariat Court’s decisions. It found that Section 540, Cr.P.C., provides wide discretion to the trial court to summon or recall any witness at any stage of the proceedings if the court deems the evidence essential for the just decision of the case. The court rejected the appellant's argument that summoning the witness would fill a lacuna in the prosecution's case. The trial court has the inherent authority to ensure that all relevant and necessary evidence is presented, regardless of whether the Public Prosecutor had earlier deemed the witness unnecessary. The court emphasized that the trial court's primary role is to administer justice, not to be bound by procedural actions taken by the Public Prosecutor if they conflict with the interests of justice. The trial court was acting within its rights and responsibilities in ensuring that all relevant evidence was available to make a fair and just decision.The appeal was dismissed, with the Supreme Court affirming the decision to summon the witness, concluding that the trial court had acted properly in ensuring that all relevant evidence was considered for a just outcome. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 540, Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) provides the trial court with broad powers to summon, recall, or re-examine witnesses if their evidence is deemed essential for the just decision of the case.

Summary: Background: The appellant, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Muzaffarabad, promoted several Sub-Inspectors to the rank of Inspector on January 7, 2015, and January 14, 2015, bypassing (the respondent). The respondent's promotion was denied based on adverse remarks in his 2013 Annual Confidential Report (ACR) and a five-year increment stoppage penalty. Muhammad Munir challenged these promotion orders before the Service Tribunal, which accepted his appeal and set aside the promotion orders. The IGP then appealed this decision to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Service Tribunal violated the principle of natural justice by setting aside the promotion orders without hearing the individuals who were promoted. -----2- Whether the respondent, Muhammad Munir, was unfairly excluded from promotion due to adverse service records. -----3- Whether the Service Tribunal had the authority to set aside the promotion orders. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant, setting aside the judgment of the Service Tribunal on the grounds of procedural impropriety. The Court held that the Service Tribunal violated the fundamental principle of audi alteram partem (the right to be heard) by setting aside the promotion orders without hearing the promoted Sub-Inspectors. The individuals who had been promoted were directly affected by the decision, and they should have been made parties to the proceedings before the Tribunal. The Court emphasized that no one should be condemned without being given an opportunity to be heard. The failure to include the promoted individuals in the case rendered the Tribunal's decision invalid. The Court also noted that if Muhammad Munir is eligible and meets the conditions for promotion, the relevant authorities are obligated to consider his case according to the law and regulations. However, the setting aside of the promotion orders without proper procedure was improper. -----Citations/Precedents: The Court reinforced the principle of natural justice, specifically audi alteram partem, which mandates that all parties directly affected by a judicial or quasi-judicial decision must be given an opportunity to present their case.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan (199), Sale Tax Act 1990----Through instant petition the petitioner, inter alia, has sought refund of amount Rs.7183168/- which was collected by the respondents from the petitioner on its electricity bills for the month of August 2013 on account of 5% extra GST and 1% further GST.Sales Tax Act and Article 199 of the constitution of Pakistan, Pakistan were discussed in the case.In this case, it was observed that absence of any order from competent forum regarding illegality of suspension of Sales Tax Registration of petitioner, it cannot be presumed that such suspension of the petitioner was patently illegal or amounted to abuse of authority by respondent, which could be treated as nullity in the eyes of law. That any consequential payment of tax, extra GST on account of delayed filing of return and tax, would also be treated as illegal and would not eventually give right to the petitioner to seek refund of such payments by filing a Constitution Petition at this belated stage of proceedings. Petition was dismissed.

Summary: Background: A criminal case was registered under sections 34, 109, 302, 324, 334, 337, and 504 of the Pakistan Penal Code, along with section 13 of the Arms Act, 1965. The prosecution alleged that the accused-respondents were involved in a murder case. The trial Court initially denied their bail. However, the respondents later filed a criminal revision petition before the Shariat Court, which granted bail to the respondents. The appellant, the complainant in the case, then appealed to the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, requesting the cancellation of bail granted by the Shariat Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Shariat Court properly granted bail to the respondents, given the gravity of the charges. -----2- Whether there were valid grounds for the cancellation of bail. -----3- Whether the respondents misused the bail by registering false cases against the complainant party. -----4- Whether the trial Court should be directed to expedite the disposal of the case. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the Shariat Court's decision to grant bail, reasoning that none of the fatal injuries causing the victim's death were attributed to the accused-respondents. The respondents were neither armed nor directly involved in causing fatal injuries, according to the prosecution’s own evidence. The Court emphasized that the criteria for canceling bail differ from those for granting it. Once bail is granted, it can only be canceled if the order is arbitrary, perverse, or violates established legal principles, which was not the case here. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no valid grounds to cancel the bail. However, the Court did issue a direction for the trial Court to expedite the proceedings, ordering the case to be concluded within six months. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 34, 109, 302, 324, 334, 337, 504, Pakistan Penal Code Section 13, Arms Act, 1965 Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C)

Summary: Summary pending