Summary: (Appointment by transfer)Prime grievance of the petitioners is that Recruitment Rules, framed for the post of Secretary (BPS-17), District Regional Transport Authorities (DRTA) and notified on 13.7.2011, provide no room for posting of outsiders, but the respondents in deviation of aforesaid rules are posting the officers of other cadre against the post of Secretary (BPS-17), DRTA---Much emphasis has been laid that the post of Secretary, DRTA, can be filled by the officers of other cadres. We have also noticed that the six (06) posts of Secretary (BPS-17), RTA, and one post of Secretary (BPS-17), PTA, do fall within the ambit of cadre schedule in respect of posts to be filled by officers of PAS, Ex-PCS and PSS. As such, the aforesaid post can only be filled as per Recruitment Rules and subject to eligibility and entitlement, and not otherwise for the simple reason that Provincial Transport Department is a separate cadre and Recruitment Rules are already in the field. The said rules are framed in consultation with the Services, General Administration and Coordination Department, Government of Sindh in pursuance with sub-rule (2) of Rule 3 of the Rules, 1974. In view of the above, we do not agree with the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, the petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.

Summary: KPT-Termination--Besides respondents have leveled serious allegations against the petitioner about his appointment at the back door, and subsequent involvement in criminal activities, his absence from duty due to certain political/ criminal activities as discussed supra. Keeping in view the above-mentioned facts and circumstances of the case, we do not see any infringement of the right of the Petitioner which could be called in question by way of Writ Petition.

Summary: Accused in reference, were extended a relief of pre and post arrest bail by this Court. NAB not satisfied with the order challenged the same before the Honorable Supreme Court where remanding the case back to this Court for deciding the afresh in the light of guidelines laid down in the cases reported in PLD 2018 SC 40, PLD 2005 SC364 and PLD 2019 SC 250. Case mainly revolves around allegations against accused Agha Siraj Durani, , for committing corruption and corrupt practices and illegal means accused in the reference, said to be his family members, associates, agents, domestic workers, gunmen, etc. Gulbahar Lohar Baloch servant cum gunman of accused Agha Siraj Khan Durani, has been found to have purchased a plot of 1000 sq. yards in DHA Karachi in the year 2013, have built a house thereon and sold it finally. He earned Rs.212,500,000.00 from this transaction. While working with accused Agha Siraj Khan Durani he was able to clinch such a deal in itself is a pointer to his role in the offence, that is, he has been facilitating him in accumulating property from illegal means. In presence of such prima facie evidence, sufficient enough to believe his involvement in the case, he is not entitled to grant of pre arrest bail. Hence, dismissed.

Summary: The precise and foremost question before this Court is as to whether in case of denial of relationship of landlord and tenant, the Additional Rent Controller was vested with the power to pass tentative rent order under section 17 (8) of the "Act, 1963". The term "landlord" is defined in section 2(g) of the "Act, 1963". Section 2 (j) provides the definition of "tenant". A landlord can seek eviction of tenant by moving a petition under section 17 of the "Act 1963" on the grounds mentioned therein. Subsection 8 of section 17 empowers the Rent Controller to direct the tenant to deposit in his office before a specified date all the rent due from him and also to deposit regularly till the final decision of the case, before the 5th day of each month, the monthly rent which subsequently becomes due either on the first hearing of proceeding or as soon thereafter as may be but before issues are framed. In case of any dispute as to the amount of rent due, the Rent Controller shall determine such amount approximately It is trite law that in case of denial of relationship in the ejectment petition, if it is determined by the Rent Controller that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and "respondent", the latter should have been evicted straight away on determination of relationship. The Rent Controller cannot proceed mechanically with the proceedings and pass an order under section 17 (8) of the "Act, 1963" without being satisfied that there exists relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before it. As per preamble, the provisions of "Act, 1963" can only be invoked for the control of rents of certain class of buildings within the limits of cantonment areas, eviction of tenants therefrom and for matters connected therewith. The purpose and object of the "Act, 1963" is to control and regulate the matters interse tenant and landlord. The Rent Controller, thus, cannot travel beyond the ambit of "Act, 1963".

Summary: Held that after insertion of the word 'Guardianship' in the First Schedule of The West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, the remedy by way of appeal is available against an order under Section 12 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 although earlier, as per Section 47 of the Act, 1890, the right of appeal was not available. It has been further held that plain reading of Section 12(1) of the Act, 1890 indicates that the overarching and controlling position held by the welfare of a minor in granting his permanent custody under Section 25 of the Act, 1890 is equally applicable to the grant of interim custody under Section 12 of the Act ibid and it will defeat the legislative intent and object of the law if the paramount interest of welfare of a minor is considered supreme and dominant feature only at the time of deciding application under Section 25 of the Act and not so at the time of deciding an application under Section 12 thereof. Thus, the welfare of a minor is always to be controlling force at every stage and decision made under Section 12 of the Act, 1890 is no exception. In the instant case, the respondent/father was allowed to retain the custody of the minor, who was admittedly of tender age of four years, which has been held not to be in best interest of the minor inasmuch as the minor of such tender age, at an interim stage, should not be deprived from the love and care which a mother can extend since such deprivation has far reaching impact on mental and physical upbringing of the minor, which is not the object of Section 12 of the Act, 1890.

