Summary: Bail granted ----- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 377-B & S. 506(ii)---Post-arrest bail---Sexual abuse of a minor---Scope---Petitioner was accused of attempting sexual abuse of a minor aged 7/8 years and threatening the complainant with a weapon. The investigation revealed no medical examination or conclusive evidence of sexual abuse beyond an allegation of kissing the minor. Held, under S. 377-B, the offense of sexual abuse is broadly defined to include acts such as fondling and other explicit conduct, with severe punishments prescribed. However, given the limited evidence and the discretionary nature of bail under S. 497(2) Cr.P.C., a ground of further inquiry emerged. Cited Cases: • Fida Ahmad v. The State 2020 YLR (N) [Gilgit-Baltistan Chief Court] 153 • Muhammad Makki v. The State and another 2010 PCr.L.J [Lahore] 1482 • Aziz Khan and another v. The State and another 2004 PCr.L.J [Peshawar] 490 • Muhammad Akbar v. The State 1987 MLD [Lahore] 3096 • Syed Azmat Hussain Shah v. The State 2009 PCr.L.J [Islamabad] 780 • Mukhtar Ahmad and others v. The State 1999 PCr.L.J [Lahore] 1107 (b) Anti-Rape (Investigation & Trial) Act, 2021 ----S. 8, S. 21---Prohibitory and preventive measures---Protection of victim and community---Post-arrest bail was granted with strict conditions, including maintaining distance from the victim and his family, and the imposition of prohibitory orders under the Anti-Rape Act to prevent contact with children or engaging in activities involving children. SHO was directed to provide protection to the victim and community under S. 8(1)(viii) and S. 21 of the Act, ensuring confidence restoration in the victim's family and community safety from potential future harm. (c) Child Rights and International Conventions ----Child protection measures---Incorporation of international principles---Court emphasized adherence to the Child Rights Convention (CRC) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). Recommendations such as mandatory restraining orders, monitoring, and other protective measures akin to the UK's Sexual Offences Prevention Order (SOPO) were highlighted to safeguard children and prevent reoffending. (d) Judicial Discretion---Public Policy Considerations ----Non-compoundable offense---Post-arrest bail---Scope of compromise---While the offense under S. 377-B is non-compoundable, the court, considering the compounding statement of the complainant and the circumstances of the case, deemed no useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner incarcerated, especially when the investigation was complete. Disposition: Post-arrest bail granted subject to conditions, including undertaking by the petitioner’s parents to ensure no contact with the victim or their family, and protective measures imposed to safeguard the community and prevent future abuse. Police directed to enforce measures under the Anti-Rape Act, 2021, and Ministry of Law instructed to frame rules for prevention, protection, and rehabilitation under S. 19 of the Act.

Summary: Bail denied----Background: The petitioner sought post-arrest bail on the grounds of statutory delay in the conclusion of his trial. The case involves allegations against the petitioner for committing sodomy with a minor, as recorded in an FIR filed by the victim's father. The petitioner argued that the trial, initiated on 21.03.2021, had not yet concluded, constituting a delay sufficient to justify bail. ----Issues: 1- Is the petitioner entitled to bail on the grounds of statutory delay in the conclusion of his trial? 2- Does the statutory delay attributed to various parties, including the prosecution, defense, and external factors, justify the grant of bail? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court denied the petitioner's request for bail, determining that the delay in the trial's conclusion could not be solely attributed to the prosecution. The delay was found to be contributory, involving the defense, prosecution, and external factors such as the non-availability of the presiding officer and strikes. The court emphasized that granting bail based on the delay alone would be inappropriate, especially given the gravity of the allegations against the petitioner. The court highlighted that, under the fourth proviso of section 497 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), individuals charged with severe crimes, such as the one alleged, could be denied bail despite statutory delays. The court cited precedent cases where the severity and nature of the alleged crime justified denying bail. -----Citations/Precedents: Allah Wasava vs. The State & others: PLD 2022 Supreme Court 541 This case discusses the criteria for determining if an accused can be treated as a hardened, desperate, or dangerous criminal under section 497(1) Cr.P.C., even in the absence of a prior criminal record. Rehmat Ullah vs. The State & another: 2011 SCMR 1332 The court should not grant or cancel bail when the trial is in progress.

