Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Limitation---Condonation of delay---Public policy---Sufficient cause---Law of limitation is not a mere technical rule of procedure but is founded upon sound public policy aimed at securing certainty, finality and repose in litigation---Once a valuable right accrues to a successful litigant by efflux of time, the same cannot be disturbed except upon demonstration of sufficient cause within contemplation of law---A party seeking condonation of delay must approach the Court with clean hands, disclose all material facts and furnish a plausible, satisfactory and bona fide explanation covering the entire period of delay---Negligence, indolence or casual conduct do not constitute sufficient cause. (b) Limitation---Appeal filed before forum lacking pecuniary jurisdiction---Return of memorandum of appeal---Subsequent delay in approaching competent forum---Respondent/plaintiff obtained an ex parte judgment and decree dated 05.04.2018 in a suit for specific performance and permanent injunction relating to land in Village Pind Parian, Islamabad, after the petitioner's application for setting aside ex parte proceedings (ordered on 22.12.2017) was dismissed on 05.04.2018 for failure to produce evidence on the issue of due service of summons---Petitioner preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Islamabad-West, on 25.04.2018, which was returned on 30.05.2018 for want of pecuniary jurisdiction, and thereafter filed Regular First Appeal No.94 of 2018 before the Islamabad High Court on 11.07.2018---High Court dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation and otherwise incompetent---Held, that even if the period during which the matter remained pending before the District Judge was reckoned in favour of the petitioner, after return of the memorandum of appeal on 30.05.2018 the petitioner failed to approach the competent forum with due promptitude and allowed the matter to remain unattended for approximately 37 days, for which no plausible or satisfactory explanation was furnished---Mere filing before an incompetent forum does not confer an automatic right to exclusion or condonation of all subsequent delay---A litigant invoking equitable discretion must establish continuous bona fide pursuit of remedy; where negligence intervenes after return of the proceedings, the protective plea of bona fide prosecution loses much of its force---High Court aptly held the appeal to be barred by limitation. (c) Conduct of litigant---Negligence and lack of diligence---Non-impleadment of necessary parties---Leave to appeal---Held, that the suit was initially allowed to proceed ex parte; the application for setting aside ex parte proceedings was dismissed for failure to produce evidence; an appeal was then preferred before a forum lacking pecuniary jurisdiction; and even thereafter the High Court appeal was instituted after unexplained delay of approximately 37 days from the date of return and was further rendered incompetent for non-impleadment of necessary parties---Cumulative conduct unmistakably reflected negligence, lack of diligence and casual disregard for the process of law---No case for grant of leave was made out. Cited Cases: • Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 • Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad PLD 2008 Supreme Court 462 • Government of Pakistan v. Malbrow Builders Contractor Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248 • Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs PLD 2011 Supreme Court 657 • Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi PLD 2016 SC 872 • Secretary to Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Communication and Works Department, Peshawar v. Messrs Parcon Associate Government Contractors PLD 2025 Supreme Court 371 Disposition: Leave refused; civil petition dismissed. (C.P.L.A. No.3469/2025, T & T Employees Cooperative Housing Society Islamabad v. Haji Ghulam Hussain & Others, against judgment dated 04.06.2025 of the Islamabad High Court in RFA No.94 of 2018; announced in open Court on 02.06.2026 at Lahore; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Remand---Appellate jurisdiction---Exceptional power---Family appeal---Appellate Court remanding family suit for decision afresh---Whether justified---Petitioner/husband was proceeded against ex parte at the evidence stage after he had entered appearance, filed written statement and contested Family Suit No.70/3N of 2017 instituted by respondent/wife and minor daughters for dissolution of marriage, recovery of dower and gold ornaments, maintenance and a one-fourth share in a house---Family Court, Dera Ismail Khan, passed an ex parte judgment and decree dated 11.03.2020 dissolving the marriage on khula, awarding alternate market value of the one-fourth house share, five tolas of gold ornaments and maintenance of Rs.4,000/- per month for each minor---After a first remand dated 23.05.2022, the Family Court again decided the suit by judgment and decree dated 25.01.2023, which the appellate Court, by judgment dated 30.05.2024, remanded for decision afresh---Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench, in W.P. No.110-D of 2024, set aside that remand and restored the Family Court decree dated 25.01.2023---Held, that the power of remand is a corrective and exceptional jurisdiction to be exercised with great circumspection and only where the interests of justice so demand, such as when a material issue has remained wholly undecided, essential evidence has not been considered, or a party has been denied a fair and meaningful opportunity to present its case---It is not intended to displace the duty of an appellate Court to decide the matter on the record available before it, nor can it be invoked as a matter of routine, or employed as a device to prolong litigation, reopen concluded matters, or