Summary: Background: A petitioner filed a constitutional petition challenging the validity of orders from lower courts that dismissed his application for correction of an ex-parte decree. The petitioner had previously sought a declaration of legal heirship and specific performance regarding a property inherited from a deceased individual. The trial court granted a declaration but omitted the requested specific performance and injunction reliefs, prompting the petitioner to seek corrections. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's omission of reliefs for specific performance and perpetual injunction constituted an accidental slip or omission. 2- Whether the petitioner was entitled to corrections under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court determined that the omission in the decree was unintentional and qualified as an accidental slip under Section 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. The court emphasized that such corrections are within the jurisdiction of the court to promote justice and avoid undue hardship due to clerical errors. As a result, the petition was allowed, the lower court's orders were set aside, and the trial court was directed to amend the decree to include the reliefs sought by the petitioner. -----Citations/Precedents: Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi vs. Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner (PLD 1992 Supreme Court 472) Muhammad Akram v. DDCO, Rahim Yar Khan and others (2017 SCMR 56) Bank of Credit and Commerce International (Overseas) Ltd vs. Messrs Ali Asbestos Industries Ltd (1990 MLD 130) Mst. Forosha v. Fazal Gul and others (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 220) Amjad Butt vs. Amjad Ali (2017 CLC Note 45) Ram Singh v. Sant Singh and others (AIR 1930 Lahore 210) Raj Raj Bahadur Singh v. Shatranjai (AIR 1942 Oudh 226) Baqar vs. Muhammad Rafique and others (2003 SCMR 1401) Muhammad Shafi and others v. Muhammad Boota and others (2004 SCMR 1611)

Summary: Background: This case involves a financial dispute under Section 9 of the Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The Plaintiff, a financial institution, sought recovery of PKR 487,104,728.44, inclusive of markup, from the Defendant Company, which had availed finance facilities for a spinning unit. The finance facilities were initially granted in 2004 and subsequently restructured multiple times. Despite the restructuring, the Defendant Company defaulted on repayments, leading to the institution of this suit. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Defendant Company availed the finance facilities. 2- Whether a banker-customer relationship exists between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. 3- Whether the Plaintiff’s claim for various finance facilities, including Running Finance, Cash Finance, LTF-EOP, and Auto Loan, is valid. 4- Whether the Plaintiff's suit was filed by an authorized individual. 5- Whether the Defendant’s leave to defend should be granted or dismissed. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court determined that the Defendant Company had availed and subsequently restructured the finance facilities, evidenced by various agreements and documents on record. The court found that a valid banker-customer relationship existed between the Plaintiff and the Defendant based on the finance agreements and the Defendant's admissions. The Plaintiff Bank's claims for the amounts due under Running Finance, Cash Finance, LTF-EOP, and Auto Loan facilities were upheld, as the Defendant had admitted to availing the facilities and failed to provide sufficient evidence to refute the claims. The suit was filed by a competent person authorized by the Plaintiff Bank, and the objection raised by the Defendant regarding the authorization was dismissed. The court rejected the Defendant’s leave to defend application, ruling that the defense was evasive and improbable. The Plaintiff's suit was decreed for PKR 487,104,728.44, with additional costs and markup. -----Citations/Precedents: National Bank of Pakistan v. Kohinoor Spinning Mills Ltd. (2021 CLD 1112) Messrs Dadabhoy Cement Industries Ltd. & 6 Others v. National Development Finance Corporation, Karachi (PLD 2002 SC 500) Apollo Textile Mills Ltd. & Others v. Soneri Bank Ltd. (PLD 2012 SC 268) Muhammad Arshad & Another v. Citibank N.A., Lahore (2006 SCMR 1347) Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. v. City Steel Industries Lahore (2023 CLD 235) Bank of Punjab v. Messrs Magic River Services & 4 Others (2016 CLD 171) NIB Bank Ltd. v. Mirza Ghulam Mujtaba (2015 CLD 1547) National Bank of Pakistan v. Najma Sugar Mills Ltd. (2015 CLD 1990)

Summary: The Ombudsman had issued an order in response to the complaint, noting that since the insurance company had accepted the claim, there was no maladministration. The Ombudsman's order referred the matter to the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) for necessary action. The court observed that the petitioner had not disputed the claim and had already made part payment. The petitioner had expressed reservations about the loss apportionment process and had approached the SECP for this matter. The court raised the question of whether the Ombudsman was authorized to delegate responsibilities to another authority. Despite the petitioner's argument that the reference to the SECP was legitimate, the court found that such delegation was not permissible without explicit statutory authorization. The court noted that the petitioner initially accepted the claim but later challenged its position. The court decided that the legality of the Ombudsman's order needed to be addressed before other considerations. The Federal Ombudsman Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 was cited, stating that no authority could assume jurisdiction over matters pending with or decided by an Ombudsman. Consequently, the court ruled that the Ombudsman's order was not legally sustainable. The order was set aside, and the matter was remanded back to the Ombudsman for reconsideration. The Ombudsman was instructed to provide a hearing to the parties and decide the complaint based on the available records, in accordance with the law, within a month.

Summary: Promotion ( CP dismissed. policy-making domain of the respondent-EOBI. )

Summary: [Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997 (Section 31 (7) In light of the foregoing, we reach to an irresistible conclusion that the exercise of passing monthly FCA on to the petitioners on the basis of NEPRAs determination dated 27.12.2019 is in accordance with law and the timeline provided under Section 31(7) of the Act, 1997 be adhered to, unless any party is restricted for a reason beyond its control, which is a case at hand. The Petitioners clearly failed to avail statutory remedies under the law while the impugned determination was being made and even thereafter, nonetheless there is no cavil that the petitioners owe FCA component to K-Electric and liable to satisfy this debt. These instant Petitions being devoid of merit are accordingly dismissed.