Summary: Background: This criminal appeal was filed by a juvenile, challenging his conviction under Sections 377 and 377-B of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in FIR No. 353, dated 10.10.2020, Police Station City B-Division, Chishtian, District Bahawalnagar. The appellant was sentenced by the Juvenile Court to 10 years' simple imprisonment under Section 377 PPC and 14 years' simple imprisonment under Section 377-B PPC. Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently, and the appellant was also fined. The appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellant's conviction under both Section 377 and 377-B PPC is legally valid, considering the doctrine of merger. 2- Whether the sentence imposed under Section 377 PPC is appropriate, given that the appellant was a juvenile and a first offender. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Conviction under Sections 377 and 377-B PPC: The court held that the appellant could not be convicted under both Section 377 (unnatural lust) and Section 377-B (sexual abuse) simultaneously. The court applied the doctrine of merger, which states that when a single act fulfills the definitions of two separate offenses, the lesser offense merges into the greater offense. In this case, the graver offense of sodomy under Section 377 PPC encompassed the lesser offense of sexual abuse under Section 377-B PPC. As a result, the conviction under Section 377-B PPC was set aside. --Sentence under Section 377 PPC: The court upheld the conviction under Section 377 PPC, finding that the prosecution had provided credible evidence, including a positive DNA report. However, considering that the appellant was a juvenile, a first offender, and a student at the time of the offense, the court reduced the sentence from 10 years to 2 years' simple imprisonment. The court also imposed a fine of Rs. 10,000, with a default sentence of two months’ simple imprisonment in case of non-payment of the fine. The benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant, allowing for the time already served to be deducted from the sentence. -----Citations/Precedents: The State vs. Abdul Malik alias Malkoo (PLD 2000 Lah 449) Bashir Ahmed vs. The State (1985 P.Cr.LJ 1516 Lahore) Lashkar and others vs. The State (1987 P.Cr.LJ 1034 Lahore) Ahmad Daud-ul-Hussaini vs. The State (2008 SCMR 111) Fiaz Muhammad vs. The State (1981 P.Cr.LJ 12 Karachi) Zafar Iqbal alias Kala vs. The State (2013 P.Cr.LJ 645 Lahore) Khalid Iqbal vs. The State (1991 P.Cr.LJ 443 Federal Shariat Court)

Summary: (Allowed) The petitioner, Saghir Ahmed, along with three co-accused, was tried for committing sodomy with the son of the complainant. The trial court acquitted the co-accused but convicted the petitioner under Section 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and sentenced him to ten years of rigorous imprisonment (RI) along with a fine. On appeal, the High Court maintained the conviction but reduced the sentence to five years of RI. The petitioner filed a jail petition seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined the evidence presented and noted contradictions in the statements of the witnesses. The medical evidence did not conclusively support the prosecution's case. The court emphasized the principle that if there is any doubt in the evidence, the benefit of the doubt should be given to the accused. Citing previous judgments, the court held that a single doubt or loophole in the prosecution's case should be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and acquitted the petitioner of the charge. The petitioner was ordered to be released from jail unless detained in any other case. The well-established principle of law states that when there are two possible interpretations of the evidence presented in a case, one suggesting the guilt of the accused and the other indicating innocence, the interpretation favoring the accused should be adopted. This principle finds support in the cases of Shahid Orakzai Vs. Pakistan Muslim League (2000 SCMR 1969), jjz Hussain Vs. The State (2002 SCMR 1455), lftikhar Hussain and others Vs. The State (2004 SCMR 1185), and Muhammad Zubair Vs The State (2010 SCMR 182). It is important to note that the severity of the offense alone is not sufficient grounds to convict an accused if it is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The legal and equitable principle holds that it is better to let a hundred guilty persons go free than to allow one innocent person to suffer. This sentiment was expressed by the eminent English jurist William Blackstone, who wrote, "Better that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." Benjamin Franklin, a prominent figure in early American history, further emphasized this point, stating that "it is better a hundred guilty persons should escape than one innocent person should suffer." In the present case, the report from the Forensic Science Laboratory raises doubts about the prosecution's case, providing a basis for the petitioner to be granted the benefit of the doubt. It is well established in law that for the accused to receive this benefit, it is not necessary for there to be multiple circumstances creating uncertainty. Even if there is only one doubt, the petitioner is entitled to the benefit. The court, in the case of Mst. Asia Bibi Vs. The State (PLO 2019 SC 64), while relying on previous judgments, categorically stated that if a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in a prudent mind regarding the guilt of the accused, the accused should be entitled to such benefit as a matter of right, rather than as a mere grace or concession. Relevant cases supporting this view include Twig Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345) and Avub Masih V. The State (PLO 2002 SC 1048). The same view was reiterated in Abdul bbar vs. State (2019 SCMR 129), where the court observed that once a single loophole is identified in the prosecution's case, such as a conflict between eyewitness accounts and medical evidence or doubts about the credibility of witnesses, the benefit of that loophole automatically favors the accused. A conviction must be based on evidence that is unimpeachable, trustworthy, and reliable. Any doubts arising in the prosecution's case should be resolved in favor of the accused. In the present case, as discussed above, the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

