Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving on public way---Appreciation of evidence---Appeal against acquittal---Prosecution case was that accused-respondent, driver of oil tanker,had collided with Frontier Constabulary Post, resultantly, five persons died at the spot, theofficial vehicle and official weapons were damaged and driver and conductor fled away fromthe scene---Prosecution, in order to establish the charge had produced nine witnesses, whichwere not consistent and confidence-inspiring---Complainant of the case mostly reiterated thecontents of his fard-e-bayan---Evidence of said witness was not helpful to the case ofprosecution for the reasons that he himself had not witnessed the crime rather at the time ofalleged occurrence he was 80 kms. away from the place of occurrence and receivedinformation through wireless set---Entire statement of said witness was silent to the effect asto who had told him the story of the incident in such a sequence---Admittedly, the statementof said witness was hearsay and the same was only to the extent of setting criminalmachinery into motion---Statements of both the alleged eye-witnesses were contradictorywith each other on certain counts---Both the witnesses had unanimously brought on recordthat they witnessed the crime directly---Both the said witnesses had admitted in their crossexamination that their statements under S. 161, Cr.P.C. were recorded after delay of 13-daysof the incident, though they were very much present in the area---Admission of both theprosecution witnesses depicted the complete failure of the Investigating Officer to record thestatements of both the said witnesses immediately---No explanation was available on therecord as to why such statements were delayed for 13-days and till that the accused-appellanthad voluntarily surrendered him before the police---No solid or concrete evidence wasavailable against the accused/respondent connecting him with the commission of allegedoffence---Trial Court after proper appreciation of evidence in its true perspective had rightlyacquitted the accused-respondent of the charge---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 161---Delay in recording the statement of witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C.---Effect---Such evidence could not be given that sanctity as was generally given to the evidence of awitness whose statement had been recorded promptly soon after the occurrence---Statements of prosecution witnesses under S. 161, Cr.P.C. recorded after the arrest of the accusedcreated reasonable doubt in the case of prosecution---Witnesses appeared to have beenplanted by the prosecution subsequently after the arrest of the accused/respondent.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 320 & 279---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 22---Qatl-i-Khata, rash driving onpublic way---Appreciation of evidence---Identification parade---Scope---Identification of theaccused/respondent in the Trial Court was doubtful---According to the case of prosecution,soon after the occurrence the culprits decamped from the place of occurrence---InvestigatingOfficer arrested five persons on the basis of suspicious, who were subsequently dischargedfrom the case under the provisions of S. 169, Cr.P.C.---Circumstances suggested that theInvestigating Officer as well as the alleged eye-witnesses were not sure about the culprit---First Information Report was silent with regard to physique and personal appearance of theescaped accused persons---Investigating Officer after the arrest of the accused/respondentwas supposed to have conducted the identification parade of the accused/respondent whichwas not done---Material dent caused to the case of prosecution due to failure to holdidentification parade during the course of investigation, which was not curable.Khawar v. The State 2014 YLR 2120 rel.(d) Criminal trial-------Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single circumstance if creating reasonable doubt in aprudent mind was sufficient for acquittal of accused not as a matter of grace, but as a matterof right.Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1221 rel.(e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 417--- Appeal against acquittal--- Presumption--- Double presumption of innocencewas attached to the order of acquittal---Interference in acquittal was unwarranted unless thesame was arbitrary, capricious, fanciful or against the record.

Summary: The brief facts of the case involved a dispute over an Areca nut purchase, resulting in a fatal incident. The accused party sought a cross version under Section 22-A (6) Cr.P.C, and subsequently, respondent No.2 filed a private complaint against the petitioners. The petitioners argued that the delay in filing the private complaint raised doubts about its bona fide. Additionally, they contended that a private complaint is not maintainable against the investigating officer under the Police Order, 2002. The court noted that Section 155(2) of the Police Order, 2002, creates a bar on filing a private complaint against police officers, and prosecution requires a report in writing by an authorized officer. Relying on precedent, the court declared that the private complaint against the petitioners was not maintainable. The judgment set aside the impugned order and allowed the revision petition. The court directed the trial court to proceed with the private complaint against other accused in accordance with the law. Both criminal revisions were disposed of accordingly.

