Summary: Background:In the case of M/s Saeed Buksh (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mst. Azra Bibi, the respondent filed an eviction petition under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 against the appellant. The appellant was proceeded against ex parte, resulting in the acceptance of the ejectment petition. Subsequently, the appellant filed an application seeking setting aside of the ex parte order, along with an application under sections 5 & 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay. Despite the respondent's failure to file a reply to these applications or controvert the attached affidavits, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the applications, leading to the filing of the instant appeal.----Issues:The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant was condemned unheard due to improper service of notice and whether the application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed within the prescribed limitation period. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the procedural irregularities warranted setting aside the ex parte order and remanding the case for fresh consideration.-----Holding:The Lahore High Court held that the appellant was condemned unheard due to improper service of notice, as there was no evidence to suggest that proper service had been affected. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the principle of Audi Alteram Partem and decided to set aside the impugned order. The court also noted that the application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed within the limitation period prescribed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for fresh consideration.----Citations and Precedents:Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Ibrahim, 1976 SCMR 79Nasim Nizami v. Habib Bank Limited, 2006 CLC 1213-LahoreM. Imam Ud Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through The Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad, PLD 1972 Supreme Court 123Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another v. Muhammad Arif, PLD 2015 Supreme Court 137Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others, PLD 2016 Supreme Court 712Allah Ditta v. Aziz Din, PLD 1981 Lahore 508

Summary: Discussion: (1) In the time barred petitions filed by the Government, administrative delays due to lengthy procedure cannot be considered sufficient cause. (2) No preferential treatment can be accorded to Government Departments for condoning the delay. (3) Law aids those who are vigilant but not those who are sleeping or slumbering. (4) SOP (PLD 2003 Journal 95) made out for this purpose has not been implemented----The petitioner sought condonation of a 31-day delay in filing the petition, arguing that the delay was due to administrative procedures and circumstances beyond their control. However, the court found the explanation for the delay insufficient, highlighting a trend where government departments routinely seek condonation of delay without adequate justification. M/s SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractors thr. Regional Director v. Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and others (2022 SCMR 1615): Government departments are treated like ordinary parties before the court, and no preferential treatment is given to them. Food Department, Gujranwala thr. Deputy Director and others v. Ghulam Farid Awan (2010 SCMR 1899): Government cases filed beyond the time limit might be to favor litigants or to hide illegality or negligence. No preferential treatment should be given to government functionaries. Khuda Bakhsh and others v. Muzaffar thr. L.Rs. and others (2007 SCMR 1032): Delays caused by lethargy in government offices are not considered sufficient grounds for condonation. Government of Pakistan thr. Ministry of Works and another v. M/s Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot (2006 SCMR 1248): Delays cannot be condoned without sufficient cause; laxity, carelessness, and a cursory approach are not sufficient grounds. Province of Punjab v. Sh. M. Riaz Shahid (2005 SCMR 1435): Government entities cannot be treated differently from ordinary litigants regarding limitations. Delay due to government processes is not a sufficient ground for condonation. Province of Punjab thr. Secretary Education v. Kishwar Qudus Paul (2004 SCMR 571): Delays in government offices cannot be considered sufficient cause for condonation. Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, Karachi and another v. Muhammad Rafique Siddiqui (2004 PLC (C.S.) 962): Completion of formalities is not sufficient grounds for condoning delay. These cases underscored the principle that the law treats government departments and litigants equally and that delays caused by government processes or negligence are not automatically grounds for condonation. Each case must be examined on its merits, and sufficient cause must be shown for condoning delay. The court emphasized the need for government departments to adhere to strict timelines and procedures and highlighted the consequences of failing to do so. Ultimately, the court dismissed the application for condonation of delay and the Civil Petition itself, directing relevant authorities to take note of the judgment for compliance and information.

