Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R.10---Joinder and non-joinder of necessary and proper party---Object, purpose and scope---If a person deemed necessary to a suit is not joined as a party, this situation is referred to as non-joinder- --All persons must be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief is alleged to exist---Necessary party is the person in whose absence no effective order can be passed at all---Proper party is the person in whose absence effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on a question involved in proceedings. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 2 (d)---Word "party"---Connotation---Word "party"as defined in section 2(d) of Family Courts Act, 1964, includes any person whose presence as such is considered necessary for a proper decision of the dispute---To ensure presence of real defendant, power is also given to Family Court to add such a person as a party to the dispute---As such the definition is liberal and extensive and is not confined only to spouses rather, it gives a right and the prerogative to choose and implead in a suit as defendant, the person against whom relief is sought. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Recovery of dowery articles---Joinder of parties other than spouses---Petitioners/defendants were brother and wife of ex-husband of respondent/plaintiff---Suit for recovery of dowery articles was decreed by Family Court against petitioners/defendants---Judgment and decree was maintained by Lower Appellate Court and High Court-- -Validity---Jurisdiction of Family Court is not contingent upon identities of individuals or persons involved; instead, it is fundamentally defined by nature of subject matter presented in suit---Any dispute that pertains to the categories outlined in the schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964 can be brought to Family Court, regardless of who the parties are---Such broad approach is designed to ensure that a diverse array of family-related disputes - ranging from matrimonial issues to child custody arrangements, can be addressed in a specialized forum tailored to handle sensitive familial matters---Legislation does not specify particular individuals or persons who possess exclusive right to initiate or defend actions in Family Court---Petitioners/defendants failed to bring forth any witnesses who could confirm return of dowry articles in their presence---Petitioners/ defendants were obligated to return dowry articles in question and a decree was issued in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Petitioners/ defendants failed to point out any irregularities or errors in proceedings of Family Court or any discernible errors in law that High Court could have the authority to address in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663; Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591; Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir 2011 SCMR 1361 ref. Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor PLD 2020 SC 269 distinguished. (d) Precedent--- ----Generalizing of judgment---Principle---Legal case holds authority solely concerning specific issues it addresses and the conclusions it reaches---Judgment cannot be generalized beyond its context, as it is only applicable to the situation at hand and does not serve as a precedent for matters that lie outside its explicit scope. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)---Family disputes-- -Writ of certiorari---Scope---High Court can issue an order of certiorari to rectify jurisdictional errors committed by subordinate Courts in family law matters---Such errors can arise when Family Courts or First Appellate Courts issue decisions without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or fail to exercise their jurisdiction altogether---Certiorari order is applicable when Family Court or First Appellate Court acts in an illegal or improper manner while exercising its jurisdiction---This includes situations where Court makes determinations without providing an affected party opportunity to be heard or where procedural methods employed contravene fundamental principles of natural justice---It is crucial to recognize that High Court's jurisdiction to issue certiorari is fundamentally supervisory, meaning, it does not possess authority to function as an appellate body---Such supervisory role imposes clear limitations: specifically, it prohibits High Court from reevaluating or questioning factual findings made by subordinate Courts based on their assessment of evidence---High Court does not engage in reviewing or re-weighing evidence that underlies decisions made by Family Court or First Appellate Court---Instead, it may only nullify a decision it finds to be beyond jurisdiction or grossly erroneous without imposing its own conclusions in place of those reached by lower Courts---Certiorari orders can be granted solely when a clear error of law is evident on the face of record; however, this does not extend to addressing errors of fact, regardless of their severity. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Tauseef Ejaz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Branch Registry Lahore for Respondents Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. I, R.10---Joinder and non-joinder of necessary and proper party---Object, purpose and scope---If a person deemed necessary to a suit is not joined as a party, this situation is referred to as non-joinder- --All persons must be joined as defendants against whom any right to relief is alleged to exist---Necessary party is the person in whose absence no effective order can be passed at all---Proper party is the person in whose absence effective order can be made but whose presence is necessary for a complete and final decision on a question involved in proceedings. (b) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 2 (d)---Word "party"---Connotation---Word "party"as defined in section 2(d) of Family Courts Act, 1964, includes any person whose presence as such is considered necessary for a proper decision of the dispute---To ensure presence of real defendant, power is also given to Family Court to add such a person as a party to the dispute---As such the definition is liberal and extensive and is not confined only to spouses rather, it gives a right and the prerogative to choose and implead in a suit as defendant, the person against whom relief is sought. Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591 rel. (c) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched.---Recovery of dowery articles---Joinder of parties other than spouses---Petitioners/defendants were brother and wife of ex-husband of respondent/plaintiff---Suit for recovery of dowery articles was decreed by Family Court against petitioners/defendants---Judgment and decree was maintained by Lower Appellate Court and High Court-- -Validity---Jurisdiction of Family Court is not contingent upon identities of individuals or persons involved; instead, it is fundamentally defined by nature of subject matter presented in suit---Any dispute that pertains to the categories outlined in the schedule of Family Courts Act, 1964 can be brought to Family Court, regardless of who the parties are---Such broad approach is designed to ensure that a diverse array of family-related disputes - ranging from matrimonial issues to child custody arrangements, can be addressed in a specialized forum tailored to handle sensitive familial matters---Legislation does not specify particular individuals or persons who possess exclusive right to initiate or defend actions in Family Court---Petitioners/defendants failed to bring forth any witnesses who could confirm return of dowry articles in their presence---Petitioners/ defendants were obligated to return dowry articles in question and a decree was issued in favour of respondent/plaintiff---Petitioners/ defendants failed to point out any irregularities or errors in proceedings of Family Court or any discernible errors in law that High Court could have the authority to address in its Constitutional jurisdiction---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. PLD 1963 SC 663; Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot 2011 SCMR 1591; Quinn v. Leathem 1901 AC 495; Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal PLD 1984 SC 95 and Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir 2011 SCMR 1361 ref. Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor PLD 2020 SC 269 distinguished. (d) Precedent--- ----Generalizing of judgment---Principle---Legal case holds authority solely concerning specific issues it addresses and the conclusions it reaches---Judgment cannot be generalized beyond its context, as it is only applicable to the situation at hand and does not serve as a precedent for matters that lie outside its explicit scope. (e) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii)---Family disputes-- -Writ of certiorari---Scope---High Court can issue an order of certiorari to rectify jurisdictional errors committed by subordinate Courts in family law matters---Such errors can arise when Family Courts or First Appellate Courts issue decisions without jurisdiction, in excess of jurisdiction, or fail to exercise their jurisdiction altogether---Certiorari order is applicable when Family Court or First Appellate Court acts in an illegal or improper manner while exercising its jurisdiction---This includes situations where Court makes determinations without providing an affected party opportunity to be heard or where procedural methods employed contravene fundamental principles of natural justice---It is crucial to recognize that High Court's jurisdiction to issue certiorari is fundamentally supervisory, meaning, it does not possess authority to function as an appellate body---Such supervisory role imposes clear limitations: specifically, it prohibits High Court from reevaluating or questioning factual findings made by subordinate Courts based on their assessment of evidence---High Court does not engage in reviewing or re-weighing evidence that underlies decisions made by Family Court or First Appellate Court---Instead, it may only nullify a decision it finds to be beyond jurisdiction or grossly erroneous without imposing its own conclusions in place of those reached by lower Courts---Certiorari orders can be granted solely when a clear error of law is evident on the face of record; however, this does not extend to addressing errors of fact, regardless of their severity. Mrs. Shireen Imran, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners. Tauseef Ejaz Malik, Advocate Supreme Court via video link from Branch Registry Lahore for Respondents Date of hearing: 28th January, 2025.