Summary: Acquittal granted--- The revision petition challenged a judgment affirming the conviction and sentence imposed by the Magistrate Section 30, Sahiwal, on the petitioner for offenses under Sections 320, 279, and 427 PPC. The case arises from a collision between a Yamaha motorcycle and a Hilux Pick-up driven by the petitioner, resulting in the death of Mukhtar Ahmad. The prosecution argued that the petitioner drove negligently and rashly, causing the accident. The court noted discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, including contradictions in witness testimonies and inconsistencies in the accounts of the accident. It emphasized the importance of the Inquest Report, which did not identify the driver at the time of its preparation. The court concludes that there is reasonable doubt about the petitioner's involvement and questions the credibility of the prosecution's case. The judgment delved into legal principles related to rash and negligent driving, highlighting the need for a careful examination of the circumstances. The court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the case against the petitioner, resulting in the acquittal of the charges.

Summary: The petitioner contested the charge under Section 320 PPC, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The petitioner's counsel contended that there was no concrete evidence linking the petitioner to the accident and questioned the credibility of eyewitnesses. The judgment critically analyzed the evidence presented during the trial. The court noted inconsistencies in the statements of witnesses, highlighting that the complainant, who initially reported being present at the scene, was later found not to have witnessed the accident directly. The court emphasized the lack of evidence connecting the petitioner to the accident and the failure to establish that the tractor-trolley was being driven rashly or negligently. The judgment cites legal precedents defining "rash and negligent driving" and underscored the necessity of proving these elements in such cases. Ultimately, the court concluded that the prosecution did not meet the burden of proof, resulting in a defective investigation. The petitioner was acquitted, and the conviction and sentence are set aside. The petitioner was ordered to be released from jail unless detained for other reasons

Summary: Fatal Accidents Act (XIII of 1855)-------S. 1---Electricity Act (IX of 1910), S.33---Fatal accident---Suit for compensation---Deceased 36 years of age, a Head Constable in Traffic Police, died on account of electrocution by coming into contact with energized pole erected by Electric Supply Company---Plaintiffs being legal heirs of the deceased filed suit for recovery of compensation against the Company---Issues in question were whether the suit was not maintainable; whether no cause of action had accrued to the plaintiffs to file the suit and whether the plaintiffs had alternate remedy under S.33 of the Electricity Act, 1910 to get redressal of their grievances---Burden of proof of said issues, was on the defendant Company---Defendant, having not advanced any arguments on the issues, same were answered against the Company---Burden of proof that deceased died due to electric shock owing to negligence and wrongful act of the defendant company and about deceased's earning was on the plaintiffs---Evidence on record had proved that deceased had died due to electrocution, and there was also a clear evidence that monthly salary of deceased was Rs.9945 as he was Head Constable in Police Department---Documents produced on record had confirmed that the cause of death of the deceased was due to electricity current in the electric Pole---Plaintiffs, in circumstances, were entitled for the relief they had claimed as compensation for the death of the deceased---Plaintiffs being immediate family of the deceased, directly affected by accidental death of the deceased had given well calculated figures to claim quantum of damages amounting to Rs.10,802,220---Defendant company, in cross-examination, had not even disputed the calculation given in the plaint as well as in the affidavit-in-evidence on oath and conceded that the figures of quantum of damage given in the affidavit, were proper calculation---Quantum of compensation had been determined keeping in view life span of the deceased, future benefit with the charge in salary etc.---Plaintiffs, were widow of the deceased, his mother, one son and four daughters---Preamble of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 had explained that purpose of the said Act, was to provide compensation to the families for loss occasioned by the death of a person caused by actionable wrong---Suit was decreed with cost and the defendant was directed to deposit, decretal amount with Nazir of the court within 30 days.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----S. 320---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 340(2) & 342---Qatl-i-Khata by rash or negligent driving---Appreciation of evidence---Di'yat, non-awarding of---Accused was allegedly driving vehicle rashly and negligently and as a result, accident took place and six people lost their lives while fourteen were injured---Trial Court convicted the accused and sentenced him for five years imprisonment but did not order payment of Di'yat amount---Validity---Accused in order to disprove allegation of rash and negligent driving should have made a statement on oath under S.340(2), Cr.P.C.---Accused, in his statement under S.342, Cr.P.C., was unable to make any explanation as to why evidence had come on record against him---Trial Court rightly convicted the accused but should have added punishment of payment of Di'yat to legal heirs of each deceased---Trial Court in view of the use of word 'shall' in S.320,P.P.C. had no option to avoid ordering payment of Di'yat to legal heirs of deceased while convicting accused---High Court maintained the conviction but modified the sentence and included payment of Di'yat to legal heirs of the deceased person by the accused---Appeal was dismissed accordingly.