afford a negligent litigant a fresh opportunity to fill lacunae, improve deficiencies or repair the weakness of his case---None of the conditions justifying remand existed: the Family Court had framed issues, afforded full opportunity to adduce evidence and rendered findings through a reasoned judgment---Observation of the appellate Court that pre-trial proceedings had not been conducted was not borne out from the record, the Family Court judgment itself reflecting due completion of the requisite proceedings prior to trial---No material issue had remained wholly unaddressed, no indispensable evidence had been excluded, and neither side had been denied a fair opportunity of hearing---Proper course for the appellate Court was to examine the correctness of the findings, reappraise the evidence where necessary, and determine the appeal finally---Appellate Court, while directing remand, did not identify any specific issue requiring limited reconsideration nor confine the scope of further proceedings, but sent the entire controversy back for decision afresh, which, absent compelling legal necessity, amounted to abdication of appellate responsibility. (b) Ex parte proceedings---Default after contest---Ground for remand---Held, that the fact that the petitioner/husband had been proceeded against ex parte did not furnish lawful ground for remand---Petitioner had entered appearance, filed written statement, raised objections and participated in the proceedings, and it was only at the stage of evidence that he chose not to pursue the matter and absented himself, whereupon he was rightly proceeded against ex parte in accordance with law---A litigant who, after entering contest, voluntarily withdraws from the proceedings cannot subsequently invoke his own default as a basis to seek reopening of the case or a fresh trial. (c) Family litigation---Prompt and final adjudication---Suit instituted in 2017 remaining unresolved for almost a decade---Held, that the appellate Court did not exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law while passing the remand order---Matter arose out of family litigation involving rights of spouses and children, which by its very nature requires prompt and final adjudication rather than prolonged uncertainty. Cited Cases: • Noor Muhammad (deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Ashraf PLD 2022 SC 248 • Messrs Shah Nawaz Khan and Sons v. Government of NWFP 2015 SCMR 945 • Rehman Shah v. Sher Afzal 2009 SCMR 462 • Habib Ullah v. Azmat Ullah PLD 2007 SC 271 • Mst. Shahida Zareen v. Iqrar Ahmed Siddiqui 2010 SCMR 119 • Pramatha Nath Chowdhury v. Kamir Mondal PLD 1965 SC 434 • Fateh Ali v. Pir Muhammad 1975 SCMR 221 • Nasir Ahmad v. Khuda Bakhsh 1976 SCMR 388 • Arshad Ameen v. Messrs Swiss Bakery 1993 SCMR 216 • Syed Abdul Hakim v. Ghulam Mohiuddin PLD 1994 SC 52 • Chairman, Wapda, Lahore v. Gulbat Khan 1996 SCMR 230 Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgments of the Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench dated 08.10.2025 in W.P. No.110-D of 2024 and of the appellate Court set aside; matter remanded to the appellate Court to decide the lis itself on the record already available, after hearing the parties, within three months of receipt of certified copy of the order. (C.P.L.A. No.5464/2025, Muhammad Zubair v. Mst. Raheela Gul etc., announced in open Court on 02.06.2026 at Lahore; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: (a) Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912----Ss. 16 & 30(2)---Cancellation of allotment---Land permanently settled---Bona fide purchaser---Sale consideration paid and possession delivered---Respondent No.1 filed a suit for declaration with permanent injunction asserting ownership of land measuring 20 kanals 10 marlas of Chak No.89/NB, Tehsil and District Sargodha, allotted originally to Muhammad Yousaf (respondent No.4) vide order No.650 measuring 50 kanals 5 marlas and thereafter transferred by sale, mutation having been sanctioned in the revenue record---Member (Colonies), Board of Revenue, Punjab, cancelled the allotment on the ground that the land fell within the prohibited area within five miles radius of the municipal limit and that allotment was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation---Trial Court decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 21.04.1992; District Judge, Sargodha, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 24.11.1994; Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Civil Revision No.1291 of 1995, set aside the appellate judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree by judgment dated 23.12.2003---Held, that the competent authority may proceed against fraudulent transfers of tenancy/lessees' rights under Ss. 16 and 30(2) of the Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act, 1912, but not with regard to land permanently settled on the allottees---Sale consideration was fully paid and possession of the land was handed over without any demur; the land vested in the respondents and their names were duly reflected in the revenue record as recorded owners in possession, and there were no pending proceedings for cancellation of the land to the original allottee---Matter did not relate to tenancy rights, hence there was no authority to cancel the land allotted to Muhammad Yousaf after receiving the entire sale consideration and execution of sale deed---No tangible evidence of fraud or misrepresentation was brought on record to trigger suo motu proceedings without notice to the respondents. (b) Punjab Colonization of Government Lands Act----S. 32(2) [as quoted] & S. 30(2)---Cancellation or resumption of land---Reasonable opportunity of showing cause---Notice---Mandatory---Section 32(2), as reproduced in the judgment, provides that if at any time the Board of Revenue is satisfied that any person had acquired