Summary: Background: A writ petition was filed seeking the recovery of a minor girl who was allegedly abducted and later claimed to have entered into a marriage contract with an adult man. The petitioner alleged that the minor was unlawfully taken and sought her custody. The court placed the minor in Dar-ul-Aman for protection while determining the validity of the marriage and the minor’s legal capacity to consent. The court also examined statutory and constitutional provisions addressing child welfare, marriage, and sexual abuse. -----Issues: 1- Can a minor under 18 years of age legally consent to a marriage? -----2- Does puberty alone establish the legal competence of a minor to enter into a marriage contract under Pakistani law? -----3- Is a marriage contract involving a minor valid when it entails conduct defined as rape or sexual abuse under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)? -----4- Who should have custody of the minor pending the resolution of the matter? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court declared that a minor under the age of 18 years cannot validly consent to marriage. A purported marriage involving a minor is void ab initio as it violates statutory laws prohibiting child marriages and sexual exploitation. --Statutory Provisions: The court emphasized that under the Majority Act, 1875, a person below 18 years is a minor. Sections 375 and 377A PPC criminalize any sexual activity involving a minor, even with purported consent. A marriage contract involving a minor thus has an unlawful object and is void. --Islamic Personal Law: The court clarified that Muslim Personal Law is subject to statutory enactments, which take precedence when regulating marriage and child protection. --UNCRC Compliance: The court referenced Pakistan’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which protects children under 18 years from exploitation and mandates their welfare as a primary consideration. --Public Policy: Allowing such marriages would undermine laws ensuring the welfare, safety, and education of minors, particularly females, and is against constitutional protections for children. The minor was ordered to be released into the custody of her mother. The respondent claiming to be her husband was directed to pay litigation costs. The court also recommended legislative clarity to address inconsistencies in child marriage laws. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2018 Islamabad 385 (Determination of age through NADRA records without requiring medical examination) PLD 2020 Islamabad 28 (Directions to curb child marriages) PLD 1970 SC 323 (Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmed) (Marriage of a girl under 16 attracts criminal liability but does not automatically invalidate the marriage contract; distinguished due to subsequent legal developments) 2000 PCr.LJ 226 (Tariq Mahmood v. The State) (Minors are not competent to contract marriage) 2012 PCr.LJ 11 (Muhammad Aslam v. The State) (Marriage requires "consenting adults") 2016 PCr.LJ Note 61 (A minor cannot give consent) 2002 SCMR 1694 (Societe Generale De Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan) (International obligations in statutory interpretation) 2021 SCMR 1401 (Yar Muhammad Khan v. Sajjad Abbas) (Minors lack capacity to contract) PLD 1994 SC 693 (Shehla Zia v. WAPDA) (Right to life includes a meaningful existence) PLD 2016 SC 17 (Malik Mumtaz Qadri v. State) (Judicial limits in interpreting Shari’ah law)

Summary: Case involving the marriage of a minor under the age of 18 --- A child is defined as a person who has not reached the age of 18 and must be under the care of a parent, guardian, or other caregiver. --- A female child below the age of 18 cannot be considered legally competent to give consent to a marriage contract solely based on physical signs of puberty. --- Sections 375 and 377A of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) are considered mandatory provisions, and any marriage contract involving a child under the age of 18 is void from the beginning. --- Consent for sexual conduct cannot be given by a child under the age of 18 or by a parent or guardian on behalf of the child. Sexual conduct with a child is considered a crime. --- Various laws within Pakistan establish the age of 18 as the threshold for various rights and responsibilities, such as obtaining a National Identity Card, voting, and obtaining a driver's license. --- Protecting the rights and well-being of children is a paramount duty of society, and the legal system must ensure their protection. -- The court orders the release of a minor from a shelter into the custody of her mother, with responsibilities outlined for the mother and her husband under the Islamabad Capital Territory Child Protection Act, 2018. --- The court directs the relevant authorities to take note of inconsistencies and potential conflicts in existing laws regarding the marriage age and child protection.

