Summary: Service matters---( annual increment awarded after move-over)---The petitioners in these cases were individuals who had served as lecturers in various positions within the civil service. They raised concerns regarding the non-granting of annual increments during certain years of their service, which had subsequently impacted their pensionary benefits. The petitioners argued that the denial of these increments was in violation of their rights and was unjustified. The court deliberated on the matter extensively, referring to past judgments and legal principles. The court emphasized the principle of treating similarly situated individuals equally, regardless of whether they had filed legal proceedings. It pointed out that judgments by higher courts had established that the denial of increments to such employees was unjust and discriminatory. In conclusion, the court held that the petitioners should be granted the annual increments they were entitled to, in line with previous judgments and principles of fairness. The court criticized the respondents for forcing employees to approach the judiciary for rights that should have been granted without the need for legal intervention. The judgment underscored the importance of equal treatment and adherence to the law in matters of civil service benefits.

Summary: Petition Dismissed---The petitioner, not being a successful bidder, has not been awarded contracts for these hydrants, which have been granted to independent contractors with their own tankers. Water supply is managed through an app-based system, and the petitioner's arguments of being deprived of filling water from the hydrants are deemed invalid, as he does not hold the necessary contracts. Mr. Waleed Khanzada, representing KW&SB, asserts that all relevant rules are being followed, and any contractor violating them, including tanker capacity requirements, will be held accountable. The issue of illegal hydrants in the city, despite the Supreme Court's directives, has not been effectively addressed by KW&SB. The Supreme Court had directed KW&SB to focus on providing portable water through regular distribution networks, with hydrants catering to water-scarce areas and underserved populations. Additionally, the court cites a directive, urging action against unauthorized hydrants. Given the circumstances, the court concludes that further intervention is unnecessary. The petition was disposed of, with a directive for KW&SB to enforce their rules, as adhered to by individual contractors, and ensure rule violations are prevented.

Summary: Appointment in PQA---In Constitutional Petition, Muhammad Usman Ghani Qureshi filed a petition against the Federation and two others concerning his appointment as Deputy Manager (Human Resource Management) (BS-18) in Port Qasim Authority (PQA).The petitioner claimed that he was unjustly denied the Deputy Manager position at PQA despite being ranked first on the assessment sheet dated 16th May 2007. The petitioner cited violation of his constitutional rights under Articles 4, 9, and 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan. The court questioned the petitioner about the delay in approaching the court since the alleged cause of action occurred in 2007 but the petition was filed in 2013. The PQA's counsel argued that the petition was not maintainable due to laches, time elapsed, and the absence of statutory rules of service at the relevant time. The court discussed how Muhammad Saqib, though now deceased, was appointed against the Deputy Manager post despite lacking eligibility. The PQA's representative claimed that the competent authority approved Saqib's appointment and the petitioner had not challenged Saqib's appointment directly. The court noted that the petitioner's claim lacked merit due to the absence of an appointment order, and even a successful candidate doesn't have an indefeasible right to be appointed. While the court expressed reservations about PQA's handling of appointments, it found that the petitioner's case was impacted by laches and lacked substantial grounds. The court dismissed the petition, citing the petitioner's delayed approach and the petitioner's case law as inapplicable.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, registered a case under Sections 337 F(i), 337 F(v), 337 L(2), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) after sustaining injuries. A District Standing Medical Board was constituted for his medical re-examination, which concluded that the injury to his left foot (injury No. 6) could have been fabricated. Dissatisfied with this conclusion, the petitioner sought re-examination by the Provincial Standing Medical Board. His application was dismissed by the Area Magistrate on 09.01.2023. The petitioner then challenged this dismissal through a constitutional writ petition. -----Issues: 1- Whether the dismissal of the petitioner’s request for re-examination by the Provincial Standing Medical Board was lawful. 2- Whether the District Standing Medical Board’s opinion regarding the possibility of fabrication of the petitioner’s injury was justified. 3- Whether re-examination by the Provincial Standing Medical Board was necessary for the proper administration of justice. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Lawfulness of the Dismissal: The court found that the dismissal of the petitioner’s request for re-examination was unjustified. The Area Magistrate failed to consider critical factors regarding the petitioner’s injury and the conflicting opinions about its potential fabrication. District Medical Board's Opinion: The court held that the District Standing Medical Board's conclusion that injury No. 6 (a fractured toe) was possibly fabricated because it involved a small bone that is easy to fracture, lacked sufficient grounds. This opinion was inconsistent with two X-ray reports from radiologists, which confirmed the fracture without suggesting any possibility of fabrication. Re-examination Requirement: The court ordered the re-examination of the petitioner by the Provincial Standing Medical Board. It noted that dismissing the possibility of injury fabrication based solely on the small size of the fractured bone could set a dangerous precedent in future cases, undermining the integrity of medical jurisprudence. The court set aside the impugned order of the Area Magistrate and directed that the petitioner be re-examined by the Provincial Standing Medical Board to ensure a just and accurate medical assessment.

