Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 25---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Act, 2017, Ss. 2(1)(s)(t), 4, 6, 7 & 44---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Police Department Ministerial Service Rules, 1974, R. 2(n)---Risk Allowance---Entitlement of ministerial/administrative staff of Police Establishment---Distinction between uniformed police personnel and ministerial staff---Equality---Reasonable classification---Respondents, employees of Police Establishment of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa claiming Risk Allowance on ground of discrimination under Art. 25, obtained judgment dated 10.04.2025 of Peshawar High Court in W.P. No. 90-M/2024 directing extension of allowance to them in the same manner as to uniformed police officials---Question was whether respondents were "police officials" entitled to the allowance or whether there is distinction between uniformed police personnel and administrative/ministerial staff---Held, law establishes a clear distinction between the two and respondents were not entitled to the allowance---Respondents form part of ministerial office establishment, performing essentially administrative and clerical duties, and under the Ministerial Service Rules, 1974 they have their own method of recruitment, eligibility and constitution and composition of service; nowhere is it provided that a person appointed under those Rules as ministerial staff shall perform active police service---Risk Allowance was granted to members of police force under notifications issued by Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa from time to time, the seminal notification dated 30.04.2009 providing that all uniformed police personnel would be granted one initial pay per month as Risk Allowance---Allowance is sanctioned on account of nature, character and hazards of a particular duty and cannot automatically be claimed by every employee serving in the same Department---Guarantee of equality does not mean that all persons must invariably be treated alike irrespective of nature of duties, responsibilities, classifications or conditions of service; Art. 25 prohibits discrimination but does not prevent reasonable classification founded upon intelligible differentia having rational nexus to the object---Uniformed police personnel performing active and operational duties (physical danger, law and order operations, arrests, raids, security assignments, crime control) are distinct from employees of ministerial establishment performing administrative, clerical and ministerial functions, and administrative association of both with police department does not obliterate the material distinction---Principle of "equal pay for equal work" or broader guarantee of equality cannot be invoked without first establishing that persons claiming parity are similarly placed in all material respects; mere commonality of department, establishment or employer is not sufficient---Respondents failed to demonstrate that they performed duties of same nature and in same conditions as uniformed personnel---Denial of allowance did not constitute hostile discrimination or offend constitutional guarantee of equality. Cited Cases: • I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Finance Division, Islamabad 1991 SCMR 1041 (b) Service matter---Allowance---Grant, withdrawal or extension of allowance---Judicial review---Held, relevant question was not whether respondents belonged to police department but whether they belonged to the class of employees for whom the allowance was sanctioned; allowance of this nature is not by its character an automatic incident of employment in a particular department---Employee seeking extension of allowance sanctioned with reference to particular nature of duties or occupational risks must establish that he falls within prescribed class---Court cannot enlarge scope of such allowance merely on basis of departmental affiliation, particularly where classification has rational connection with the performance for which the allowance was introduced---Determination of conditions of service, including grant, withdrawal or extension of allowance, ordinarily falls within domain of competent authority subject to constitutional and statutory limitations---Courts may interfere where classification is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory or without rational basis, but where government has identified a distinction based on nature of duties and occupational risks, judicial interference is not warranted merely because another category of employee considers itself entitled to same benefit---High Court erred in allowing writ petition merely on basis of alleged discrimination, proceeding primarily on the fact that both categories serve with police department, without examining whether respondents were similarly placed and whether classification had a rational basis. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment dated 10.04.2025 of Peshawar High Court, Mingora Bench (Dar-ul-Qaza), Swat in W.P. No. 90-M/2024 set aside and writ petition filed by respondents dismissed. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Order of withdrawal of petition passed on application filed by an unauthorized person recalled by holding that as the said order was void ab initio and had no legal existence, hence, question of limitation would not arise.

Summary: Registration Act, 1908 --- Sections 32, 34, 77 ---Scope of suit under Section 77 confined to examining legality of refusal of registration and not validity of underlying transaction or title ---Power of attorney stands extinguished upon death of principal under Section 201 of the Contract Act, 1872.Where the principal had died before completion of the registration process, the attorney ceased to possess lawful authority to act on his behalf; consequently, refusal of registration by the Sub-Registrar was held lawful and justified.Appellate Court's reversal of the Trial Court's judgment found to be based on misreading and non-reading of evidence ---Judgment of Appellate Court set aside and dismissal of suit under Section 77 restored.Dismissal of a suit under Section 77 does not bar an independent suit for specific performance, as the remedies under the Registration Act and the Specific Relief Act operate in distinct fields and arise from separate causes of action.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Following question of law has been put forth for determination by this Court: "What is the correct approach for a Court while appreciating evidence in cases where an alleged love marriage is relied upon by one party and allegations of abduction, coercion or forced marriage are raised by the other?" Held that while dealing with such cases, where the parties are completely strangers, the Courts are obligated to inquire as to how the alleged relationship originated and ultimately matured into a decision to contract marriage against wishes of the family. While the law does not require proof of a relationship through call records, social media exchanges, photographs or other forms of electronic communication, the complete absence of any material explaining the genesis of the alleged relationship remains a relevant circumstance while evaluating the plea of a consensual love marriage. Absence of any prior connection between the parties, becomes significant qua explanation as to how the alleged relationship came into existence.

