Summary: Summary pending

Summary: It is, however, an admitted position that the seized gold jewellery was transmitted to the Pakistan Mint for melting, resulting in reduction of its original weight to 2467.300 grams. Such transformation of the seized property does not extinguish or impair the proprietary rights of the petitioner, which have attained finality up to the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. The record is conspicuously silent regarding any lawful disposal of the refined gold through a legally recognized mode of sale. In the absence of a sale conducted in accordance with law, reliance placed by the respondents on Section 169(5) of the Act, 1969 is wholly misconceived. The said provision becomes applicable only where the seized property has actually been sold and sale proceeds have come into existence. Mere melting of the gold and its subsequent lifting by the State Bank of Pakistan, followed by credit of an amount into the Government treasury on the basis of the London Bullion Market price, cannot be treated as a lawful substitute for the statutory requirement of sale.

Summary: Application/objection under order XXI rule 99 & 100 CPC: It is evident from the record that instead of addressing the real controversy, the courts below remained preoccupied with determining whether the petitioners’ grievance fell under Section 12(2) CPC, Section 47 CPC, or otherwise, thereby losing sight of the fact that the petitioners were third parties claiming independent possession, dispossessed during execution. Even when the learned Additional District Judge, vide order dated 16.01.2014, correctly observed that an application under Section 12(2) CPC was not competent before the District Court and was required to be filed before the court which passed the decree, the subsequent proceedings once again culminated in dismissal on technical grounds, including the alleged principle of merger—an approach which was conceded by the learned counsel for the respondent to be legally unsustainable. It is an admitted position that: i. the petitioners were not parties to the suit; ii. no decree was passed against them; and iii. their grievance arose solely from dispossession under the guise of execution. Such a grievance squarely falls within the ambit of Order XXI Rules 99 and 100 CPC, which constitute a complete and self-contained statutory mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating to dispossession of third parties during execution of a decree. Rule 99 provides a remedy to a person who: 1. is not a judgment-debtor; 2. has been dispossessed of immovable property; 3. in execution of a decree; 4. by the decree-holder or auction-purchaser; and 5. claims an independent right, title, or interest therein. Rule 100 mandates restoration of possession where the executing court, upon inquiry, is satisfied that such dispossession was unlawful. An order passed thereunder is deemed to be a decree, appealable under Section 96 CPC. Rule 101 further obligates the executing court to finally decide all questions of right, title, or interest, barring a separate suit. In the present case, no evidence was recorded on the objections, nor was any inquiry conducted as required by law. Instead, the objections were repeatedly dismissed on misconceived notions regarding maintainability of an application under Section 12(2) CPC, a provision which, from inception, was not attracted to the facts of the case. In view of the facts of the case the reliance of the respondents on the case law i.e., Sardaraz Khan v. Amirullah Khan (PLD 1995 Peshawar 86) and Mst. Khalida Begum v. Mst. Yasmeen (2000 CLC 1290) is misplaced, as those cases pertain to circumstances materially distinguishable from the present one. It is a settled principle that an act of the court shall prejudice no one. Reference may be made to Zulfiqar v. Shahdat Khan (PLD 2007 SC 582) wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held: It is well-settled principle of law that act of the Court or act of a public functionary on the actions of whom a citizen has no control should not be allowed to prejudice anyone. Reference may also be made to the case of Jawad Mir Muhammadi v. Haroon Mirza (PLD 2007 SC 472).

