Summary: Background: The petitioner, a brother of the accused, challenged the rejection of an application for bail under Section 466 of the Cr.P.C. The accused was facing trial under Section 295-B PPC, and the petitioner argued that the accused was insane, supported by a medical board’s diagnosis of schizophrenia. The trial court rejected the bail application, referencing schizophrenia as a recoverable disease and citing the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Mst. Safia Bano vs. Home Department, Government of Punjab (PLD 2017 SC 18). -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court was correct in rejecting the bail application despite the medical board's diagnosis of the accused as insane. 2- Whether the proper procedure for determining the mental fitness of the accused had been followed by the trial court. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court set aside the trial court's order and held that the trial court had not adhered to the mandatory procedure under Sections 465 and 466 of the Cr.P.C. The court emphasized the need for a proper trial to determine the mental fitness of the accused through a “voir dire” (a trial within a trial). The court directed the trial court to obtain a fresh medical report following the procedure outlined by the Supreme Court in Mst. Safia Bano (PLD 2021 SC 488) and, if necessary, apply Section 466 for safe custody of the accused if found insane. The case was remanded to the trial court for compliance with the outlined legal processes. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Safia Bano vs. Home Department, Government of Punjab (PLD 2017 SC 18) Mst. Safia Bano and another vs. Home Department Government of Punjab through Secretary and others (PLD 2021 SC 488) Noor Jehan vs. The State (PLD 1980 Peshawar 103) Khan Baig vs. The State (PLD 1984 Lahore 434) Salim Uddin vs. The State (PLD 1985 Karachi 594) Said Rasool vs. Muhammad Fazil and another (1990 P Cr.L.J. 210) Muhammad Naseem vs. The State (1982 SCMR 754) Muhammad Saeed Waseer vs. D.F.C., Sialkot and others (1998 P Cr.L.J 1441) Shahbaz Ahmad vs. The State and others (2021 P Cr.L.J 1100)

Summary: Background: The appellants filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell under Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The trial court dismissed their suit on 17.12.2021 for failure to produce evidence. The appellants contended that despite the trial court’s contradictory order on 13.12.2021, which indicated that evidence was available, their case was dismissed. They argued that they were not provided with sufficient opportunities to present their evidence due to pending applications and adjournments not attributable to them. -----Issues: 1- Whether the appellants were denied sufficient opportunity to produce their evidence before the trial court. 2- Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the suit for specific performance by misapplying Order XVII Rule 3 of the C.P.C. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court found that the trial court had issued contradictory orders on 13.12.2021, stating both that the appellants' evidence was present and that it was not available. This inconsistency created ambiguity, and the High Court ruled that such an error should not prejudice the appellants. The principle that no one should suffer due to a court’s mistake (actus curiae neminem gravabit) was invoked. The High Court held that the appellants should be given another opportunity to present their evidence in the interest of justice. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case for further proceedings. -----Citations/Precedents: Homoeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed vs. Government of Punjab through its Secretary Health, Department & others (2022 SCMR 1546) Sikandar Hayat and another vs. the State and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 559) Abdul Qudoos vs. Commandant Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar & another (2022 SCP 352) Wasal Khan and others vs. Dr. Niaz Ali Khan (2016 SCMR 40)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a bank, challenged the order dated 28.10.2021 passed by the President’s Secretariat, directing the bank to compensate the respondent (a customer) for missing gold jewelry from a locker in the bank’s custody. The respondent had used the bank's locker services but discovered that her gold jewelry, weighing 16.50 tolas, was missing when she tried to access the locker in January 2020. Despite filing a complaint with the bank, her grievance was initially rejected. The respondent then filed a complaint with the Banking Mohtasib, which was dismissed. Upon representation to the President of Pakistan, the order was reversed, instructing the bank to compensate the respondent. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner-bank is liable to compensate the respondent for the missing jewelry. 2- Whether the procedure followed by the Banking Mohtasib and the President's Secretariat was lawful and within their jurisdiction. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court upheld the decision of the President’s Secretariat and dismissed the petition. The court emphasized that the relationship between a bank and its customer is based on trust, and the bank had a duty to secure the valuables stored in its lockers. By failing to adequately investigate the respondent's complaint and declining her request for redress, the bank violated its obligation to provide security. The court cited the State Bank of Pakistan's Circular No. 5 dated 5th June 2007, which mandates that all lockers must be insured and requires banks to compensate locker holders in case of damage or theft as per the insurance ceiling. The court further noted that the petitioner-bank’s failure to provide a counter-affidavit to dispute the respondent's sworn affidavit amounted to an admission of the respondent's claims. As a result, the court ordered the bank to release the insured amount to the respondent and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. -----Citations/Precedents: Abida Parveen vs. District Education Officer, Schools Elementary (Female) Mirpur & Others (2014 PLC (C.S) 999) Muhammad Nawaz vs. Mohsin Saleem (2016 MLD 1553) Iyaz-ul-Haq Chaudhary vs. NIB Bank Limited & Others (2016 CLD 1741) Muhammad Bachal vs. IXth Additional District Judge, Hyderabad & Another (2019 CLC Note 51) President of Pakistan through Chairman, P.W.R., Lahore vs. Sarfraz Khan (1980 CLC 541) Muhammad Farooq M. Memon Advocate vs. Government of Sindh (1986 CLC 1408) Messrs Holy Family Hospital through Administrator vs. Government of Sindh & Another (2009 PLC (C.S) 824) Quaid-e-Azam Medical College, Bahawalpur through Principal vs. Muhammad Aslam & Another (2009 YLR 1508)