Summary: (a) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– ----Arts. 46, 64 & 95 – Leading evidence by attorney – Evidentiary value – Admissibility of testimony by an attorney-holder – Suit for specific performance based on oral and written agreements, where the plaintiff did not appear as a witness and instead relied on an attorney-holder to testify – Held, an attorney-holder cannot depose for the principal regarding facts of which the principal alone has personal knowledge and is required to be cross-examined – If an attorney has not personally witnessed or participated in the transaction, their testimony is inadmissible – Plaintiff’s non-appearance warranted an adverse inference under the principle that a party who withholds best evidence must suffer consequences – Trial court rightly disregarded attorney-holder’s testimony in the absence of the plaintiff’s own evidence – Appeal dismissed. Cited Cases: • Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin (1998 SCMR 2296) • Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar and another v. Syed Ehsan ur Rehman and others (2022 SCMR 1398) • Maan Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010 SCC 512) (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) –– ----S. 54 – Effect of unregistered agreements to sell – Rights of the parties – Agreements to sell must be registered to confer any title or interest in immovable property – Held, under S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of immovable property valued above one hundred rupees must be made through a registered document – Plaintiff’s reliance on unregistered agreements (Exh.P-3 and Exh.P-5) was legally untenable as such documents do not create or transfer ownership rights – Non-registration rendered the agreements unenforceable, and no title could be claimed on their basis. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Mst. Baseerat and others (2017 SCMR 367) (c) Registration Act (XVI of 1908) –– ----S. 49 – Effect of non-registration – Held, as per S. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, an unregistered document cannot be used to establish, declare, or transfer any legal title in immovable property – Plaintiff did not produce any evidence proving a legal impediment to registering the agreements – Mere possession, without a registered instrument, did not create ownership rights – Appeal dismissed as unregistered agreements were legally ineffective. (d) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) –– ----S. 53-A – Protection under doctrine of part performance – Scope – Plaintiff invoked S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, claiming that possession was handed over in part performance of the agreement – Held, S. 53-A does not exempt an agreement from mandatory registration but only protects a party from eviction if they have taken possession under a valid contract – Provision can be used as a shield but not as a sword to establish ownership – In absence of a validly registered document, no enforceable right was created in favor of the plaintiff. Cited Cases: • Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002 SCC 676) (e) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– ----Burden of proof – Sale consideration – Absence of evidence – Plaintiff failed to prove that the sale price was paid, as there was no record of bank transactions, property sales, or any financial dealings establishing the alleged payment – Held, in the absence of documentary proof of payment, mere oral assertions were insufficient to establish ownership – Failure to prove financial capability to purchase the property weakened the plaintiff’s case. (f) Administration of justice –– ----Limitation – Lapse of time – Suit for specific performance filed after a significant delay of 17 years from the first agreement and 12 years from the second agreement – Plaintiff provided no justification for the delay or evidence of any attempts to enforce her alleged rights earlier – Held, specific performance being an equitable relief cannot be granted when a party fails to act diligently – Delay in filing weakened the credibility of the claim. Cited Cases: • Liaqat Khan v. Falak Sher (PLD 2014 SC 506) • Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others (2019 SCMR 524) • Arif Shah v. Abdul Hakeem Qureshi (PLD 1991 SC 905) (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) –– ----Discretionary nature of specific performance – Relief of specific performance is not an absolute right but a discretionary remedy – Held, courts must assess whether enforcing a contract would be just and equitable – Plaintiff failed to meet legal standards for specific performance due to non-registration of agreements, absence of evidence of sale consideration, and unexplained delay – Court rightly exercised its discretion to refuse the relief sought. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz Hussain v. Zahoor Ul Hassan (2021 SCMR 431) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Safia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (h) Islamabad Capital Territory –– ----Protection of immovable property – Authority of CDA – CDA directed to take possession of the suit property within 15 days to prevent further unlawful occupation – CDA to preserve the property, clear outstanding utility dues, and restrict any title changes until legal heirs are formally declared – Held, state is obligated under Article 24 of the Constitution to protect private property from illegal claims and encroachments. Disposition: Appeal dismissed – CDA directed to take possession of property – Legal heirs directed to establish inheritance rights through competent court – No ownership rights conferred to the appellant.

Summary: The petition was filed with a delay of 11 days. The petitioners sought to condone the delay through CMA No. 10322/2022, explaining that they had to fulfill certain formalities and obtain permission from higher authorities before filing the petition. During the hearing, the court inquired about the amount of revenue involved, which was stated to be 2.8 million rupees, while a court fee of 250 rupees was payable for the petition. The court further inquired whether any action was taken against the person responsible for the delayed filing, to which it was informed that no such action was taken. The court expressed surprise that the petitioners risked losing a claim of 2.8 million rupees to save a court fee of 250 rupees. It criticized the petitioners for neglecting the larger goal and emphasized that if decisions are to be challenged, they should be done within the prescribed period. In this case, since there was no valid reason to condone the delay, the court dismissed the application to condone the delay and consequently dismissed the petition for leave to appeal.