Summary: (a) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898----S. 497(1), third and fourth provisos---Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010----Ss. 3 & 4---Post-arrest bail---Statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial---Substantive right---Exceptions---Petitioner sought leave against order of the Lahore High Court dismissing his post-arrest bail petition, filed solely on the statutory ground of delay in conclusion of trial, in FIR No.01/2025 dated 01.01.2025 registered at FIA Anti-Money Laundering Circle, District Lahore Zone, for offences under Ss. 3 and 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010---Petitioner was the alleged recipient of funds remitted by his son, stated to be involved in facilitating illegal transportation of Pakistani nationals across international borders---Petitioner was arrested on 02.02.2025; challan had been submitted and charge framed, yet not a single prosecution witness had been examined---Held, that the third proviso to S. 497(1), Cr.P.C., confers a substantive statutory right upon an accused where the trial is not concluded within the prescribed period, subject only to the exceptions expressly provided in the third and fourth provisos---An act or omission attributable to the accused must disclose a visible and concerted effort to obstruct or delay the trial---Mere adjournments or isolated procedural requests do not by themselves disentitle an accused from claiming the benefit of the proviso---Once the conditions of the third proviso stand satisfied and none of the statutory exceptions are attracted, the accused becomes entitled to bail as a matter of right and not as a matter of grace---Gravity of the allegation cannot, by itself, defeat a right expressly conferred by statute. (b) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898----S. 497(1), third proviso---Delay in conclusion of trial---Abscondence of co-accused---Whether attributable to the accused seeking bail---High Court declined relief primarily on the ground that one of the co-accused was absconding and therefore delay could not be attributed to the prosecution---Held, that delay occasioned by a co-accused cannot be attributed to the accused seeking bail unless the prosecution establishes, on undisputed facts, that the accused was complicit in the conduct causing such delay---No such material was brought on record---Except for a single adjournment sought by defence counsel for submission of power of attorney, no delay had been occasioned by the petitioner or any person acting on his behalf---Proceedings revealed that it was the prosecution which delayed conclusion of the trial because prosecution witnesses were not produced, the Presiding Officer was on leave or attending official training, or the prosecutor was unavailable due to official engagements---Prosecution failed to point out any conduct of the petitioner reflecting a design or pattern intended to delay the trial---None of the exceptions in the fourth proviso to S. 497(1) were shown to be attracted. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898----S. 497(1), third proviso---Reliance on earlier authority expecting expeditious future conclusion of trial---High Court’s reliance on Muhammad Jahangir Badar v. The State (PLD 2003 SC 525) was held misconceived in the peculiar facts---Subsequent authoritative pronouncements had comprehensively explained the scope of the third proviso and made it clear that where delay is not attributable to the accused, the statutory right cannot be denied merely on the expectation that the trial may conclude expeditiously in future. Cited Cases: • Shakeel Shah v. The State 2022 SCMR 1 • Nadeem Samson v. The State PLD 2022 SC 112 • Adnan Shafai v. The State 2024 SCMR 1543 • Mehran v. Ubaid Ullah and others PLD 2024 SC 843 • Noor Agha v. The State 2025 SCMR 1679 • Muhammad Jahangir Badar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 525 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 06.04.2026 of the Lahore High Court set aside; petitioner admitted to post-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.500,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court; findings tentative and of no bearing on the trial. (Crl.P.L.A. No.449-L of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan at Lahore, decided 03.06.2026; Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code, 1860----S. 462-J---Criminal Procedure Code----S. 497---Theft of electric power---Pre-arrest bail---Offence falling within non-prohibitory clause---Discretion as to imprisonment or fine---Petitioner sought leave against order of the Lahore High Court dismissing his pre-arrest bail application in FIR No.1335/2025 dated 20.10.2025 registered at Police Station Saddar Gojra, District Toba Tek Singh, under S. 462-J, P.P.C.