Summary: Background: The petitioners sought exemption from the FCPS Part-I exam, claiming that after five years of obtaining an MCPS qualification, they should be eligible for this exemption. They argued that the Pakistan Medical and Dental Council (PM&DC) had recognized their MCPS qualification as equivalent to an M.Phil. They further argued that the College of Physicians and Surgeons Pakistan (CPSP) should also recognize the equivalence and grant them the exemption. Their request for exemption was denied by CPSP in light of a change in the exemption rules, communicated through a notification dated 26th February 2020. The petitioners sought judicial review of CPSP's decision, invoking the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners were entitled to an exemption from the FCPS Part-I exam based on their MCPS qualification. 2- Whether the change in CPSP’s exemption rules violated the doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel. 3- Whether the equivalence of the MCPS qualification to an M.Phil. under the 2018 regulations warranted the exemption. 4- Whether CPSP’s policy change was arbitrary or unfair, resulting in discrimination against the petitioners. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Entitlement to Exemption: The court found that the petitioners did not have any enforceable right to the exemption from the FCPS Part-I exam. There was no specific representation, promise, or assurance made by CPSP that would grant them such an exemption. Furthermore, the petitioners had only applied for the exemption shortly before the policy change, and there was no vested right created. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and Promissory Estoppel: The court held that the petitioners failed to prove the legitimacy of their expectation for exemption. There was no specific assurance or promise from CPSP that the exemption rules would remain unchanged. The change in policy was made in the public interest, to elevate academic standards and improve the quality of specialized studies. The doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel did not apply in this case. Equivalence of MCPS to M.Phil.: The court determined that the recognition of the MCPS qualification as equivalent to an M.Phil. under the 2018 regulations did not automatically grant the petitioners an exemption from the FCPS Part-I exam. The PM&DC had not issued any equivalence certificate for the purposes of this exemption, and the petitioners' reliance on the recognition of experience was misplaced. Fairness and Policy Change: The court found that the change in CPSP’s exemption rules was not arbitrary or discriminatory. The policy change was based on public interest, aiming to improve academic standards and ensure fairness for all candidates. Granting the petitioners an exemption would have resulted in discrimination against others who had to undergo the FCPS Part-I exam under the revised rules. The court dismissed the petitions, holding that the petitioners were not entitled to the exemption claimed, and no vested right had been violated. The policy change by CPSP was found to be lawful and reasonable. -----Citations/Precedents: Pakistan Through Secretary Ministry of Commerce and 2 others. vs. Salahuddin and 3 others. (PLD 1991 SC 546) Hashwani Hotels Limited. vs. Federation of Pakistan and others. (PLD 1997 SC 315) Mst. Fatima Faryad and others. vs. Government of Punjab and others. (2020 CLC 836) Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. and others. vs. Federation of Pakistan, through Secretary, M/O Finance and others. (2015 PTD 2304) R v North and East Devon Health Authority, ex parte Coughlan ([2001 QB 213]; [2000] 2 WLR 622) Associated Picture Houses Ltd. v Wednesbury Corp. ([1948] 1 K.B.223) Regina (Patel) v General Medical Council ([2013] 1 WLR 2801); [2013] EWCA Civ 327

Summary: The petitioners have applied for the post of Assistant Director & Deputy Director and also appeared in the written test and interview but thereafter, neither they have been recommended for the post nor any merit list was issued or any appointment letter was issued in favour of the petitioners. In absence of any of the aforesaid incidents, no vested right accrued in favour of the petitioners. This legal position also coincide with the Regulation 12 (a) of the Regulation under which the department could withdraw the requisition altogether for valid reasons before any recommendations made by the PPSC.