Summary: Vicarious Liability---Employer liable for Employee---The court notes that the defendants did not appear in court despite being served, leading to their being declared ex parte (absent). The judge explains that in cases involving fatal accidents, where the defendant denies allegations of negligence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to prove their innocence. The judgment goes on to discuss the liability of the defendants, particularly the owner of the vehicle and the issue of vicarious liability. The court cites legal precedents to establish the principles of vicarious liability, which holds employers responsible for the actions of their employees during the course of employment. The judge concludes that the defendant Nos. 1 and 2 (the driver and the owner of the vehicle) are jointly and severally liable for the tort (wrongful act) that caused the accident. The judgment then addresses the issue of compensation for the plaintiffs' claim. The court calculates the compensation based on factors such as the deceased's age, potential earnings, and personal expenses. The court decrees a specific amount as compensation to be paid to the plaintiffs.The judge concludes the judgment by specifying the compensation amount awarded and mentions that the parties are left to bear their own costs.

Summary: ''Where the wrong, damage or injury is caused by two or more persons, each of the wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to make good the loss to the claimant who suffered at the hands of such tortfeasors. It is the prerogative of the plaintiff to proceed against any or all such wrongdoers. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. On the other hand, where a person suffers injury, partly due to his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence.'' ---- Issue: Whether the NLC, its driver, and the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), later succeeded by the City District Government Karachi (CDGK), were liable for compensation to the legal heirs of Sher Azam Khan due to the fatal accident. --- Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions holding the NLC, its driver, and the CDGK/KDA jointly and severally liable for the accident and compensating the legal heirs of Sher Azam Khan.Reasoning:The Court found that the evidence supported the conclusion of composite negligence involving the NLC driver and the CDGK/KDA.It was established that the NLC driver's rash driving and the CDGK/KDA's failure to take necessary safety measures during road repairs contributed to the fatal accident.The Court emphasized that in cases of composite negligence, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable for the entire damages, allowing the victim or their legal heirs to proceed against any or all of the tortfeasors.The NLC's attempt to shift the entire liability to the CDGK/KDA was rejected, as both parties were found to have contributed to the circumstances leading to the accident.Significance: This judgment underscores the legal principle of joint and several liabilities in cases of composite negligence, where multiple parties' negligent acts contribute to a single event causing harm or loss. It reaffirms the responsibility of both vehicle operators and civic authorities to ensure public safety and the potential for joint liability when their combined negligence leads to tragic outcomes.

Summary: The petitioner filed claims for compensation with the Railway Department, but they were rejected on the grounds that the death resulted from a heart attack and was not an accident eligible for compensation.The primary legal question in the case revolves around whether a heart attack during the course of employment can be considered an "accident" within the meaning of Section 3 of the Workmenís Compensation Act, 1923. The petitioner argues that her father's heart attack qualifies as an accident, as it was unexpected and untoward while he was performing his official duties. The court agrees with the petitioner's stance, defining "accident" in the popular and ordinary sense as an unexpected or unlooked-for mishap or untoward event. The court rules that the heart attack suffered by the petitioner's father while performing his official duties qualifies as an accident and falls within the scope of Section 3 of the Act. Consequently, the court sets aside the impugned order and directs the respondents to pay compensation to the petitioner and other legal heirs of the deceased as per their entitlement under the law. The court emphasizes the urgency of resolving the compensation claim, as it has been pending for eight years. It orders the respondents to make the compensation payment within 45 days from the date of the judgment. The court allows the petition and grants compensation to the petitioner and other legal heirs of the deceased.

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)??????S. 426??? Suspension of sentence??? Accused after having filed an appeal against hisconviction under a bailable offence is entitled to bail as a matter of right. [p. 2101 AMian Mahmud Ali Qasuri and others v. The State PLD 1963 SC 478 and Hataand others v. The State PLD 1967 Lah. 1302 ref.(b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)??????S. 426(1)???Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S.320??? Suspension of sentence ?? Accused,a Mini Bus driver, in a case of a fatal accident had been convicted and sentenced underS.320, P.P.C. and his appeal against his conviction and sentence had beenadmitted???Offence being bailable accused after admission of his appeal was entitled tobe released on bail as a matter of right ???Sentence of accused was consequentlysuspended and he was released on bail accordingly. [p. 2101 BMian Mahmud Ali Qasuri and others v. The State PLD 1963 SC 478 and Hataand others v. The State PLD 1967 Lah. 1302 ref.