Summary: And C.M.A.5277/2023 In C.R.P.NIL/2023 In C.P.L.A.3113/2020 (Against order dated 30.09.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No. 1381 of 2020.) C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023 and C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023 in C.R.P. Nil of 2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 3113 of 2020, decided on 14th February, 2025. (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Review of judgment---Question of law---Effect---Sole basis of judgment under review was dismissal of petition for leave to appeal on a question of law---Validity---When decision (more formally, the ratio decidendi) turns solely on a pure question of law and all the more so when that question is exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not enough for review petitioner to contend that the interpretation is incorrect---To allow such a ground to be taken would be, in effect, to allow review petitioner to reargue the case---Ground for review would have to be that the decision was per incuriam; it was difficult to conceive of any other reviewable ground being available. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Review of judgment---Non-assailing order of High Court- --Petitioner did not assail order passed by High Court---After dismissal of petition for leave to appeal filed by another party, petitioner intended to seek review of that judgment of Supreme Court---Validity---It was not open to a person who was a party to proceedings in High Court and was heard there but chose not to assail the latter's decision in the Supreme Court to then turn around and complain on some other party's leave petition, that the same was dismissed without notice to it---Application was dismissed. Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023). Rehan-ud-Din Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023). Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023) and Rehan-ud-Din Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th February, 2025.

Summary: And C.M.A.5277/2023 In C.R.P.NIL/2023 In C.P.L.A.3113/2020 (Against order dated 30.09.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No. 1381 of 2020.) C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023 and C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023 in C.R.P. Nil of 2023 in C.P.L.A. No. 3113 of 2020, decided on 14th February, 2025. (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Review of judgment---Question of law---Effect---Sole basis of judgment under review was dismissal of petition for leave to appeal on a question of law---Validity---When decision (more formally, the ratio decidendi) turns solely on a pure question of law and all the more so when that question is exclusively a matter of statutory interpretation, it is not enough for review petitioner to contend that the interpretation is incorrect---To allow such a ground to be taken would be, in effect, to allow review petitioner to reargue the case---Ground for review would have to be that the decision was per incuriam; it was difficult to conceive of any other reviewable ground being available. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Review of judgment---Non-assailing order of High Court- --Petitioner did not assail order passed by High Court---After dismissal of petition for leave to appeal filed by another party, petitioner intended to seek review of that judgment of Supreme Court---Validity---It was not open to a person who was a party to proceedings in High Court and was heard there but chose not to assail the latter's decision in the Supreme Court to then turn around and complain on some other party's leave petition, that the same was dismissed without notice to it---Application was dismissed. Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023). Rehan-ud-Din Khan, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicant (in C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023). Ch. Hafeez Ullah Yaqub, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.M.A. No. 5277 of 2023) and Rehan-ud-Din Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 540 of 2023) for Respondents. Date of hearing: 14th February, 2025.

Summary: Bail Application Held: i) As per the medical evidence the deceased received a single firearm entry wound for which two persons have been charged with a generalized role. Whether the shot allegedly fired by the petitioner / accused proved effective or that of the co-accused emerges as a significant question to be thrashed out at the trial. (ii) It is alleged that the deceased was simultaneously fired at by two persons with Kalashnikovs from a distance of around 10 to 14 feet. If this were indeed the case the consequences would have been far more drastic. Nevertheless as noted above the deceased still sustained a single firearm entry wound. (iii) It is now well settled that when an accused is otherwise entitled to bail mere abscondence not being conclusive proof of guilt would not suffice to obstruct the way of his bail. (Bail allowed)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---Art. 15, 199, and Rule 22 of the Passports Rules, 2021 Right to freedom of movement—Placement of citizen’s name on Passport Control List (PCL)—Legality—Due process—Requirement of Federal Government’s approval The Petitioner challenged the placement of his name on the Passport Control List (PCL) under Article 199 of the Constitution, contending that the restriction was arbitrary, unlawful, and a violation of his fundamental rights. The Petitioner was accused in FIR No. 96/23 under various sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. However, his pre-arrest bail petition was withdrawn after the investigating officer found him not guilty. Despite this, his name remained on the PCL based on the recommendation of the Home Department, Punjab, without any prior notice or opportunity for a hearing. Rule 22 of the Passports Rules, 2021, requires approval from the Federal Government for placing an individual on the PCL, which was absent in the present case. The court held that such a restriction, in the absence of lawful authority and procedural fairness, violated Article 15 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to free movement subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. Therefore, the placement of the Petitioner’s name on the PCL was declared illegal, unconstitutional, and of no legal effect. Cited Cases: Dr. Joseph Wilson v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PCrLJ 1569 Dr. Shireen M. Mazari v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 MLD 1020 Rasikh Ellahi v. Federation of Pakistan 2024 YLR 2616 Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 Farah Mazhar v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 Lahore 119 ----- Disposition: Writ petition allowed—Respondents directed to remove Petitioner’s name from PCL, as its inclusion was found to be unjustified, illegal, and violative of constitutional rights.

