Summary: 1. Consumer Rights explained: Consumer rights did not emerge solely as a modern statutory concept; rather, they developed gradually from early moral, religious, and customary norms that condemned dishonest trade practices such as fraud, adulteration, false weights, and misrepresentation in commerce. A closely related and often interchangeably used term is consumer protection, which means protecting buyers from dishonest, unsafe, or unfair business practices and ensuring that they are treated fairly. In the pre-industrial era, commercial transactions were largely governed by the doctrine of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware), which placed the primary responsibility on the buyer to inspect goods before purchase and afforded only minimal legal protection against defective goods or unfair practices. This principle was suited to small and localized markets where buyers and sellers often knew one another and goods could easily be examined prior to sale. However, with the advent of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the rapid expansion of markets, the rise of mass production, and the increasing complexity of manufactured goods made it increasingly difficult for consumers to evaluate quality and safety. Consequently, the rigid application of caveat emptor became impractical and inequitable, prompting legal systems to gradually impose greater responsibility upon manufacturers and sellers. In the United Kingdom, this shift was reflected first in the development of common law principles and later in statutory measures such as the Sale of Goods Act 1893, which introduced implied conditions and warranties relating to the quality and fitness of goods. This marked a move toward stronger consumer protection. More recently, the Consumer Rights Act 2015 has provided a specific legal framework to protect consumers by ensuring that goods, Service Laws, and digital content are of satisfactory quality, safe, and as described, while also granting rights to repair, replacement, and refund and prohibiting unfair terms. In the United States, the consumer protection movement gained significant momentum during the twentieth century, particularly through regulatory developments and the recognition of consumer rights as a matter of public policy. The movement was further strengthened when President John F. Kennedy, 1 in his historic message to the U.S. Congress in 1962, 2 formally articulated fundamental consumer rights, including the rights to safety, information, choice, and to be heard, which later expanded into a broader framework of internationally recognized consumer rights. The United States currently has around 14 important federal and state laws governing consumer protection. At the global level, the principles of consumer rights were endorsed through the United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection adopted in 1985, 3 which recognized additional rights such as consumer education, redress, satisfaction of basic needs, and the right to a healthy environment, thereby establishing a global normative framework for consumer protection. Pakistan’s legal development in this field followed these international trends but emerged comparatively later. The first comprehensive legislative effort was the Islamabad Consumer Protection Act 1995, which was subsequently followed by provincial legislation including the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumer Protection Act 1997, the Balochistan Consumer Protection Act 2003, the Punjab Consumer Protection Act 2005, and the Sindh Consumer Protection Act 2014 enacted thereafter. These statutes introduced specialized consumer courts and consumer protection councils empowered to address grievances relating to defective goods, deficient Service Laws, false or misleading advertisements, and other unfair trade practices. This legislative framework marked a significant transition from traditional remedies under contract and sale-of-goods law toward a specialized statutory regime aimed at providing accessible, speedy, and effective redress for consumers. Nevertheless, despite the existence of this legal structure, the present status of consumer protection in Pakistan remains constrained by several practical challenges, including fragmented provincial legislation, inadequate public awareness, institutional weaknesses, delays in adjudication, and limited enforcement capacity. Accordingly, while consumer rights in Pakistan now possess clear statutory recognition and legal backing through provincial consumer protection laws, supported by broader principles of commercial and regulatory law, their effective realization continues to depend upon improved enforcement mechanisms, greater institutional coordination, and enhanced consumer awareness within the modern commercial environment. 2. Jurisdiction of Consumer Court explained: Under the scheme of the Consumer Act, the Consumer Court is vested with statutory jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate complaints regarding defective goods or deficient Service Laws. Section 13 of the Act provides the mode of institution of a complaint, enabling a consumer, a recognized consumers association, or the Director or an authorized officer of the Directorate to approach the Court within the period of ten days from the sale of goods or rendering of Service Laws. Upon receipt of such complaint, the Court proceeds in terms of section 14 by issuing notice to the opposite party to submit its version within the prescribed time and, where necessary, may refer the goods in question to a laboratory for technical analysis. In conducting such proceedings, the Court exercises powers analogous to those of a Civil Law court under the Code of Civil Law Procedure (CPC), including summoning witnesses, compelling production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits and requisitioning expert reports. After completion of the inquiry, section 15 empowers the Court, where defect in goods or deficiency in Service Law is established, to grant appropriate relief including removal of defect, replacement of goods, refund of the price or charges paid, or award of compensation for loss suffered by the consumer. In this respect the “defect” and “deficiency” has been explained in clause (e) and (f) of section 2 of the