Summary: The appellant was prosecuted, convicted and sentenced under Section 9-C of CNSA by the learned Judge Special Court C.N.S, Lahore------------The prosecution witnesses made a statement revealing that during the investigation, no connection of the appellant was found with Tanveer Irshad or he was aware of the presence of any narcotics substance concealed in the consignment-------The prosecution witnesses have not supported the prosecution version and these witnesses were not declared hostile by the learned trial court------------ Section 150 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not in terms or by necessary implication confine the exercise of the power by the Court to any particular stage of the examination of the witness to permit the person who calls a witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party-----------It is wide in scope, and the discretion is entirely left to the Court to exercise power when the circumstances demand. To confine this power to the stage of examination-in-chief is to make it ineffective in practice-----------A smat witness in his examination-in-chief faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the police, but in the cross-examination, he introduces statements contradicting what he said in the examination-in-chief--------In the instant case, the evidence against the appellant remains the same--------We observed that the prosecution witnesses deposed similar about the appellant's role, which was found during the investigation--------- In the course of cross-examination, when favorable answers had been elicited, the same would be considered by the learned trial court while passing the final judgment------------- The learned trial court, while passing the judgment, whereby conviction and sentence of the appellant was recorded, has not considered the above evidence of the prosecution witnesses--------In the present case, the prosecution has badly failed to establish that the appellant associated, facilitated, and abetted in booking parcels by using fake documents --------- In such eventuality it is not possible to uphold and sustain the judgment of conviction and sentence against the appellant------------Resultantly, appeal is allowed.

Summary: Bail granted----Background: The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case registered under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) involving a murder that took place on March 22, 2022. Initially, the report was filed against unknown persons, but the petitioner was taken into custody on April 15, 2022, under Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.). Despite a formal identification parade conducted on April 28, 2022, the petitioner was not identified by the complainant but was identified by another witness. The petitioner claimed that his identity had been improperly exposed through media coverage prior to the identification parade. ----Issues: 1- Whether the pre-trial exposure of the petitioner's identity through the media compromised the integrity of the identification parade. 2- Whether the petitioner was entitled to bail on the grounds of a flawed investigation process and premature exposure. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court granted the petitioner post-arrest bail. The reasoning was based on the fact that the petitioner’s identity was exposed in the media prior to the identification parade, which compromised the fairness of the process. The court observed that the police should have ensured that the accused’s identity was concealed until the formal identification before a magistrate. The premature media exposure raised doubts about the proceedings and necessitated further inquiry under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. The bail was granted against surety bonds of Rs. 300,000. Additionally, the court directed the Regional Police Officer (R.P.O.), Gujranwala, to investigate the matter and report to the court. The Inspector General of Police, Punjab, was instructed to prevent similar premature disclosures in future cases. ----Citations/Precedents: Section 302 PPC (Pakistan Penal Code) Section 54 Cr.P.C. (Criminal Procedure Code) Section 497(2) Cr.P.C.

Summary: Perusal of above reflects that the word consider within adjudication made by this Court amounts approval to be promoted, hence, concerned Authority has already recommended the case for approval, therefore, the petitioners case shall be approved as per recommendations within 15 days with compliance report.

