Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 & 25 ---- Government employment in BPS-01 to BPS-04 ---- Appointment letters issued after completion of codal formalities ---- Non-payment of salaries without cancellation of appointments ---- Held, violative of fundamental rights Petitioners, appointed as Driver, Chowkidar, and Ward Boy in the Health Department, District Tharparkar, after due process including advertisement, interview, verification, and medical fitness, were denied salary payments despite joining duties. Their names were excluded from the salary processing list without cancellation of appointment letters or show cause notice. Held, non-payment of salaries in the absence of any lawful withdrawal of appointments constitutes a violation of fundamental rights under Arts. 3, 4, 9, 10A, 14, 18 and 25 of the Constitution. Appointment letters vested legal rights, and deprivation of salary without due process was unlawful. (b) Constitutional petition under Art. 199 ---- Scope ---- Disputed facts as a bar to writ jurisdiction ---- When not applicable ---- Duty of High Court to direct verification instead of non-suiting poor employees High Court dismissed petition on the ground of disputed facts, holding that petitioners' names were not in the final list of DRC-approved appointments. Supreme Court held that no factual controversy existed requiring elaborate inquiry, as appointment letters were admitted and not denied by department in comments. Held, when the right asserted is complete and supported by official documents, the constitutional jurisdiction is not ousted merely by raising belated factual objections. The High Court erred by not directing departmental verification and remedying administrative injustice. Dismissal of petition without such inquiry amounts to non-performance of constitutional duty. (c) Civil service ---- Recruitment irregularity ---- Appointments not revoked through lawful process ---- Employees cannot be penalized without inquiry ---- Departmental malfeasance must be addressed Held, if the appointment letters were issued without compliance of codal formalities, the Department was obligated to (i) conduct proper inquiry, (ii) identify responsible officials, and (iii) take appropriate action. Without such inquiry, recalling appointments or withholding salaries of low-paid employees constitutes administrative highhandedness. Poor appointees often become scapegoats, while departmental wrongdoers escape accountability. Held further, any withdrawal of appointments without show cause or hearing is void ab initio. (d) Administrative law ---- Direction for inquiry and verification ---- Supreme Court remand to Secretary Health Sindh ---- Time-bound compliance Supreme Court remanded matter to Secretary Health, Government of Sindh, directing that a hearing be granted to petitioners and the record examined. If the appointments were made on DRC/Selection Committee recommendation, petitioners must be allowed to resume service with prompt release of salaries. Exercise to be concluded within two months of receipt of judgment. Disposition: Civil Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; judgment of High Court set aside; matter remanded for verification and regularization of petitioners upon fulfillment of codal formalities.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---- Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 18 & 25 --- Civil Servants Act, 1973 --- Fundamental Rule 17 --- Promotion to BPS-22 --- Supersession without reasons --- Denial of fair consideration --- Proforma promotion --- Doctrine of legitimate expectation --- Remand to High-Powered Selection Board. Petitioner, a BS-21 officer of the Police Service of Pakistan, challenged his repeated supersession for promotion to BS-22 without being afforded any reasons or fair opportunity. Despite having an unblemished service record with outstanding Performance Evaluation Reports (PERs) from 2013 to 2018 and being senior to others who were promoted, the petitioner was overlooked by the High-Powered Selection Board (HPSB) in multiple meetings. No adverse material was found in the official record, yet the HPSB minutes included negative remarks not grounded in any documented performance review. The Supreme Court held that while promotion is not a vested right, the right to fair and lawful consideration for promotion is enforceable. Where a civil servant attains the age of superannuation without being justly considered for promotion, the case must be assessed under the framework of proforma promotion as envisaged in Fundamental Rule 17. The Court observed that delay or omission in considering eligible officers due to administrative lapses entitles them to proforma promotion with consequential benefits. The High Court’s dismissal was found to have overlooked the factual record and was influenced by unverified notings in HPSB proceedings. The judgment was set aside and the matter remanded to the HPSB to re-evaluate the petitioner’s case for proforma promotion in a fair, impartial, and timely manner, with specific instructions for decision within two months. Cited Cases: • Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb 2022 SCMR 2020 • Alam Chand v. Jamil Ahmad 2008 SCMR 980 • Abid Hussain Sherazi v. Secretary, M/O Industries & Production 2005 SCMR 1742 • Secretary Health Department, Punjab v. Dr. Abida Iqbal 2009 SCMR 61 • Federal Public Service Commission v. Shiraz Manzoor 2023 SCMR 2087 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed; High Court judgment set aside; matter remanded to HPSB for fresh consideration within two months.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") based, inter alia, on the ground that the suit of the respondent was barred under Order II Rule 2, CPC was dismissed and the said finding was maintained by the Revisional Court below. This Court held that pattern of electing one remedy, abandoning it after adverse consequences, then shifting to the arbitration without proper recourse, and finally returning to file a third suit without compliance with the mandatory legal provisions is precisely what the doctrine of election, the bar contained in Order II Rule 2 CPC, and the scheme of the Arbitration Act, 1940 aim to prevent. If such litigation is allowed to proceed without scrutiny under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, it would set a dangerous precedent whereby a litigant could perpetually avoid finality by alternating between forums and/or remedies, without accountability. The law does not permit a party to keep the adversary entangled in an unending chain of litigation by withholding material facts, disowning procedural consequences, and reviving stale claims under the guise of a fresh suit. The respondent, having exhausted his remedies and failed to pursue them diligently, cannot now be allowed to relitigate the same dispute under a new garb.