Act. Furthermore, section 16 provides that where the rights of a consumer are infringed, the person responsible may be subjected to penal consequences including imprisonment, fine, or both, in addition to compensation or other remedial directions deemed necessary by the Court for protection of consumers. Thus, the Act confers both remedial and penal powers upon the Consumer Court to ensure effective enforcement of consumer rights and to secure fair standards in the provision of goods and Service Laws. 3. Legal Regime governing electricity explained: The legal regime governing electricity in Pakistan is structured primarily under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (“the Act 1997”), a federal statute enacted to regulate the generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electric power throughout the country and to establish the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) as the central regulatory body. Under the scheme of the Act 1997, NEPRA exercises exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over electric power Service Laws, including the determination of tariff, rates, charges and the terms and conditions governing the provision of such Service Laws. In statutory terms, “generation” denotes the ownership, operation, management or control of generation facilities for the delivery or sale of electric power; “transmission” refers to the ownership, operation, management or control of transmission facilities forming part of the national grid for the conveyance of electricity from generating stations; while “distribution” relates to the ownership, operation, management or control of distribution facilities for the movement and delivery of electric power to consumers within a designated Service Law territory, and “supply” represents the licensed activity of furnishing electricity to end-consumers. The federal legislative competence in this field flows from Item 4 of Part II of the Federal Legislative List read with Article 157 4 of the Constitution, under which electricity is treated as a federal subject requiring centralized regulation. Within this overarching framework, the Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has established the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization (PEDO) under the Pakhtunkhwa Energy Development Organization Act, 1993, as a provincial body corporate tasked with the development, utilization and management of the Province’s energy resources and empowered to undertake schemes relating to generation, transmission and distribution of electric power, as well as to control provincial power houses, grids and related infrastructure constructed by or vested in it. However, the provincial institutional role operates within the federal statutory framework rather than in derogation of it. As explained by the Supreme Court in PESCO Vs SS Ploypropylene (Pvt.) Ltd (PLD 2023 SC 316), following the restructuring of WAPDA, the electricity sector was functionally unbundled whereby generation came to be undertaken by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and generation Companies (GENCOs), transmission and dispatch by the National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC), and distribution by regional distribution companies (DISCOs), all subject to the regulatory and tariff-determining authority of NEPRA. Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) is a distribution company and a public limited company incorporated on 23 April 1998 following the restructuring of WAPDA Power Wing. Licensed by NEPRA for distribution and supply, it is responsible for delivering electricity to consumers across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. PESCO procures electricity through CPPA, 5 maintains the distribution network within its Service Law area, and operates through circles including D.I. Khan, Bannu, Khyber, Mardan, Peshawar, Swabi and Swat. Its functions include maintaining infrastructure, providing connections, restoring outages, metering, billing, and ensuring reliable and uninterrupted electricity supply. 4. Consumer entitlement to electricity explained: Under the consumer protection regime, a consumer is entitled to proper and efficient electricity Service Law, including supply at standard voltage, accurate meter reading, correct billing on the basis of actual consumption, timely replacement of defective meters, and prompt rectification of faults in meters, transformers, and transmission lines. Deficiency in such Service Law may take various forms, including frequent or unscheduled outages, low or fluctuating voltage, sudden surges, delayed restoration after breakdowns, poor maintenance of infrastructure, unsafe or overloaded systems, overbilling, incorrect meter readings, delayed bills, and ineffective complaint handling. Thus, deficiency in electricity Service Law is not confined merely to interruption of supply, but extends to every failure to ensure safe, regular, accurate, and efficient delivery of electricity to consumers. 5. Specialized forum for redressal of tariffs and fixed charges: It is pertinent to note that a specialized forum has been provided for the determination of such disputes under the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (The Act 1997). Under section 3 of the Act 1997, the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority, NEPRA, stands established as the competent regulatory body. The levy of fixed charges, being an integral component of tariff, squarely falls within the exclusive domain of NEPRA under section 31, which empowers it to determine, modify, and regulate rates, charges, and the terms and conditions for the supply of electric power. Any grievance relating to the imposition, applicability, or legality of such charges is, therefore, to be agitated before the competent forum under the Act 1997, including by way of complaint under section 39, and does not fall within the adjudicatory ambit of the Consumer Court, whose jurisdiction is confined to matters of defective goods and deficient Service Laws, and not to tariff determination or policy issues. Admittedly, the Act 1997 is a Federal statute and, by virtue of the constitutional scheme, prevails in the field it occupies. Consequently, a Consumer Court functioning under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumers Protection Act, 1997, being a provincial enactment, cannot assume jurisdiction beyond the scope of that statute or trench upon a domain reserved to the federal regulatory framework. 