Summary: Excessive adjournments ---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –– O.XI, Rr.1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 11 & 21 –– Interrogatories –– Power of court to direct discovery –– Scope and compliance requirements The trial court is empowered under the amended Rule 1 of Order XI, CPC (as amended by Lahore High Court, 2018), to direct parties to deliver interrogatories in writing and to specify which of the interrogatories are to be answered. Once interrogatories are served, Rule 2 requires their communication to the other party for submission of replies within a specified time. Rules 6 and 7 allow objections and applications to strike out irrelevant or oppressive interrogatories, but the time period for such applications is seven days. In the instant case, the petitioner failed to comply with the court’s directions by seeking repeated adjournments and filing objections nearly two months late without seeking condonation of delay or showing exceptional circumstances. The trial court lawfully overruled the objections under Rule 7 and directed submission of replies, and this action was held to be within jurisdiction and consistent with the principles of procedural discipline. —Leave to appeal was refused. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) –– O.XI, R.21 –– Non-compliance with interrogatory order –– Striking off defence –– Judicial discretion –– Contumacious conduct –– Interpretation of “order to answer” Under Rule 21 of Order XI, CPC, a court may strike out the defence for non-compliance with an “order to answer interrogatories.” The term includes both orders under Rule 2 (initial submission) and Rule 11 (requiring proper response after insufficiency). The Supreme Court held that the trial court acted within its powers in striking out the defence of the petitioner, who failed to answer interrogatories even after receiving multiple opportunities and a final warning. Petitioner’s default was deemed willful and contumacious given his prolonged dilatory conduct over several years of proceedings, including over 80 adjournments and a four-year delay in filing his written statement. The court rejected the argument that the action could only be taken upon written application by the opposing party, holding that oral opposition suffices under Rule 21 and the Lahore High Court amendments empower proactive judicial management of interrogatories. —Leave to appeal was declined. (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction –– Art. 185(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan –– Discretionary jurisdiction of Supreme Court –– Conduct of petitioner material in exercise of discretion The Supreme Court reiterated that the grant of leave under Article 185(3) is discretionary and the petitioner’s conduct is a relevant consideration. A party that has repeatedly delayed proceedings, disobeyed court directions, and abused procedural opportunities is not entitled to discretionary indulgence of the Court. In the present case, the petitioner’s consistent pattern of protracting litigation, including refusal to answer interrogatories despite judicial warnings, justified the denial of leave. —Petitions dismissed. (d) Administration of Justice –– Delay in civil trials –– Role of trial courts –– Need for case management and enforcement of orders The Court highlighted systemic concerns over delay in civil litigation and emphasized the importance of trial courts enforcing procedural orders with firmness. Judges must balance courtesy with control and refrain from granting repetitive “last and final” adjournments, which erode public confidence and undermine judicial authority. A peremptory order, once made, must be backed by legal consequences in case of non-compliance. The case serves as a judicial endorsement of active case management and procedural discipline in civil trials. —Observations endorsed; trial court action upheld. (e) Civil Procedure –– Interrogatories –– Misuse of process –– Purpose and limits The Court reaffirmed the purpose of interrogatories under Order XI as a tool to narrow down issues, reduce trial length, and secure admissions. However, it noted with disapproval the abuse of the process in this case where interrogatories became a means to delay rather than expedite trial. The Court observed that civil courts must encourage the fair use of interrogatories, in line with the purpose of inexpensive and expeditious justice, and discourage any misuse that frustrates judicial efficiency. —Abuse condemned; due process clarified. (f) Dissenting Opinion –– Application of penal provision under O.XI, R.21 CPC –– Whether default was willful –– Delay due to genuine hardship –– Discretion ought to have been exercised cautiously Justice Ayesha A. Malik (dissenting) agreed with the majority regarding dismissal of objections (C.P. No. 3436-L/2022) but differed on the legality of striking off defence (C.P. No. 3437-L/2022). She held that the petitioner’s failure to submit replies between 08.11.2022 and 24.11.2022 was due to a genuine and well-known event — a public assassination attempt and hospitalization — which was acknowledged in court orders. Therefore, the delay was not willful, and the extreme penal consequence of striking off defence was neither warranted nor proportionate. Courts must exercise caution in applying Rule 21 CPC, especially when alternative measures such as costs could achieve compliance. She held that trial court’s order was mechanically passed and failed to account for legitimate hardship. —Dissenting view: Order striking defence set aside and case remanded to trial court for one final opportunity. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused by majority (2–1). Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases: • Moon Enterpriser v. SNGPL 2020 SCMR 300 • Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi PLJ 1987 SC 636 • Mirza Ali Khan v. Mst. Shahida Parveen 1992 SCMR 2112 • Babar Sewing Machine Company v. Tirlok Nath Mahajan (1978) 4 SCC 188 • Miss Santosh Mehta v. Om Prakash (1980) 3 SCC 610 • Bilmal Chand Jain v. Sri Gopal Agarwal (1981) 3 SCC 486 • Asha Rani Gupta v. Vineet Kumar (2022 SCC OnLine SC 829) • Qazi Naveed ul Islam v. District Judge (2023 SCP 32) ---- ''Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 185(3) of the Constitution to grant leave to appeal is discretionary. Conduct of a petitioner has a substantial bearing on the question of granting or declining such leave to him: (ii) Procedural rule prescribing the timeframe for doing a certain act in the course of the proceedings of a case should be followed as a rule and the departure therefrom can be made only as an exception in exceptional circumstances beyond the control of the party concerned; (iii) A radical approach is required to tackle the problem of delay in the litigation process by enforcing a court-controlled case management system, (iv) Granting repetitive adjournments with warnings of "last and final" and "absolute last and final" opportunity shatter confidence of litigant public in the court orders and consequentially weaken the authority and fiat of court: (v) A court has the power to take the penal action suo motu if its order is not complied with despite giving the warning of last opportunity for compliance. Toothless court is the worst form of injustice; (vi) Meaning and scope of the amended rules of Lahore High Court on the process of interrogatories, explained. ''

Summary: Background: The petitioner, Rehmdil, filed a constitutional petition challenging the judgments and decrees issued by the lower courts regarding a suit filed by the respondents (his wife and children) for recovery of dower and maintenance allowance. The trial court decreed the suit ex parte on 02.02.2021, awarding the respondents 250 misqal of gold as dower and maintenance payments. The petitioner appealed this judgment, but his appeal was dismissed as time-barred under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964. The petitioner then approached the High Court, seeking to overturn the decrees on the grounds that he was not given adequate opportunity to present his case and that the judgment was based on biased witness testimony. ----- Issues: ----1) Whether the ex parte judgment and decree passed by the trial court were justified. ----2) Whether the petitioner was denied adequate opportunity to defend his case before the trial court. ----3) Whether the decrees regarding the payment of dower and maintenance allowance should be upheld. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court upheld the trial court’s decision, finding that the petitioner had engaged counsel and appeared in court but later deliberately absented himself, leading to the ex parte decree. The petitioner's appeal was time-barred, and no reasonable justification was given to condone the delay. The petitioner did not contest the dower amount of 250 misqal of gold, and there was no evidence to suggest that the dower was deferred. Consequently, the decree regarding dower and maintenance was affirmed. The court emphasized that Family Courts are not bound by the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), allowing for a more expedient process. The trial court had acted within its authority by proceeding ex parte when the petitioner failed to appear. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit. ----- Citations/Precedents: West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964: Section 14: Governs appeals in family matters. Section 17: Excludes the application of the CPC and Evidence Act to expedite family litigation. Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir: Established that Family Courts are designed to provide swift resolution of matrimonial disputes and are not bound by the technicalities of CPC and Evidence Act. Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore: Affirmed that Family Courts have the inherent power to proceed ex parte if the defendant fails to file a written statement after being duly served.

Summary: (a) Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) ---- O. XX Rr. 1(2), 3 & 7; O. XLI Rr. 30 & 31 Judgment must always state the exact date on which it is written, signed and pronounced in open court—failure to do so frustrates the statutory scheme, obscures limitation periods and wastes judicial time; such omission is contrary to the mandatory wording of the cited rules and cannot be condoned. Cited cases: Iftikhar‑ud‑Din Haidar Gardezi v. Central Bank of India Ltd. 1996 SCMR 669; Muhammad Bakhsh v. State 1989 SCMR 1473; Fatima v. Sardara PLD 1956 (W.P.) Lah 474. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ---- O. X R. 1; O. XII R. 2; O. XIII; O. XXVI R. 2 Limitation for appeals, petitions for leave (60 days) and review (30 days) is computed from the date the judgment is actually pronounced; where that date is missing, courts must examine surrounding circumstances—upload date, certified‑copy applications, blue‑slip verification—to ensure litigants are not prejudiced. Petitions found to have been filed within time despite the office’s contrary note. (c) Administration of justice ---- Delay in writing judgments—Judicial misconduct A reserved judgment should ordinarily be delivered within 90 days and, in any event, no later than 120 days; excessive delay or back‑dating amounts to breach of Article X of the Judges’ Code of Conduct and may warrant rehearing. Cited cases: MFMY Industries Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1550; Muhammad Ovais v. Federation 2007 SCMR 1587; Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Mumtaz Begum 1979 CLC 114; Walayat Hussain v. Muhammad Hanif 1989 MLD 1012; M.K. Zaman v. Matiar Rahman 1969 PCrLJ 361. (d) Practice & procedure ---- Court directions Registrars of all High Courts directed to instruct every judge—of both superior and subordinate courts—to inscribe on each order and judgment the precise date of writing, signing and pronouncement, and to issue notice if pronouncement is deferred, so that future limitation disputes and waste of court time are avoided. (e) Civil miscellaneous applications—Condonation of delay In view of the undated High Court judgments and the evidence that they were first uploaded on 24‑3‑2022 and signed on 31‑3‑2022, the 60‑day period under O. XIII, Supreme Court Rules began on 31‑3‑2022; civil petitions filed well within time—applications allowed; Civil Petitions Nos. 1854‑L, 1855‑L, 1899‑L and 1900‑L of 2022 to be listed for regular hearing.