Summary: When Court comes to the conclusion that "A" attacked with weapon to "B" while coming to his house, caused injuries to him including at the vital part of the body and "B" after snatching or getting hold of said weapon, caused injury to "A" at most vital part of the body with full force resulting into death of "A", then "B" has exceeded his right of self defence and his act would attract offence punishable under Section: 302 (c) PPC.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Non-decision of pending applications does not vitiate proceedings absent prejudice or impact on merits.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4, 10-A, 23 & 24---Bank account---Deposited funds as property---Amounts maintained in a bank account constituted property protected by Constitution---Account holder could not be deprived of access to deposited funds except strictly in accordance with law---Arbitrary freezing, debit-blocking or operational restraint upon bank account, without lawful authorization, amounted to unjustified interference with proprietary, commercial and financial rights. (b) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016---National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency (Functions) Rules, 2025---NCCIA---Freezing or attachment of bank account---Authority---National Cyber Crime Investigation Agency possessed no lawful power to direct freezing, cautioning or attachment of bank accounts or property in absence of express authority in parent statute---Any restriction affecting financial assets had to trace its source to clear statutory authorization. Cited Case: • Muhammad Uzair Anwar v. Federation of Pakistan and others, I.C.A. No.362 of 2025, Islamabad High Court (c) Banking law---Bank account---Debit block imposed without request of investigating agency---Bank admitted that NCCIA had only sought provision of banking record and had never requested freezing or blocking of petitioner’s account---Bank nevertheless imposed debit restriction on basis of its own precautionary assumption---Financial institution could not enlarge scope of an investigative communication or exercise a power which neither investigating agency had invoked nor law had conferred. (d) Banking law---Customer deposits---Duties of bank---Bank holding customer deposits was burdened with obligations of fidelity, due care, verification and lawful dealing---Cooperation with investigating agencies in prevention and detection of crime was necessary, but did not justify arbitrary interference with customer’s property or assumption of coercive powers beyond law---Internal apprehension, administrative caution or speculative concern could not constitute legal basis for freezing account. (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4 & 10-A---Restriction on operation of bank account---Due process---Before imposing debit block, freezing order or any operational restraint, bank and investigating agency were required to ensure existence of lawful authority, reasonable justification, accurate identification of affected account and procedural fairness---Restriction could have serious civil consequences by impairing business activity, contractual payments, healthcare expenditure, education expenses and ordinary sustenance and therefore could not be imposed casually. (f) Constitutional law---Financial autonomy---Digital banking---Public confidence---As economic activity increasingly shifted towards digital payments and electronic banking, citizens possessed legitimate expectation that deposited funds would remain secure, accessible and protected from arbitrary restraint---Unauthorized freezing of accounts was capable of undermining public confidence in banking system and weakening trust in financial institutions. (g) State Bank of Pakistan---Regulatory responsibility---Unlawful debit blocks---State Bank, as banking regulator, was required to consider issuance of suitable circulars, advisories or guidelines emphasizing that no scheduled bank or financial institution should impose debit block, operational restraint or freezing except in accordance with law, upon lawful authorization and after due verification---Banks were also expected to develop internal compliance mechanisms to prevent inadvertent or precautionary restrictions unsupported by legal authority. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Withdrawal of unlawful restraint during pendency of petition---Effect---Removal of debit block did not render controversy inconsequential where petition disclosed unlawful interference with constitutional property rights and raised issues of institutional practice requiring judicial guidance---Constitutional Court could record principles governing future conduct despite subsequent rectification of individual grievance. (i) Banking law---Inquiry concerning another individual---Account of unrelated person frozen---NCCIA inquiry related to another individual, yet petitioner was deprived of access to his own account without any freezing request by agency---Action reflected institutional carelessness and failure to verify scope of communication before restricting customer’s financial autonomy---Subsequent removal of block did not cure impropriety of original action. (j) Cost of Litigation Act, 2017---Constitutional petition---Costs against bank---Petitioner was compelled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction solely because of casual and unwarranted conduct of bank---Where unlawful debit block was admitted and later removed, bank was liable to reimburse actual litigation expenses established through affidavit---Amount of Rs.300,000 directed to be paid to petitioner within one month and compliance report to be submitted through Registrar. Disposition---Debit block having already been removed, no further direction for restoration of account operation was required---Observations issued to guide banks, NCCIA and State Bank regarding future restraints upon citizens’ bank accounts---State Bank directed to examine matter and consider regulatory guidance---Respondent Bank directed to pay Rs.300,000 as litigation costs within one month and submit compliance report---Petition disposed of. Muhammad Usman v. Federation of Pakistan and others, Writ Petition No.1553 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, heard on 21.