Summary: I[Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXI, Rule.95, 100 &103 read with section 47), Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXXVII, Rule 1)] t is neither obligatory nor lawful to have always decide the application under section 47 and Order XXI rule 95, 100, 103 CPC by recording the evidence. It actually depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The learned Single Judge has done nothing wrong while dismissing the application summarily since there was no material or facts which were required to be investigated.

Summary: Held that it is misconceived on part of the petitioner that bar contained under Article 212 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is not attracted in the present case, since probe on the basis of which the petitioner has been compulsorily retired does not relate to his post-appointment period but pertains to his initial appointment/induction as EST/SVT inasmuch as Section 4 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 pertains to the ?appointment' of a person to a civil service or a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province and contemplates that such appointment is to be in accordance with the prescribed rules whereas Section 15 of the Act pertains to efficiency and discipline. Meaning thereby that appointment to the post is part of the larger ambit of the terms and conditions of service under the Act being the first step towards the same and must be in accordance with prescribed procedure since such appointment triggers applicability of remaining terms and conditions pertaining to the service of a civil servant, inter alia, probation, confirmation, seniority, promotion, posting, transfer, termination, removal and the disciplinary proceedings under the law. Moreover, the law does not create any distinction between the probe against a civil servant for any wrong done at the time of his induction/initial appointment or after such appointment of a civil servant.

Summary: Background: Petitioners, owners of newly established flour mills, challenged the legality of Clause VII in the Notification No. SO (F-1) 3-46/2020(W.E) dated 19.05.2022 issued by the Secretary Food, Government of Punjab. Clause VII of the Notification prohibited new flour mills from receiving wheat from public stock during the current release season. ----Issues: 1- Whether Clause VII of the Notification is beyond the powers conferred under Section 3 of the Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958. 2- Whether the restriction in Clause VII offends Articles 8, 18, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Authority and Legislation: The court reviewed the powers granted under the Punjab Foodstuffs (Control) Act, 1958, which allows the government to regulate the supply and distribution of foodstuffs to ensure equitable distribution and fair prices. --Reasonable Classification: The court examined whether the classification created by the impugned Clause VII between existing flour mills and newly established mills was reasonable and based on intelligible criteria. The court found that the restriction was arbitrary and lacked a rational basis. --Precedent and Legal Principles: The court referenced several precedents, including Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of N.W.F.P. (1997 SCMR 1804) and others, establishing that any differentiation must be reasonable and not arbitrary. --Violation of Constitutional Rights: The court held that the restriction violated the petitioners' rights under Articles 18 and 25 of the Constitution, which protect the freedom to conduct business and the right to equality. The court struck down Clause VII of the Notification, declaring it unconstitutional and unlawful. The court directed that the newly established flour mills with valid licenses be entitled to receive wheat from the public stock. The petitions were allowed, ensuring that all flour mills, regardless of when they were established, would be treated equally regarding the distribution of wheat from public stocks. ----Citations/Precedents: Government of N.W.F.P. v. Mejee Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (1997 SCMR 1804) Director Food, N.-W.F.P. v. Messrs Madina Flour and General Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 1) Ibrahim Flour and General Mills v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2008 Lahore 184) Messrs Ibrar Flour Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Punjab (1997 MLD 2184)

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------S. 42---Suit for negative declaration seeking only the disentitlement of defendants in suit property---Maintainability---Interpretation of S.42, Specific Relief Act, 1877---Plaintiff sought declaration to the effect that the defendants had no interest in the suit property and were not entitled to sell or dispose of, the same---Question before the High Court was whether plaintiffs could seek such negative declaration in relation to the disentitlement of the defendants without claiming in ownership , interest or legal character for themselves in relation to the suit property ---Held, that plaintiffs had not sought relief in respect of property in question for themselves, nor any legal character had been attributed to suit property, hence no entitlement in terms of S.42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 was available to the plaintiffs---Plaintiffs had sought declaration to the effect that defendants had no locus standi or right in relation to the suit property; however such prayer would not entitle the plaintiffs to file suit for declaration when they were not claiming any interest, title or legal character in the property, and especially when defendants had established their interest in the property by placing a registered sale deed---Suit for negative declaration was only maintainable in certain exceptional cases---When a plaintiff demonstrated some interest in the property to which some legal sanctity could be attached only then plaintiffs could seek some legal character in terms of S.42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877---Suit for declaration, in the present case, sought declaration to the disentitlement of the defendants, and was not maintainable---Suit was dismissed, accordingly.