Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Period fixed by any court for deposit of Court fee, may be extended, in terms of Section 148 and 149 CPC. If the same period is not provided by and under any statute.

Summary: The learned counsel for the defendant No.1 and 2exuberantly argued that in some draft agreements,choice of jurisdiction to sue and foreign arbitrationclause was also integrated. This plea is disproportionateas admittedly the fundamental defence is that noagreement was signed between the parties whereasplaintiffs assert sustenance of an oral agreement andpromises against which they made funding. When thelearned counsel for the defendant No.1 and 2 vigorouslydenied having any concluded contract between theconcerned parties then how the plaintiffs can be calledupon to first invoke arbitration clause or to apply in thecourts of elected jurisdiction accentuated in the draftsagreements.In the wake of above discussion, application filed bythe defendant No.1 and 2 forrejection of plaint is dismissed.

Summary: The plaintiffs are challenged by the construction of the 4-storey building by the defendants, claiming that it violates the bylaws of the housing society. The plaintiffs argued that the construction exceeds the permissible limits and violates the lease conditions and terms notified by the society. The judge considered the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act, the Karachi Building and Town Planning Regulations (KBTPR), and various clauses of the bylaws of the housing society. The judge also evaluates the permissible floor area ratio (FAR), footprints, and compulsory open spaces for the specific plot in question. Ultimately, the judge rules that the defendants should not proceed with construction that exceeds the permissible footprints, compulsory open spaces, and FAR as prescribed in the relevant regulations and bylaws. The judge allows the plaintiffs' application for an injunction to restrain the defendants from raising construction beyond the prescribed limits.

Summary: Section 8-B of Sales Tax Act, 1990 is procedural in nature. 100% adjustment of input tax instead of 90% in the absence of any allegation of mala fide attributed to the assessee would be a procedural lapse only and at worse department could impose penalties for non-compliance of a procedural formality and not beyond that ----- The case concerns a reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990, challenging the order of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, dated 14.01.2015. The primary issue revolves around the interpretation of Section 8B(1) and Section 66 of the Act, specifically whether the petitioner, M/s. Malik Enterprises, was entitled to adjust 100% of input tax or only 90%.The brief facts of the case state that the petitioner was alleged to have adjusted 100% of input tax during specific tax periods, which allegedly violated Section 8B(1) of the Act. After the Commissioner passed an order against the petitioner, the respondent challenged it before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, which subsequently accepted the appeal, canceling the Commissioner's order.The key dispute involves the interpretation of Section 8B(1) and Section 66 of the Act. Section 8B(1) restricts registered persons from adjusting input tax in excess of ninety percent of the output tax, with specific exceptions for fixed assets or capital goods. On the other hand, Section 66 sets the period for claiming a refund and outlines the refund process.The court determined that Section 8B(1) serves to encourage accurate tax declaration and that the 10% restriction is meant to ensure correct tax returns. The Court explained that this provision is procedural in nature and is followed by the procedure under Section 66, which deals with the petitioner's entitlement to claim a refund of the remaining 10% of input tax.The court highlighted that the claim for a refund can be made within one year from the date of payment, and the Commissioner must satisfy that the input tax adjustment is due and admissible. This allows for an adjudication process within ninety days of filing the claim.The Court found that the intention of the legislature was not to require the registered person to repeat the entire process unless there was proof of mala-fide or an illegal claim. Since there was no evidence of such illegal claims or mala-fide intentions by the respondent, the court concluded that no useful purpose would be served by repeating the process. Therefore, the reference petition was dismissed, and the question of law was answered in the affirmative.

Summary: Detailed judgement in Urdu.

Summary: Detailed judgement in Urdu.

Summary: Acquittal granted----Muhammad Ismail, the appellant, was charged with the murder of his brother Liaqat. The prosecution alleged that Ismail, along with his son who was acquitted, attacked Liaqat with a hatchet due to a dispute over marriage proposals. Ismail denied the charges and opted for trial. The prosecution primarily relied on the testimony of Mst. Bachi Mai, Liaqat's widow, and Samar, a witness who allegedly heard her cries. However, doubts were raised about Samar's credibility and the motive presented by the prosecution. During the trial, Ismail admitted guilt, but the court questioned the circumstances of his confession. Legal precedents were cited to emphasize the distinction between a confession and an admission, highlighting the necessity of procedural safeguards for recording confessions. Syed Ali Beopari v. Nibaran Mollah (PLD 1962 SC 502): This case established the obligation of courts to consider alternative theories if the evidence supports them. It emphasizes the need for thorough examination of evidence and exploration of all plausible explanations in criminal cases. Zahid Parvez v. The State (PLD 1991 SC 558): This case reiterates the duty of courts to consider all possible explanations in criminal cases. It emphasizes the importance of examining evidence from multiple perspectives to arrive at a just decision.Despite doubts about the motive and the validity of Ismail's admission, the court found sufficient evidence to uphold his conviction under Section 302(b) PPC (Pakistan Penal Code). However, considering the circumstances, the court deemed the death sentence unjustified and commuted it to life imprisonment with compensation.