---Allegation was that during a raid by a FESCO surveillance team he was found abstracting electricity by connecting a cable directly to the main supply line---Held, that S. 462-J provides that whoever, in order to commit theft of electric power, dishonestly abstracts, consumes, uses, distributes or supplies electric power without authorization shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to one million rupees, or with both---Offence thus falls squarely within the non-prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---Statutory framework itself recognizes varying degrees of culpability by vesting discretion in the trial Court to impose imprisonment, fine, or both---At the tentative stage it could not be ruled out that even if the prosecution case were ultimately proved, the petitioner might be found deserving of a sentence of fine only, which weighed in favour of bail, particularly when the law contemplates punishment short of imprisonment in appropriate cases. (b) Criminal Procedure Code----S. 497---Bail in offences falling within non-prohibitory clause---Rule and exception---Held, that in offences carrying punishment below the threshold of the prohibitory clause, grant of bail is to be considered favourably as a rule and refusal remains an exception requiring extraordinary circumstances---Where an offence falls within the non-prohibitory clause, bail ought ordinarily to be granted unless the prosecution demonstrates exceptional circumstances such as likelihood of abscondence, apprehension of tampering with prosecution evidence, or danger of repetition of the offence---Liberty is the norm and detention the exception---No exceptional circumstance having been shown, the petitioner made out a case for pre-arrest bail. (c) Criminal Procedure Code----Ss. 161 & 497---Bail---Statements under S. 161 and ipsi dixit of police---Held, that reliance placed by the High Court upon statements recorded under S. 161, Cr.P.C., and the observation that the investigating agency had found the petitioner involved, amounted to attaching undue weight to material which had yet to be tested at trial---Statements under S. 161 are not substantive pieces of evidence---Opinion of the investigating officer regarding guilt or innocence is neither conclusive nor determinative of the rights of the parties---Ipsi dixit of police is not binding upon the Court; Courts have to form their independent opinion while considering the record---Such matters ultimately fall within the exclusive domain of the trial Court after recording and appreciating evidence---High Court appeared to have treated tentative conclusions of the investigating agency as carrying greater evidentiary value than is legally permissible at the bail stage. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Personal liberty---Proportionality of pre-trial detention---Quantum of alleged loss---Alleged loss attributed to the petitioner was merely Rs.28,930/- ---While theft of electricity is a matter of concern, the Court cannot lose sight of the constitutional value attached to personal liberty---When the relatively modest financial loss is weighed against deprivation of liberty, disruption of livelihood, loss of employment opportunities, social stigma and other consequences of arrest and incarceration, continued detention appeared disproportionate, particularly when the offence fell within the non-prohibitory clause---Social and financial cost of arrest outweighed any corresponding benefit likely to be achieved through custodial detention. Cited Cases: • Hakeem alias Peer v. The State 2026 SCMR 792 • 2025 SCMR 1955 • 2011 SCMR 1708 • 2002 SCMR 1797 • 2009 SCMR 1488 • 2025 SCMR 1130 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order of the Lahore High Court set aside; petitioner admitted to pre-arrest bail subject to furnishing bail bonds in the sum of Rs.50,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial Court; findings tentative and of no bearing on the trial. (Crl.P.L.A. No.450-L of 2026, Supreme Court of Pakistan at Lahore, decided 03.06.2026; Approved for Reporting.)

Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908----S. 3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 11---Limitation---Suo motu examination---Rejection of plaint and dismissal of suit---Law of limitation does not bestow a right but results in incapacitation after lapse of the period permitted for dispensing legal rights or culmination of claims which have dwindled by efflux of time---S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 provides that, subject to Ss. 4 to 25, every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefor by the First Schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence---It is the inherent duty of the Court under S. 3 to delve into the question of limitation, regardless of whether it is raised or not---Maxim "Vigilantibus Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt": the law aids those who are vigilant and not those who sleep over their rights---Delay in invoking a lawful remedy by a person sleeping over rights may be denied---Doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner---Powers of the Court for rejection of plaint do not always depend upon filing an application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C.---Powers conferred under S. 3 of the Limitation Act are more potent and greater where, if the suit is found barred by time, the Court may dismiss the suit and the matter is finally wrapped up rather than by rejection of plaint---There is no bar or embargo under S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908 or under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., whereby the Court cannot dismiss the suit or reject the plaint in exercise of its suo motu powers or on its own initiative without a formal application from the defendant if it is barred by law---It is the responsibility of the Court to show the doors to a fundamentally flawed suit in order to save precious time of the Court from unnecessary litigation without conducting a mini-trial or looking at the written statement. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 11---Rejection of plaint---Principles---Before ordering rejection of a plaint, the Court must first examine whether the plaint discloses a cause of action; whether the relief claimed is undervalued and, if so, whether the plaintiff, on being required to correct the valuation within a fixed time, has failed to do so; whether the relief is properly valued but the plaint is written upon insufficiently stamped paper and the plaintiff, on being required to supply the requisite stamp-paper, has failed to do so; and whether the suit appears, from the statement in the plaint, to be barred by any law---If the plain reading of the plaint demonstrates that it is palpably vexatious or meritless, the Trial Court may exercise its power under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. to culminate sham litigation at the earliest stage if the plaint does not disclose an actionable legal right or injury constituting a cause of action, or the suit is explicitly prohibited by any prevailing statute or law---Court can exercise this power even before issuing summons to the other side to save judicial time and shield the parties from vexatious and misconceived litigation---A meaningful reading of the plaint is required---If the lawsuit, on its face, is incompetent, not due to any formal, technical or curable defect but because of an express or implied embargo imposed by law, it should not be allowed to encumber legal proceedings further---Law does not permit piecemeal rejection; if even one prayer in the plaint is found to be maintainable, the plaint cannot be rejected in parts---In the case of mixed questions of law and fact, the correct approach is to allow the suit to proceed to the written statement and discovery phases, determining the lis either by framing preliminary issues or through a regular trial with equal opportunities for both parties---Proper course is to frame issues and decide them on merits in light of the evidence---Court is duty-bound to ensure substantial justice between the parties and not render them remediless. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VI, R. 17---Amendment of pleadings---Discretion---Changing complexion of the suit---Court may at any stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just, and all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for the purpose of determining the real questions in controversy between the parties---Amendment in the pleading should not be of a nature which may change the complexion of the suit---Powers under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C. are discretionary, whereby the Court may allow amendments to ensure a fair trial and deliver complete justice if found necessary for determining the real questions in controversy, but amendment cannot be sought to completely alter the character or fundamental core of the case---Expression "changing the complexion of the suit" connotes fundamental and deep-rooted reformation in the original character or foundation of the case---Discretion is denied when the amendment sought may change the complexion of the suit---Amendments are permissible to shed light on or expand upon the existing case without restructuring its basic foundation or transmuting the identity of the suit. (d) Limitation---Maintainability of suit---Cause of action---Decision independent of amendment application---Question of maintainability on account of limitation needs to be decided first on the basis of averments of the plaint as well as the facts constituting the cause of action---Question whether the suit is barred by law cannot depend on the decision of an application moved for amendment of the plaint under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C.---Word "cause of action" means a bundle of facts which, if traversed, a suitor claiming relief is required to prove for obtaining judgment---Totality of the facts must co-exist and if anything is wanting the claim would be incompetent---Not only must the party seeking relief have a cause of action when the transaction or alleged act is done, but also at the time of institution of the claim the right to seek the relief must be in existence. Cited Cases: • Rana Imran & another v. Fahad Noor Khan & others 2011 YLR 1473 (e) Civil petition for leave to appeal---Single Judge of High Court, on its own motion and without any application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., rejected the plaint as barred by limitation---Division Bench in High Court Appeal set aside the rejection and directed that all applications, including under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C., be deemed pending and be decided together, including an application for amendment of plaint under O. VI, R. 17, C.P.C.---Held, that it was an admitted position that the Trial Court on its own motion fixed the matter for deciding maintainability, which was very much within its province; no application under O. VII, R. 11, C.P.C. was filed, which crucial aspect perhaps escaped the attention of the Division Bench---Directions that all applications should be heard together did not rest on a correct exposition of law---Despite remand, since the question of maintainability was still in the field, it should be decided independently keeping in mind the averments of the plaint and the facts pleaded for constituting the cause of action, without adverting to the application moved for amendment of the pleading---Civil petition converted into an appeal and partly allowed---Impugned order set aside to the extent of directions that maintainability of the suit should be decided together with the application for amendment of the plaint---Trial Court directed to first decide the question of maintainability of the civil suit in accordance with law after providing ample opportunity of hearing to the parties and then proceed further. Disposition: Civil petition converted into an appeal and partly allowed; impugned order dated 06.02.2025 of the Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in High Court Appeal No.464 of 2024 set aside to the extent of directions that maintainability of the suit be decided together with the application for amendment of the plaint; Trial Court directed to first decide the question of maintainability of the civil suit in accordance with law after ample opportunity of hearing to the parties and then proceed further. (Civil Petition No.675 of 2025, Supreme Court of Pakistan, judgment dated 03.06.2026, Muhammad Ali Mazhar, Musarrat Hilali and Irfan Saadat Khan, JJ.; Approved for reporting)