Summary: ----Ss. 2(22A), 33, 35 & Schedule-I, Art. 47 (as amended by Punjab Finance Act, 2018)---West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949, R.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 138 & 199---Constitutional petition---Public office---Collection of stamp duty---Insurance policies-- -Petitioners/insurance companies were aggrieved of notices for audit of accounts issued by Chief Inspector of Stamps, Board of Revenue Punjab---Dispute was with regard to deposit of stamp duty on instruments of insurance executed by petitioners/insurance companies-- -Held: If public functions under Art. 138 of the Constitution belong to Provincial Government then such functions can only be delegated to public officers who are departmental officials---Provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 concern themselves with collection and impounding of duties of stamp which, in essence, are public functions meant to be performed by public officers---Private bodies and persons included in definition of public office in Stamp Act, 1899 may carry out functions which can be described as public but as commercial organizations they cannot be said to possess powers solely in order that they may use them for the public good---Private bodies do not have the same duty that a public body, which is not a commercial undertaking, has---Private body is entitled to look to the interest of its shareholders-- -This also means that private bodies and persons may become subject to judicial review since their source of power is a statute---Offices to which a reference has been made in Appendix II of Stamp Act, 1899 do not include the bodies in dispute and not at all the offices of petitioners/insurance companies---Petitioners/insurance companies are not comprised in the list of Courts and offices and other accounts which are subject to stamp audit by a stamp auditor under West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949---Notices issued to petitioners/insurance companies were ultra vires as West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949 did not empower stamp auditor to inspect books and records of petitioners/ insurance companies for audit---Notices for audit were without lawful authority and Chief Inspector of Stamps was denuded of powers to serve such notices on petitioners/insurance companies to compel them to undertake stamp audit by stamp auditor nominated by Collector---High Court declared that definition of public office contained in S. 2(22A) of Stamp Act, 1899, to the extent of bodies in dispute was unconstitutional and without lawful authority and were struck out from the definition---High Court gave directions to modify definition of public officer in S. 2(22B) of Stamp Act, 1899---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802; R (King) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 and YL v. Birmingham City Council [2007] UK HL 27 ref. (b) Stamp Act (II of 1899)--- ----Ss. 33 & 35---Words "by any public officer" and "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---Scope---Words "by any public officer" in section 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are tied in with the forgoing words "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---These are all public functions conferred by Provincial Government and there is no power in any private person to act upon, register or authenticate an instrument---Such power is inconceivable to vest in a private person nor can he be conferred such a power, for that would be unconstitutional and against the holding of Supreme Court in Mustafa Impex case reported as PLD 2016 SC 808---Functions contemplated by sections 33 and 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are in essence public functions of a Constitutional nature and the wide scope of definition of 'public office' introduced by Stamp (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1973 would be in contradiction to such functions---Two potentially conflicting strands of the same term are hard to reconcile in the statutory setting of Stamp Act, 1899. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahzad Ata Elahi, Gohar Mustafa Qureshi, Shahryar Kasuri, Khawaja Omer Ghias, Syed Kamal Ali Haider, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Ali Umrao, Haider Aziz Sheikh, Muhammad Mohsin Malik, Asad Abbas Butt, Muhammad Asif, Ms. Ayesha Qazi, Awais Ahmed, Malik Muhammad Zarif, Ali Ahmad Toor and Syed Ali Ahmad Gillani for Petitioners. Abdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondent No.4-FBR. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General, Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G., Jahanzeb Inam, Addl. Advocate General and Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979) --- ----Ss.15-A & 15(2)(vii)---Eviction of tenant---Personal bona fide need of land lord---Default in payment of rent---Landlord's testimony viz. bona fide need sufficient if unshaken in cross-examination---Landlord's testimony going unrebutted---Ejectment upheld---Protection to tenants---Accountability mechanism in place to discourage the misuse of ejectment proceedings by landlord---Scope---Reletting of the same premises by landlord within one year attracts penalty ---The respondent No.1 (landlord) filed ejectment petition on the ground of default by petitioner (tenant) and personal bona fide need---Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application and appeal of the petitioner (tenant) was dismissed---Against the concurrent findings of the courts below petitioner (tenant) filed the present constitutional petition---Held Once the landlord stepped into the witness box and the plea of personal need went unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under S.15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979---It was evident from perusal of the cross-examination conducted on the respondent No.1 (landlord) that the plea of the landlord had not been shattered and no further cross-examination was conducted and only a suggestion regarding personal bona fide need was put to the witness and no other question in relation to the same was asked---For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented premises the only requirement of law was to prove bona fide need by the landlord---However, where a landlord who obtained possession of a building from a tenant on account of his personal bona fide need and then re-let the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or utilized the premises for a use other than his personal use within one year of such possession then he would liable to be punished with fine not exceeding one year's rent of the building premises and the tenant who was evicted may apply to the Rent Controller for an order directing that he be restored possession ---This accountability mechanism provided under S.15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 was introduced to ensure that ejectment proceedings were not abused and due protection was given to the tenant in cases where landlord had misused the provisions of the Ordinance, 1979---The protection given by the said provision was also available to the petitioner, however, his case did not fall within the parameters of the same, hence, the Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan 1992 SCMR 1296; Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz 1996 SCMR 1055; Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar C.P. No. S-495/2023 Order dated 21.07.2023; Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh 2010 SCMR 1925; Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir 1999 MLD 3011 and Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali 2006 CLC 1853 rel. Muhammad Aslam and S.M. Jahanbir for Petitioner. Iftikhar Javed Qazi, Asfandyar Jahangir, Samil Malik Khan and Koonj Bhutto for Respondents. Irshad Ahmed Shaikh, A.A.G. for the State. Date of hearing: 17th March, 2025. Order Muhammad Jaffer Raza, J .