Summary: In appropriate cases, learned Family Courts to consider principle of appreciation in value of certain dowry articles: In present case, alternate value of car given in dowry was fixed as Rs.2,285,000/- by the learned Appellate Court below that is the amount, which was paid by the father of respondent No.3 when the car was booked in the year 2017, when the marriage of respondent No.3 with the petitioner took place. This Court is of the view that primarily a suit for the return of dowry articles, whenever decided, is decreed by the Courts as such with the observation that in case of failure, on part of the judgment-debtor, to return the said articles, as an alternate, the amount equivalent to the price of dowry articles is ordered to be paid and while determining the alternate value of the dowry articles, the Courts consider the depreciation of most of the dowry articles on account of normal and natural wear and tear thereof that takes place over the passage of time since marriage of the parties. The rationale underlying the application of principle of depreciation is that the dowry articles are to be returned in their current position and if the same is not done, their price is to be paid as an alternate and since most of the value of dowry articles put to use during the subsistence of marriage do undergo depreciation on account of said daily use, therefore, while determining the alternate price, it is justifiable that the depreciation in value of such articles is to be taken into account. However, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there may be some articles forming part of the dowry, for instance, the gold ornaments or the vehicles or even few electrical appliances etc., value whereof may appreciate over the years. The car, in the instant case is such an article. Therefore, the learned Appellate Court below erred in not considering the appreciation in the value of the car while fixing/determining the alternate price thereof inasmuch as this is common knowledge that value of Pak Rupees has depreciated over the number of years and the value of new as well as used vehicles, like the car in instant case, is on continuous rise. Therefore, awarding amount spent on purchase of the car in the year 2017 is not justified and respondent No.3 is held entitled to recover the market value of the car as on date of realization of the decree.

Summary: Appeal Dismissed---The original order dismissed a civil appeal on the grounds of limitation. The appellant's contention is that the appeal was filed within the time limit prescribed by law and that the delay was justified due to circumstances related to obtaining a copy of the judgment. The appellant's argument focuses on section 12(5) of the Limitation Act, which pertains to the time required for obtaining a copy of a decree, sentence, order, judgment, or award. The appellant asserts that the time required for obtaining the copy should exclude certain intervening periods and be linked to the litigant's diligence in the matter.The appellant contends that the appellate court failed to properly consider the factual and legal aspects, leading to the denial of the benefits of section 12(5) of the Act. They argue that the judgments relied upon by the respondents do not apply to the specific circumstances of this case. The appellate court's decision is set aside, and the case is remanded back to the appellate court for a decision on the merits. The appeal is deemed disposed of, along with any pending applications.

Summary: Petition Dismissed---[Import Policy] Import Licence Fee is payable even if no licence was being issued in terms of Import Fee Order 1993---The Petitioners argue that after the 1979 Order was repealed and the requirement to obtain an import licence was abolished, the government was no longer providing a service that justifies the continued collection of Import Licence Fees under the Import Fee Order, 1993. It is mentioned that the process for obtaining import permits has been modified under the Import Fee Order, 1993, but the government still regulates imports and exports. The Petitioners' argument that no service is provided is deemed misconceived, as a mechanism was established for obtaining an Annexure "B" from a bank before opening a Letter of Credit, demonstrating a service being rendered. The judgment emphasizes that even though the requirement to obtain an import licence was abolished, the Act of 1950 still regulates imports and exports, and thus, a mechanism was created under the Import Fee Order, 1993, for controlling imports. The judgment notes that the concept of quid pro quo is fulfilled, as a privilege is conferred upon importers to import goods that are otherwise prohibited without a permit. Regarding the Finance Minister's speech announcing the merger of fee with customs duty, the judgment states that such speeches are not legally binding until they are incorporated into legal policies or statutes. In conclusion, the court finds that the Importers are still required to pay the Import Licence Fees under the Import Fee Order, 1993, as the government continues to regulate imports and exports through this mechanism.

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Limitation )] I am afraid this contention cannot be accepted in view of Imtiaz Ali V/S Atta Muhammad and another, PLD 2008 S.C. 462, wherein it was held by the Honble Supreme Court that the appeal, having been filed after one day of the period of limitation, had created valuable right in favour of the respondents, and no sufficient cause was found for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation. The delay of only one day was not condoned by the Honble Supreme Court in the cited case. In the above circumstances, the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity. Accordingly, the appeal and listed application are dismissed with no order as to costs.