6. The central principle laid down in the judgment: “The Consumer Court, being a creature of statute, is confined strictly to the jurisdiction and remedies expressly provided under the Consumer Protection Act, and cannot assume or enlarge its authority beyond such mandate, nor exercise powers of judicial or constitutional review to examine the legality or validity of any law, policy, tariff, or regulatory instrument. While electricity constitutes a “Service Law” and its user a “consumer,” only disputes arising from deficiency in such Service Law fall within its cognizance; matters relating to tariff determination, including levy of fixed charges, lie exclusively within the regulatory domain of NEPRA under the governing federal framework. A provincial consumer forum, therefore, cannot encroach upon a federally occupied field or adjudicate challenges to tariff policy, and any order so passed is without lawful jurisdiction and liable to be set aside.” (Rephrased from the content of judgment) 1 John F. Kennedy (29 May 1917 – 22 November 1963) was the 35th President of the United States, serving from 1961 until his assassination in 1963. 2 https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-protecting-the consumer-interest 3 https://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/consumption_en.pdf 4 157. Electricity.__ (1) The Federal Government may in any Province construct or cause to be constructed hydro-electric or thermal power installations or grid stations for the generation of electricity and lay or cause to be laid inter-Provincial transmission lines: Provided that the Federal Government, prior to taking a decision to construct or cause to be constructed, hydro-electric power stations in any Province, shall consult the Provincial Government concerned. (2) The Government of a Province may__ (a) to the extent electricity is supplied to that Province from the national grid, require supply to be made in bulk for transmission and distribution within the Province; (b) levy tax on consumption of electricity within the Province; (c) construct power houses and grid stations and lay transmission lines for use within the Province; and (d) determine the tariff for distribution of electricity within the Province. (3) In case of any dispute between the Federal Government and a Provincial Government in respect of any matter under this Article, any of the said Governments may move the Council of Common Interests for resolution of the dispute. 5 Central Power Purchasing Agency.

Summary: (a) Once the title of the vendor is found to be defective, void or non-existent, the plea of protection under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 cannot be invoked to defeat the lawful rights of the true owner. It is a cardinal principle of property law that no person can convey a better title than he himself possesses (nemo dat quod non habet). The protection contemplated under Section 41 is conditional and becomes available only where the ostensible ownership of the transferor is established with the express or implied consent of the real owner, and the transferee proves that he acted in good faith after exercising due care and reasonable diligence to ascertain the title of the transferor. In the absence of these essential ingredients, the statutory shield is unavailable. In matters relating to evacuee property, it has consistently been held that no such protection can be extended to a vendee where the very allotment in favour of the vendor was without lawful authority. After repeal of the evacuee laws in 1975, no provision was made for allotment of land against pending verified Produce Index Units (P.I.Us.). The superior Courts, while examining the effect of the relevant notification and the repealing statute, have held that any allotment made thereafter for adjustment against P.I.U. claims was wholly without jurisdiction and void ab initio. In Syed Saifullah v. Board of Revenue, Balochistan, the august Supreme Court observed that upon repeal of the evacuee laws, unallotted agricultural land vested in the Provincial Government and could only be disposed of in accordance with a scheme framed by the Government. As no provision existed for allotment against pending verified P.I.Us., any such allotment made after 1975 was without lawful authority and void ab initio. Consequently, any derivative claim based upon such void allotment could not be sustained in law. A void transaction confers no title, and its cancellation merely restores the legal position. (b) In Civil Law dispensation of justice, Courts adjudicate the lis on the touchstone of preponderance of evidence produced by the parties. The decision must tilt in favour of the party whose evidence carries greater weight and probative value. The burden of proof assumes significance primarily where a party fails to adduce evidence in support of its assertions or where the evidence on record is so evenly balanced that the Court is unable to arrive at a definitive conclusion. Where there exists inconsistency between the findings of the two Courts below, the High Court, in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, is obliged to undertake a reappraisal of the entire evidence to determine which findings are based upon proper appreciation of the material on record and correct application of law. The revisional Court, in such circumstances, is not to act mechanically but must independently examine whether the conclusions drawn by the Courts below are sustainable in law and supported by evidence.