Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 2(s), 17, 157, 168 & 181 ---- Smuggling of foreign origin goods ---- Confiscation of conveyance used for smuggling ---- Scope of Adjudicating Officer’s discretion under S. 181 ---- The petitioner, employed as a driver, was found transporting smuggled foreign origin betel nuts in a Hino LPG Gas Bowzer, a vehicle exclusively designed for transporting LPG ---- The vehicle was detained under S. 17 and later seized under Ss. 157 & 168 of the Customs Act, 1969 ---- The Adjudicating Officer ordered outright confiscation of both the vehicle and smuggled goods, without granting an option for release under S. 181 in light of SRO 499(1)/2009 ---- The Customs Appellate Tribunal granted an option for release of the vehicle upon payment of redemption fine, which was subsequently overturned by the High Court ---- Held, conveyances exclusively used for smuggling fall under the prohibition in clause (b) of SRO 499, making them ineligible for release under S. 181 ---- Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief. (b) Interpretation of SRO 499(1)/2009 & Amendments ---- Effect of amendment through notification dated 20.08.2024 ---- Whether the amendment affected the prohibition on release of smuggling vehicles ---- The petitioner relied on the amendment, which inserted clause (ba), providing that a conveyance seized for the third time would be ineligible for release ---- Held, clause (ba) did not override clause (b) of SRO 499, which categorically prohibits the release of vehicles exclusively used for smuggling ---- Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was not applicable in this case, as the vehicle fell under the original prohibition in SRO 499. (c) Application of Beneficial Legislation ---- Effect of insertion and subsequent omission of the second proviso to S. 157(2) ---- The petitioner argued that the proviso, inserted through the Finance Act 2021 and later omitted by the Finance Act 2022, should be applied retroactively ---- Held, the vehicle was seized in 2020 and outrightly confiscated before the proviso was introduced ---- The proviso was effective for a short duration and later omitted, thus it had no bearing on a case where confiscation had already been finalized ---- Supreme Court reaffirmed that beneficial legislation cannot be applied where statutory provisions have been expressly time-bound and subsequently repealed. (d) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal & Judicial Review ---- Limits of Tribunal’s powers in modifying orders under S. 181 ---- The Customs Appellate Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to grant an option for release when the Federal Board of Revenue has expressly prohibited it under SRO 499 ---- Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial intervention is warranted only where there is misapplication of law, not where explicit statutory prohibitions exist ---- High Court correctly ruled in favor of the respondent department by applying the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and SRO 499. (e) Locus Standi – Right of Appeal Under Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 181 & 194-A ---- Whether a driver has the right to challenge confiscation of a vehicle ---- The petitioner was not the owner of the vehicle and admitted his employment as a driver ---- The registered owner neither contested the confiscation nor appeared during proceedings ---- Held, under S. 181, only the "owner" of confiscated goods or conveyance is entitled to seek relief ---- S. 194-A limits the right of appeal to an "aggrieved person," which in this case did not include the petitioner ---- Reference made to Sher Andaz v. Director-General, Intelligence & Investigation-FBR (2010 SCMR 1746) and Director, Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation v. M/s Al-Faiz Industries (2006 SCMR 129), where the Supreme Court held that only a person whose legal rights are directly affected can file an appeal ---- The Tribunal erred in allowing an appeal by a person without locus standi. Disposition: Leave to appeal dismissed. High Court's judgment upheld, confirming the outright confiscation of the vehicle and smuggled goods. The petitioner's arguments regarding SRO 499 amendments and the omitted proviso to S. 157(2) were found to be without merit. The petitioner, not being the owner of the vehicle, had no locus standi to challenge the confiscation.

Summary: Background: This case involves a dispute between M/S 7Sky Digital Marketing Pvt. Ltd. (petitioner) and M/S ASR Builders (respondent) regarding the construction and marketing of a multi-storey building project, IRENIC-II. The petitioner was responsible for the advertising, marketing, and sales, while the respondent was responsible for construction. Disputes arose between the parties, leading to civil and criminal litigation. Both parties agreed to arbitration, appointing an arbitrator (respondent No. 2) to settle the dispute. The petitioner filed a petition under Section 14 and Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking a direction for the arbitrator to issue an arbitration award. In response, the respondent filed a petition under Sections 5 and 11 of the same Act. The Civil Judge consolidated the petitions and framed consolidated issues, which the petitioner challenged. ----- Issues: ----- 1) Whether the consolidation of two petitions under the Arbitration Act, 1940, is permissible. ----- 2) Whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) apply to proceedings under the Arbitration Act, 1940, particularly with respect to framing consolidated issues. ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the petitioner’s challenge to the consolidation of the petitions and the framing of consolidated issues. It held that: The Arbitration Act, 1940, does not prohibit the consolidation of petitions and permits the application of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) under certain provisions, particularly Section 41. Section 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, allows for disputes about arbitration agreements or awards to be resolved based on affidavits, and the CPC can apply to these proceedings to ensure justice. The petitioner, having previously sought additional issues under the CPC, was estopped from challenging the application of the CPC in this case. The court found that the consolidation of the petitions and the framing of consolidated issues were valid under the law. ----- As a result, the court dismissed the petition and upheld the consolidation order. ----- Citations/Precedents: Arbitration Act, 1940 (Sections 5, 11, 14, 17, 33, 41) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (Order XIV, Rule 5) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984