--- The instant petition has impugned the concurrent findings of learned lower fora. In seriatim, Judgment dated 11.12.2024 passed in F.R.A. No.173/2024 by learned Additional District Judge-XII, South, Karachi and Judgment dated 25.05.2024 passed in Rent Case No. 1295/2016 by learned Rent Controller-II, South, Karachi ("Impugned Judgments") Facts of the case are summarized as under: - 1. The Respondent No.1 being owner of the tenement in question filed Rent Case No. 1295/2016 on the ground of default and personal bona fide need. The same was disposed of vide Judgment dated 25.05.204 by the learned Rent Controller and the rent application was allowed. The points for determination were settled as follows: - Point No.1: Whether the opponent is liable to pay rent of the demised premises at an agreed enhanced rat of 10% every year by virtue of the Memorandum of Understanding dated 18.08.2011? Point No.2: Whether the opponent has committed willful default in payment of rent of the demised premises as per MOU dated 18.08.2011? Point No. 3: Whether the applicant is in bona fide need of the demised premises for its personal use in order to set up the charitable hospital in collaboration with the German and British Red Crescent Society? Point No.4: Whether the opponent has committed default in payment of water and conservancy charges since 2001 in terms of clause-2 of the lease agreement dated 18.02.1984? Point No.5: What should the judgment be? 2. The rent application was allowed and all four points stood proved, thereafter, the Petitioner filed F.R.A. No. 173/2024 and the same was dismissed vide Impugned order. 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has argued that he is a doctor and running hospital in the name of Sindh Medical Center and providing services in the field of Health Care Management. Learned counsel states that the relationship between the parties is not denied, however, the ejectment application filed by the Respondent No.1 ought to have been dismissed on both grounds for the reason that no default was committed by the Petitioner and the Respondent No.1 has failed to prove his personal bona fide need. Learned counsel in this respect concedes that earlier in the year 2006, the compromise took place between the parties as a result of which an MoU was executed. It is further stated that the judgment passed by the learned Rent Controller is based on another MoU, the execution of which is denied by the Petitioner. It is further stated that requirements of personal bona fide need have been elaborated by the Respondent No.1 in paragraph number 9 of his rent application and it is stated by the learned counsel that the same does not meet the requirements of law set out under Section 15(2)(vii) of the SRPO. For the purpose of convenience, the learned counsel has read out the paragraph number 9 of the rent application which is reproduced as under:- "9. That it is also to be mentioned that Applicant in connivance with the German Red Cross and British Red Cross is planning to establish a Charitable Hospital for the poor and needy persons. Since the Opponent is a clear default and liable to be ejected from the demise premises. The Application in order to build up its Charitable Hospital need the said demise premises for its personal bona fide need." 4. At this juncture, both learned counsel agreed that for the purposes of the instant petition, it may be convenient to first adjudicate the ground of personal bona fide need and if the need arises, the ground of default can be adjudicated upon. I have specifically asked the learned counsel for the Petitioner, to point out the part of cross-examination in which according to him, the ground of personal bona fide need has been shattered. Learned counsel in response has invited my attention to page 403 which is a cross-examination of the applicant/Respondent No.1 and the same is reproduced hereunder: - It is in my knowledge that after filling of my ejectment application, the opponent filed his written statement. It is correct to suggest that some documents were attached with written statement. It is correct to suggest that document attached with written statement dated 10.04.2004 as annexure "A" is a correspondence between applicant and opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that the document attached with written statement as annexure "B" which is memorandum of understanding dated 12.04.2012 was executed between applicant and opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that the document which is annexure "B" bears ay signature. It is not in my knowledge whether opponent had sent the letter to the applicant to bring all the relevant documents in respect of demised premises before this court. It is correct to suggest that the correspondence in respect of demised premises has taken place time to time between opponent and the applicant. Yes, I can produce the record in respect of correspondence held between applicant and the opponent from the year 2011 till to date again says all the relevant documents in respect of correspondence, I have already produced before this court. It is correct to suggest that annexure "C" dated 13.08.2011 attached with written statement has been issued by the applicant. It is correct to suggest that we have received the annexure "D" dated 15.08.2011 attached with written statement is correct to suggest that the applicant has issued letter dated 28.07.2001 which is attached with written statement as annexure "E". It is correct to suggest that the document dated 30.06.2007 which is annexure "F" attached with written statement is available in the record of applicant. It is correct to suggest that apparently this document which is annexure "F" states that the water dues have been adjusted from the account of opponent but it is subject to verification as we have not officially received this letter from KWSB. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had issued letter dated 17.03.2016 which is annexure "G" and same is attached with written statement. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had filed one rent case No. 1366/2006 under section 15 SRPO against the opponent in the year 2006. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant had levelled similar allegations in above rent case as have been levelled in this case. It is correct to suggest that apparently annexure H/1 attached with written statement has been issued by the applicant but it is subject to verification from the office as it is an old document pertaining to year 2003 and same is signed by Hussain Bux Hoat but not me. It is not in my knowledge whether opponent had written a letter which is annexure H/2 voluntarily says that this letter is undated. It is incorrect to suggest that I am deliberately not producing the relevant documents before this court voluntarily says that I have already produced. It is correct to suggest that the rent case bearing No. 1366/2006 was disposed of on the basis of compromise. It is correct to suggest that annexure H/5 dated 19.03.2009 attached with written statement has been issued by me. It is correct to suggest that both the parties were bound on the terms and condition mentioned in a document dated 12.02.1984 produce by me and same has been marked as x until the signing of MOU dated 18.08.2011, Further cross-examination is reserved on the request of learned counsel for the opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that another MOU was also prepared/executed after the execution of MOU produced at Ex. A/2. is correct to suggest that some properties are mentioned in indenture of was executed in the year 1984 which has been marked on Xi correct to suggest that the details of sad properties are not mentioned in ejectment application as well as in my affidavit-in-evidence voluntarily says that details of current properties are mentioned in MOU signed on 18 August 2011 which has been produced at Es. A/2. It is correct to suggest that the applicant had filed one rent case tearing No 1306/2006 against the opponent. I don't remember at present whether applicant had not mentioned the details of properties mentioned in ar deed executed in the year 1984 in memo. of ejectment application as well as in affidavit in evidence of above rent case (1366/2006). It is correct to suggest that the applicant obtained possession of some of the properties mentioned in lease deed executed in the year 1984 from the opponent after exerting pressure upon him and thereafter rented out the same to some other tenants. At the moment I am not aware of the letter dated 19 July 2017 allegedly sent by the opponent through courier service to the applicant whether it was received by our office or not but we will give due reply after confirmation. The applicant has not received the letter dated 19.07.2017 voluntarily says that I have filed statement on 11.01.2018 and has also attached photocopies of paid water bills. It is incorrect to suggest that I have deposed falsely that the applicant has not received letter dated 19.07.2017. It is correct to suggest that I have filed the photocopies of paid water bills of entire building where the demised premises is situated but not exclusively of the demised premises. There are 20/22 tenants in the entire building It is correct to suggest that I have not produced the document showing the breakup of amount of the each tenant in respect of water voluntarily says that I have attached documents as annexure D to D/23 which show the water bills and maintenance charges along with Tet of the demised premises. It is correct to suggest that I have not duced original bills of paid water bilis. It is correct to suggest that the document attached with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D/1 which shows the amount of Rs.26,064/- as bill of water consumption for the month of October 2016 for the demised premises. It is incorrect to suggest that I have attached fake bills with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D to D/23. It is incorrect to suggest that the landlord has to pay all the Government taxes in respect of demised promises voluntarily says that the landlord has only to pay the property tax whereas the water and conservancy tax is to be paid by the tenant. I see annexure D of the meme of ejectment application and say that it allows the outstanding amount of Rs 87,20,839/-in respect of water and conservancy charges up to the month of October 2016 for the demised premises. It is correct to suggest that annexure D does not show the breakup of outstanding amount in months voluntarily says that when the opponent raised objections in this regard the applicant made correspondence and produced the rent account which is annexed with memo. of ejectment application as annexure F/1. It is correct to suggest that one bill dated 03.11.2016 is also part of the annexure D which shows the outstanding amount up to the month of October 2016 as Rs.57,04,773/-. It is incorrect to suggest that I have not mentioned the difference in both bills of annexure D voluntarily says that the both bills are different wherein one bills is for rent and second one is a maintenance bill therefore the difference between both bills cannot be compared. I don't remember the exact amount for charging the maintenance bill per square feet for demised premises. It is incorrect to suggest that the plaintiff has not sent the documents which are attached with memo. of ejectment application as annexure D to D/23 to the opponent nor received by the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the opponent is paying the rent regularly through cheque to the applicant voluntarily says that he is paying without enhancement of 10% rent and has also defaulted in payment of arrears of water and conservancy charges. It is correct to suggest that as per lease agreement, the rent of the demised premises was to be increased 10% after every three years voluntarily says that in August 2011, opponent agreed to pay 10% annual enhancement of rent. It is correct to suggest that the lease agreement dated 18th February 1984 which is marked as X is a registered document voluntarily says that the applicant had not got it registered but as per claim of the opponent it has been registered by the opponent. The original of the document marked as X is not in our custody. It is incorrect to suggest that I have not produced original of the annexure X with mala fide intention. I don't know at present whether the opponent has been paying the rent with 10% enhancement after every three years voluntarily says that I have to check it from my office. It is correct to suggest that the opponent is paying the monthly rent of the premises regularly, Voluntarily says that however, he is not paying the water charges. It is incorrect to suggest that any other MOU was made between the applicant and opponent subsequently MOU referred at para No. 2 of the letter dated 20.01.2016 vide Ex. A/5. It is correct to suggest that the sub lease between the parties is registered in respect of the premises in question. I don't know that the MOUs have got any precedence over the registered sub lease legally. Voluntarily says that however the said MOUs were made with mutual consent of the parties and same are part and parcel of sub lease. The MOUs made between the parties are not registered. It is incorrect to suggest that the opponent uses to pay the water charges to the water board directly. I don't reme bar as to how the MOUs were sent to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that any document on refusal to be received in person is sent through courier service. It is correct to suggest that I have not produced any postal/courier service receipt in respect of such MOUSJ. It is correct to suggest that the said MOUs don't bearing any receiving. It is correct to suggest that a letter dated 17.03.2016 vide Ex. A/7 was sent to the opponent through courier service and that its reply was also sent by the opponent dated 05.05.2016 at Ex. A/10. It is incorrect to suggest that the letters dated 07.04.2016 and 27.04.2016 vide Ex. A/8 and A/9 have never been sent to the opponent and that same have been prepared /fabricated only for the purpose of record. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 10.04.2016 attached as Annexure A with written statement was sent by the accountant of the applicant to the opponent. It is incorrect to suggest that MOU dated 12.04.2012 was made between me being the representative of the applicant and tenants. Voluntarily says that it is false and fabricated document. It is incorrect to suggest that it bears my signature. Voluntarily says that the original is not being shown in order to properly verify the same. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 13.08.2011 was sent by me to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the said letter was responded by the opponent through its letter dated 15.08.2011 being annexure D attached with the written statement. It is correct to suggest that the letter dated 28.07.2001 was sent by the applicant to the MD of KWSB in respect of water charges. It is incorrect to suggest that the KWSB sent any letter in response to the said letter to us/applicant. It is correct to suggest that the rent case No: 1366/2006 was filed by the applicant against the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the said case was withdrawn since compromise was effected. It is incorrect to suggest that the said rent case was filed on the same ground of non-payment of water charges and default in payment of the rent. Voluntarily says that it was in respect of enhancement of the rent. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant is adopting different methods in order to make the applicant to enhance the rent. It is incorrect to suggest that the applicant has ever stopped the water supply of to the opponent. It is correct to suggest that the applicant has asked the opponent to get installed separate electricity connection/meter. It is incorrect to suggest that neither the opponent has committed in default in payment of the rent nor in payment of water charges. It is correct to suggest that almost all of the offices are rented out and the clinics are situated therein. The 10 percent of the property of the applicant is in its own use. It is incorrect to suggest that the premises-in-question are not in personal need of the applicant. Voluntarily says that the same are needed for setting up medical centre, OPD etc for the welfare of public. It is incorrect to suggest that I am deposing falsely. It is incorrect to suggest that I have filed false application against the opponent in order to harass him. (Emphasis Added) 5. Learned counsel further argued that in paragraph number 9 (reproduced above) it is evident that the tenement is not required for the personal use and the intention of the Respondent is mala fide. It was also argued that it is apparent from bear reading of paragraph Number 9 (reproduced above) that the Respondent No.1 wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. 6. Conversely, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1 has argued that witness of the Respondent No.1 has reiterated his stance taken in the rent application as well as in the affidavit in evidence. He has further stated that the Respondent No.1 has fully discharged its burden and the Petitioner failed to shatter the evidence of the witness of the Respondent No.1. He has further argued that it is unconscionable that a landlord has being deprived of the tenement even though the rent application was filed in the year 2016. On the averment of the Petitioner regarding renting out the property to another tenant, learned counsel stated that adequate protection is provided under Section 15A of the SRPO. 7. Heard learned counsel and perused the record. It is evident that the Petitioner conducted a very detailed cross-examination of the Respondent No.1, on several dates, only a portion of which has been reproduced above. It is evident from perusal of the cross-examination reproduced above, that the plea of the landlord has not been shattered and no further cross-examination was conducted in reference to this ground by the Petitioner. It is noticeable from a bare perusal of the cross-examination that only a suggestion regarding personal bona fide need was put to the witness and no other question is relation to the same was asked. 8. The argument of the Petitioner in reference to tenement being rented out to another tenant, I agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the Respondent No.1, that Section 15A of the SRPO provides adequate relief/protection to the tenant in such circumstances. It is a settled principle of law that once the landlord steps into the witness box and the plea of personal need is unrebutted, the ejectment application must be allowed under Section 15 of the SRPO. The following judgements advance the said proposition. The respective judgments and their relevant parts are reproduced below: - ? Jehangir Rustom Kakalia v. State Bank of Pakistan "Rule laid down in the cases mentioned above is that on the issue of personal need, assertion or claim on oath by landlord if consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross-examination, or disproved in rebuttal is sufficient to prove that need is bona fide." ? Wasim Ahmad Adenwalla v. Shaikh Karim Riaz "3. Leave was granted to consider the contention that the plea of personal requirement was not bona fide as a flat was available in the same premises which A the Respondent did not occupy. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the Respondent is residing in a bugalow in Defence Housing Authority and that it is not imaginable that he would shift in a small house in a dingy and congested locality. He further contended that during the pendency of the case a portion of the house, which was an independent apartment, fell vacant, but the Respondent did not occupy it and rented it out to the tenant. On the basis of these facts it is contended that the Respondent's need is neither genuine nor bona fide. So far the first contention is concerned the learned counsel for the Respondent stated that the Respondent is residing in a rented house with his son in the Defence Housing Authority. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant therefore does not hold water because firstly, the Respondent is not residing in his own house, but is residing with his son who has rented out a house in that area, and secondly, in these circumstances if a landlord chooses to reside in his own house which may be in a locality which is much inferior and congested than the place where he is residing on rent, it cannot be termed as mala fide. It is the choice of the landlord to choose the house or the place where he wants to reside." (Emphasis added) ? Rabia Jamal v. Mst. Nargis Akhtar "22. On the basis of the above decisions of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, it is apparent that once the landlord has adduced evidence by stating that they require the Said Tenement for their personal use in good faith, thereafter the burden shifts on the tenant to show either that the landlord did not require the Said Tenement for her personal use in good faith or that the Said Tenement could not be used by the landlord for the purpose as indicated in the Application under clause (vii) of subsection (2) of Section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. However, while raising such a contention it is not open to the tenant to allege mala fide on the part of the landlord by adducing evidence to state that the landlord had alternative premises or for that matter that the landlord had alternative premises that were more suitable for the needs of the landlord. This right to choose from amongst a host of properties that are available to a landlord as to which of those properties the landlord requires for their personal use vests solely with the landlord to the exclusion of all others." (Emphasis added) ? Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh "6. For seeking eviction of a tenant from the rented shop, the only requirement of law is the proof of his bona fide need by the landlord, which stands discharged the moment he appears in the witness box and makes such statement on oath or in the form of an affidavit-in-evidence as prescribed by law, if it remains unshattered in cross-examination and un-rebutted in the evidence adduced by the opposite party." 9. Any adjudication on Section 15(2)(vii) would be deficient without referring to the accountability mechanism provided for under Section 15-A of the SRPO. The same is reproduced below: - 3[("15-A"] 4[ Where the land-lord, who has obtained the possession of a building under section 14 or premises under clause (vii) of section 15, relets the building or premises to any person other than the previous tenant or puts it to a use other than personal use within one year of such possession-- (i) he shall be punishable with fine which shall not exceed one year's rent of the building of the premises, as the case may be, payable immediately before the possession was so obtained. (ii) The tenant who has been evicted may apply to the Controller for an order directing that he shall be restored to possession of the building or the premises, as the case may be, and the Controller shall make an order accordingly."] 10. The provision reproduced above was introduced by the legislature through the Sindh Ordinance No. II of 1980 on January 21, 1980, to ensure that ejectment proceedings are not abused and due protection is given to the tenant in cases where the landlord/owner has misused the provisions of the Ordinance. An embargo of one year has been placed on the landlord in case the landlord wishes to rent out the property to another tenant. The protection given, which is also available to the present Petitioner, has been expounded in the following judgments, relevant parts of the same are reproduced: - a) Mst. Zubeda through her son and General Attorney v. Muhammad Nadir. "Sufficient protection has been postulated in section 15-A of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which in the event of use of premises other than personal rise not only postulates punishment for the landlord but also provide an effective mechanism for restoration of the possession to the evicted tenant before the Controller who would be entitled to exercise such authority on due consideration of the facts. Since the law provides an alternate and effective remedy to defuse the impression of the Respondent, I think the apprehension is not well founded in the present state of circumstances." b) Mst. Dilshad Bibi v. Ramzan Ali. "Keeping in view the only restriction imposed on the personal need by way of section 15-A of the SRPO as well as authorities quoted by the Petitioner and the evidence brought on record the Petitioner has proved that the shop is required for personal need to be used by her son and no doubt has been created in this respect. The apprehension of the Respondent that the Petitioner may let out the premises after obtaining the same to other tenant is covered by section 15-A of the SRPO which remove the above apprehension." For the foregoing reasons the instant petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. UN/H-7/Sindh Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Stamp Act (II of 1899)--- ----Ss. 2(22A), 33, 35 & Schedule-I, Art. 47 (as amended by Punjab Finance Act, 2018)---West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949, R.3---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 138 & 199---Constitutional petition---Public office---Collection of stamp duty---Insurance policies-- -Petitioners/insurance companies were aggrieved of notices for audit of accounts issued by Chief Inspector of Stamps, Board of Revenue Punjab---Dispute was with regard to deposit of stamp duty on instruments of insurance executed by petitioners/insurance companies-- -Held: If public functions under Art. 138 of the Constitution belong to Provincial Government then such functions can only be delegated to public officers who are departmental officials---Provisions of Stamp Act, 1899 concern themselves with collection and impounding of duties of stamp which, in essence, are public functions meant to be performed by public officers---Private bodies and persons included in definition of public office in Stamp Act, 1899 may carry out functions which can be described as public but as commercial organizations they cannot be said to possess powers solely in order that they may use them for the public good---Private bodies do not have the same duty that a public body, which is not a commercial undertaking, has---Private body is entitled to look to the interest of its shareholders-- -This also means that private bodies and persons may become subject to judicial review since their source of power is a statute---Offices to which a reference has been made in Appendix II of Stamp Act, 1899 do not include the bodies in dispute and not at all the offices of petitioners/insurance companies---Petitioners/insurance companies are not comprised in the list of Courts and offices and other accounts which are subject to stamp audit by a stamp auditor under West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949---Notices issued to petitioners/insurance companies were ultra vires as West Pakistan Stamp Inspection and Audit Rules, 1949 did not empower stamp auditor to inspect books and records of petitioners/ insurance companies for audit---Notices for audit were without lawful authority and Chief Inspector of Stamps was denuded of powers to serve such notices on petitioners/insurance companies to compel them to undertake stamp audit by stamp auditor nominated by Collector---High Court declared that definition of public office contained in S. 2(22A) of Stamp Act, 1899, to the extent of bodies in dispute was unconstitutional and without lawful authority and were struck out from the definition---High Court gave directions to modify definition of public officer in S. 2(22B) of Stamp Act, 1899---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Sui Southern Gas Company Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 SCMR 802; R (King) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2015] UKSC 54 and YL v. Birmingham City Council [2007] UK HL 27 ref. (b) Stamp Act (II of 