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----Ss. 19(4), 24(4), 39---PEMRA Rules, 2009, R.5 & Schedule-B, Table-I---Annual Gross Advertisement Revenue---Annual renewal fee---Vires---Satellite TV channels challenged Annual Gross Advertisement Revenue component imposed through Schedule-B to PEMRA Rules, 2009---High Court held that under S.19(4), PEMRA was empowered to charge fee for grant and renewal of licence, and under pre-amendment S.24(4), licence validity was subject to payment of annual fee prescribed from time to time---Rule 5 read with Schedule-B prescribed Annual Renewal Fee, comprising fixed component plus 5% or 7.5% of AGAR depending on category---AGAR, being component of Annual Renewal Fee, could not be declared ultra vires parent Ordinance merely on ground of lack of enabling provision. (b) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Rules, 2009---- ----Schedule-B---AGAR demanded for period prior to framing of Rules---Effect---PEMRA demanded AGAR from some licensees for years 2008 to 2021, although PEMRA Rules, 2009, through which AGAR was imposed, were framed only in December 2009---High Court held that any demand of AGAR for period prior to framing of PEMRA Rules, 2009 was illegal, unlawful and beyond mandate of law. (c) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----Ss. 13 & 30---Demand notices issued by Deputy Director with approval of Chairman---Authority and jurisdiction---Petitioners contended that impugned demand notices were not issued by PEMRA constituted under S.6 and therefore lacked jurisdiction---High Court held that demand notices merely directed payment of alleged outstanding AGAR and warned that proceedings for suspension/cancellation may be initiated in case of non-compliance---Such notices did not themselves suspend, revoke or cancel licences and therefore did not fall within S.30 or restriction on delegation under S.13---Demand notices were not without authority on this ground. (d) Show cause notice---- ----Demand/recovery notice distinguished---PEMRA dues---No prior show cause required for demand notice---A show cause notice calls upon a person to explain why particular action should not be taken for alleged violation, whereas a demand/recovery notice merely requires payment and warns of consequences upon non-payment---High Court held that prior show cause notice was not required before raising demand for payment of dues under law---If demand notice is not complied with and PEMRA seeks suspension/cancellation or penal action, then show cause notice would be required at that later stage. Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Messrs Millat Tractors Limited 2024 SCMR 700 • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Jahangir Khan Tareen 2022 SCMR 92 (e) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----S. 24(4) & 24(4A), as amended by PEMRA Amendment Act, 2023---AGAR abolished prospectively---Retrospective effect---High Court held that after PEMRA Amendment Act, 2023, annual fee no longer includes AGAR in any form, and PEMRA also confirmed that AGAR is not chargeable from 2023 onwards---However, nothing in amended S.24(4) showed plain, clear and unambiguous legislative intent for retrospective application---Amendment was substantive, not merely procedural, explanatory or clarificatory---AGAR was therefore not abolished retrospectively for earlier licence periods. Cited Cases: • Nabi Ahmed v. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan PLD 1969 SC 599 • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Olympia 1987 PTD 739 • Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shahnawaz Ltd. 1993 SCMR 73 • Messrs Rajby Industries Karachi v. Federation of Pakistan 2023 SCMR 1407 (f) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----S. 24(4A)---Licence renewal fee distinguished from annual renewal fee---Scope---Licence renewal fee under S.24(4A) is calculated with reference to last bid price at time of renewal for fresh tenure, whereas Annual Renewal Fee under Schedule-B of PEMRA Rules, 2009 was recurring during licence term and comprised fixed fee plus AGAR component---High Court held that S.24(4A), which provides that licence renewal fee shall not include AGAR, could not be used to conclude that AGAR had been retrospectively abolished from Annual Renewal Fee for past licence periods. (g) Constitutional law---- ----Retrospective operation of statute---Principles---Statutes are presumed prospective unless retrospective intent appears in plain, clear and unambiguous language---Substantive provisions cannot ordinarily be given retrospective operation---Remedial statute may operate retrospectively only where it cures ambiguity, oversight or error in existing law---Mere beneficial effect is insufficient to infer retroactivity. (h) Fee and tax---- ----Regulatory licence fee---Quid pro quo---PEMRA annual renewal fee---No direct service required---High Court held that a fee may be compensatory or regulatory---In case of regulatory licence fee, strict quid pro quo or specific service to payer is not necessary---PEMRA regulates broadcast media and distribution services, maintains institutional structure, staff, experts, regional offices and complaint councils; such regulatory framework entails expenditure---Annual Renewal Fee, including AGAR component, was in nature of regulatory fee, not invalid merely because no specific service was rendered to each licensee. Cited Cases: • Shell Pakistan Limited, Karachi v. Capital Development Authority PLD 2015 Islamabad 36 • Messrs D.S. Textile Mills Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2016 Lahore 355 • Trade Serve International (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and others PLD 2017 Lahore 563 (i) Regulatory licence fee---- ----Reasonableness and proportionality---Correlation with regulatory costs---Burden on regulator---Regulatory fee must be reasonable, not excessive, and must bear broad correlation with cost of administration/regulation, though exact arithmetical equivalence is not required---Dominant character of levy must remain regulatory, not revenue-raising---PEMRA was required to justify that AGAR related to its regulatory functions and was not excessive. (j) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----AGAR as regulatory fee---Failure to justify correlation with cost---Effect---PEMRA failed to provide material showing costs incurred in discharge of its regulatory functions corresponding to AGAR demanded for 2009 to 2021---Report filed by PEMRA showed anticipated expenses of Rs.52.5 billion, mostly capital expenditure such as construction of media workers’ institute, regional offices, field offices, monitoring setup and payment to Competition Commission---High Court held that PEMRA failed to demonstrate that AGAR recovery from Satellite TV Channels correlated with regulatory functions or reasonable regulatory costs. (k) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----AGAR---Capital