Summary: Determination of qualifications for admission to institutions in any field is within the legislative competence of the government

Summary: a) Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) —- S. 5 —- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (X of 1984), Art. 85 —- Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3) —- Dower —- Proof of Nikah Nama —- Evidentiary presumption —- Leave to appeal —- Execution of Nikah Nama not denied —- Non-production of marginal witnesses —- Effect —- Validity —- Where the relationship of husband and wife is admitted and execution of Nikah Nama is not specifically denied in the written statement, the plaintiff-wife’s failure to produce marginal witnesses of the Nikah Nama is not fatal to her claim. A Nikah Nama is a public document under S.5 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 and carries presumption of truth under Art. 85 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Mere verbal denial of execution during oral testimony, without corroborating evidence, carries no legal weight. In the present case, the defendant did not dispute the Nikah Nama in his pleadings but attempted to deny it orally at trial without proof. Such denial was rightly disregarded by the trial court. Cited Cases: Rasool Bibi v. Waryam (1992 SCMR 1520) Jan Muhammad v. Salamat Bibi (2002 SCMR 1408) (b) Family Courts —- Suit for recovery of dower and maintenance —- Appellate Court and High Court —- Failure to determine crucial issue —- Jurisdiction not properly exercised —- Remand —- The trial court had framed an issue regarding maintenance allowance (Issue No.3), yet both the Appellate Court and the High Court failed to record any findings on this issue. Such omission constituted a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them under the law. The Supreme Court held that the non-determination of a framed issue by the subordinate forums warranted remand for proper adjudication. The matter was thus remanded to the High Court to decide the constitutional petition afresh in light of the observations made by the Supreme Court. Disposition: Appeal allowed. Impugned order of the High Court set aside. Case remanded to the Peshawar High Court for decision afresh within thirty working days after providing an opportunity of hearing to the parties.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan –– Arts. 15 & 199 –– Passports Act, 1974 –– Passports Rules, 2021, R. 22(2)(b) –– Placement of name on Passport Control List (PCL) –– Right to freedom of movement –– Requirement of procedural fairness –– Scope and limitations. Inclusion of petitioner’s name on the Passport Control List (PCL), despite his confirmed pre-arrest bail in a pending criminal case, held to be unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights under Art. 15 of the Constitution––Court observed that Rule 22(2)(b) of the Passports Rules, 2021 permits recommendation for PCL placement, but such discretion must be exercised with procedural safeguards––No notice was issued nor any opportunity of hearing provided to the petitioner––Court held that mere registration of a criminal case or unverified apprehension of flight risk is insufficient ground to curtail a citizen’s liberty of movement, particularly when the petitioner had already submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court––Held further, that placement on the PCL without transparent criteria, structured guidelines, or individualized justification amounts to arbitrary executive action in derogation of constitutional guarantees. Disposition: Petition allowed; impugned order dated 29.11.2024 set aside; respondents directed to remove petitioner’s name from the PCL. (b) Constitution of Pakistan –– Art. 10A –– Due process –– Procedural safeguards –– Necessity of hearing before adverse action –– Executive discretion –– Judicial review. Held, that even if Rule 22(2)(b) of the Passports Rules permits placement of a person’s name on PCL upon recommendation of government departments, such authority must be exercised in accordance with principles of natural justice––Failure to issue notice or provide hearing renders the decision procedurally unfair––Executive discretion, if exercised in an unstructured or blanket manner, becomes vulnerable to constitutional challenge––Judiciary is empowered under Art. 199 to strike down such action where no lawful justification is provided and the affected party’s right to be heard has been denied. Cited case: Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) [cited in a similar context in related jurisprudence]. (c) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 –– Ss. 91, 204, 512, 514 –– Bail –– Trial management –– Powers of Trial Court to ensure presence of accused. Court held that the contention of the Police that the petitioner’s presence in trial necessitated retention of his name on PCL was misconceived––Once bail is granted, it is presumed the accused will comply with Court directives––Trial Court has sufficient powers under Cr.P.C. to compel appearance, grant exemption, or cancel bail upon non-compliance––Executive agencies cannot override judicial discretion by imposing travel bans based on speculative