Summary: The respondent, had filed an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal after his contract service period of 4 ½ years was excluded from the calculation of his pension benefits upon retirement. The Federal Service Tribunal allowed his appeal, ruling in favor of including the contractual period in his pension calculation. The petitioner contended that the contractual period should not be counted towards pension benefits, asserting that the respondent’s claim was time-barred and did not meet the conditions of service laws. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the respondent's contractual service period of 4 ½ years should be included in the calculation of his pensionary benefits. ------ 2) Whether the respondent’s claim for recalculation of pension was time-barred. ------ 3) Whether the Federal Service Tribunal’s decision to allow the appeal was legally valid. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the Federal Service Tribunal's judgment. The Court ruled that pension constitutes a recurring cause of action, meaning that any delay in claiming pension benefits does not invalidate the claim. The Court found that the respondent’s contractual service, followed by regularization, must be included in the pension calculation under Article 371-A of the Civil Service Regulations (CSR). It was also observed that the respondent's claim was not time-barred as pension is considered a recurring entitlement. The Court further stated that the Federal Service Tribunal had applied the law correctly, as the respondent’s continuous service justified the inclusion of his contractual period in the pension calculation. ------ Citations/Precedents: Abdul Jabbar vs. Pakistan Railways (2018 PLC (CS) 375) Umar Baz Khan vs. Jehanzeb (PLD 2013 SC 268) M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India & Ors. (1995 5 SCC 628) Union of India & Ors. vs. Tarsem Singh (2008 8 SCC 648) Chairman, Pakistan Railways vs. ShahJehan Shah (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 534) Chief Executive Progressive Paper Ltd. vs. Sh. Abdul Majeed (2005 PLC (C.S.) 1439) Ministry of Finance, through Secretary vs. Syed Afroz Akhtar Rizvi & others (2021 SCMR 1546)

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged a decision by the Division Bench of the High Court of Balochistan, which had modified the penalty imposed on Roz-ud-Din, a Grade-II officer of the National Bank of Pakistan (NBP). The initial penalty, based on allegations of negligence related to ATM cash feeding, maintenance, and balancing, was dismissal from service. The High Court reduced this penalty to a one-step downgrading of his pay scale. The petitioner sought leave to appeal against this modification, contending that the original penalty of dismissal should be reinstated, arguing that the respondent's actions warranted this severe punishment. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the dismissal from service of Roz-ud-Din was a disproportionate penalty compared to the lesser penalties imposed on other similarly placed employees of NBP. ------ 2) Whether the modification of the penalty by the High Court, reducing dismissal to a downgrading in pay scale, was justified. ------ 3) Whether the respondent’s role in the alleged negligence constituted sufficient grounds for dismissal. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the High Court's decision to reduce the penalty. The Court found that the penalty of dismissal from service was disproportionate, particularly when two other employees facing similar charges were only downgraded in their pay scale. The Court highlighted that the main accused, Branch Manager Babar Butt, had admitted full responsibility for the ATM discrepancies, thus absolving Roz-ud-Din from direct involvement in fraud or embezzlement. The Court ruled that the punishment must be commensurate with the guilt and that imposing a harsher penalty on Roz-ud-Din compared to others violated Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. ------ Citations/Precedents: Secretary to Government of Punjab, Food Department, Lahore, and another v. Javed Iqbal and others (2006 SCMR 1120) National Bank of Pakistan through its President, Karachi vs. Syed Shafqat Hussain Shah and others (Civil Petitions No. 3801 and 3648 of 2023)