expenditure and future projects---No contemporaneous basis---PEMRA relied on anticipated construction costs of institute, regional offices, council offices and field offices to justify recovery of AGAR---High Court found no underlying contemporaneous documentation from time of framing PEMRA Rules, 2009 showing such projects or costs were contemplated when AGAR was imposed---No basis or time period for estimated construction costs was provided---Such capital expenditure could not justify excessive AGAR demands for past years. (l) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----Discrimination in recovery from Satellite TV Channels---General regulatory costs---Effect---Costs sought to be funded through AGAR related to general functions of PEMRA, including offices and complaint councils used for regulatory functions beyond Satellite TV Channels, including radio stations---Recovery of AGAR only from Satellite TV Channels to fund general liabilities and capital expenditure was held unreasonable, unjustified and discriminatory. (m) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----S.14---PEMRA Fund---Other revenue sources---Effect on reasonableness of AGAR---PEMRA Fund includes licence fees, renewal fees, seed money, loans, foreign aid and other sums---PEMRA did not disclose total funds available from other revenue streams after operational expenses---Failure to disclose total expected AGAR from all licensed Satellite TV Channels despite Court direction weakened PEMRA’s claim that AGAR was reasonable and proportionate. (n) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----S.30-A---Appeal to High Court---Demand notices not order or decision of PEMRA---Maintainability---Impugned demand notices were recovery notices and did not constitute “order” or “decision” of PEMRA within meaning of S.30-A---Connected CMAs/appeals were therefore not competent as appeals; however, as no adequate alternate remedy existed and vires/legality of AGAR was challenged, High Court converted connected CMAs into writ petitions. (o) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Alternate remedy---Demand notices outside statutory appeal---Maintainability of writ---Where impugned notices were recovery/demand notices not appealable under S.30-A, and petitioners challenged legality, reasonableness and excessive nature of levy, constitutional petition was maintainable for lack of alternate adequate remedy. (p) Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002---- ----AGAR demand notices---Unreasonable and excessive levy---Consequences---Although AGAR component was not ultra vires the parent Ordinance and could be treated as regulatory fee in principle, PEMRA failed to prove that AGAR demanded was reasonable, proportionate, or correlated with regulatory expenditure---High Court declared AGAR unreasonable and excessive, hence illegal, unlawful and unjustified, and set aside impugned demand notices. Disposition: Writ Petition No.1252 of 2022 and connected CMAs converted into writ petitions were allowed to the extent that impugned AGAR was declared unreasonable, excessive, illegal, unlawful and unjustified; impugned demand notices dated 10.03.2022, 11.03.2022, 16.03.2022 and 17.03.2022 were set aside; office was directed to assign writ petition numbers to converted matters.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Conversion to S.302(c), PPC---Sudden provocation---Heat of passion---Deceased allegedly murdered by petitioner/convict by inflicting churri blows, while two other prosecution witnesses also received injuries during the same occurrence---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death, while High Court maintained conviction but commuted death sentence to imprisonment for life---Supreme Court, upon reappraisal of evidence, found that prosecution version regarding occurrence inside complainant’s chobara was materially doubtful---Defence version was that deceased had illicit relations with petitioner’s wife and was seen by petitioner inside his house during late hours of night, whereafter deceased fled and petitioner chased him in a state of emotional disturbance---Medical and investigative evidence showed that deceased was not wearing shalwar at the time of post-mortem, which materially supported defence version and rendered prosecution version highly unbelievable---Occurrence was held to be neither premeditated nor result of prior design, but had taken place suddenly in the heat of passion upon grave and sudden provocation---Prosecution failed to establish requisite ingredients of S.302(b), PPC---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was set aside and petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC instead. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Grave and sudden provocation---Scope---Where homicide was committed without pre-planning, in heat of passion, upon sudden provocation, and without taking undue advantage or acting in a cruel or unusual manner, offence would fall within S.302(c), PPC and not S.302(b), PPC---Petitioner, after allegedly seeing deceased with his wife at late night, lost self-control and chased deceased, culminating in fatal assault---Such facts brought case within S.302(c), PPC---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for twenty years was awarded under S.302(c), PPC. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Appreciation of evidence---Two divergent versions of same occurrence---Suppression of material facts by both sides---Duty of Court---Where prosecution and defence presented divergent versions and both sides appeared to have suppressed material facts to minimize their respective roles, Court was required to sift evidence and form its own view consistent with probabilities of case and capable of satisfying a prudent mind---Supreme Court found defence version substantially corroborated by medical officer, investigating officer and constable who escorted dead body---Circumstance that deceased remained without shalwar up to post-mortem was highly unbelievable if prosecution version of murder inside complainant’s chobara were accepted, but strongly supported defence version that deceased had fled from petitioner’s house after being found with petitioner’s wife. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 342---Statement of accused---Evidentiary value---Admission by accused---Petitioner/convict, in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., admitted inflicting injuries but explained occurrence as result of sudden loss of self-control after seeing deceased with his wife---Such statement, when supported by surrounding circumstances and prosecution evidence itself, was considered for determining true nature of offence---Admission did not sustain conviction under S.302(b), PPC, but supported alteration of conviction to S.302(c), PPC. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 337-L(2) & 337-F(ii)---Causing injuries to prosecution witnesses---Convictions maintained---Injured prosecution witnesses received injuries during the same transaction when they intervened in occurrence---Although murder conviction was altered from S.302(b) to S.302(c), PPC, convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained---Sentence for causing injuries to Mst. Umme Farwa and Syed Gohar Hussain remained intact. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---Sentences to run concurrently---After converting Jail Petition into appeal and partly allowing same, Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner/convict---Substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. (g) Sentence---- ----Enhancement of sentence---Petition by complainant seeking restoration/enhancement to death sentence---Effect of conversion of conviction from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC---Since conviction of respondent/convict was converted from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, complainant’s petition seeking enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death lost efficacy and became infructuous---Criminal Petition seeking enhancement was dismissed accordingly. Disposition: Jail Petition No.716 of 2017 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), PPC were set aside; petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for twenty years; compensation and default sentence were maintained; convictions and sentences under remaining offences were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended and substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Criminal Petition No.1475-L of 2017 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Conversion to S.302(c), PPC---Sudden altercation---Heat of moment---Single fire shot---Petitioner/convict was alleged to have fired at deceased during a dispute over payment/deduction of price of pedi crop---Trial Court convicted petitioner under S.302(b), PPC and sentenced him to death, while High Court maintained conviction but commuted death sentence to imprisonment for life---Supreme Court, on reappraisal of evidence, found that occurrence had taken place at doorstep of petitioner’s house during a spontaneous dispute arising from settlement of price of pedi crop---Parties initially entered into altercation and grappling, and petitioner fired only one shot which proved fatal---Circumstances showed absence of premeditation, prior planning or intention to kill in the manner contemplated under S.302(b), PPC---Act was found to be a spontaneous reaction in a heated moment and no undue brutality was inflicted upon deceased---Case fell within ambit of S.302(c), PPC and not S.302(b), PPC---Conviction under S.302(b), PPC was set aside and petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----S. 302(c)---Sudden fight---Spontaneous reaction---Scope---Where occurrence arose suddenly from a dispute regarding deduction from price of crop, parties grappled with each other, only one fire shot was made, and no act of undue brutality was committed, offence was liable to be categorized under S.302(c), PPC---Supreme Court held that Trial Court and High Court had overlooked relevant facts and settled principles applicable to similar cases while maintaining conviction under S.302(b), PPC---Sentence of rigorous imprisonment for fifteen years was awarded under S.302(c), PPC. (c) Criminal trial---- ----Ocular account---Medical evidence---Single firearm injury---Ocular account furnished by complainant and eyewitness consistently attributed firing to petitioner/convict---Place of occurrence was not challenged by defence during cross-examination---Medical evidence supported ocular account, as post-mortem showed a single firearm entrance wound on lower border of left lower jaw, which caused unnatural death of deceased---However, such evidence, while establishing petitioner’s role in causing death, did not by itself establish premeditation or intention necessary for maintaining conviction under S.302(b), PPC in view of peculiar facts of sudden altercation. (d) Criminal trial---- ----Motive and manner of occurrence---Prosecution not honestly placing complete circumstances before Court---Effect---Motive related to settlement of price of pedi crop and dispute over alleged deduction from total crop price---Supreme Court observed that to some extent the motive and mode and manner of occurrence had not been honestly placed by prosecution before Court---Initial grappling/altercation between petitioner, deceased and others indicated absence of pre-planning and supported conclusion that fatal act occurred suddenly in heat of moment. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 342---Statement of accused---Different version by accused---Petitioner did not deny occurrence, but stated that during grappling deceased was hit with his own pistol---Although Court did not accept said version in entirety, the surrounding circumstances, including admitted altercation, place of occurrence, single shot and absence of premeditation, were considered for determining true nature of offence---Conviction was altered from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC. (f) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)---- ----S. 382-B---Benefit of previous detention---After conversion of conviction from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, Supreme Court extended benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. to petitioner/convict---Compensation and default sentence imposed by Courts below were maintained. (g) Sentence---- ----Enhancement of sentence---Complainant’s petition seeking death penalty---Effect of conversion of conviction to S.302(c), PPC---Complainant sought enhancement of sentence from imprisonment for life to death---Since Supreme Court converted conviction and sentence from S.302(b), PPC to S.302(c), PPC, petition for enhancement of sentence lost efficacy and became infructuous---Criminal Petition seeking enhancement was dismissed. Disposition: Jail Petition No.778 of 2017 was converted into appeal and partly allowed; conviction and sentence under S.302(b), PPC were set aside; petitioner was convicted under S.302(c), PPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for fifteen years; compensation and default sentence imposed by Courts below were maintained; benefit of S.382-B, Cr.P.C. was extended. Criminal Petition No.1391-L of 2017 seeking enhancement of sentence was dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: If as per F.I.R., witness was fired at by the assailant at 11:45 a.m., shot hit to mobile phone in right pocket, broke the same and then hit thigh but he was not medically examined immediately rather at 06:15 p.m. and no injury was found at right thigh however abrasion and bruise was only noted on left thigh by the medical officer in MLC; any oozing of blood or pinkish fluid was not observed in said abrasion as well as bruise; any corresponding hole was not found on Shalwar; any metallic foreign body/missile of bullet neither found entangled in Shalwar nor found from place of occurrence; any forensic analysis report to show that mobile phone was hit by bullet also not produced then receiving firearm injury by said witness in the occurrence seems doubtful. 12Land 10283/25 Muhammad Athar Hanan &

Summary: Although the primary object of Order XXI Rule 35 CPC is to regulate delivery of possession in execution of a decree for immovable property, including cases of joint possession—its protective sweep, in a limited sense, may extend to a tenant in occupation. However, such extension is neither absolute nor independent; it is strictly derivative and circumscribed by the title and interest of the landlord under whom the tenant claims. A tenant’s right to retain possession is not autonomous but flows from, and remains subservient to, the subsisting title of the landlord. A tenant, acting independently and without reference to the landlord’s title, cannot invoke Order XXI Rules 97 or 98 CPC to resist execution of a decree for possession, nor can he seek shelter under sub-rule (2) of Rule 35. The statutory protection against actual dispossession of a tenant is specifically contemplated under Order XXI Rule 36 CPC, which provides that where a decree directs delivery of immovable property in the lawful occupation of a tenant or other person not bound by the decree to vacate, delivery shall be effected symbolically, by affixing a copy of the warrant at a conspicuous place on the property and proclaiming the substance of the decree through customary modes. Even this protection, however, remains conditional upon the tenant’s lawful and permissive possession traceable to the landlord’s title. In Ratan Lal Jain v. Uma Shankar Vyas (AIR 2000 SC 804), the august Supreme Court of India held that where tenants were inducted into possession with the consent of the owners and were authorized to construct shops and induct sub-tenants within the stipulated lease period, the sub-tenants’ possession was derivative of and traceable to the landlord’s consent. Consequently, such occupants, not being persons bound by the decree, were entitled only to symbolic dispossession in execution. The ratio decidendi of the said judgment reinforces the principle that the benefit of Rule 36 is available solely to a tenant whose possession is lawful and referable to the landlord’s subsisting title. Where an alleged tenant seeks to protect possession devoid of any juridical nexus with the landlord, or in derogation of the landlord’s title, no protection can be extended under Rule 36 CPC. In the instant matter, the petitioner’s case does not fall within the ambit of Order XXI Rule 35(2) CPC, nor does it attract the protection envisaged under Rule 36 CPC, as the claimed possession lacks the requisite legal foundation traceable to the landlord’s title.

Summary: Writ Petition Held: Issue / Section of Laws. CPC-O VII R 11— It is by now well-settled that the decisive test for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C., is whether, upon a meaningful and purposeful reading of the plaint—rather than a formal or pedantic one—a cause of action is made out. The allegations of fraud, collusion, and unlawful deprivation of inheritance rights, pleaded in the plaint, sufficiently constitute a cause of action that warrants adjudication on merits. At preliminary stage, the defence set up by the defendant would be wholly immaterial and could not be taken into consideration, as such defence can only be examined after the parties have been afforded an opportunity to lead evidence. The Courts, while exercising jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11, are not permitted to venture into disputed factual realms or to assess the correctness or otherwise of the averments made in the plaint. Any grounds taken by the defendants in their application may, at best, be considered during the trial of the suit; however, for the purposes of Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C., the Court is strictly confined to the statutory grounds enumerated therein. Since the contents of the plaint do disclose a cause of action, the question as to whether such cause of action has in fact accrued in favour of the petitioners is a matter to be determined by the learned trial Court after recording pro and contra evidence. O VII Rule 11-application of- a plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of pleas raised in the written statement. If the plaint discloses a cause of action, any contrary defence set up by the defendants is irrelevant at this preliminary stage and must be tested during trial. Moreover, any defence plea regarding res judicata and the bar of limitation are, by their nature, mixed questions of law and fact. Such pleas cannot be decided summarily but require the recording of pro and contra evidence to determine the date of knowledge and the history of prior litigation. (Writ Petition is Allowed)

