Summary: The appellants claimed that the house belonged to their father and, after his death, devolved upon them as his legal heirs. The respondents contended that the house was given to the respondent No. 2 (wife of respondent No. 3) as dower through an agreement dated 03.07.1972. According to them, respondent No. 2 subsequently sold the house to respondent No. 1 through a sale agreement dated 14.03.2005. The trial court initially dismissed the appellants' suit but decreed the suit of respondent No. 1. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision, decreeing the appellants' suit and dismissing respondent No. 1's suit. However, the High Court allowed a revision petition filed by respondents No. 1, 2, and 3, setting aside the appellate court's judgment and restoring the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial and High Courts had erred in their judgments. The High Court and trial court had relied on a more than thirty-year-old agreement as evidence, presuming its genuineness without sufficient examination. They did not establish the proper custody of the agreement or its execution and signature by the purported executant. The Supreme Court held that the burden of proof of the agreement's genuineness, age, custody, execution, and signing rested on the respondents, who failed to provide sufficient evidence. The court also noted that even if the agreement were considered genuine, it would not create a title or ownership of the house since it had not been acted upon by the alleged executant or through a court decree. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's and trial court's judgments, and restored the appellate court's decision. As a result, the appellants' suit was decreed, and respondent No. 1's suit was dismissed.

Summary: (Muslim Female Customary Law) The dispute revolved around a property that was initially owned by Naaju, who passed it on to his son Abdul Ghafoor and daughter Mst. Roshnae. After Abdul Ghafoor's death, Mst. Roshnae gifted the property to Abdul Khaliq and others. The respondents, claiming to be collaterals, filed a lawsuit seeking their share of inheritance. The trial court dismissed the suit, but the appellate court granted the respondents a 1/3rd share. The High Court modified the judgment, granting the respondents a 3/4th share. The case was previously decided by the Supreme Court, but a review was allowed, leading to the current appeal. The appellants argued that the respondents were not entitled to any inheritance, while the respondents contended that the property should devolve upon them as residuaries. The court examined the applicable law, including the Act of 1962, and concluded that the limited estate held by Mst. Roshnae was terminated, allowing the property to devolve according to Muslim Personal Law (Shariah). The court upheld the High Court's decision, granting the respondents a share in the property. The Supreme Court concluded that the limited estate held by Mst. Roshnae would be terminated under the Act of 1962, even if the last full owner had died before its commencement. As a result, the property would devolve according to Muslim Personal Law (Shariah).

Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 ----Ss. 4 & 5---Registered sale deed---Presumption of validity---Complainant, daughter of Muhammad Nazir, purchased 2½ marla portion of House No. ZA-1307 through registered sale deed No. 5817 dated 16-09-2014—Respondent, her brother, occupied that portion and refused to hand over possession—Held, registered sale deed carried presumption of correctness under law, and respondent, being an attesting witness to the same, was estopped from disputing its authenticity. (b) Admission by attesting witness---Evidentiary value ----Respondent admitted his status as a witness to complainant’s sale deed during cross-examination—Such admission rendered subsequent denial immaterial and further strengthened complainant’s claim to ownership and possession. (c) Family distribution of property---Equal shares ----Father of parties had distributed the house equally among descendants through multiple registered deeds; complainant’s entitlement to 2½ marla clearly demarcated by boundaries described in the deed—Held, she was entitled to delivery of possession of that specific portion. (d) Exercise of influence by respondent---Police service ----Respondent’s use of official position as police officer to retain illegal possession condemned—Forum emphasized protection of women’s property rights irrespective of social or official status of male relatives. (e) Relief and direction ----Ombudsman directed restoration of possession of 2½ marla portion to complainant Zaib-un-Nisa within the boundaries defined in her registered sale deed—Respondent’s share to remain confined to area delineated in his own registered deed. (f) Disposition — Complaint allowed. Respondent Muhammad Sarfraz directed to deliver possession of 2½ marla portion of House No. ZA-1307 to complainant Zaib-un-Nisa as per boundaries specified in sale deed No. 5817 dated 16-09-2014. Each party entitled to portion transferred to them through separate deeds. Case disposed of.

Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 ----Ss. 4 & 5---Inheritance---Deprivation of female heirs---Misuse of authority by male legal heir---Complainant, along with her sisters, was deprived of inherited property by their brother who had taken exclusive possession of the family house and rented out portions for personal gain—Held, such deprivation constituted violation of women’s property rights safeguarded under the Act—Ombudsman empowered under S.5 to restore possession and title to rightful heirs according to *shari* shares. (b) Evidence and burden of proof ----Ex parte proceedings---Respondent’s defense of exclusive construction and tenancy arrangement disbelieved for lack of documentary proof—No rent deed, agreement, or evidence produced to substantiate claim—Held, reply vague and unsubstantiated; allegations of deprivation proved through affidavits and witness testimonies of complainant and her sisters. (c) Family property—Partition and sale by auction ----Procedure---Deputy Commissioner Islamabad directed to restore or confer ownership and possession of the house situated in Sector G-7/2, Islamabad, to all legal heirs according to *shari* shares—If property found indivisible, DC to appoint commission to determine market value and conduct open auction—Sale proceeds to be distributed among heirs proportionately. (d) Jurisdictional limitation ----Agricultural land outside ICT---Claim regarding 338 kanals of agricultural land situated in Moza Bajar, Tehsil and District Khushab, Punjab, held beyond territorial jurisdiction of the forum—Complainant advised to seek remedy before competent authority under provincial law. (e) Disposition — Complaint partly allowed. Deputy Commissioner Islamabad directed under S.5 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, to restore title and possession of house situated in Sector G-7/2, Islamabad, to complainant and her sisters according to their *shari* shares. In case of indivisibility, property to be sold through open auction and proceeds distributed among all heirs. Claim concerning agricultural land at Khushab dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Compliance report to be submitted by 08-06-2022.

Summary: The case revolves around Haji Muhammad Yunis and his wife, Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar, who initially lived in South Africa and later settled in the United Kingdom. The couple purchased a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on a 4-kanal and 7-marla land. The property was bought from Mst. Suriyya Ashraf in 1989. After Mst. Ashraf's demise, her legal heirs, including Mst. Farukh Sultan and Syed Faisal Shah, contested the ownership of the property. Mst. Farukh Sultan, one of the legal heirs of Mst. Suriyya Ashraf, filed a suit seeking a declaration that she and her siblings were the co-owners of the property. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but Mst. Sultan appealed the decision. Eventually, the High Court reversed the previous judgments, decreeing in favor of Mst. Sultan. Civil Appeals No. 152 and 153 of 2019 were filed by the appellants as a result. In parallel to the civil appeals, Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar filed a complaint against Syed Faisal Shah under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, accusing him of illegally occupying the property. The trial court temporarily halted the proceedings until the civil suit was decided. After the civil suit's conclusion, the trial court resumed the proceedings, leading to a series of legal battles between the parties. The High Court eventually dismissed the appellants' complaint, which prompted them to file Civil Petition No. 472 of 2019. During the case, the appellants raised concerns regarding the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. They accused him of introducing a fictitious attorney, misrepresenting the death of Haji Muhammad Yunis, and filing a written statement on behalf of the appellants through the fictitious attorney. Additionally, it was alleged that Shah had obtained a sale mutation for half of the property through the same fabricated attorney. These claims were substantiated when the appellants appeared before the trial court to expose the fraud. The Supreme Court meticulously evaluated the facts presented and the arguments put forth by all parties involved. They considered the authenticity of the sale mutation, the legal rights of the legal heirs, and the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. The court notes that during the trial proceedings, the appellants (Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar) appeared in person and exposed the fraud committed by Syed Faisal Shah regarding the fictitious attorney and the misrepresentation of the death. However, despite this exposure, Syed Faisal Shah proceeded with obtaining half of the suit property through the fictitious attorney.The court also addresses the issue of limitation, stating that the suit filed by Mst. Farukh Sultan (respondent No.1/plaintiff) was time-barred, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The court finds that Mst. Farukh Sultan failed to discharge the initial burden of rebutting the legal presumptions of regularity and truth attached to the sale mutation and the revenue entries, which favored the appellants.The High Court's judgment, which favored Syed Faisal Shah, is reversed by the appellate court, restoring the concurrent judgments of the trial court and appellate court.Finally, the judgment calls for affirmative actions to address the grievances of overseas Pakistanis in pursuing their legal rights in courts, as they face disadvantages due to their absence from the country.The court also examined the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, which were reversed by the High Court. The supreme court after thorough analysis, allowed the appeal and restored the judgement by the trial court.

Summary: The case revolves around Haji Muhammad Yunis and his wife, Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar, who initially lived in South Africa and later settled in the United Kingdom. The couple purchased a house in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on a 4-kanal and 7-marla land. The property was bought from Mst. Suriyya Ashraf in 1989. After Mst. Ashraf's demise, her legal heirs, including Mst. Farukh Sultan and Syed Faisal Shah, contested the ownership of the property. Mst. Farukh Sultan, one of the legal heirs of Mst. Suriyya Ashraf, filed a suit seeking a declaration that she and her siblings were the co-owners of the property. The trial court initially dismissed the suit, but Mst. Sultan appealed the decision. Eventually, the High Court reversed the previous judgments, decreeing in favor of Mst. Sultan. Civil Appeals No. 152 and 153 of 2019 were filed by the appellants as a result. In parallel to the civil appeals, Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar filed a complaint against Syed Faisal Shah under the Illegal Dispossession Act 2005, accusing him of illegally occupying the property. The trial court temporarily halted the proceedings until the civil suit was decided. After the civil suit's conclusion, the trial court resumed the proceedings, leading to a series of legal battles between the parties. The High Court eventually dismissed the appellants' complaint, which prompted them to file Civil Petition No. 472 of 2019. During the case, the appellants raised concerns regarding the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. They accused him of introducing a fictitious attorney, misrepresenting the death of Haji Muhammad Yunis, and filing a written statement on behalf of the appellants through the fictitious attorney. Additionally, it was alleged that Shah had obtained a sale mutation for half of the property through the same fabricated attorney. These claims were substantiated when the appellants appeared before the trial court to expose the fraud. The Supreme Court meticulously evaluated the facts presented and the arguments put forth by all parties involved. They considered the authenticity of the sale mutation, the legal rights of the legal heirs, and the conduct of Syed Faisal Shah. The court notes that during the trial proceedings, the appellants (Haji Muhammad Yunis and Mst. Mumtaz Akhtar) appeared in person and exposed the fraud committed by Syed Faisal Shah regarding the fictitious attorney and the misrepresentation of the death. However, despite this exposure, Syed Faisal Shah proceeded with obtaining half of the suit property through the fictitious attorney.The court also addresses the issue of limitation, stating that the suit filed by Mst. Farukh Sultan (respondent No.1/plaintiff) was time-barred, as it was filed beyond the prescribed period. The court finds that Mst. Farukh Sultan failed to discharge the initial burden of rebutting the legal presumptions of regularity and truth attached to the sale mutation and the revenue entries, which favored the appellants.The High Court's judgment, which favored Syed Faisal Shah, is reversed by the appellate court, restoring the concurrent judgments of the trial court and appellate court.Finally, the judgment calls for affirmative actions to address the grievances of overseas Pakistanis in pursuing their legal rights in courts, as they face disadvantages due to their absence from the country.The court also examined the judgments of the trial court and the appellate court, which were reversed by the High Court. The supreme court after thorough analysis, allowed the appeal and restored the judgement by the trial court.

Summary: [Excluding other legal heirs of their rights, specially sisters/ daughters] The case of Mst. Raj Begum vs. Mst. Ajaib Jan revolves around the inheritance rights of the legal heirs of Allah Ditta, who passed away in either 1947 or 1948. Allah Ditta was survived by a widow, two sons, and three daughters. The dispute arose when the daughters filed a suit claiming their inheritance and seeking the cancellation of an inheritance mutation. This case summary will analyse the arguments presented by both parties and the subsequent judgments passed by the lower courts and the High Court. After Allah Ditta's death, inheritance mutation number 2207 was attested on April 6, 1956, in the names of his two sons, declaring them as the sole heirs to his agricultural land measuring 53 kanats and 13 marlas. However, the daughters of Allah Ditta contested this mutation, arguing that they were entitled to their share of the inheritance. After examining the arguments presented by both parties and reviewing the relevant laws and judgments, the Supreme Court agreed with the respondents' contention. They concluded that even if Allah Ditta had passed away before the cut-off date of March 15, 1948, the two sons had not acquired the land before that date, thereby excluding the other legal heirs. The purported exclusion took place when the inheritance mutation number 2207 was made in the sons' favor on April 6, 1956. The Court emphasized that the sons' acquisition did not meet the requirements of the 1962 Act and the interpretation of the 1948 Act in the case of Ghulam Haider v Murad. As a result, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the judgments of the subordinate courts and the High Court. The Court also directed the concerned authority to immediately implement the judgments and record the ownership of all the legal heirs of Allah Ditta in the property records. The case of Mst. Raj Begum vs. Mst. Ajaib Jan highlights the importance of adhering to the applicable laws and proper documentation when determining inheritance rights. The Supreme Court's judgment emphasized that the acquisition of agricultural land by male heirs must have occurred before the cut-off date of March 15, 1948, to claim exclusive ownership. This case serves as a precedent for future cases involving inheritance disputes and reinforces the principles of Islamic Shariat law of inheritance. Appeal was dismissed.

