Summary: Summary pending

Summary: i. Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997- Section 11B & 11EE- In the Constitutional Law landscape shaped by the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the concept of proscription must be approached not as an episodic administrative measure, but as a solemn statutory instrument embedded within a carefully constructed preventive architecture. The Act itself was conceived in recognition of a stark reality: that terrorism is not an isolated eruption of Criminal Lawity, but an organized, networked, and ideologically sustained enterprise which thrives upon structure, continuity, and coordination. It is this structural dimension of terrorism that the mechanism of proscription seeks to neutralize. The authority to declare an organization proscribed, or, where the statute so contemplates, to designate an individual, is therefore neither ornamental nor unfettered. It is a power of grave consequence, carrying Civil Law, political, and penal ramifications. Such authority must be exercised within the disciplined confines of statutory purpose, Constitutional Law limitation, and judicially manageable standards. The touchstone is not suspicion, not unpopularity, and certainly not dissent. The touchstone is demonstrable involvement in the architecture of terrorism as defined by law. ii. Sections 11B & 11EE- vires- the provisions, when read collectively and harmoniously, create a Constitutional Lawly balanced mechanism. The proscription regime functions not as an unbridled executive instrument but as a regulated statutory process safeguarded by institutional checks and judicial oversight, thereby ensuring conformity with Constitutional Law guarantees and the rule of law. In a Constitutional Law democracy, power is never self-authorizing. It draws its validity from the Constitution, remains confined by law, and is perpetually accountable to reason. Section 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 may trace its legitimacy to Constitutional Law foundations, particularly the calibrated permissions reflected in Articles 17(2), 19, 256, and 5, yet such legitimacy is neither unconditional nor unfettered. It survives only within the disciplined boundaries of Constitutional Law command. Proscription is not an ordinary administrative measure. It is a solemn declaration that transforms legal status, restricts collective association, suppresses expression, and carries profound reputational consequences. It does not merely regulate conduct; it reshapes civic existence. When the State invokes the power under Section 11B, it does so in a manner that casts effects far beyond the text of the notification and into the lived reality of those affected. Precisely for this reason, Constitutional Law governance demands restraint where authority is grave. The omission of recorded reasons is not a trivial procedural lapse; it is a Constitutional Law infirmity. Reasons are the visible manifestation of rational decision-making. iii. Vires of Legislation- Principles of- duly enacted legislation must be upheld unless it demonstrably and unmistakably violates Constitutional Law supremacy, and judicial invalidation is reserved exclusively for cases of manifest Constitutional Law conflict. Accordingly, the doctrine herein articulated constitutes binding precedent and shall govern future Constitutional Law adjudication concerning the presumption of validity and judicial deference to legislative enactments. Reliance Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739). iv. Interpretation of Statutes- . It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that the duty of the Court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of Parliament as expressed in the words of the statute. Where the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for it is not the function of the Court to question the wisdom or policy of the Legislature. The Legislature is supreme within its domain, and its intention, as gathered from the statutory text, must prevail. Ref: Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Pages 28 and 29. v. Article 199- Alternative remedy- Principles and Exceptions of- The principle that Constitutional Law jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked in the presence of an efficacious statutory remedy is not a rule of limitation but of judicial restraint. It preserves the functional integrity of statutory forums and respects legislative design… Ref: Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid [1964] 6 SCR 654: AIR 1964 SC 1419]; Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436: (AIR 1984 SC653), Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433: (AIR 1983 SC 603), Union of India v. Oswal Woollen Mills Ltd (1984) 2 SCC 646: (AIR 1984 SC 1264); Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. (AIR 1985 SC 330; (1985) 1 SCC 260); There are limited exceptions, absence of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or patent unConstitutional Lawity, no such exceptional circumstance is demonstrated here. Ref: Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998) 8 SCC 1; United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110

Summary: The Rent Controller is statutory forum of exclusive jurisdiction for adjudication of landlord-tenant dispute. This exclusivity reflects legislative intent, since eviction impacts possession, livelihood, and proprietary rights, and the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, provides a comprehensive adjudicatory and executory framework that cannot be overridden through execution directions.