under the Act tenancy rights in respect of any land by means of fraud or misrepresentation or was not eligible to have such rights for any reason whatsoever, then notwithstanding the acquisition of proprietary rights, the Board of Revenue may, after giving such person a reasonable opportunity of showing cause, pass an order resuming the land or reducing the area of such land or pass such order as it may deem fit---No action detrimental to the tenancy or proprietary rights of land could be initiated without issuing notice---Nothing produced throughout the proceedings showed that any notice before taking drastic action was issued to the respondents including the original allottee Muhammad Yousaf---While exercising power under S. 30(2), neither any notice was issued nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded to the respondents before cancellation of allotment---Condition of providing a reasonable opportunity of showing cause before resuming the land, reducing the area, or passing such order, is not merely a formality but a substantive provision, and without compliance the whole action deems to be an illegal exercise of powers which is also ultra vires the provision providing a right of audience---Appellate Court failed to appreciate the correct legal proposition; High Court rightly set aside the appellate judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree---Question of whether the land fell within five miles of outer municipal limits, raised with reference to the 1956 Scheme for the Resettlement of Ejected Tenants of Certain Categories and a Survey General report placed on record pursuant to order dated 29.12.2021, was not the basis on which the appeal was dismissed. (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 10A---Natural justice---Fair trial---Vested rights---Right to a fair trial is a fundamental right under Art. 10A of the Constitution---Courts and quasi-judicial authorities are bound to ascertain whether that indispensable right was afforded or deprived of---Principles of natural justice require that a person against whom action is taken should be afforded a fair opportunity to converge, offer explanation and contest it before he is found guilty and condemned---Where a statute provides compliance of the principle of natural justice, it should be adhered to stringently; even if the statute is silent on the right to fair trial, the canons of natural justice should be lived up to, according to the elementary rule of law that no decision affecting the right of any person should be taken without providing an opportunity of being heard---Secured vested rights cannot be devastated or upset by unilateral actions when the relevant law itself advocated to afford right of audience---Before cancelling the land in question, the respondents who were purchasers against valuable consideration should have been afforded an opportunity of hearing---Admittedly, neither any notice was issued nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded before cancellation of land on unilateral action. (d) Limitation---Condonation of delay---Government department---Sufficient cause---Each day's delay---Equality before law---Civil Petition No.769-L of 2016 was barred by 4402 days---Application (CMA No.683-L of 2016) sought condonation on the ground of negligence, high-handedness and unprofessional behaviour of revenue officials putting valuable rights of the public exchequer at stake---Held, that mechanical and unpersuasive justification of administrative delays or lapses on the part of officials, consistently pleaded through stereotypical and generalized applications, cannot be considered "sufficient cause" or a reasonable ground as gospel truth---Ground raised for such a long delay demonstrated recklessness and inefficiency of the concerned department and its officials---Government departments have at their disposal their own legal department and the help of the Attorney General's or Advocate General's Office, and immediately upon receiving a copy of the judgment or order may move for instructions rather than waiting for the lapse of the period of limitation---Cavalier attitude at times smears and smacks mala fide and leads to the belief that the appeal is intentionally being presented belatedly only as a formality---Nothing was articulated as to who was actually responsible for the delay and what punitive or disciplinary action was taken against the person instrumental in causing the delay---Delay of each and every day is required to be explained, which was missing---While considering grounds for condonation of delay, no extraordinary clemency, compassion or preferential treatment may be accorded to the Government department, autonomous bodies or private sector/organizations; their case should be dealt with uniformly and in the same manner as cases of ordinary litigants and citizens---Law favours adjudication on merits, but the law helps the vigilant and not the indolent---Maxims "leges vigilantibus non dormientibus subserviunt" and "vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt" articulate that the law aids those who are vigilant but not those who are sleeping or slumbering---Doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner---No plausible reasons shown for justifying grave inefficiency and negligence in filing the civil petition in time---CMA for condonation of delay dismissed; civil petition dismissed as barred by time. Disposition: Civil Appeal No.187-L of 2009 dismissed; judgment dated 23.12.2003 of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Civil Revision No.1291 of 1995 left undisturbed. Civil Petition No.769-L of 2016 dismissed as barred by 4402 days; CMA No.683-L of 2016 for condonation of delay dismissed. (Civil Appeal No.187-L of 2009 and C.P.L.A. No.769-L of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 2nd June, 2026, authored