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)-------S. 22(1), (2)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 5 & 29(2)---Civil Procedure Code (V of1908), O. XLIII, R. 3---Appeal---Statutory limitation---Condonation of delay---Advancenotice, non-issuance of---Appellants/borrowers were aggrieved of judgment and decreepassed by Trial Court---Appeal filed by appellants / borrowers was barred by 12 days andthey did not issue advance notice to respondent/Bank---Validity---Appellants/borrowers didnot furnish any sufficient cause for condonation of delay of 12 days in filing of appeal, whichwas barred by time and was liable to be dismissed---Reason mentioned byappellants/borrowers in application for condonation of delay was baseless and false,therefore, delay could not be condoned even in absence of counter affidavit byrespondent/Bank---Special limitation prescribed by S. 22(1) of Financial Institutions(Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, itself was not subject to application of S. 5 ofLimitation Act, 1908, due to bar contained in S. 29(2)(a) & (b) of Limitation Act, 1908---Reliance on S. 5 of Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay in filing appeal wasmisplaced---Provision of general law, (Limitation Act, 1908) did not apply to special law[Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001]---Appellants/borrowers didnot comply with the provision of S. 22(2) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances)Ordinance, 2001 before filing appeal, which provided for a notice of filing of appeal inaccordance with the provisions under O. XLIII, R. 3, C.P.C. to respondent/Bank, so that itcould appear to contest admission of appeal on the date fixed for hearing---Provisions of S.22(1) of Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, were mandatory andviolation thereof did not cure that illegality committed at filing of appeal---Appeal wasdismissed in circumstances. ----- Delay in Filing Appeal: The appeal was filed 12 days beyond the statutory limitation period, and the appellants did not issue an advance notice to the respondent bank as required by law.Condonation of Delay: The appellants sought condonation of the delay in filing the appeal, claiming they had no knowledge of the suit's institution. However, it was determined that their reason for the delay was false.Special Limitation: Section 22(1) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001, provides a specific limitation period for filing appeals, and it was found that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, was not applicable due to the special nature of the ordinance.Failure to Comply with Notice Requirement: The appellants also failed to comply with the requirement of giving notice to the respondent bank before filing the appeal, as mandated by Section 22(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001.Precedents: The judgment referenced previous cases, including Muhammad Khalid Naeem v. Habib Bank Limited (2018 CLD 1027) and Messrs Ashraf Agro v. H.B.L (2008 CLD 449), which emphasized the importance of complying with statutory limitations and notice requirements in such cases.Dismissal of the Appeal: In light of the above factors, the appeal was dismissed as it lacked merit.

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S.54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908) S.5---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay--- Scope---Appellants assailed judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Appeal was filed after a delay of 05 months---Appellants had not been able to sufficiently explain the inordinate delay within the parameters of law and the only reason furnished by the appellants was that they had been unable to accord the necessary sanctions from law department timely- --In the absence of any valid explanation of the delay for each and every day, the appeal was not maintainable---Appeal was dismissed. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Dismissal of suit, instituted, after period of limitation---Scope---Where an appeal is not filed within stipulated period, it creates valuable rights in favour of the opposite party, such valuable rights cannot be taken away unless very strong, convincing and solid grounds are shown for condoning the delay. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248 and Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 rel. Shahid Baloch, Additional A.G. for Appellants

Summary: (Detailed Judgement on Limitation) Computation of period of limitation prescribed by Section 12 mainly deals with appeals, application for leave to appeal, application for review judgment and application to set-aside an Award and these proceedings have the minimum time period prescribed in the Limitation Act which ranges between 15 to 90 days excluding the time consumed for obtaining the certified copies. Prolonging the restricted period of limitation which would frustrate the very purpose by which the legislature has curtailed the period of suspense and uncertainty for the litigants to ensure their peace of mind. Appeal Dismissed.