Summary: [discussion on doctrine of acquiescence and the significance of third-party interest] Jalal Shah had two sons, Mushtaq Ali Shah and Said Ali Shah, who were approved as joint owners of his estate. However, Jalal Shah also had a daughter, Mst. Ghulam Fatima, who passed away before him. Mst. Ghulam Fatima's three daughters, namely Ummat-ul-Aziz, Akhtar Bibi, and Safdar Bibi, invoked the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, to claim their share in the estate. Ummat-ul-Aziz filed an application in 2008 to correct the inheritance mutation, which was initially disallowed. In 2012, she filed a suit seeking cancellation of the mutation and a declaration of her entitlement to her share in the estate. However, the suit faced several challenges, including issues of limitation and the question of her awareness of her rights. Meanwhile, Mushtaq Ali Shah and Said Ali Shah's legal heirs sold their respective shares in the inherited land to a third party, Misbah-ul-Hassan. Said Ali Shah's legal heirs sold their share to Syed Kausar Ali Shah, who later sold the land, along with his inherited portion, to Taqi Developers (Pvt.) Limited in 2007. The petitioners argued that Ummat-ul-Aziz's claim was time-barred due to the delay in asserting her rights. They also emphasized that third-party interests had been created in the land, and Taqi Developers (Pvt.) Limited had acted in good faith when purchasing the property. The court analyzed the facts and relevant legal principles, including the doctrine of acquiescence and the significance of third-party interests. It concluded that Ummat-ul-Aziz had allowed the creation of third-party interests without challenging the property records for forty-five years. As a result, the court dismissed the suit, setting aside the previous judgments.

Summary: (a) Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020 ----S. 5---Inheritance---Restoration of ownership and possession---Where complainant and other female heirs were deprived of their shares in ancestral house by one male heir who had taken exclusive possession and received rent, Ombudsman invoked S.5 of the Act directing restoration of possession and title to all legal heirs according to their *shari* shares—Held, deprivation of co-heirs from inherited property constitutes unlawful dispossession remediable under the Act. (b) Ex parte proceedings---Unrebutted evidence ----Ex parte decree---Respondent’s failure to file written reply or cross-examine witnesses rendered the complainant’s affidavits and testimony unchallenged—Held, unrebutted evidence of complainant sufficient to establish deprivation of property rights and justify relief under the Act. (c) Deputy Commissioner’s obligation ----S.5---Administrative enforcement---Deputy Commissioner Islamabad directed to ensure physical restoration of possession or conferment of title upon all legal heirs, including complainant, in accordance with their *shari* shares and to submit compliance report within seven days of implementation. (d) Disposition — Complaint allowed. Deputy Commissioner Islamabad directed under S.5 of the Enforcement of Women’s Property Rights Act, 2020, to restore possession and confer ownership of House No.154, Gali No.158, Sector G-11/1, Islamabad, to the complainant Ms. Naseem Ansari and other lawful heirs of deceased Haji Ghulam Sabir Ansari according to their

Summary: Great-grandchildren were not entitled to inherit under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961----The issue at hand is whether great-grandchildren can be considered "children" under section 4 of the Ordinance. This section deals with the distribution of inheritance in case of the death of a son or daughter before the opening of succession. The relevant portion of section 4 states that the children of a deceased son or daughter, who are alive at the time of succession, are entitled to a share equivalent to what the deceased child would have received if alive.The matter arose when a person passed away, leaving behind a residential property. The deceased had several children, including two sons who predeceased them. The grandchildren of one of the predeceased sons, who are the petitioners in this case, claimed a share in the property based on their interpretation of section 4. They argued that the term "per stirpes" in the section indicated that if a grandchild of the deceased had also passed away, their children (the great-grandchildren) should inherit the share.The petitioners appealed their case after the lower courts ruled against them. Their argument hinged on interpreting the term "per stirpes" as indicating that the lineage of a deceased grandchild should continue through their children, the great-grandchildren. They believed that this interpretation aligned with the intent and spirit of the section.However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court emphasized that the wording of section 4 clearly limited its applicability to the children of the deceased son or daughter who were alive at the time of the death of the propositus (the deceased person). The Court highlighted that the intention behind section 4 was to create a specific exception to the standard rules of Muslim inheritance, allowing only those grandchildren who were alive at the time of the death to inherit a share. Therefore, the Court ruled that great-grandchildren could not be considered "children" under the section and upheld the lower courts' decisions.In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the petitioners' argument and upheld the interpretation that great-grandchildren were not entitled to inherit under section 4 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to the specific wording and intent of the section when interpreting its applicability.