Summary: ''Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972--- Recruitment process for a certain post --- It is vested domain of Selection Board/ Committee to examine the qualification and the eligibility criteria as well as fitness of a candidate. The Court is not the substitute forum of a Selection Board / Committee as such it cannot direct an appointing authority to issue appointment letter in favour of a candidate and any such intrusion would amount to committing judicial overreach which is unwarranted by law.'' ---- Background This case arises from an Intra Court Appeal (ICA) filed by Lahore College for Women University (LCWU) challenging the judgment dated June 7, 2024, by a Single Judge, which directed LCWU to issue an appointment letter to Dr. Rehana Kausar (Respondent No.1) for the position of Professor of Urdu (BS-21). The dispute began when LCWU advertised two posts for Professor of Urdu in December 2017. After interviews and evaluations, the Selection Board found both candidates, including Dr. Rehana Kausar, unsuitable and decided to re-advertise the post. After the re-advertisement in September 2018, the process of selecting candidates and evaluating their qualifications became contentious, leading to conflicting recommendations from the Selection Board and the Syndicate, with the matter eventually being referred to the Chancellor, who recommended re-advertising the post. 1) Issues: 1) Whether the Lahore College for Women University properly followed the prescribed procedures for the appointment of Professor of Urdu (BS-21). ---2) Whether the recommendations of the Selection Board and the Syndicate were properly considered. ---3) Whether the Chancellor's decision to re-advertise the post was lawful and could be challenged in a writ petition. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge and dismissing the writ petition filed by Dr. Rehana Kausar. The court held that: The process undertaken by the Sub-Committee in relying on old evaluation reports instead of conducting fresh evaluations was in violation of the Service Statutes of LCWU. The Selection Board had initially found Dr. Kausar unqualified and later, the Chancellor, as the final authority, directed the re-advertisement of the post, which was lawful and could not be challenged through a constitutional petition. It is not within the court's domain to substitute its opinion for that of the Selection Board or Syndicate regarding the suitability of candidates. Courts can only ensure the process follows the law but cannot direct appointments based on subjective matters like interviews and expert evaluations. ---- Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Ashraf Sangri vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2014 SCMR 157) Courts cannot substitute their own opinions for that of interview boards regarding candidate suitability. The Secretary Punjab Public Service Commission, Lahore, and others vs. Aamir Hayat and others (2019 SCMR 124) ----- Courts exceeded jurisdiction when directing appointing authorities to issue letters of appointment. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar, and others vs. Hayat Hussain and others (2016 SCMR 1021) Waheed Gul Khan and another vs. Province of Sindh and others (2024 SCMR 1701) ---- Chief Executive Officer, Multan Electric Power Company Ltd. Khanewal Road, Multan vs. Muhammad Ilyas and others (2021 SCMR 775) Recommendations for appointments fall within the domain of the concerned authority, and judicial overreach is unwarranted.

Summary: Background: The case involves a dispute between the tax authority and electric supply companies regarding the applicability of sales tax on the Tariff Differential Subsidy (TDS) received by the companies from the Federal Government. The tax authority argued that TDS should be included in the value of supply and thus be subject to sales tax. The companies, on the other hand, argued that the subsidy provided by the government is not chargeable to sales tax. The Appellate Tribunal ruled in favor of the electric companies, prompting the tax authority to file a reference under Section 47 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990. -----Issues: 1- Is the Tariff Differential Subsidy (TDS) provided by the Federal Government subject to sales tax under the Sales Tax Act, 1990? ----2- Does the explanation added to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act in 2022 apply retroactively, clarifying that government subsidies to electricity consumers are not subject to tax? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court ruled that the explanation added to Section 2(46) of the Sales Tax Act in 2022 clarified that government subsidies, including the TDS, have never been subject to sales tax. The court rejected the argument by the tax authority that the amendment should not apply retroactively, stating that the clarification provided in the law makes the question of retrospective effect irrelevant. As a result, the reference application was dismissed, and the Tribunal's decision in favor of the electric companies (DISCOs) was upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Commissioner Inland Revenue, LTO, Lahore v. M/s Gujranwala Electric Power Co. (GEPCO) (2024 PTD 440) Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s GEPCO Limited (S.T.R No. 77467/2022), Lahore High Court, Judgment dated 25.05.2023 Commissioner Inland Revenue v. M/s Faisalabad Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. (S.T.R No. 113/2014), Lahore High Court, Order dated 06.02.2024

Summary: The case arose from a writ petition filed by Tahir Mushtaq in the Peshawar High Court, seeking appointment to the post of Statistical Clerk/Crop Reporter on the basis of the employee son’s quota policy, after his father’s retirement. The petitioner argued that the policy allowed him to inherit his father's position. The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, however, contended that the policy was only applicable to Class-IV employees and that Tahir Mushtaq did not meet the qualifications required for the post he sought. ---- Issues: 1) Whether Tahir Mushtaq was entitled to be appointed under the employee son's quota policy despite the post being above Class-IV. --2) Whether the policy, which reserves positions for the children of retired government servants, was consistent with the merit-based employment system and the Constitution. ---3) Whether the post sought by Tahir Mushtaq was eligible for appointment under the quota policy, given that it had been upgraded in pay scale. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Policy Limitations: The court held that the employee son's quota policy was only applicable to posts in BPS-1 to BPS-4, and the position Tahir Mushtaq sought (Statistical Clerk/Crop Reporter) was a higher post. The policy did not apply to such posts, and thus, he was not entitled to be appointed. Constitutional Violation: The court ruled that reserving positions for children of government servants violated the principle of equality enshrined in Articles 25 and 27 of the Constitution of Pakistan, which prohibit discrimination in employment and mandate merit-based recruitment. The quota system undermined meritocracy and transparency in government employment. ---- Set Aside: The court further noted that the instructions cited by Tahir Mushtaq did not disclose the competent authority or legal basis for reserving such posts, which led to ambiguity and potential illegalities. The court set aside the Peshawar High Court’s decision, converted the petition into an appeal, and allowed the appeal in favor of the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of merit-based recruitment and the need for clear legal foundations for any employment policies. The ruling emphasized that favoritism or preferential treatment based on family relationships is unconstitutional. ----- Citations/Precedents: Province of Sindh v. Shahzad Hussain Talpur (2022 SCMR 439)

Summary: Background: This case involves contempt proceedings initiated against multiple television channels, including Senator Fesal Vawda, following his press conference at the National Press Club, Islamabad, on 15.05.2024. The media outlets broadcasted statements considered false and contemptuous regarding the Supreme Court and its judges. The Court issued show-cause notices to these channels, demanding responses and explanations. ----Issues: 1- Whether the media channels' broadcast of false and defamatory material amounted to contempt of court. 2- Whether the media channels' unqualified apologies and promises to broadcast corrective statements during prime time could mitigate the contempt charge. 3- Whether the Court should impose further consequences or accept the apologies and expiations offered by the media channels. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court accepted the unqualified apologies submitted by the 26 television channels, represented by Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, and other channels through their respective counsels. The Court noted that the media outlets had undertaken to broadcast, during prime time, an apology and corrective statements in line with the guidance provided in the Court’s previous order dated 28.06.2024. This included references to Quranic verses prohibiting slander and scandal, emphasizing the need for truthfulness and the harmful effects of spreading falsehoods. The Court acknowledged the media’s role as a pillar of the state, stressing that its credibility is compromised when falsehoods are disseminated. However, in light of the sincere apologies and the commitment to expiation through the broadcast of corrective statements, the Court withdrew the show-cause notices issued on 17.05.2024. The Court also encouraged media organizations to develop internal mechanisms for accountability to prevent similar issues in the future. ----Citations/Precedents: Article 19 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Freedom of Speech and Press) Article 14 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (Right to Dignity) Quranic references on slander and truthfulness, including Surah Al-Humazah (104:1), Surah Al-Qalam (68:10-11), and Surah Qaf (50:18).

Summary: Bail allowed ---- Background: Ghulam Qadir, the applicant, was arrested on June 13, 2022, after a personal search by the police, who recovered 1130 grams of cannabis (Charas) from him. The arrest followed a tip-off alleging his involvement in the narcotics trade. He applied for post-arrest bail, which was rejected by the trial court (Special Judge CNS/Additional Sessions Judge, Uthal) on June 23, 2022. He then filed the current application for post-arrest bail, arguing that the investigation had been completed, and there was no prior criminal record. --- Issues: 1) Whether the failure to prepare a parcel or obtain samples at the time of recovery from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution's case. ---2) Whether the applicant, having no prior criminal record and with the investigation completed, should be granted bail. ---3) Whether benefit of the doubt can be extended to the applicant at the bail stage. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court observed that the FIR failed to mention whether any sample of the narcotics was obtained or if a parcel of the recovered narcotics was prepared at the spot, raising doubts about the prosecution’s case. Citing the principle that the benefit of the doubt can be extended at the bail stage, the court concluded that this omission warranted further inquiry under section 497(2) of the Cr.P.C. As a result, the court granted Ghulam Qadir post-arrest bail, subject to a surety bond of Rs.200,000, with a P.R. bond of the same amount. ---- Citations/Precedents: Ihtisham Ali Cheema v. The State: The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the benefit of the doubt can be extended even at the bail stage.