1899)--- ----Ss. 33 & 35---Words "by any public officer" and "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---Scope---Words "by any public officer" in section 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are tied in with the forgoing words "acted upon, registered or authenticated?. by any public officer"---These are all public functions conferred by Provincial Government and there is no power in any private person to act upon, register or authenticate an instrument---Such power is inconceivable to vest in a private person nor can he be conferred such a power, for that would be unconstitutional and against the holding of Supreme Court in Mustafa Impex case reported as PLD 2016 SC 808---Functions contemplated by sections 33 and 35 of Stamp Act, 1899 are in essence public functions of a Constitutional nature and the wide scope of definition of 'public office' introduced by Stamp (Punjab Amendment) Act, 1973 would be in contradiction to such functions---Two potentially conflicting strands of the same term are hard to reconcile in the statutory setting of Stamp Act, 1899. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2016 SC 808 rel. Imtiaz Rashid Siddiqui, Shahzad Ata Elahi, Gohar Mustafa Qureshi, Shahryar Kasuri, Khawaja Omer Ghias, Syed Kamal Ali Haider, Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Ali Umrao, Haider Aziz Sheikh, Muhammad Mohsin Malik, Asad Abbas Butt, Muhammad Asif, Ms. Ayesha Qazi, Awais Ahmed, Malik Muhammad Zarif, Ali Ahmad Toor and Syed Ali Ahmad Gillani for Petitioners. Abdul Muqtadir Khan for Respondent No.4-FBR. Mirza Nasar Ahmad, Addl. Attorney General, Asad Ali Bajwa, D.A.G., Jahanzeb Inam, Addl. Advocate General and Hassan Ijaz Cheema, A.A.G. for Respondents. Date of hearing: 26th February, 2025.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ---S.20---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 344, 249-A & 265-K---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Filing of private criminal complaint by the Bank against accused / customer, challenging of---Constitutional petition---Maintainability---Summoning of accused not being challenged by the customer/ accused---Effect---Alternate remedy, availability of---Petitioners (customers) challenged filing of criminal private complaint by filing constitutional petition on the ground that civil litigation was already pending before the Banking Court on the same subject, thus, proceedings should be stayed till final decision of the civil litigation---Validity---Record (including appended copies of complaint along with order sheet) reflected that the Banking Court had passed order under S.204 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ('Cr.P.C') while taking cognizance of the matter and summoning the accused (petitioners) to face trial---But no supplication to challenge said summoning order had been made by the petitioners /accused; whereas such order, being judicial in nature, was assailable, however, none of the petitioners ever challenged the same---Non-assailing of the order whereby cognizance was taken by the Judge Banking Court, would imply that the petitioners had submitted to jurisdiction of the Banking Court in the complaint against them---After failure of the petitioners to challenge the summoning order, if they wanted stay of criminal proceedings pending civil litigation, they could move an application under S.344 of the Cr.P.C. before the Trial Court with prayer to postpone the commencement of trial or adjourn the trial, if already commenced, pending decision in the respective civil proceedings---Provision under S.344 of the Cr.P.C. denotes that a court may postpone the initiation of any inquiry or trial or may adjourn any inquiry or trial which is already in progress---Postponement of the commencement or adjournment of trial can be made due to the absence of a witness or for any other reasonable cause ---Petitioners could even have approached the Trial Court by moving application under S.265-K of Cr.P.C. seeking their acquittal at any stage---Section 265-K of Cr.P.C. provides jurisdiction to Trial Court to discharge/acquit an accused if it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of the offence---In the present case, the petitioners instead of exhausting any of such adequate efficacious remedies available to them, had opted to approach the High Court directly by invoking the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution ---A constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable when a person has an adequate, efficacious alternate remedy--- In light of the availability of an alternate remedy to the petitioners under S.344 or 265-K of the Cr.P.C. and in the absence of any compelling reasons with the petitioners to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court the present petition could not be entertained---Constitutional petition, being non-maintainable, was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani PLD 2016 SC 55 and Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department, Lahore v. Yasir Majeed Sheikh 2021 SCMR 624 ref. Messrs Long Grain Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Habib Bank Limited through Senior Manager (CAD) and Senior Manager (Remedial) and another 2016 CLD 551 distinguished. Syed Zeeshan Haider Zaidi for Petitioners. Muhammad Nadeem for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 24th March, 2025. Judgment Raheel Kamran, J .--- The petitioners have filed this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as the ('Constitution') to challenge the filing of private complaint under section 20 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance 2001 (hereinafter to be referred as 'FIO 2001') by the respondent No.2-Bank against the petitioners and proforma respondent No.3 during pendency of civil litigation before the Banking Court on the same subject. 2. The petitioners as well as pro forma respondent No.3 have been arrayed as accused in the private complaint filed by respondent-Bank on the allegation that they removed the hypothecated stocks, etc. It is asserted in the petition that civil suit instituted by the respondent-bank against the petitioners and pro forma respondent No. 3 is pending and during pendency of such civil suit, criminal complaint has been filed. Prayer of the petitioners is that filing of the criminal complaint be declared illegal and proceedings thereof be ordered to be stayed till final decision of the civil litigation. 3. Learned counsel for the respondent-Bank has raised preliminary objection on the maintainability of this petition by contending that adequate alternate remedies are available to the petitioners either to approach the trial court by filing application to seek postponement of the proceedings till determination of the civil liability under section 344 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter to be referred as 'Cr.P.C.') or to seek acquittal under section 265K of Cr.P.C. Learned counsel while making reference to the case of Sheikh Muhammad Anwar and 4 others v. Judge Banking Court and another (2024 CLD 724) submits that the trial court is empowered to postpone proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that criminal liability is intimately connected with the outcome of civil proceedings. Learned counsel emphasizes that even otherwise, the suit instituted by the respondent-Bank against the petitioners has already been decreed. He finally contends that after filing of the complaint, the order passed by the Banking Court taking cognizance of the matter, which is assailable, was not assailed by the petitioners through appropriate proceedings, as such they are precluded from agitating such grievance by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. 4. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the petitioners while placing reliance on the dicta laid down in the case of Messrs Long Grain Rice Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. through Chief Executive v. Habib Bank Limited through Senior Manager (CAD) and Senior Manager (Remedial) and another (2016 CLD 551) contends that the petition is maintainable. 5. In view of the objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent, this Court deems it necessary to first address and resolve the issue of maintainability as a preliminary matter before proceeding to examine the substantive aspects of the petition, so as to ensure that the proceedings are properly before it. 6. The petitioners have challenged the filing of complaint before the Judge Banking Court as is evident from perusal of the prayer clause. No supplication to challenge the summoning order has been made despite the fact that copies of complaint along with order sheet are appended with the petition, perusal whereof reflects that the Banking Court has passed order under section 204 of Cr.P.C. while taking cognizance of the matter and summoning the accused (petitioners) to face trial. Such order being judicial in nature, is assailable, however, none of the petitioners ever challenged the same. Non-assailing of the order whereby cognizance was taken by the Judge Banking Court, would imply that the petitioners have submitted to jurisdiction of the Banking Court in the complaint against them. After failure of the petitioners to challenge the summoning order, if they wanted stay of criminal proceedings pending civil litigation, they could move an application under section 344 of the Cr.P.C. before the trial court with prayer to postpone the commencement of trial or adjourn the trial if already commenced pending decision in the respective civil proceedings. Subsection (1) of section 344 of Cr.P.C. reads: - "344. Power to postpone or adjourn proceedings. (1) If, from the absence of a witness, or any other reasonable cause, it becomes necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn any inquiry or trial, the Court may, if it thinks fit, by order in writing, stating the reasons therefor, from time to time, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody:" Plain reading of the text of this section denotes that a court may postpone the initiation of any inquiry or trial or may adjourn any inquiry or trial which is already in progress. Postponement of the commencement or adjournment of trial can be made due to the absence of a witness or for any other reasonable cause. 7. The petitioners could even have approached the trial court by moving application under section 265-K of Cr.P.C. seeking their acquittal at any stage. Section 265K of Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder for the ready reference. "265K. Power of Court to acquit accused at any stage. Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence." Section 265K ibid provides jurisdiction to trial court to discharge/acquit an accused if it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of the offence. 8. In the instant case, the petitioners instead of exhausting any of such adequate efficacious remedies available to them, have opted to approach this Court directly by invoking the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution. 9. By now it is well-established that a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution is not maintainable when a person has an adequate, efficacious alternate remedy. In light of the availability of an alternate remedy to the petitioners under Section 344 or 265K of the Cr.P.C. and in the absence of any compelling reasons with the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction, the Court is not inclined to entertain this petition. The judgment relied upon by the petitioners side in the case of Messrs Long Grain Rice Mills (supra) is distinguishable on facts. 10. For the foregoing reasons, this petition is not maintainable, which is dismissed as such. MQ/A-28/L Petition dismissed.

Summary: Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)--- ----S. 5, Sched---Family Courts Rules, 1965, R.5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Constitutional petition---Suit for recovery of maintenance, medical and delivery-related expenses---Scope--- Husband's (petitioner) application for return of plaint of the wife on the ground of limitation and lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Family Court was dismissed concurrently---Validity---No plea of limitation was raised in the written statement---Despite that, the petitioner subsequently filed an application under S. 5 of the Family Court Rules, 1965 in a seemingly contrived effort to delay the proceedings and subject the respondent No. 1 (wife) to prolonged hardship---Conduct of petitioner appeared manifestly calculated to defeat the legitimate claims of respondent No. 1---Petitioner's argument regarding limitation was untenable---Obligation to provide maintenance was a continuing one, rooted in Islamic Injunctions and transcended the limitations imposed by special statutes---It was the unequivocal responsibility of a man to meet the educational, medical and subsistence needs of his spouse and children---Petitioner's failure to fulfill these obligations since 2007 was not only reprehensible but amounted to deliberate cruelty, both mental and economic---Family Courts Act, 1964, is a remedial statute designed to secure expeditious relief in family matters, which precluded the availability of a second appeal, intending to place a definitive end to prolonged family litigation---Conduct of the petitioner in the present matter was precisely what the legislature sought to curtail---Minor child had suffered years of neglect and deprivation owing to the petitioner's indifference---Petitioner, through the petition, was seeking merely to frustrate the judicial process and prolong the agony of the respondent No.1 and her child---In the light of prima facie mala fide conduct apparent from the record, the petition was not maintainable---Both impugned orders were well-reasoned and judiciously rendered, and no reason to interfere was found---Petition stood dismissed, in limine. Mushtaq Hussain Bokhari v. The State and 6 others 1991 SCMR 2136; Maliha Hussain v. Additional District Judge-V and another 2017 MLD 485; Syed Saghir Ahmed Naqvi v. Province of Sindh through Chief Secretary S&GAD Karachi and others 1996 SCMR 1165; Arif Fareed v. Bibi Sara and others 2023 SCMR 413; M. Hamad Hassan v. Mst. Isma Bukhari and 2 others 2023 SCMR 1434 and Muhammad Shamim Ali v. Mst. Asma Begum and others 2024 SCMR 1642 rel. Muhammad Ibrahim Lashari for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 24th March, 2025.

Summary: Bail granted ---- Held: The relevant provision that relates to the dispatch of samples for testing or analysis to the FSL is contained in Rule 4 (2) of the control of Narcotic substances (Government Analysts) Rules, 2001. It provides that samples may be dispatched for analysis under the cover of a test Memorandum specified in Form-I at the earliest, but not later than seventy-two hours after the seizure. In the Instant case, sample parcel was sent to FSL after 10 days (beyond seventy-two hours) after it seizure. Moreover, a copy of register-XIX is available on the record, however, it does not reveal the name of the police official who transmitted the sample parcel to the FSL. Therefore, the prosecution is yet to establish not only the factum of recovery, but also its safe custody and secure transmission to the FSL. However, at the moment, the aforesaid discrepancy makes the instant case arguable for purpose of bail. (Bail Petition allowed).

Summary: Constitution Petition Held: The Principle--- that column No. 13 to 16 in the nikahnama need to be holistically interpreted--- is further elaborated in the given facts and circumstances of the case. A doubt in the nikahnama as regards dower, is to be resolved in favour of wife, given our socio-culture norms that a bride is not meaningfully and demonstrable consulted at the time of nikah while dower is fixed and its mood of payment, proposed.

Summary: Bail denied ---- In order to get a right of bail under the third proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C, an accused person has not only to prove that his trial could not be concluded within the statutory period but he has also to prove that the delay in the conclusion of the trial is neither attributable to him nor to any person acting on his behalf besides he has also to prove that his case is not hit by the conditions precedent for attracting the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C. 2. Under the established criminal jurisprudence, the third and fourth provisos to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C could not co-exist. If the fourth proviso does attract to the case of an accused person, then he will not be entitled for the benefit of the third proviso. In order to determine the applicability or otherwise of the fourth proviso to section 497 (1) Cr.P.C to the case of an accused person, the Court has to see that as to whether firstly that if he is a previously convicted offender for an offence punishable with death or life imprisonment; secondly that if he, in the opinion of the Court, is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal; and thirdlythat if he has been an accused of an act of terrorism punishable with death or imprisonment for life. 3. In forming an opinion by the Court of law that as to whether an accused person is a hardened, desperate or dangerous criminal, it amongst the other factors, could consider the nature of offence, the role attributed to the accused, the manner in which the offence was committed and the conduct of the accused. 4. Under the established criminal jurisprudence, any person is neither legally or religiously have a right to take the law into his own hands nor to take the life of anybody in the name of family honour.

Summary: Where the High Court has not favorably considered the case of two or more accused persons on a common ground and out of them, one has approached to the Apex Court against the order of the High Court and the Apex Court has favorably considered that ground in favor of such an accused then the co-accused, who has not approached to the Apex Court, could file a subsequent bail application before the competent Court on the fresh ground, which has accrued to such an accused person after passing of the judgment by the Apex Court. 2. A fresh ground for a subsequent bail application is to be considered that ground which was not available to the accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application rather available to him after the filing/ decision of the earlier bail application. 3. Any ground, available to an accused person at the time of filing of an earlier bail application but when the same has not been taken/ agitated in the earlier bail application then such ground could not be considered as a fresh ground.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act, 1964 ----S. 14---West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965, R. 22---Limitation Act, 1908, S. 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay---Scope---Petitioner challenged concurrent findings of Family Court and Appellate Court on grounds of misreading and non-reading of evidence---Appeal before Appellate Court was filed with delay of 71 days beyond prescribed 30-day period---Application for condonation under S. 5 of Limitation Act dismissed for failure to provide sufficient cause or explanation for each day of delay---Held, limitation is not a mere technicality; once expired, it vests substantive rights in the respondent---“Sufficient cause” must be shown to justify delay; absence of cogent justification renders appeal time-barred---High Court under constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 may issue certiorari only in cases of jurisdictional errors or patent illegality apparent on the face of the record---Scope of writ does not extend to reappraisal of evidence or reconsideration of factual findings---Petitioner failed to show any legal error, jurisdictional defect, or sufficient cause for condonation---No ground for interference with concurrent findings of lower courts. Cited Cases: • Mst. Nadira Shahzad v. Mubashir Ahmad and others (1995 SCMR 1419) • Government of Pakistan v. Malbrow Builders (2006 SCMR 1248) • Province of Punjab v. Kishwar Qudus Paul (2004 SCMR 571) • Fozia Mazhar v. Additional District Judge, Jhang and others (PLD 2024 SC 771) Disposition: Petition dismissed.