Summary: (a) Review Jurisdiction—Scope and Limitations ----C.P.L.A. 3113/2020—Review Petition—Grounds for Review—Per Incuriam Principle Petitioner, Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority (OGRA), sought review of the Supreme Court's judgment refusing leave to appeal against the decision of the Islamabad High Court—High Court had ruled that OGRA could not authorize Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan (Institute) to conduct sampling under the Pakistan Oil (Refining, Blending, Transportation, Storage, and Marketing) Rules, 2016—Supreme Court reaffirmed that its earlier judgment was based solely on statutory interpretation and a pure question of law—Review jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to reargue a case—Petitioner failed to establish that the judgment was per incuriam, which is a necessary ground for review in such cases—Review petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Principles of Per Incuriam—Established legal doctrine • Judicial Precedents on Review Jurisdiction—No specific case cited, but principles reaffirmed (b) Procedural Fairness—Right to be Heard—Dismissal of Review Application ----C.M.A. 5277/2023—Condemned Unheard—Finality of Judgment Institute, which had not sought leave to appeal against the High Court’s decision, filed an application seeking review of the Supreme Court’s judgment—Claimed it was condemned unheard as no notice was issued to it—Supreme Court held that the Institute was a party in the original High Court proceedings and was heard there—Failure to seek leave to appeal led to finality of the judgment against it—Supreme Court practice does not require issuance of notice to non-petitioning respondents when leave to appeal is refused—Review application dismissed. (c) Interpretation of Statutory Provisions—Rule 54 of the 2016 Rules & Section 4 of the 2006 Act ----Judicial Review—Statutory Interpretation—Authority of Regulatory Bodies High Court interpreted Rule 54 of the 2016 Rules and relevant clauses of Section 4 of the 2006 Act—Supreme Court upheld the interpretation that OGRA could not delegate its sampling authority to the Institute—When a decision rests purely on statutory interpretation, a review petition cannot be used to challenge the correctness of such interpretation without demonstrating a fundamental legal error—No such error established—Petition dismissed. Disposition: Both review petition (CRP 540/2023) and review application (CMA 5277/2023) dismissed.

Summary: (a) Family Law ----Recovery of dowry articles---Non-joinder of necessary party---Scope---Petitioners contended that the suit for recovery of dowry articles was not maintainable as the plaintiff (respondent No.3) had failed to implead her husband as a necessary party---Held, that the plea of non-joinder must be raised at the earliest stage of proceedings, and if not raised timely, it is deemed to have been waived---Petitioners neither included this objection in their written statement nor raised it in their first appeal before the Additional District Judge---Thus, they were precluded from introducing this plea before the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution or in seeking leave to appeal before the Supreme Court---Further, the Family Courts Act, 1964, provides a broad definition of “party” and empowers the Family Court to implead any person necessary for a just decision of the dispute---Respondent No.3's claim was specifically against the petitioners, alleging that they unlawfully retained her dowry articles after evicting her and her husband from their shared residence---In light of this cause of action, the presence of the petitioners alone was sufficient for a proper adjudication, and the non-joinder of respondent No.3’s husband did not affect the maintainability of the suit. Cited Cases: • East and West Steamship Co. v. Queensland Insurance Co. (PLD 1963 SC 663) • Muhammad Arif v. District and Sessions Judge, Sialkot (2011 SCMR 1591) • Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 1984 SC 95) (b) Family Law ----Jurisdiction of Family Court---Non-joinder of necessary party---Comparison with Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor (PLD 2020 SC 269)---Distinction between cases---Scope---Petitioners heavily relied on Fawad Ishaq to argue that respondent No.3’s husband was a necessary party---Held, that reliance on Fawad Ishaq was misplaced as the facts of the present case were distinguishable---In Fawad Ishaq, the wife had sought transfer of a property mentioned in the Nikahnama as dower, but the property belonged to the husband’s mother, who was not legally obligated to transfer it---Husband was a necessary party because he was responsible for dower payment---In contrast, in the present case, petitioners were found to be in possession of the dowry articles and were responsible for returning them---Their liability was independent of the husband’s, making his inclusion unnecessary in the suit---Distinguishing Fawad Ishaq, the Court held that petitioners' argument was misconceived. Cited Cases: • Fawad Ishaq v. Mst. Mehreen Mansoor (PLD 2020 SC 269) (c) Family Law ----Scope of High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in family cases---Issuance of certiorari---Reappraisal of evidence---Scope---Petitioners argued that the decree for recovery of dowry articles was based on improper appreciation of evidence and sought its re-examination---Held, that under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, the High Court’s jurisdiction in family cases is supervisory and does not extend to reappraising evidence or acting as an appellate court---High Court may issue a writ of certiorari to correct jurisdictional errors where the Family Court acts beyond its jurisdiction, fails to exercise its jurisdiction, or commits a gross illegality affecting due process---However, it cannot interfere in factual findings or reassess evidence unless there is a clear error of law on the face of the record---The Family Court and First Appellate Court had properly assessed the evidence and found petitioners liable for returning the dowry articles, rejecting their defense that the articles had already been returned---Petitioners failed to point out any jurisdictional error or violation of natural justice warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Azam vs. Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 1984 SC 95) • Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir (2011 SCMR 1361) (d) Family Law ----Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in family matters---Principle of judicial restraint---Petitioners sought leave to appeal arguing misappreciation of evidence---Scope of Supreme Court’s intervention---Held, that in cases arising from certiorari proceedings, the Supreme Court exercises restraint and does not interfere with findings of lower courts unless substantial legal grounds exist---The principle ensures that family disputes are resolved efficiently and finality is given to decrees issued under the Family Courts Act, 1964, except in cases of clear legal misinterpretation or injustice---As no legal errors or jurisdictional issues were identified, interference by the Supreme Court was unwarranted. Cited Cases: • Quinn v. Leathem (1901 AC 495) • Secretary Revenue Division v. Iftikhar Ahmed Tabassum (PLD 2019 SC 563) Disposition: Petition dismissed; leave to appeal declined.