concerns––Judicial mechanism for enforcement of trial presence must be respected. (d) Administrative law –– Rule 22(2)(b) of the Passports Rules, 2021 –– Interpretation –– Narrow construction to avoid arbitrariness –– Executive action based on misrepresentation –– Effect. Held, that Rule 22(2)(b) confers limited and recommendatory power upon government departments to request placement of individuals on PCL––Where such recommendation is based on incorrect or misleading facts, including assertions that the petitioner was evading arrest when he was on bail, the resultant action is void ab initio––Court emphasized that fundamental rights cannot be suspended based on flawed or routine administrative procedures––Rule must be construed narrowly to avoid arbitrary deprivation of liberty––Presumption of innocence remains intact until conviction, and travel restrictions cannot be imposed absent compelling reasons tested through proper procedure.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — Ss. 154, 342, 374 — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302(b), 311, 338-C — Qatl-e-amd — Defective FIR — False implication — Benefit of doubt — Acquittal FIR was lodged belatedly via a written application (Exh.PA) after oral narration of the occurrence to a police official at the police station, which was not recorded contemporaneously. The Court held that the true “first information” under S.154, Cr.P.C., was the unrecorded verbal statement by the complainant to the Moharrar, rendering the written application inadmissible as FIR in stricto sensu. Lack of blood marks or dragging signs at the alleged outdoor scene contradicted the prosecution version. Ocular evidence was rendered doubtful due to the chance witness status of both prosecution eyewitnesses, who failed to offer credible reasons for their presence at the scene. Testimonies were held to be “suspect evidence,” warranting rejection without corroboration. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez 2015 SCMR 1142 • Muhammad Ashraf alias Acchu v. The State 2019 SCMR 652 • Sarfaraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 (b) Qatl-e-amd — Recovery evidence — Weapon recovery — Tampering and delay — Forensic inconclusiveness — Effect Pistol and chhurri allegedly recovered on the appellant’s pointation were found unreliable. The pistol parcel reportedly included six live bullets, yet PFSA report failed to confirm receipt of the same, raising tampering concerns. The chhurri was recovered after 27 days; its forensic report was held inconsequential as human blood disintegrates within three weeks. Thus, recoveries were held uncorroborated and irrelevant for confirming the prosecution’s version. Cited Cases: • Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2016 SCMR 2138 (c) Evidence — Ocular account — Chance witnesses — Lack of proximity — Dishonest improvements — No corroboration Complainant and PW-2 were not residents of the area of occurrence and offered no plausible explanation for following the deceased. Their statements lacked corroboration, were riddled with improvements, and were not supported by independent or forensic evidence. No witness from the locality or the alleged house of the deceased’s maternal uncle was presented. In the absence of reliable and independent eyewitness account, the prosecution's version collapsed. (d) Criminal trial — Medical and motive evidence — Corroborative value — Cannot identify assailant — Motive inconsequential if ocular account fails Medical evidence merely confirmed the nature of injuries but could not identify the assailant. Motive alleged was based on marriage without family consent, which the Court held to be a double-edged sword—capable of both implicating and exonerating the accused. With the ocular account discredited, motive was declared inconsequential. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ramzan v. The State 2025 SCMR 762 • Akbar Ali v. The State 2007 SCMR 486 (e) Criminal trial — Standard of proof — Single dent in prosecution case sufficient for acquittal — Legal principle affirmed The Court reaffirmed the principle that even a single material defect in the prosecution case is sufficient to acquit the accused. In the instant case, multiple material contradictions, gaps, and inconclusive forensic evidence created reasonable doubt. The prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Cited Case: • Abdul Ghafoor v. The State 2022 SCMR 1527 Disposition: Criminal Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; accused acquitted. Death sentence not confirmed; Murder Reference answered in negative. ---- "FIR is always considered a cornerstone of the case of prosecution, however, if complainant immediately after the occurrence meets the police official, narrates entire detail of occurrence to him but it is not recorded then and there rather subsequently on written application or oral statement of the same complainant received at some other place, FIR is recorded then neither it can be termed as First Information Report as mentioned in Section: 154 Cr.P.C. in stricto sensu nor any importance can be attached to the same like promptly recorded FIR."

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending