Summary: Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (Section 31 (7)------ In light of the foregoing, we reach to an irresistible conclusion that the exercise of passing monthly FCA on to the petitioners on the basis of NEPRAs determination dated 27.12.2019 is in accordance with law and the timeline provided under Section 31(7) of the Act, 1997 be adhered to, unless any party is restricted for a reason beyond its control, which is a case at hand. The Petitioners clearly failed to avail statutory remedies under the law while the impugned determination was being made and even thereafter, nonetheless there is no cavil that the petitioners owe FCA component to K-Electric and liable to satisfy this debt. These instant Petitions being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, a public limited company, challenged an order issued by the Punjab Information Commission (the Commission) under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The order directed the petitioner to provide certain information requested by a citizen under the Punjab Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013 (PTRI Act). The Commission ruled that while some personal information (such as names and identities of members) should remain private, the petitioner was still required to provide general information requested. The petitioner argued that it did not qualify as a "public body" under the PTRI Act and, therefore, was not obliged to disclose the information. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner qualifies as a "public body" under the PTRI Act. 2- Whether the grant of leasehold rights of state land amounts to "substantial financing" by the government, making the petitioner subject to the PTRI Act. 3- Whether the Commission's order to disclose information violates any statutory or constitutional provisions. 4- Whether the rule of ejusdem generis applies to restrict the definition of "public body" under the PTRI Act. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Public Body Definition: The court held that the petitioner fell within the definition of a "public body" under Section 2(h)(iv) of the PTRI Act. The petitioner, although a public limited company, received substantial financial support from the government in the form of leasehold rights for state land. Therefore, the petitioner was bound by the provisions of the PTRI Act. Substantial Financing: The court found that the grant of 117 acres of state land at a token rent of PKR 5,000 per year constituted substantial financing by the government. The land, valued at billions of rupees, provided significant material support to the petitioner, which contributed to its existence and operations. Disclosure of Information: The court upheld the Commission's order requiring disclosure of certain information while protecting private data like the names and identities of members. It found that the disclosure aligned with Article 19-A of the Constitution, which ensures access to information in matters of public importance. Ejusdem Generis: The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the rule of ejusdem generis limited the interpretation of "public body." It concluded that the PTRI Act's purpose is to advance transparency and accountability, and the term "other body substantially financed by the government" should be interpreted broadly to include organizations like the petitioner. ----Citations/Precedents: Soneri Travel and Tours Ltd. vs. Soneri Bank Ltd. (2011 CLD 193) Muhammad Hussain vs. Messrs Adamjee Sheikh Jeevanjee (2001 MLD 1183) Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa vs. Intizar Ali (2022 SCMR 472) Federation of Pakistan vs. Durrani Ceramics (2014 SCMR 1630) Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah vs. Mst. Saba Imtiaz (PLD 2011 SC 260) Indian Olympic Association vs. Veeresh Malik Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. vs. State of Kerala (16 SCC 82) Don Basco High School vs. Assistant Director, E.O.B.I. (PLD 1989 SC 128)

Summary: Background: This case involves a petition filed by the accused under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), challenging two previous judicial decisions. The first order, dated 16.04.2022, was made by a Magistrate in Gojra, rejecting the petitioner's application under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. for acquittal. The second order, dated 15.08.2022, was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gojra, upholding the Magistrate’s decision. The petitioner had been charged under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act 1885, based on an FIR filed in 2020, alleging that he made threatening calls to the complainant. ----Issues: 1- Whether the charge under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act was groundless. 2- Whether the Compact Disc (CD) provided by the prosecution was admissible as evidence without proper forensic examination. 3- Whether the acquittal of the co-accused influenced the validity of the charges against the petitioner. 4- Whether the trial should be quashed under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. due to lack of probability of conviction. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges. The Compact Disc (CD), the primary evidence against the petitioner, was not forensically analyzed to verify its authenticity. Moreover, the police did not seize the mobile phones allegedly involved in the threatening calls, which could have been critical for corroborating the evidence. The court further noted that the co-accused had already been declared innocent, and the complainant did not challenge their exoneration. Given the lack of substantial evidence and the failure to meet the criteria established by precedent regarding the admissibility of audio recordings, the court quashed the trial proceedings and acquitted the petitioner of all charges under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. ----Citations/Precedents: Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675 Member (Administration), Federal Board of Revenue v. Mian Khan, PLD 2021 SCMR 1077 Muhammad Rafique v. State, 2014 SCMR 1698 Nasrullah alias Nasro v. The State, 2017 SCMR 724

Summary: Background: The Deputy Registrar of Companies filed a petition to wind up Mukhtar Textile Mills Limited due to its non-operation since 2011 and non-compliance with statutory obligations. The winding-up order was passed on 27.02.2018, and an official liquidator was appointed to handle the company’s affairs. The application at hand, filed by Umer Saleem, Director/Chief Executive of Mukhtar Textile Mills Limited, seeks the recall of the winding-up order on the grounds of a revival plan. -----Issues: 1- Whether Section 414 of the Companies Act, 2017 is applicable for recalling the winding-up order. 2- Whether the Director/Chief Executive of the company has the locus standi to file this application. 3- Whether the revival plan presented by the applicant justifies recalling the winding-up order. 4- Whether the ongoing winding-up proceedings should be stayed based on the revival plan. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Section 414 of the Companies Act, 2017: The court determined that Section 414 is not applicable in this case as it pertains to declaring a company's dissolution void, while the company in question is still in the winding-up process and not yet dissolved. Locus Standi: The court held that Umer Saleem, as Director/Chief Executive, does not have the locus standi to file the application under Section 313 of the Companies Act. Only the official liquidator or authorized persons are allowed to file such applications under the relevant provisions. Revival Plan: The court found that the revival plan submitted by the applicant was neither verified nor endorsed by all shareholders or independent auditors. Moreover, the causes that led to the winding-up of the company, such as non-compliance with statutory obligations and financial issues, still persist, and no substantial proof was provided to demonstrate that these issues had been resolved. Winding-up Proceedings: The court concluded that staying the winding-up proceedings at this stage would delay the liquidation process and could prejudice the rights of other creditors. Therefore, the application was dismissed as it failed to meet the necessary legal requirements. -----Citations/Precedents: SAUDI PAK INDUSTRIAL & AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD vs. CHENAB LIMITED (2020 CLD 339) THE ADDITIONAL REGISTRAR COMPANY vs. AL-QAIM SUGAR MILLS LIMITED (2021 CLD 931) Nilkanta Kolay v. The Official Liquidator (AIR 1996 Calcutta 171)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, the Chief Minister of Punjab, challenged the orders issued by the Governor of Punjab on 19.12.2022 and 22.12.2022, under Article 130(7) of the Constitution of Pakistan. The first order summoned a session of the Provincial Assembly and required the petitioner to take a vote of confidence. The second order, issued on 22.12.2022, declared that the petitioner had ceased to hold office as Chief Minister due to the failure to take the vote of confidence and dissolved the Cabinet. However, the petitioner was allowed to continue functioning until a new Chief Minister was elected, as per Article 133 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner was required to take a vote of confidence under Article 130(7) of the Constitution. 2- Whether the Governor's order of 22.12.2022, removing the petitioner from office, was legally valid. 3- Whether the petition became moot following the petitioner’s successful vote of confidence on 12.01.2023. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Vote of Confidence: During the pendency of the writ petition, on 12.01.2023, the petitioner successfully took a vote of confidence in the Provincial Assembly, passing the required floor test under Article 130(7) of the Constitution. A notification confirming the vote was issued by the Speaker and communicated to the Governor. Governor's Response: Upon receiving the report from the Speaker that the petitioner had passed the vote of confidence, the Governor withdrew his previous order dated 22.12.2022, which declared that the petitioner had ceased to hold office. In light of the petitioner’s successful vote of confidence and the Governor's withdrawal of the 22.12.2022 order, the court concluded that the petition had borne fruit. The court set aside the Notification dated 22.12.2022 and deemed further adjudication on the justiciability of the Governor's order unnecessary. The petition was thus disposed of. -----Citations/Precedents: Pir Sabir Shah vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1994 SC 738)

Summary: Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXXIX, Rule.1 & 2 Interim Injunction)----Plaintiff thus has no prima facie case in his favour and sincedefendants have registered instruments in their favour and haveacquired the title after a long drawn litigation, the other twoingredients for grant of injunction i.e. balance of inconvenience andirreparable loss also does not exist in plaintiffs favour.

Summary: Word "Irrevocability" is not connected or articulated anywhereexcept Clause 1 i.e. for first 15 years only. There is no clause ofinvestment after 15 years which may give continuity to irrevocability forany other period than described in the first clause and defendant has tohand over every structure, whether built by plaintiff or plaintiffoccupied an already constructed area and that is it. Now at the end ofthis period the plea of investment cannot come into play since 15 yearswere consumed by plaintiff which is a huge period for recovery of suchinvestment, if made, which in any case not the responsibility ofdefendant, as understood from plain reading of agreement. This has tobe kept in mind while reading clause 38 that it is not a grant inperpetuity; only if parties to contract agree, it may be extended.

Summary: Bail cancelled ---- Background: This petition was filed to challenge the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the Additional Sessions Judge in a murder case. The petitioner alleged that the respondent was involved in conspiring and abetting the murder of a person, even though the respondent was not named in the initial FIR. During the investigation, another accused was arrested and disclosed that the respondent had planned the murder, leading to their involvement in the crime. The trial court granted pre-arrest bail to the respondent, which the petitioner sought to have canceled. -----Issues: 1- Whether the respondent's pre-arrest bail should be revoked based on the evidence collected during the investigation, which suggests the respondent's involvement in the conspiracy and abetment of the murder. 2- Whether the initial granting of pre-arrest bail was perverse, considering the circumstances and evidence linking the respondent to the crime. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the evidence gathered, including the respondent’s connection with other accused and the use of a particular mobile number, provided sufficient material to link the respondent to the crime. The court emphasized that pre-arrest bail is an extraordinary remedy that should only be granted in cases where the accused is being falsely implicated or there is clear mala fide intent, neither of which was evident in this case. The court determined that the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent by the trial court was perverse, as it overlooked the incriminating material and failed to consider the severity of the charges, including abetment and conspiracy in a murder. As a result, the court set aside the earlier bail order and canceled the pre-arrest bail granted to the respondent. -----Citations/Precedents: Mir Muhammad and others v. National Accountability Bureau through Chairman and others (2020 SCMR 168) Muhammad Sadiq and others v. The State and another (2015 SCMR 1394) Rana Muhammad Arshad v. Muhammad Rafique and another (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 427) Wajid Ali v. Mumtaz Ali Khan etc. (NLR 2000 Criminal 48) Mst. Hanifan Bibi and another v. Zulfiqar and another [PLJ 2001 Cr.C (Lahore) 168] Nazeer Ahmad v. Abdul Rashid Chatha and another [PLJ 2004 Cr.C (Lahore) 727] Sarwar Sultan v. The State and another (PLD 1994 Supreme Court 133)

Summary: Murder Trial (Unseen incident)----The FIR of the incident has been lodged with delay of about four days; such delay could not be overlooked. Complainant Khalid Mahmoud and his witnesses were fair enough to admitthat none has seen the alleged incident. The appellant has been involved in commission of the alleged incident on the basis of recovery of Car of the deceased, CDR report and his extra-judicial confession.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII Rule 10)