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978--- ----O. XIII, R. 3(1-A)---Appeal before the Supreme Court, filing of---Matter emanating from two suits having been filed before the Court of original jurisdiction---Lists of legal representatives of the plaintiffs and defendants of both the suits, not annexed---Appeal---Maintainability- --Admittedly, two suits were filed before the Trial Court, however, while fling the Petition for Leave to Appear (PLA)/appeal the appellant had annexed the verification regarding non-filing of the list of the plaintiffs in one suit filed by the (present) Appellant and failed to annex the list of legal representatives of the defendants in the said suit---Similarly, neither the list of legal representatives of the plaintiffs as well as defendants in second/other suit was filed by the (present) respondent, nor the verification in that regard had been annexed with the memo of PLA/appeal---Under Sub-rule (1-A) of R. 3 of O. XIII of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978, filing of lists of the legal heirs of the plaintiffs and the defendants filed before the Trial Court was mandatory and had to be annexed with the memo of PLA/appeal and failure to comply with it entailed dismissal of the PLA/ appeal on this sole ground---It was enjoined upon the (present) appellant to annex the lists of legal representatives of the plaintiffs and the defendants of both the suits and if the same were not filed in the Trial Court, then the certification of the Trial Court in said regard should necessarily be brought on the record, which had also not been done---Present appeal had been filed in violation of the statutory provision, hence, the same being filed incompetently, was liable to be dismissed on the sole ground---Thus, the (present) appeal had been filed incompetently, therefore, there was no need to dilate upon the merits and demerits of the case as the same would be a futile exercise---Appeal was dismissed. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Supreme Court Rules, 1978--- ----O. XIII, R. 3(1-A)---Appeal before the Supreme Court, filing of---Matter emanating from two suits having been filed before the Court of original jurisdiction---Lists of legal representatives of the plaintiffs and defendants of both the suits, not annexed---Appeal---Adjudication on merits---Scope---Contention of the appellant was that the requirement of annexing the lists of legal heirs with the PLA/appeal may be dispensed with and the case be decided on merits---Validity---Record revealed that the appellant annexed the certification regarding non-filing of the list of legal heirs of the plaintiffs of one suit, meaning thereby he was fully aware of the requirement of the statutory provision, but failed to file the list of legal representatives of the plaintiffs and defendants of both the suits as mandated under the Rules---Consequently, in view of the appellant’ negligence in complying with such statuary requirement, the inherent powers of the Court could not be invoked to dispense with such compliance---Thus, the (present) appeal had been filed incompetently, therefore, there was no need to dilate upon the merits and demerits of the case as the same would be a futile exercise---Appeal was dismissed. Syed Atif Mushtaq Gillani, Advocate for Appellant. Tahir Aziz Khan, Advocate for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 409, 468, 471, 420, 161, 465, 109 & 34---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5---Criminal breach of trust by public servant, cheating and dishonestly inducing someone to deliver property, forgery for valuable security, use of a forged document as genuine, criminal breach of trust by public servant, public servant accepting any gratification other than legal remuneration, offence of forgery, abetment, common intention, criminal misconduct---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Rule of consistency---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that he through forged document and with the connivance of Naib Tehsildar sold out land measuring 1410 kanals including common village lands and public grazing land fraudulently---Admittedly, the accused/petitioner was not a Government servant hence S.409, P.P.C, and S.5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 were not applicable to the extent of the petitioner in the present case---Co-accused, who were arrested by the police in the instant case, had already been granted post arrest bail by the Chief Court and another nominated accused, the then Naib Tehsildar was on interim bail, as such the present petitioner became entitled for concession of bail on the basis of rule of consistency---Moreover, there was unexplained delay of one year and two months in lodging of the FIR and the documentary evidence available on the prosecution file suggested the matter being of private transaction---Piece of land regarding which the transaction was alleged was not Government land as per revenue record, rather the same was recorded as Jagir of Raja's of the area in the revenue documents---Investigation in the matter to the extent of the present petitioner was completed and the petitioner was behind bars without any trial in the case---Nothing was available on case file to prove the entrustment of the petitioner for the offence of criminal breach of trust, hence, the application of S.409, P.P.C., in the instant matter required further inquiry to the extent of present petitioner---Other sections did not fall under the prohibitory clause of S.497,Cr.P.C.---Petitioner was local habitant of the area and the prosecution had not taken the plea of abscondance or tampering with the evidence by the accused, as such in absence of any allegation of abscondance or tempering with the prosecution evidence by the petitioner, bail was not to be withheld as punishment, because the accused/ petitioner would face the sentence, if ultimately convicted by the Trial Court at the time of conclusion of the trial---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Tentative assessment---Scope---Findings made in bail order are tentative in nature and the Trial Court needs not be influenced by them in any way. Abdul Karim, Ammar Sadib and Tariq Shah for Petitioner. Faqeer Shah Special Prosecutor for Anti-Corruption Department GB for the State. Date of hearing: 13th February, 2025.