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 364-A & 377---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 39---Sodomy---Appreciation ofevidence---Medical evidence---Offence---Determination--Confession before police---Accused persons were alleged to have abducted complainant and committed sodomy withhim---Trial Court convicted both the accused persons for abducting complainant andsentenced them to imprisonment for life---Validity---Medical evidence was a corroborativepiece of evidence coupled with statement of victim---Evasive denial without any allegationof false implication had concluded that offence of sodomy punishable under S. 377, P.P.C.was established---Prosecution's case carried two versions, one introduced bycomplainant/victim and another brought on record through disclosure of one convict---Confession before police was discarded as the same was not admissible in evidence---Otherdetails or narrations mentioned/made in such disclosure could not be accepted also---Statement/any piece of evidence was to be accepted or rejected in toto and not otherwise---Version introduced by accused persons could not be trusted, as the same was not worthy ofcredit---Carnal intercourse was committed with complainant and the same was proved onrecord---High Court altered the charge framed for an offence punishable under S. 364-A,P.P.C. to offence of sodomy captioned as unnatural offence punishable under S. 377, P.P.C.---High Court reduced sentence of imprisonment from life to ten years---Appeal wasdismissed, in circumstances.

Summary: Background: The appellant was convicted by the Additional District Judge - VII, Quetta, under sections 376 and 377 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) for committing the rape and unnatural offenses against two minor victims, Hafza Afzal and Urwa Batool. The trial court sentenced him to death on two counts and life imprisonment on two counts for the respective crimes. The appellant challenged the judgment in the High Court through a criminal jail appeal, while the trial court also sent a murder reference for the confirmation of the death sentence. -----Issues: 1- Whether the conviction of the appellant under sections 376 and 377, PPC, was supported by sufficient evidence. -----2- Whether the death sentence awarded to the appellant was justified. -----3- Whether the prosecution successfully proved the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court upheld the appellant's conviction under sections 376 and 377, PPC, based on strong oral, direct, circumstantial, and medical evidence. The prosecution's case was supported by the testimony of the victims, corroborating witness statements, the recovery of pornographic material, and expert analysis. The court found the defense's arguments unconvincing, as the appellant failed to provide any concrete defense or point out contradictions in the prosecution's case. However, regarding the quantum of sentence, the court did not agree with the trial court's decision to impose the death penalty. The court noted that not all the victims were produced in court, and there were delays in reporting the crimes by some victims. Given these factors, the death sentence was deemed unwarranted, and the court reduced the sentence to life imprisonment on two counts. The remaining sentences, including fines and compensation to the victims, were upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 376, Pakistan Penal Code Section 377, Pakistan Penal Code Fayyaz alis Fayyazi and another v. The State (2006 SCMR 1042) Feroz Ahmed Khan v. Fasihullah Sheikh (2007 YLR 2377)

Summary: Value of Res gestae evidence and informal admission----The Judgment issued by the learned trial court in the case FIR dated 11.03.2013 u/s 367-A/ 377/ 302 PPC Police Station Saddar, District Mandi Bahauddin. The prosecution's case relied on several types of evidence, including last seen evidence, evidence of Wajtakkar (informants), extra-judicial confession, medical evidence, and recovery of items. However, the court found issues with the credibility and reliability of each type of evidence presented by the prosecution. Regarding last seen evidence, the court noted inconsistencies and improbabilities in witness statements and highlighted the weakness of such evidence, citing legal precedents such as "Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another" (PLJ 2008 SC 687). Similarly, the evidence of Wajtakkar was found lacking in corroboration and reliability, as per the case of "Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others" (2003 SCMR 477). The court also analyzed the extra-judicial confession made by the appellants and found it to be insufficient and unreliable, referring to the case of "Tahir Javed Vs. The State" (2009 SCMR 166). In terms of medical evidence, the court emphasized that while it may confirm certain aspects of the case, it does not directly connect the accused with the crime, citing "Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another" (PLJ 2008 SC 687). The court further discussed the concept of circumstantial evidence and its admissibility, referencing "Shabbir Hussain alias Sukku v. The state" (PLD 2003 SC 368) and "Lal Shah v. The State" (1970 SCMR 743), and concluded that the prosecution failed to provide evidence meeting the required standards. Ultimately, the court allowed the appeal, overturned the convictions and sentences, acquitted the appellants, and declined to confirm the death sentences, based on the insufficiency and unreliability of the prosecution's evidence, as discussed in detail throughout the judgment.

Summary: Sections 377/34 PPC, 53 Child Protection Act, 2010.i. Factors in consideration for the grant of bail are considerable delay in lodging of the FIR, medical evidence inconsistent with the act of commission of sodomy.ii. Accused-petitioner being minor and semen of human origin was not detected on his articles.iii. Purpose behind enactment of law; whether the victim falls within the definition of child at risk or otherwise.iv. Applicability of Section 53 of the Act of 2010 is a begging question.v. Non-compliance of Section 164-B Cr.PC as no samples were obtained for DNA. Bail allowed.