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: Dissenting note of Malik Shahzad Ahmad Khan, J., in Crl. Appeal Nos. 43, 359-L, 360-L/2020 etc., disagreeing with the majority, which had held that non-mentioning of “full protocols” as envisaged under un-amended R. 6 of the Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analyst) Rules, 2001, did not of itself invalidate the report of the Government Analyst, and that mere mentioning of the names of internationally recognized tests described in clauses (i) to (vii) of Explanation II to amended R. 6 amounted to full and sufficient compliance of the Rules. (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 4 & 10-A---Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997---Strict construction---Fair trial and due process---Dissenting Judge observed that it was the constitutional right of every citizen under Arts. 4 and 10-A to be dealt with in accordance with law and to have a fair trial and due process, and that no action detrimental to life, liberty, body, reputation or property could be taken except in accordance with law---As very stringent punishments were provided for offences under the Act of 1997, the Act and the rules made thereunder were to be construed and followed strictly in letter and spirit, it being in the interest of justice that provisions dealing with procedure as well as furnishing of expert report were so followed---Principle “harsher the sentence, stricter the standard of proof” applied---Practice of planting fake recoveries of narcotics made it highly risky to hold that non-mentioning of full protocols did not invalidate the Analyst’s report and that only mentioning names of internationally recognized tests amounted to full and sufficient compliance. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997----Ss. 36 & 77---Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analyst) Rules, 2001---Un-amended and amended R. 6 and Form-II---Report of Government Analyst---Requirement of “full protocols”---Mandatory or directory---Referred questions---Dissenting Judge held that the main point before the larger Bench was whether mentioning of full protocols (details of the test or tests applied, steps taken and results) in the report of the Government Analyst was mandatory and whether a report not disclosing full protocols would vitiate its evidentiary value---Word “shall” in unamended and amended R. 6 made it mandatory for the Analyst to mention full protocols and their results---A faulty report not containing full details of protocols applied and results would defeat the purpose of the Act of 1997 and prejudice either party, and on that ground also the rule was mandatory---Where non-compliance of a rule would prejudice either party or defeat the purpose of the parent law, the rule was to be treated as mandatory and not directory---Condition of mentioning full protocols did not exceed S. 36 of the parent Act; it advanced the purposes of the Act, transparency and fair play---Federal Government had, vide notification dated 02.06.2021, amended R. 6 and Form-II after earlier judgments requiring tests and protocols to be mentioned as per international guidelines---Even under amended R. 6 and para. 2 of Form-II, details of results of tests and analysis were to be mentioned, and para. (i) of Form-II exposing a Government Analyst to prosecution for a false statement regarding observation of protocols underscored the importance of observing full protocols---Dissenting Judge answered Question I as follows: mentioning of full protocols in the report of the Government Analyst was mandatory as envisaged under unamended R. 6; non-mentioning of full protocols and analysis would invalidate the report; amended or unamended R. 6 did not exceed S. 36(2) of the Act of 1997---A report that failed to give details of full protocols of the test or tests applied, their analysis and results, was inconclusive, unreliable, suspicious and untrustworthy and would not meet the evidentiary assumption attached to a Report of the Government Analyst. (c) Control of Narcotic Substances (Government Analyst) Rules, 2001----Amended R. 6, Explanation II (i to vii) and Form-II---What constitutes sufficient compliance with the protocols requirement---Term “protocol”---Dissenting Judge held that “protocol”, undefined in the Act or Rules, meant a recognized standard method or plan for carrying out the test applied, as explained in Imam Bakhsh and Qaiser Javed Khan---Report of the Government Analyst must contain (i) the tests applied, (ii) the protocols applied to carry out those tests, and (iii) the result of the test or tests---International standards (SWGDRUG recommendations and ISO/IEC 17025:2017) likewise required identification of methods and analytical techniques---Explanation II (i to vii) of amended R. 6, providing that only mentioning names of internationally recognized tests shall be deemed full and sufficient compliance in respect of supply of “Full Protocols”, was in conflict with the parent rule, which required a signed report of results while observing protocols of the test and analysis applied---Concerned forum/Government might consider further amending Explanation II of R. 6 and Form-II to bring them into conformity with the main rule and the Act of 1997---Question II answered: unamended and amended R. 6 coupled with Form-II(2) required mentioning of full protocols, names of internationally recognized tests, and steps taken during the tests with analysis and results; absence of those details would not meet the protocols requirement. (d) Criminal Procedure Code----S. 510---Report of Government Analyst---Whether summoning the Analyst is a sufficient statutory safeguard---Dissenting Judge held that S. 510, Cr.P.C., which exempts a Government Analyst from personal appearance unless summoned, did not provide a sufficient statutory safeguard for the rights of the accused---Once a report was issued, the Analyst would seek to defend it; summoning and cross-examination wasted court time and public expense; Analysts were usually not summoned, and when summoned vigorously defended their reports because of possible penal or departmental consequences---Better course, for the Analyst and for safe administration of justice, transparency and fair play, was that all details of test, analysis and results be mentioned in the report so as to avoid summoning. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Hashim v. The State PLD 2004 Supreme Court 856 • Muhammad Imran v. The State 2011 SCMR 1954 • Ameer Zeb v. The State PLD 2012 Supreme Court 380 • The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others 2018 SCMR 2039 • Khair-ul-Bashar v. The State 2019 SCMR 930 • Qaiser Javed Khan v. The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore and another PLD 2020 Supreme Court 57 • Gul Alam v. The State 2011 SCMR 624 • Liaquat Ali and another v. The State 2022 SCMR 1097 Disposition: Dissenting note answering the referred questions as above; clarified that the note was confined to those questions and that the petitions as well as the appeals shall be fixed by the office as per roster on their own turn. (Crl. Appeal Nos. 43, 359-L, 360-L/2020 etc., Supreme Court of Pakistan, Islamabad; Approved For Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984----S. 6(4)---Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, Ss. 7(6), 7(7), 15, 21 & 28---General Clauses Act, 1897, S. 6---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 152---Suit for recovery instituted under the Ordinance of 1984---Decree as prayed for in the plaint---Subsequent enactment of the 1997 Act during pendency---Transfer of proceedings to Banking Court---Amendment of decree to add markup under S. 15 of the 1997 Act by invoking S. 152, C.P.C.---Held, impermissible---Petitioner availed financial facilities from respondent Bank during 1990-1995 and could not repay---Bank filed suit on 13.11.1995 for recovery of Rs.76,241,234.68, praying also for liquidated damages from 01.10.1995 till realisation---Leave to defend was dismissed and suit was decreed on 15.10.1999; claim for liquidated damages was disallowed---During pendency the 1997 Act was enacted, the Ordinance of 1984 was repealed by S. 28, and the suit stood transferred to the Banking Court under S. 7(6) of the 1997 Act---Bank then obtained amendment of the decree under S. 152, C.P.C., adding markup from the date of institution till realisation, on the premise that the Banking Court had omitted to award markup under S. 15 of the 1997 Act---High Court in Regular First Appeal dismissed the challenge, holding that the omission was rightly corrected under S. 152, C.P.C., and that in any event O. XLI, R. 33, C.P.C., empowered the Appellate Court to include markup---Held, that under S. 6(4) of the Ordinance of 1984 the Banking Tribunal shall pass a decree in favour of the banking company as prayed for in the plaint---In the earlier law the decree could be passed as prayed, and there was no prayer or exact provision under that law to grant markup or interest---S. 15 of the 1997 Act, which requires the decree to provide for interest or mark-up from the date of institution of suit to payment, was a subsequent substantive provision---Under S. 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, repeal does not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed enactment, nor any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect thereof, which may be continued as if the repealing Act had not been passed---Pending proceedings are to be adjudicated according to the old law that was in force unless the new law unambiguously provides otherwise---Laws affecting vested rights operate prospectively unless retrospective operation is given by express enactment or necessary intendment; procedural law operates retrospectively unless it affects an existing right---The case was to be proceeded and decided within the parameters of the law prevailing at the time of institution of the suit, and relief prayed and available under that law could only be granted; the Court could not travel beyond the prevailing provisions---S. 7(6) and (7) of the 1997 Act provide for transfer of pending proceedings and continuation from the stage reached, but do not authorise award of a substantive relief neither claimed in the plaint nor available under the law in force at institution. Cited Cases: • Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal 2025 SCMR 303 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Mekotex Pvt. Ltd. PLD 2024 SC 1168 • Commissioner of Income Tax Peshawar v. Islamic Investment Bank Ltd. 2016 SCMR 816 • Laleesa Begum v. Iqbal Ahmed Qureshi PLD 1982 SC 396 • Muhammad Tariq Badr v. National Bank of Pakistan 2013 SCMR 314 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Eastern Federal Union Insurance PLD 1982 SC 247 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S. 152---Amendment of judgments, decrees or orders---Clerical or arithmetical mistakes or errors arising from accidental slip or omission---Scope---Cannot be used to add a new relief or alter substance of the judgment---Primary