Summary: Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983--- ----Arts. 9(2), 29 & 32---Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Art. 199---Service matter---Pensionary benefits---Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib---Bar regarding personal grievance of public servant---Effect of undertaking given before Ombudsman---Representations before President---Maintainability of constitutional petition--- Petitioner, retired employee of Telephone Industries of Pakistan, sought redress before Wafaqi Mohtasib regarding non-settlement of pensionary benefits, including cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted pension and annual increases---Chief Financial Officer of employer gave written undertaking before Mohtasib that pension issues would be resolved within 30 to 45 days, whereupon complaint was disposed of with direction for compliance---On review, Mohtasib further directed employer to place matter before Board of Directors and determine date of payment---Representation before President was dismissed on limitation, but High Court in constitutional jurisdiction set aside orders of Mohtasib and President on ground of want of jurisdiction---Federal Constitutional Court held that grievance raised by petitioner was plainly a personal service grievance relating to his employment in agency where he had served, and thus fell squarely within bar contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983---Wafaqi Mohtasib had no lawful authority to entertain such complaint or pass directions thereon, and orders passed by him were coram non judice and void ab initio---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts under Art. 29 of the Order of 1983 did not preclude interference by High Court where order of Ombudsman suffered from want or excess of jurisdiction---Dismissal of representation before President on ground of limitation did not validate inherently void order, nor did exhaustion of alternate remedy bar constitutional jurisdiction in such case---Undertaking or participation by employer before Ombudsman could not confer jurisdiction on forum expressly barred by statute, nor could doctrine of estoppel operate against law---High Court had rightly set aside impugned orders---Leave was refused and petition dismissed. Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Karachi v. Wafaqi Mohtasib and others (1998 SCMR 841); Peshawar Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), Islamabad and others (PLD 2016 SC 940); Muhammad Afzal v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan and another (PLD 1967 SC 314); Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan, Member Provincial Assembly, N.-W.F.P. (PLD 1995 SC 66); Maulvi Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Ahmad Khan and others (2004 SCMR 1622); Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. v. Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2006 SC 328); Syed Muhammad Hussain Shah v. Abdul Qayyum and others (2011 SCMR 743) rel. (a) Wafaqi Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Service matters of employees of agency---Bar contained in Art. 9(2), Order of 1983--- Article 9(2) of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 expressly prohibits Wafaqi Mohtasib from accepting for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a public servant or functionary concerning any matter relating to agency in which he is or has been working, where grievance pertains to his personal service affairs---Such matters are to be agitated before competent fora constituted for service disputes, and not before Ombudsman. (b) Pensionary claim of retired employee---Nature of dispute--- Claim regarding recalculation of pension, inclusion of cost of living allowance, restoration of commuted portion of pension and grant of annual increases is a personal grievance arising out of service and retirement benefits---Such dispute falls within exclusionary clause of Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (c) Order passed without jurisdiction---Effect--- Any order passed by Wafaqi Mohtasib in a matter expressly excluded by Art. 9(2) is without lawful authority, coram non judice and void ab initio---Such order cannot be sustained irrespective of merits of underlying claim. (d) Article 29, Order of 1983---Bar of jurisdiction of Courts---Scope--- Statutory bar against challenge to action or order of Wafaqi Mohtasib does not oust constitutional jurisdiction of High Court where impugned order suffers from want or excess of jurisdiction, is coram non judice, or has been passed in violation of law---In such cases, judicial review under Art. 199 of the Constitution remains available. (e) Representation before President under Art. 32, Order of 1983---Dismissal on limitation---Effect--- Dismissal of representation on technical ground of limitation does not amount to affirmation of impugned order on merits, nor does it cure inherent jurisdictional defect in original proceedings---Even a decision on merits cannot validate an order that is a nullity for want of jurisdiction. (f) Alternate remedy---Exhaustion of statutory recourse---Whether bars writ jurisdiction--- Availability or even exhaustion of alternate statutory remedy does not operate as absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction where impugned order is ex facie contrary to statute or passed without jurisdiction---High Court remains competent to correct such illegality. (g) Undertaking before Ombudsman---Consent, waiver or acquiescence---Effect on jurisdiction--- Jurisdiction is creature of statute and cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, acquiescence, silence, participation or undertaking of parties---An employer’s written undertaking before Ombudsman to resolve employee’s grievance cannot validate proceedings before a forum expressly barred by law from entertaining such matter. (h) Estoppel against statute---Non-application of doctrine--- Doctrine of estoppel does not operate against statute---No concession or conduct of parties can override express prohibition contained in Art. 9(2) of the Order of 1983. (i) Undertaking given before incompetent forum---Remedy--- Although undertaking given before Wafaqi Mohtasib cannot cure lack of jurisdiction, aggrieved person may, if so advised, agitate effect of such undertaking before a competent forum in accordance with law. Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: Summary pending