Summary: Public procurement / tender process--- ----Notice Inviting Tenders (NIT)---Undisclosed engineer’s estimate---Additional security---Rejection of bid---Forfeiture of earnest money---Debarment---Transparency and fairness in public procurement--- Petitioners invited tenders for improvement and widening of road project---Respondent bidder was successful for Package-I and had deposited earnest money at 2% of estimated cost disclosed in advertisement---Petitioners subsequently demanded 8% additional security on basis of engineer’s estimate, asserting that bid was 22.5% below such estimate---Said engineer’s estimate, however, had not been disclosed in NIT---On bidder’s refusal to deposit additional security, bid was rejected, earnest money forfeited, and bidder debarred for six months---High Court set aside such action---Validity---Federal Constitutional Court held that where petitioners had themselves computed earnest money on basis of estimated cost expressly mentioned in advertisement, they could not later shift to an undisclosed benchmark for imposing additional burden upon bidder---Such course offended requirements of transparency, consistency, fairness and equal treatment in public procurement---Any change in essential tender terms or introduction of a fresh financial benchmark after commencement of bidding process, without prior disclosure or fresh advertisement, was arbitrary and legally untenable---Judgment of High Court was found consistent with governing law and principles of public procurement---Leave to appeal was refused and petition was dismissed. Habibullah Energy Limited and another v. WAPDA through Chairman (PLD 2014 SC 47); Ishaq Khan Khakwani and another v. Railway Board through Chairman and others (PLD 2019 SC 602); Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation and others (AIR 2000 SC 2272) rel. (a) Notice Inviting Tenders---Disclosure of material terms---Necessity--- In public procurement, all material and essential terms governing participation in the bidding process must be disclosed in the advertisement / Notice Inviting Tenders so as to ensure a free, fair, open, competitive and transparent process. An undisclosed criterion cannot subsequently be invoked to the prejudice of a bidder. (b) Additional security---Basis not disclosed in NIT---Effect--- Where the petitioners demanded additional security on the basis of an engineer’s estimate not mentioned in the advertisement, such demand was without lawful basis---A bidder could not be burdened with additional security calculated on a benchmark withheld from all participants at the time of tender. (c) Transparency, consistency and equal treatment---Public contracts--- The procuring agency, having calculated the 2% earnest money on the basis of the estimated cost expressly disclosed in the advertisement, could not lawfully switch to another undisclosed valuation standard later on---Such inconsistency violated the principles of transparency, fairness and equal treatment among bidders. (d) Change in essential tender terms after commencement of process---Propriety--- A change in an essential term or financial basis of tender after initiation of bidding process cannot be sustained unless the same is publicly notified through a fresh advertisement enabling all potential bidders to compete on equal footing---Midstream alteration of tender conditions is akin to changing the rules of the game after it has begun and is inherently arbitrary. (e) Rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment---Legality--- Where demand for additional security itself was founded on an undisclosed and impermissible basis, consequential actions of rejection of bid, forfeiture of earnest money and debarment of bidder could not be legally sustained. (f) Leave to appeal---Refusal of--- As the High Court had correctly applied the law and the settled principles of public procurement, no legal infirmity was found in the impugned judgment and no ground for interference was made out. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 175F(1)(c)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S. 491---Leave to appeal against dismissal of habeas corpus petition for recovery of alleged detenue/daughter---Scope---Petitioner/father sought recovery of his daughter on the plea that she was a Christian minor and had been taken into unlawful custody by respondent, who claimed to be her husband---Courts below dismissed the petition on the basis of the girl’s voluntary statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and her assertion that she had contracted marriage of her free will---Federal Constitutional Court held that where the alleged detenue had repeatedly appeared before competent fora and unequivocally stated that no abduction had taken place and that she had married voluntarily, her custody with the person claiming to be her husband could not, in summary proceedings under S.491, Cr.P.C., be termed illegal or unlawful---Question whether Nikahnama was forged, or whether investigation required transfer, pertained to criminal process and could not by itself justify habeas corpus relief---Leave was refused and petition was dismissed. (b) Muslim Personal Law---Marriage between Muslim male and Christian female---Validity---Petitioner contended that his Christian daughter could not lawfully marry a Muslim male---Held, contention was misconceived and contrary to settled principles of Islamic law---A Muslim male may validly contract marriage with a Christian woman, being from Ahl al-Kitab---Such principle stood recognized in earlier Supreme Court authorities and classical juristic exposition---Court held that objection to marriage merely on the basis of difference of religion was without substance. Cited Cases: Mrs. Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin K. Jatoi and others PLD 1967 SC 580. Mst. Zainab Bibi and others v. Mst. Bilqis Bibi and others PLD 1981 SC 56. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Art. 189---Federal Constitutional Court---Precedential value of judgments of Supreme Court of Pakistan after establishment of Federal Constitutional Court---Held, judgments of the former Supreme Court of Pakistan do not bind the Federal Constitutional Court as a matter of absolute precedent under the restructured constitutional hierarchy, but continue to carry great persuasive value where they are based on sound reasoning, are consistent with constitutional text and structure, and do not offend fundamental rights or evolved constitutional values---Doctrine of stare decisis was not abrogated but recalibrated in light of constitutional supremacy---Departure from earlier Supreme Court precedent must be express, reasoned and principled, and may be justified where such precedent is manifestly inconsistent with the Constitution, undermines fundamental rights, reflects judicial overreach, becomes incompatible with evolved constitutional values and democratic norms, or where any other compelling reason advances the cause of justice. (d) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)----S.1(2)---Marriage---Conversion to Islam---Effect---Though marriage of a Muslim male with a Christian female is permissible in principle, solemnization and registration under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance is confined to Muslim citizens---Respondent’s stance was that the girl had embraced Islam before marriage---Affidavit appended with Nikahnama and subsequent certificate issued by a religious institution were produced to show conversion---Held, faith is a personal matter; once a person openly professes adherence to Islam, ordinarily no roving inquiry into the sincerity or motive of conversion is warranted in such proceedings---No specific ritual is indispensable beyond declaration and profession of belief---Where girl herself acknowledged correctness of Nikahnama and declared conversion, Court would not undertake deeper inquiry into genuineness of conversion in summary jurisdiction---Marriage was, prima facie, validly solemnized under the Ordinance. Cited Cases: Mst. Zarina and another v. The State PLD 1988 FSC 105. Tariq Masih v. The State 2004 PCr.LJ 622. (e) Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---Child marriage---Effect on validity of marriage---Petitioner asserted that alleged detenue was about twelve years of age and, therefore, incapable of contracting valid marriage---Held, the Act of 1929 restrains and criminalizes solemnization of child marriage, but does not expressly render such marriage void or voidable---In absence of explicit statutory language invalidating the marriage, its legal status remains unaffected---Where legislature intends to override settled personal law, it must do so in clear and unequivocal terms; such intention cannot be inferred from silence---Therefore, even assuming minority, marriage would not automatically become void merely because it was contracted in contravention of the Act of 1929. Cited Cases: Mushtaq Ahmad v. Mirza Muhammad Amin and another PLD 1962 W.P. Karachi 442. Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmad and another PLD 1970 SC 323. Mauj Ali v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah and another 1970 SCMR 437. Nasreen Bibi v. Station House Officer and others 2024 PCr.LJ 2058. Muhammad Khalid v. Magistrate 1st Class and others PLD 2021 Lahore 21. Muhammad Azam v. The State and another 2018 PCr.LJ Note 175. Muhammad Safeer v. Additional Sessions Judge (West) Islamabad PLD 2018 Islamabad 385. Allah Nawaz v. Station House Officer PLD 2013 Lahore 243. Allah Bakhsh v. Safdar and others 2006 YLR 2936. Ghulam Qadir v. The Judge Family Court, Murree 1988 CLC 113. Ghulam Hussain v. Nawaz Ali and another 1975 PCr.LJ 1049. (f) Evidence---Age of alleged detenue---Delayed birth documents---Probative value---Petitioner relied on birth certificate and child registration certificate to show that his daughter was born on 07.10.2012---Held, both documents had been procured many years after the alleged date of birth and no satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay was furnished---Delayed registration of birth, unless supported by independent and reliable material, is susceptible to manipulation and its evidentiary value is diminished---Further, inconsistency in petitioner’s own stance regarding age in the F.I.R., close birth dates shown for the alleged detenue and her next sibling, entry of a different date of birth in the Nikahnama, and the girl’s own denial of minority materially weakened petitioner’s case---In such circumstances, delayed documents could not be treated as sole basis for holding that the girl was minor, particularly when she appeared physically before the Court and seemed to be of more advanced age. (g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.164---Statement of alleged detenue---Evidentiary significance in habeas corpus proceedings---Girl had recorded statement before Magistrate that nobody abducted her, no zina was committed, and that she had married respondent of her own free will; she had also made a similar statement in proceedings under Ss.22-A & 22-B, Cr.P.C.---Held, such consistent voluntary statements before judicial fora carried significant value in determining whether custody was illegal---Where marriage was acknowledged and free will asserted, summary court was justified in declining to infer unlawful detention. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)----S.491---Summary nature of proceedings---Limitations---Question whether Nikahnama was forged or unregistered, and whether offences were made out in investigation, could not properly be adjudicated in proceedings of interim and summary nature under S.491, Cr.P.C.---Such issues were to be pursued before competent criminal court or through appropriate investigative remedies---Habeas corpus jurisdiction is not designed to conclusively determine complex factual controversies touching upon validity of marriage documents. (i) Res judicata---Constitutional petition for recovery of daughter---Earlier writ petition on same cause having attained finality---Effect---Petitioner had earlier filed writ petition for recovery of same daughter from same alleged custody on same foundational ground, which was dismissed by High Court after considering her statement under S.164, Cr.P.C. and holding that her custody with husband was not illegal or unlawful---Said finding was not challenged before higher forum and, therefore, attained finality---Held, subsequent proceedings on same issue were barred by principle of res judicata, and petitioner could not re-agitate the same question through another round of litigation. Cited Case: Pir Bakhsh v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee PLD 1987 SC 145. (j) Constitutional law---Fundamental rights---Reliance on High Court judgment concerning discriminatory definition of “child”---Relevance---Petitioner relied upon PLD 2025 Lah. 1---Held, said judgment had no application to the controversy in hand, as that case concerned challenge to discriminatory definition of “child” prescribing different minimum ages for males and females with reference to provincial legislation, whereas present case concerned legality of custody and alleged invalidity of marriage in the factual setting of Punjab law. Disposition: Leave to appeal was refused and the petition was dismissed; however, observations made in the judgment were not to prejudice or impede criminal proceedings, if any, before the competent criminal court in accordance with law. ------ "The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 merely criminalizes the solemnization of a child marriage but does not expressly declare such a marriage to be void or voidable. The binding force of judicial precedent is not derived from institutional seniority but from the constitutional hierarchy itself. Since, the supremacy of constitutional adjudication now vests in this Court, therefore, all courts, including the Supreme Court of Pakistan, are bound by its pronouncements. However, this Court would ordinarily respect and follow the earlier constitutional jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, unless it is established that the same is manifestly erroneous, inconsistent with the constitutional text or scheme, or incompatible with fundamental rights and contemporary constitutional values. "

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi) & 34---Qatl-i-amd---Double murder---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd---Firearm injuries to injured witness---Appreciation of evidence---Petitioner/convict was alleged to have fired with 12-bore rifle at two deceased ladies, namely Mst. Khatoon Bibi and Mst. Batool Bibi, who died at the spot, and also caused firearm injuries to injured witness Qadar Yar---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC on two counts and sentenced him to death on two counts, along with convictions under Ss.324, 337-F(iii) and 337-F(vi), PPC---High Court maintained conviction and confirmed death sentence---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, held that prosecution had successfully established guilt of petitioner through trustworthy ocular testimony duly corroborated by medical evidence---Conviction and sentences under all offences were upheld, however, death sentence under S.302(b), PPC was commuted to imprisonment for life on two counts due to mitigating circumstances. (b) Criminal trial---- ----Prompt FIR---Effect---Occurrence took place at about 7:30 a.m. and was reported at police station at 8:30 a.m., within one hour of incident---Police station was about seven kilometres from place of occurrence---Complainant was confronted with unnatural death of his mother and sister-in-law and injuries to his brother, and time consumed in arranging transportation and shifting dead bodies/injured was natural and reasonable---FIR was held to have been lodged with promptitude, ruling out possibility of consultation or deliberation. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Related witnesses---Injured witness---Evidentiary value---Complainant, eyewitness Muhammad Akram and injured witness Qadar Yar furnished consistent, natural and confidence-inspiring account of occurrence---They specifically attributed firing at two deceased ladies and injured witness to petitioner/convict---Their statements were consistent on material particulars, including date, time, place, manner of arrival of accused on motorcycle and use of 12-bore rifle---Presence of injured witness Qadar Yar could not be doubted as he had sustained firearm injuries during occurrence---Eyewitnesses were natural witnesses as occurrence took place in front of complainant’s house in early morning when they were taking cattle out, which was common rural practice---Petitioner was co-villager and already known to eyewitnesses, and occurrence took place in broad daylight; therefore, question of mistaken identity did not arise---Related witnesses who had lost close family members were unlikely to spare real culprit and falsely implicate innocent person---Ocular account was accepted. Cited Cases: • Aman Ullah v. The State 2023 SCMR 723 • Imran Mehmood v. The State 2023 SCMR 795 • Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 • Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 (d) Criminal trial---- ----Related witnesses---Mere relationship not sufficient to discard testimony---Principle---Closely related eyewitnesses who had personally witnessed occurrence and suffered loss of close family members could not be discarded merely on ground of relationship---Possibility of substitution in such circumstances was extremely remote and, in facts of case, beyond realm of probability---Eyewitnesses had not exaggerated role of co-accused by assigning firing to him, rather confined their version to what they had actually witnessed, which supported their bona fides. (e) Criminal trial---- ----Medical evidence---Corroboration of ocular account---Injured witness received firearm entry wounds on right thigh, left thigh and little finger of left hand---Post-mortem evidence showed that firearm injuries sustained by both deceased ladies were ante-mortem and sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death---Nature and bunch of firearm injuries on deceased persons, when examined with injuries on injured witness, established use of 12-bore firearm---Medical evidence fully supported and independently corroborated prosecution’s ocular account. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b)---Death sentence---Mitigating circumstances---Commutation to imprisonment for life---Although guilt of petitioner/convict was established, death sentence required reconsideration in view of peculiar facts and circumstances---Occurrence was not outcome of any pre-planned or premeditated design---Petitioner and complainant party were neighbours and their houses were adjacent in same Mohallah---Incident originated when complainant party was taking cattle alongside petitioner’s house and petitioner’s wife became annoyed, went to complainant party’s house, and grappled with Mst. Khatoon Bibi deceased---Petitioner was attracted to spot upon grappling between his wife and deceased, and occurrence ensued thereafter---Such circumstances constituted mitigation sufficient to commute death sentence to imprisonment for life. (g) Criminal trial---- ----Motive---Failure to prove---Effect on sentence---Prosecution alleged that petitioner had previously been implicated in a criminal case regarding theft of buffalo at instance of complainant party and, due to such grudge, committed offence---No independent or documentary evidence, such as copy of FIR or judgment in said case, was produced---In absence of supporting material, alleged motive could not be held proved---Failure to establish motive was considered as a mitigating circumstance for reducing death sentence to imprisonment for life. (h) Criminal trial---- ----Recovery of weapon---No crime empties recovered from place of occurrence---Effect---Recovery of crime weapon allegedly effected at petitioner’s pointation and reported by Punjab Forensic Science Agency to be in working condition was held inconsequential because no crime empties were recovered from place of occurrence---Such recovery did not materially advance prosecution case and was considered while assessing sentence. (i) Sentence---- ----Advanced age of convict---Mitigating circumstance---At time of recording statement under S.342, Cr.P.C. on 21.09.2019, petitioner was approximately seventy years old, and on date of hearing before Supreme Court, i.e., 03.02.2026, he was about seventy-six years, six months and six days old---Advanced age of petitioner was considered as a mitigating circumstance---Ends of justice were held to be adequately met by commuting death sentence awarded on two counts to imprisonment for life on two counts. (j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---Concurrent sentences---Supreme Court maintained conviction and sentences under all offences, but commuted death sentence under S.302(b), PPC to rigorous imprisonment for life on two counts---All substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently and benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to petitioner/convict. Cited Cases: • Shah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 460 • Sayad Ikram and others v. Sikandar Hayat and others 2016 SCMR 467 Disposition: Jail Petition No.348 of 2024 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentences of petitioner/convict under all offences were upheld; however, sentence under S.302(b), PPC was commuted from death on two counts to rigorous imprisonment for life on two counts; all substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended to petitioner/convict.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Presence of witnesses on the fateful day in the court is a condition precedent for closing the right of other party to cross-examine them and in their absence, the said right cannot be taken away.