Summary: Objection under section 47 of CPC, Object and scop. i. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were arrayed as parties to Suit No. 90/1 of 2018, instituted by the decree-holder. It is further undisputed that, pendente lite (during the pendency of the suit), the petitioners contended they were the rightful owners of the disputed property. To resolve this issue, Issue No. 4 was framed, and following the conclusion of evidence, the finding was rendered against the defendants/petitioners. It is now an established fact that the petitioners do not hold title to the disputed property. It was never the petitioner`s contention that they were the contiguous/adjacent owners of the property, such that the transfer of possession of the decreed property would result in the wrongful handover of their owned property to the decree-holder. Consequently, their objection did not fall within the ambit of Rule 97 or Rule 98 of the Code of Civil Law Procedure, 1908 (CPC), nor could their case be sustained under Rule 99 of the CPC. Resistance to the possession of the decreed property can only be legitimately exercised by a co-sharer in accordance with Order XXI, Rule 35(2) CPC, or by a contiguous owner. As the objectors satisfy neither of these criteria, they are precluded from resisting possession and lack any legal justification for impeding the execution process. The assertion that the decree-holder has alienated a portion of his ownership interest to another party is immaterial; this constitutes no valid ground to resist or object to the execution of the transfer of actual possession. ii. Insofar as the objection filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Law Procedure (CPC) is concerned, the court holds that this provision pertains exclusively to the satisfaction, discharge, and execution of the decree, and all questions related thereto must be adjudicated by the executing court between the original parties to the suit. Crucially, the objectors bear the burden of proof to demonstrate the justification of their objection, specifically, whether their legal possession of an adjacent property is being adversely affected. This is particularly pertinent given their failure to substantiate their claim of ownership over the property in dispute. No such averment or reference was included in the objection submitted before the executing court that would warrant or justify the formal determination of facts through the recording of evidence. Absent title ownership of the decreed property or as a contiguous owner thereof, the objectors are legally barred from challenging the title or possession of the decree-holder with reference to any alleged “deficient possession” on their part. The matter of the decree-holder`s possession of the entire decreed property, or any portion thereof, is an issue inter se (between themselves) amongst the actual owners. iii. The objector`s concerns regarding their own deficient physical possession at the locus in quo (at the actual site) may require determination, but this cannot be achieved either through objections under Section 47 or under Order XXI, Rules 97 to 99 of the CPC, as no such claim was formally raised in their submissions. If the petitioners/objectors have a legitimate boundary dispute concerning any property they possess, they retain the right to submit an application to the relevant authority for a formal determination and resolution based on survey or demarcation. Should any encroachment be established in lieu of that process, it may be redressed in accordance with the law, in consonance with the Latin maxim “Ubi jus ibi remedium” (where there is a right, there is a remedy). This principle signifies that for every legal wrong or violation of a recognized right, the law provides a mechanism to enforce it or compensate the aggrieved party, thereby ensuring that legal rights are not merely theoretical in application.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----Ss. 100, 101, 102 & 103---Regular Second Appeal---Maintainability in Islamabad Capital Territory---Effect of CPC amendments---Civil suit was instituted on 05.11.2019, after promulgation of Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Ordinance, 2019 dated 01.11.2019, whereby Ss.100, 101, 102 and 103, CPC stood omitted---Such omission was continued through Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2020---S.102, CPC was later re-inserted through Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2023---High Court held that during interregnum from 01.11.2019 till enforcement of 2023 amendment, no Regular Second Appeal was maintainable. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 102---No second appeal in certain cases---Pecuniary value not prescribed in Islamabad Capital Territory---Effect---Re-inserted S.102, CPC for ICT provides that no second appeal shall lie except when amount or value of subject matter exceeds amount “as may be prescribed”---Expression “prescribed” means prescribed by rules---No rules had been framed and no pecuniary value had been prescribed for ICT---In absence of prescribed pecuniary limit, bar under S.102 could not be mechanically applied so as to defeat right of second appeal, but appeal filed in present case remained incompetent because suit was instituted during period when provisions governing second appeal stood omitted. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----Ss. 102, 122 & 125---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.202---Rule-making power of High Court---Pecuniary limit for second appeal in ICT---High Court observed that no pecuniary value had been prescribed in ICT for purposes of S.102, CPC---Matter directed to be placed before Chief Justice for convening Full Court to propose amendment to Order XLII, CPC specifying amount or value of suit for purposes of S.102---Recommendation to be forwarded to Government of Pakistan for submission to President and publication in Gazette---High Court competent under Ss.122 and 125, CPC read with Art.202 of Constitution to frame rules regulating procedure of High Court and civil courts. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Regular Second Appeal converted into Civil Revision---Power of Court to convert proceedings---Although Regular Second Appeal was not competent, High Court converted same into Civil Revision under S.115, CPC to protect legal rights of party and decide matter according to correct procedural framework---Office directed to number matter accordingly. Cited Case: • Faqir Muhammad v. Muhammad Din 1993 SCMR 1955 (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Civil Revision---Scope of interference---First appellate Court decreed respondent’s suit for recovery after reappraisal of evidence---High Court held that while exercising revisional jurisdiction, it would not interfere where findings of first appellate Court did not suffer from illegality, infirmity or perversity---Appreciation of evidence by first appellate Court under S.96, CPC deserved due weight where all factual and legal issues were considered. (f) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Arts. 117 & 119---Burden of proof---Recovery suit---Loan/entrustment between close relatives---Respondent claimed that while residing abroad he transmitted Rs.14,80,000 to petitioner as loan or for purchase of plot on his behalf---Petitioner denied loan but pleaded that he had purchased and sold properties for respondent and adjusted amounts in later transaction---Initial burden lay on plaintiff under Art.117, but once petitioner set up specific plea of adjustment, sale proceeds and purchase of another plot, burden shifted to petitioner under Art.119 to prove those particular facts. (g) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Art. 119---Specific plea of adjustment---Failure to prove---Effect---Petitioner asserted that 22-marla plot at Pind Parrian was purchased in 2008, later sold for Rs.13,20,000 with respondent’s permission, and sale proceeds were adjusted towards purchase of 10-marla plot at Khanna Dak, Islamabad---During cross-examination, petitioner admitted he could not produce proof of purchase of Pind Parrian plot, proof that Rs.14,80,000 was paid towards 10-marla plot, written proof of sale to Roshan Pakistan for Rs.13,20,000, and that relevant agreement did not mention Rs.14,80,000---Failure to prove specific plea justified decree against petitioner. (h) Contract/recovery suit---- ----Close relatives---Funds transmitted from abroad---Admission through explanation---Effect---Although petitioner formally denied receiving loan, his own explanation showed receipt/transmission of Rs.14,80,000 in connection with property transaction---High Court held that explanation amounted to admission of receipt of amount, while petitioner failed to prove alleged lawful adjustment or utilization of amount for respondent’s benefit. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 96---First appeal---Reappraisal of evidence---Recovery decree---First appellate Court was justified in passing decree for Rs.15,80,000 along with markup at bank rate where petitioner failed to discharge burden of proving adjustment of money received and sale/purchase transactions pleaded by him---Findings were based on evidence and did not warrant revisional interference. (j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 102---Punjab amendment and ICT position distinguished---Punjab Act XIV of 2018 fixed Rs.25 million threshold for second appeals in Punjab, but no corresponding pecuniary limit was prescribed for Islamabad Capital Territory---Before establishment of Islamabad High Court, ICT was under appellate jurisdiction of Lahore High Court, but subsequent ICT amendments and absence of prescribed rules created separate procedural position requiring rule-making for ICT. Disposition: Regular Second Appeal No.02 of 2023 was held incompetent and converted into Civil Revision No.56 of 2026; civil revision was dismissed on merits; decree passed by first appellate Court for recovery of Rs.1,580,000 with markup at bank rate was maintained; Registrar was directed to place copy of judgment before Chief Justice for appropriate action regarding prescription of pecuniary value under S.102, CPC for Islamabad Capital Territory.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5) & Federal Legislative List, Entry 49---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, Sch. 2, Serial No. 14---Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Challenge to vires---Tax on services vis-à-vis tax on goods---Scope of provincial taxing power after Eighteenth Amendment--- Petitioners challenged vires of Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 on ground that levy described as tax on “Construction Services” in substance included goods component of construction contracts, which, according to petitioners, could only be taxed by Federation under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List---Federal Constitutional Court held that impugned provision, when read harmoniously with Entry 49, imposed tax only on services and not on goods---After Eighteenth Amendment, power to levy tax on services vested exclusively in Provinces, while Federation retained competence over taxes on sales and purchases of goods except sales tax on services---Impugned entry was confined to construction and allied services and was not inconsistent with Constitution---Even learned counsel for petitioners conceded that Serial No. 14 was confined to services and did not extend to goods---Accordingly, no ground was made out to strike down impugned law as ultra vires. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022--- ----Levy on entire contractual consideration---Inclusion of goods component---Double taxation concern---Adjustment mechanism---Need for bifurcation--- Court, however, observed that grievance of petitioners substantially related not to vires of law but to manner of its implementation, as show-cause notices had demanded tax on entire contractual consideration for period from July 2021 to April 2022, including value of goods utilized in performance of contracts---Court noted that statute itself allowed claim of adjustments, including refunds, regarding tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable services, and Memorandum of Understanding between FBR and KPRA also envisaged cross-adjustment to avoid double taxation---Matter was thus governed by existing law and administrative arrangement and did not warrant constitutional invalidation of impugned provision---Court nevertheless emphasized that KPRA should devise clearer mechanism, rules or Standard Operating Procedures requiring bifurcation of contractual consideration into service component and goods component so that only service portion is subjected to provincial sales tax and unnecessary hardship to taxpayers is avoided. Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Art. 175E(5)---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Tax reference involving vires of law--- Though tax references were not expressly enumerated within ordinary appellate jurisdiction of Federal Constitutional Court, challenge in present case involved substantial question of constitutional interpretation, namely vires of provincial law---Court held that Art. 175E(5) empowered it, on its own motion or otherwise, to call for record of “any case” from “any court” where substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution arose---Such power was unqualified and wide enough to include tax references and other proceedings even where express jurisdiction might not otherwise be specifically mentioned---Since vires of legislation inherently raised substantial constitutional question, Federal Constitutional Court was competent to adjudicate matter and, under present constitutional scheme, is sole apex forum for determining vires of legislation. (a) Provincial sales tax on services---Construction services---Constitutional validity--- After the Eighteenth Amendment, Provinces possess exclusive competence to levy tax on services, while Federation retains competence to tax goods under Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List, except sales tax on services---Serial No. 14 of Schedule 2 to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022, being confined to “Construction Services” and allied services, was intra vires the Constitution. (b) Vires challenge---Harmonious construction of constitutional and statutory provisions--- Where constitutional entry and impugned statutory provision can be read harmoniously without contradiction, constitutional invalidation is not warranted---Impugned law did not trench upon federal taxing domain over goods merely because construction contracts may involve use of goods in course of service delivery. (c) Levy on whole contract amount---Goods and services mixed in construction contracts---Effect--- If tax is demanded on entire contractual consideration, inclusive of both service charges and cost of goods utilized in execution of contract, such grievance pertains to application and assessment mechanism rather than constitutional validity of charging provision itself---Province may tax service component only and not goods component. (d) Double taxation concern---Statutory adjustment and refund mechanism--- Where statute provides for adjustment or refund of tax paid under other laws on goods or taxable services used in provision of taxable service, and there exists inter-agency arrangement for cross-adjustment, apprehended double taxation is addressable within framework of law and does not by itself render charging provision unconstitutional. (e) Revenue administration---Need for bifurcation of contractual consideration--- Revenue authority should streamline process by first requiring taxpayer to identify and segregate portion of contractual consideration attributable to services and portion attributable to goods, so that provincial sales tax is levied strictly on services while goods component remains governed by federal sales tax regime---Formulation of rules or Standard Operating Procedures to this effect was recommended. (f) Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction over tax reference involving vires of law--- Even though tax references are not expressly listed in ordinary heads of jurisdiction, Art. 175E(5) authorizes Federal Constitutional Court to call for and adjudicate “any case” from “any court” if it involves substantial question of law as to interpretation of Constitution---Challenge to vires of legislation inherently raises such question and therefore falls within jurisdiction of said Court. (g) Present constitutional scheme---Forum for striking down legislation--- Under present constitutional arrangement, authority to adjudicate upon vires of legislation and to strike down laws on constitutional grounds vests in Federal Constitutional Court, and not in Supreme Court, wherever substantial question of constitutional interpretation is involved. Leave refused; petitions dismissed; impugned judgment affirmed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVIII, cross-examination---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Right of cross-examination---Scope and limitations---Harassing, irrelevant, repetitive, indecent, scandalous or insulting questions---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had already cross-examined PW-1 on seven dates over nearly two months and an extensive cross-examination of about thirty pages had been recorded---Trial Court, on objection by plaintiff’s counsel, held that prolonged cross-examination had become irrelevant to the controversy and amounted to misuse of right of cross-examination and abuse of process of Court---Supreme Court held that right of cross-examination, though valuable, was neither unlimited nor unbridled---Object of cross-examination was discovery of truth and not humiliation, intimidation, harassment or scandalizing of witness---Court was not required to remain a silent spectator where cross-examination was being abused by irrelevant, repetitive or offensive questions---Trial Court was competent to regulate proceedings and close petitioner’s right of further cross-examination where sufficient opportunity had already been afforded. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Shafi PLD 1967 SC 167 • Mir Hassan 1999 SCMR 1418 • Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar PLD 2023 SC 211 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---- ----Arts. 144, 145, 146 & 148---Questions in cross-examination---Reasonable grounds---Indecent, scandalous, insulting or annoying questions---Court’s power to forbid questions---Under Art.144, no question as to imputation could be asked unless person asking had reasonable grounds for thinking that imputation was well-founded---Under Art.145, Court could require reporting of circumstances where question was asked without reasonable grounds---Under Art.146, Court could forbid indecent or scandalous questions unless related to facts in issue or necessary matters---Under Art.148, Court was required to forbid questions intended to insult or annoy, or which appeared needlessly offensive in form---Such provisions empowered Court to protect witness from abusive cross-examination and ensure that questioning remained relevant to matters in controversy. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XVII, R.3---Failure to perform act necessary for progress of suit---Court’s power to proceed---Where a party, despite opportunity, failed to perform any act necessary for further progress of suit, Court could proceed to decide suit forthwith---Petitioner/defendant No.1 had been given more than adequate opportunity to cross-examine PW-1 but continued with questioning which Trial Court found irrelevant and harassing---Closure of further cross-examination in such circumstances was not illegal or irregular. (d) Administration of justice---- ----Control over proceedings---Protection of witnesses---Abuse of cross-examination---Court’s duty---Cross-examination must remain confined to relevant matters and may be used to test veracity, credibility, bias, interest, corruption or prior inconsistent statements of witness---Witnesses, including witnesses in adversarial litigation, must be treated with dignity and respect by Courts---Court has duty to intervene where witness is subjected to unnecessary harassment, intimidation, scandalizing or humiliation---Court should disallow irrelevant questions designed merely to prolong cross-examination or manipulate witness into error---Trial Court, therefore, lawfully protected PW-1 from further abusive cross-examination. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 151---Inherent powers of Court---Fixing specific date and time for cross-examination---Power to regulate proceedings---Petitioner contended that High Court lacked authority to fix and limit a specific date and time for conducting cross-examination---Supreme Court repelled contention and held that Courts possess ample inherent powers under S.151, CPC to make such orders as necessary to secure ends of justice and prevent abuse of process---Power to regulate judicial proceedings, including fixing specific date and time for cross-examination after repeated and sufficient lenience, fell within inherent jurisdiction of Court---Such exercise was lawful where required to ensure orderly and expeditious disposal of proceedings, maintain discipline in conduct of trial and protect witness from needless harassment or protraction. Cited Case: • NWFP Government v. Abdul Ghafoor through L.Rs PLD 1993 SC 418 (f) Judicial proceedings---- ----Presumption of correctness---Consent recorded in judicial order---Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art.129(e)---Petitioner asserted that no consent had been recorded before High Court for grant of limited opportunity of cross-examination, though impugned order itself recorded existence of such consent---Supreme Court held that strong and well-entrenched presumption existed in favour of correctness of judicial proceedings and veracity of judicial record---Such presumption could not be displaced by mere assertions or bald allegations but only by cogent, convincing and unimpeachable proof---No material was placed on record to rebut presumption or show that recital in High Court order was incorrect---Contention that no consent was recorded was wholly unsubstantiated and devoid of merit. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah and others 2025 SCMR 361 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain and others 2004 SCMR 964 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Review not appeal in disguise---Review could be sought only on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after due diligence, was not within knowledge or could not be produced at time of decree/order; some mistake or error apparent on face of record; or any other sufficient reason---Review Court does not act as appellate Court and review jurisdiction cannot be invoked for rehearing on merits or for correcting every alleged erroneous decision---Petitioner attempted to characterize recording of consent in High Court order as omission or error attributable to Court, but impugned judgment reflected conscious and reasoned exercise of jurisdiction and not accidental slip or error apparent on face of record---High Court rightly declined review. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah 2025 SCMR 361 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • M/s Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227 • Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961 • Government of Punjab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421 • Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049 • Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O. XLVII, R.1---Review jurisdiction---Limits---Error apparent on face of record---A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an allegedly erroneous decision is reheard and corrected---Review lies only for a patent error apparent on face of record, not for elaborate re-argument or reappraisal of merits---Where a party merely contended that all aspects had not been highlighted or argued more forcefully, such grievance could not constitute ground for review---No case for interference in review jurisdiction was made out. Cited Cases: • Smt. Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari AIR 1995 SC 455 • M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1964 SC 1372 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Interference with discretionary order regulating trial---High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction, declined interference with Trial Court’s order closing further cross-examination after finding that Trial Court had acted within lawful authority to regulate proceedings and prevent harassment of witness---High Court nevertheless, with consent of parties, granted one final controlled opportunity for cross-examination under supervision of Trial Court---Supreme Court held that High Court had lawfully structured remaining opportunity of cross-examination in controlled and supervised manner and such exercise could not be termed without authority or in excess of jurisdiction. Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.1078-L of 2025 was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused; Supreme Court upheld concurrent orders of Trial Court and Lahore High Court whereby petitioner’s right of further cross-examination was closed/regulated after repeated opportunities, and review order of High Court was maintained.

Summary: Presence of witnesses on the fateful day in the court is a condition precedent for closing the right of other party to cross-examine them and in their absence, the said right cannot be taken away. 20Service 37551/25 Karam Elahi Vs Medical Superintendent Lahore General Hospital etc Mr. Justice Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi 30- 01- 2026 2026 LHC 1233

Summary: Summary pending