by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. on the Bench; Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990----Rr. 3, 4, 6, 7 & 10---Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), Ss. 6, 8 & 25---Police Service of Pakistan---Probationer---Common Training Programme---Repetition of CTP for unsatisfactory performance---Determination of seniority---Respondent appointed and joined Police Service of Pakistan as probationer on 30.09.2016, directed to repeat Common Training Programme with the 45th Batch, and his seniority fixed with the 45th CTP Batch instead of his original 44th CTP Batch---Federal Service Tribunal, while holding that the order of repetition of CTP was valid, declared Office Memorandum dated 22.10.2015 ultra vires and directed that seniority of the respondent be fixed on the basis of marks obtained in the 44th CTP and not the 45th CTP---Held, that seniority as a rule is determined according to the CTP in which the contender/probationer is declared successful---If he fails to qualify the mandatory course, his seniority is relegated and determined with the batchmates of the CTP wherein he successfully completed and passed out the course, and in such scenario the seniority moves on to the new CTP batch---If CTP is cleared in subsequent attempts, the probationer is relocated to the bottom of that new batch---Seniority is always governed and regulated strictly in accordance with the applicable statutory rules and regulations of the department---Seniority is not an inherent or fundamental right but is reckoned according to relevant laws and rules---A civil servant cannot claim seniority with an earlier batch if he failed to fulfil the statutory prerequisite---The stretch of time consumed in repeating CTP due to failure, and subsequently qualifying it successfully in the next training programme, does not bestow any privilege or dispensation for determination of seniority with the original batchmates; rather, the length of finalized service is counted from the batch in which the CTP is cleared---Rules of 1990 were framed pursuant to S. 25 read with Ss. 6 and 8 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973---Rule 3 requires every probationer to undergo specified training and appear in specified examinations, and a probationer who fails to undergo prescribed training and qualify the prescribed examination renders his appointment liable to termination without notice, with two further chances to appear in the Final Passing Out Examination in the subject or subjects in which he failed---Rule 4 empowers Government, where performance or conduct is determined unsatisfactory, or where the probationer is prevented by sickness or other adequate cause from completing training, to require further training---Rule 6 provides that a probationer who fails to qualify in the Final Passing Out Examination shall have his increments withheld until he qualifies; shall lose one increment if he fails in the first attempt; be relegated in seniority to the bottom of his batch if he fails in the second attempt; and be discharged from service under S. 6(2)(a) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 if he fails in the third attempt---Rule 7 provides that seniority of the probationers shall be determined by the appointing authority after Final Passing Out Examination, and lays down the manner of adding marks obtained in the competitive examination, initial training, specialized training and the Final Passing Out Examination qualified in the first attempt---Tribunal failed to consider the niceties of R. 7, of which the core prerequisite is passing out of the final examination---Respondent appeared in 44th CTP but could not qualify, was provided an opportunity to join 45th CTP, and after being declared successful his seniority was rightly determined according to R. 7---Providing a further chance to complete the course in the next CTP, rather than electing removal from service under R. 10 during the probationary period, was a grace which ought not to be disgraced. (b) Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990----R. 7---Office Memorandum dated 22.10.2015 (No.2/3/2015-T-V)---Ultra vires---Scope---Expression "ultra vires" means beyond the powers; if an act is carried out without authority, it is ultra vires---Before declaring an Office Memorandum ultra vires, it was obligatory for the Tribunal to see whether the O.M. was issued without competence, whether it had transgressed or contravened the relevant rules for determination of seniority, or whether it was just an explanation within the bounds of the relevant rule---O.M. dated 22.10.2015 conveyed that if a probationer is asked to repeat his CTP due to unsatisfactory performance his seniority will be fixed with the batch he successfully completes his CTP, while for the purpose of pay fixation his length of service will be considered from the date of joining of original (first) CTP, and that in case of unsatisfactory performance even during the second CTP his services will be liable to be terminated---Held, that there was no justification to declare the O.M. ultra vires or void---Considered in juxtaposition to Rr. 6 and 7 of the Rules of 1990, the O.M. was in harmony with the set rules rather than imposing any condition contrary thereto---Condition that, for pay fixation, length of service is considered from the date of joining of original (first) CTP does not provide any cause of action to claim seniority with the original (first) CTP without passing out; it is merely a beneficial condition only for pay fixation---Tribunal's declaration of the O.M. as ultra vires, null and void, set aside. Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 11.12.2023 of the Federal Service Tribunal in Appeal No.328(P)CS/2021 set aside; service appeal of the respondent dismissed. (Civil Petition No.670 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 2nd June, 2026, authored by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. on the Bench; Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) Service law---Pakistan WAPDA Hydel Generation Staff Service Rules, 2018---Retrospective operation---Seniority---Assistant Station Attendants, WAPDA Hydel North Region, Warsak, Peshawar---Department had maintained a combined seniority list of all Assistant Station Attendants, and thereafter resorted to a separate seniority list of ASAs working in Operations and Maintenance Sections in terms of the 2018 Rules issued vide Office Memo dated 30.08.2018---Separation of seniority affected promotion prospects, in that juniors on the combined list had already been promoted---Federal Service Tribunal held that the 2018 Rules should be implemented prospectively for those who joined after their promulgation, restored the combined seniority list of those appointed and serving prior to the 2018 Rules, directed that their services be governed by the previous Rules without disturbing promotions of private respondents Nos.4 to 14, and directed consideration for promotion with effect from the date juniors were promoted, with all back benefits---Core issue was whether the 2018 Rules, which provided that they shall come into force at once, applied with retrospective effect---Held, that the 2018 Rules shall be applied with prospectivity---Neither can the 2018 Rules be put into motion to disturb or upset settled seniority, nor can they be applied retrospectively to shake up the seniority of employees enjoying their seniority prior to promulgation of the new Rules---Tribunal's judgment did not require interference. (b) Interpretation of statutes---Prospectivity and retrospectivity---Substantive and procedural law---Vested rights---Seniority and eligibility for promotion---Laws and rules are presumed to operate prospectively rather than retrospectively unless unambiguously specified---Maxim "nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis": a new law ought to regulate future things, not past things---Substantive law defines rights, while procedural law deals primarily with process or remedies---Seniority and eligibility for promotion are equivalent to substantive rights and cannot be regarded as merely a procedural matter---Any new rules or amendments detrimental to vested or accrued rights, including attainment of seniority, shall operate prospectively and cannot be used to unsettle already settled and undisputed seniority attained under previous rules---Upsetting settled seniority by antedating application of rules infringes legitimate expectation and renders the administrative action arbitrary, discriminating and prejudicial---Seniority is a valuable asset for an employee, playing a crucial part in professional weightage, pathway for progression and job security, and cannot be disturbed out of the blue under the garb of newly enacted rules with retrospective effect---Rights vested under a previous notification cannot be retrospectively destroyed by a subsequent executive order---Substantive laws must operate prospectively; procedural changes can apply retrospectively---Laws affecting, curtailing or prejudicing vested rights shall be applied prospectively, and there is a well-settled principle against interference with vested rights by subsequent legislation unless the legislation has been made retrospective expressly or by necessary implication---A statute is not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment, especially where it would affect vested rights, past and closed transactions, or facts that have already occurred. Cited Cases: • Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Azizuddin Industries Ltd. PLD 1970 SC 439 • Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher Afzal PLD 1969 SC 187 • Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal through its Chairman, Lahore 2025 SCMR 303 = 2024 SCP 387 • Raja Amer Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 SCP 4 = PLJ 2024 SC 114 (c) Service law---Seniority---Retrospective alteration of rules---Comparative jurisprudence---State cannot retrospectively take away or extinguish a vested or accrued right such as seniority or promotion eligibility already legally acquired under previous rules---While rules can be made retrospective, they must pass the test of fairness and cannot operate to the detriment of existing employees---Retrospective rules cannot be used to unilaterally adjust the date of entry into service so as to alter the existing seniority list to the disadvantage of validly appointed employees---Seniority has to be decided on the basis of the service rules in force on the date of actual appointment---A seniority list that has remained settled for a considerable period cannot be disturbed by retrospective application of modified executive instructions or amended rules. Cited Cases: • T.R. Kapur v. State of Haryana 1986 Supp. SCC 584 = 1987 AIR 415 = 1986 (3) SCR 696 • K. Narayanan v. State of Karnataka 1993 INSC 282 • State of Uttaranchal v. Dinesh Kumar Sharma 2006 INSC 944 • Uttaranchal Forest Rangers' Association v. State of U.P. 2006 INSC 654 Disposition: Civil petitions dismissed and leave refused. (Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal Nos.4818 to 4842 of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 2nd of June, 2026, by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ. agreeing. Approved for Reporting)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Regular inquiry was dispensed with without assigning any reason in writing--- controversial facts, requiring resolution of --- Minor penalties were proposed in the show cause notice, however, major penalty was imposed by the competent authority on the employee without putting him under notice or confronting him with the same, which is not permissible under the law.