objective of S. 152, C.P.C. is to set right unintentional typographical, mathematical or clerical errors which ensue by slip of the pen, typing oversight or omission---Provision cannot be applied to reconsider or retrace the merits of the case whereby the substance of the judgment is altered, or to add new reliefs that were not formerly part of the proceedings---Rooted in the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, it is aimed to straighten out accidental typographical error, wrong numbers or naming mistakes so that the final decree tallies the judge's true intention, and to sort out technical errors in property descriptions, interest rates or claim amounts that would otherwise make a decree non-executable---Court cannot supplement or alter the substance by adding a new relief; the provision stringently forbids a court from re-examining its decision or introducing an unequivocally new legal outcome---If a party deems errors arising out of intentional judicial decisions or oversights, the proper remedy is a review petition or an appeal rather than an application under S. 152, C.P.C.---Typical instances of legitimate correction include omission of costs expressly awarded in the judgment, omission of damages orally granted, omission of one of two plots ruled upon, or omission of markup in the decree where the judgment had extensively dealt with markup and fixed the quantum---Omission to award markup which was never claimed, never dealt with on merits, and was not available under the law in force at institution, was not an accidental slip amenable to S. 152, C.P.C. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Boota 2004 SCMR 1611 • Muhammad Tufail v. Ghulam Farid 2000 SCMR 1035 • Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181 = AIR 2001 SC 1084 • State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328 • Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa AIR 1966 SC 1047 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 7, O. II, R. 2 & O. XLI, R. 33---Doctrines of infra petita, ultra petita and extra petita---Relief not claimed in the plaint---Moulding of relief---Limits of appellate power---General rule in civil law is that a court cannot grant a relief that has not been explicitly claimed in the plaint---O. VII, R. 7, C.P.C. commands that a plaint should explicitly state the relief claimed, so that the defendant is not taken by surprise---If a relief is not claimed, the Court deduces that it has been abandoned under O. II, R. 2, C.P.C.---Mere boilerplate prayer for "any other relief" is not sufficient for justifying unclaimed relief unless it is harmonious with the facts and evidence already on the record---Principle of ultra petita prohibits the Court from granting more than was entreated or something altogether distinct from what was solicited---Appellate Court, in order to do complete justice, may modify, adjust or rewrite the order, judgment and decree and may pass any order which the trial court ought to have passed, but it cannot invent altogether a new case or cause of action that was never pleaded, and cannot grant any such relief that was never claimed---Principle of moulding the relief is structured on facts and evidence already on the record and not to create a brand-new case---Prayer of the Bank clearly reflected that it was without any claim of markup, which meant they omitted such relief in their plaint---Appellate Court can only grant alternate or modified relief if essential facts in the pleadings are already present and complementary to the overall case, without contradicting statutory law---Reliance of the High Court on O. XLI, R. 33, C.P.C. to include unclaimed markup was, therefore, misplaced. Cited Cases: • Samar Gul v. Muhammad Firdos PLD 1986 SC 35 • Trojan & Co. v. RM.N.N. Nagappa Chettiar AIR 1953 SC 235 • Bharat Amratlal Kothari v. Dosukhan Samadkhan Sindhi AIR 2010 SC 475 • Akella Lalita v. Sri Konda Hanumantha Rao 2022 INSC 759 • Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC 594 (d) Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997----Ss. 7(6), 15 & 28---Shahida Bibi v. Habib Bank Limited PLD 2016 SC 995 distinguished---That case concerned transfer of pending execution proceedings instituted under the Ordinance of 1984 to the Banking Court after promulgation of the 1997 Act---Supreme Court there held that S. 7(6) transferred such proceedings, that S. 28 did not indicate retrospective application of the 1997 Act, and that relevant provisions of the 1997 Act were to apply on the date of transfer of execution proceedings and thereafter---Present controversy was not execution of a decree already passed as prayed, but amendment of a recovery decree so as to add markup neither claimed in the plaint nor available under S. 6 of the Ordinance of 1984---Shahida Bibi did not authorise grant of a new substantive relief by amending the decree under S. 152, C.P.C. Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal and allowed; judgment dated 07.02.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in R.F.A. No.470 of 2000, and order dated 23.02.2001 of the learned Single Judge (Banking Court) in C.M.A. No.568-B of 2000, both set aside to the extent of allowing markup by means of amended decree. (Civil Petition No.1481-L of 2019, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 01.06.2026, by Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J.; Islamabad; Approved for reporting.)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: 1. Order XII-Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure-1908. 2. Judgment or order on the basis of admission.

Summary: Conversion of case property by the accused is understandable but to support it there must be tentative incriminating material otherwise converted property would be restored to the accused party.