Summary: Background: A contractual agreement for the supply of ethanol was entered into between two companies in 2015. The agreement included a clause for arbitration in the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) under English law. A dispute arose when one party (the respondent) allegedly failed to fulfill its obligations under the agreement, leading the other party (the applicant) to approach the LCIA. The LCIA tribunal, formed in 2016, passed a final arbitral award in favor of the applicant in April 2017. The applicant then sought recognition and enforcement of this foreign arbitral award in Pakistan under the Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act, 2011. The respondent filed objections, primarily challenging the validity of the agreement and the enforceability of the arbitral award in Pakistan. -----Issues: 1- Whether the Lahore High Court has jurisdiction to enforce a foreign arbitral award under the 2011 Act. 2- Whether the applicant met the document submission requirements under Section 5 of the 2011 Act. 3- Whether the foreign arbitral award was unenforceable due to the invalidity of the agreement under Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention. 4- Whether the enforcement of the arbitral award would be contrary to public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. 5- Whether the doctrine of pro-enforcement bias applies in Pakistan's courts. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Court held that it has exclusive jurisdiction to enforce foreign arbitral awards under Section 3 of the 2011 Act, as only the High Courts in Pakistan are empowered to handle such matters. The Court found that the applicant had fulfilled all document submission requirements by providing certified copies of the award and agreement in accordance with Article IV of the New York Convention. The respondent's challenge to the validity of the agreement, based on an alleged lack of authority of its signatories, was dismissed. The tribunal had determined that the individuals signing the agreement had at least ostensible authority, and the Court held that the arbitration agreement was valid under English law. The Court rejected the argument that enforcement of the award would violate public policy. It emphasized that public policy objections must be narrowly construed, and enforcement would not be contrary to the basic notions of morality and justice in Pakistan. The Court reiterated the pro-enforcement bias embedded in the New York Convention, holding that foreign arbitral awards should be enforced unless exceptional circumstances apply. Consequently, the arbitral award was recognized and enforced, with the court converting the application into execution proceedings. -----Citations/Precedents: Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration, Sixth Edition Justice Jawad Hassan, Role of Judiciary and Jurisprudence in Domestic and International Arbitration (2018) CLD Journal Hitachi Limited vs. Rupali Polyester (1998 SCMR 1618) Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v Insurance Company Chubb [2020] UKSC 38 Kabab-Ji SAL v Kout Food Group [2021] UKSC 48 Orient Power Company (Private) Limited vs. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (2019 CLD 1069) POSCO International Corporation vs. Rikans International (2023 CLD) Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse SA vs. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 2018 Lahore 597) Dhanya Agro-Industrial (Pvt.) Limited vs. Quetta Textile Mills Ltd. (2019 CLD 160) M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd. Franchisee of Pizza Hut vs. Multan Development Authority (2021 CLD 639)

Summary: [Discussion on Section 42 & 22 of the Specific Relief Act, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 & Section 10 of the Contract Act. The phrase consensus ad idem connotes a meeting of the minds to describe the intention of parties. Effect of doctrine of caveat emptor in the case) The petitioner (deceased) through legal heirs, filed a civil suit for declaration and specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 30.11.1993. The petitioner claimed that he entered into an agreement with Muhammad Feroz (deceased) for the property in question. The suit was contested by Muhammad Afzal (deceased) through legal heirs and others, who argued that the agreements were forged and the suit was time-barred. The Trial Court decreed the suit for declaration but declined the relief of specific performance. The Appellate Court accepted the respondents' appeal and set aside the Trial Court's judgment. The petitioner then filed a Civil Revision in the Lahore High Court, which was dismissed. The petitioner appealed to the Supreme Court. In the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the transaction was completed, and the respondents received the sale consideration and handed over possession of the property. The petitioner contended that the agreements were proved in evidence and that the High Court relied on a previous case that was later revisited by the Supreme Court. The respondents, on the other hand, supported the judgments of the Appellate Court and High Court, arguing that the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence and that the petitioner occupied the property illegally. After considering the arguments and evidence, the Supreme Court held that the agreements were not proved and that the co-owner Muhammad Afzal never signed the agreements. The Court found that the petitioner filed the suit for declaration and specific performance after a significant delay and failed to initiate legal proceedings during the lifetime of Muhammad Feroz. The Court noted that a suit for mere declaration is not permissible unless there are circumstances justifying it under the law.

Summary: (a) Public Procurement Rules, 2004 (PPRA Rules) ----Rules 33, 38, and 44—Public procurement—Cancellation of tender—Interpretation of PPRA Rules—Maintainability of writ petition—Petitioner challenged the cancellation of tender by NADRA, arguing that the issuance of a purchase order constituted a binding contract under Rule 44 of the PPRA Rules, and cancellation violated Rules 33 and 38. The court held that Rule 33 applies only to the rejection of bids before their acceptance, and Rule 38 governs the acceptance of the most advantageous bid if the procurement proceeds. Rule 44 provides that a procurement contract is effective upon bid acceptance only if no formal signing of a contract is required. In the present case, the purchase order was conditional on the signing of a formal contract, which had not occurred. (b) Contracts—Nature and enforceability ----Software supply agreements—Conditional purchase orders and the doctrine of "agreement to agree"—Court emphasized that software supply, installation, and maintenance contracts involve detailed terms requiring a definitive agreement. The purchase order issued by NADRA was expressly contingent on signing a formal contract. Even if a contract was assumed to exist, its breach could not be addressed under constitutional jurisdiction but rather through a suit for damages. (c) Constitutional law—Scope of judicial review ----Writ of mandamus—Limits of judicial intervention in public procurement—Court clarified that a constitutional court cannot compel a public procurement agency to proceed with a project it no longer wishes to implement, as this would amount to specific performance of a contract, which is not enforceable in constitutional jurisdiction. The petitioner’s remedy, if any, lies in appropriate forums outside of constitutional writ jurisdiction. (d) Natural justice ----Right to hearing—Cancellation versus abandonment of procurement—Court held that the cancellation of tender did not constitute an adverse action against the petitioner. As the project itself was abandoned, there was no violation of the petitioner’s rights that warranted a hearing. The petitioner did not acquire a vested right to demand the implementation of the project or its execution through external sourcing. Disposition: The writ petition was dismissed, with the court holding that constitutional jurisdiction could not be invoked to enforce procurement decisions or compel the implementation of projects abandoned by a public authority. The petitioner was advised to seek remedies, if any, in other forums. Cited Case: • Messers Fast Track v. FIA (2021 CLC 1160 Islamabad).

Summary: (a) Contract employment---- ----Transfer/posting---Contract employee---Power of employer/competent authority---Petitioner was appointed as Lady Health Visitor on contract basis and challenged her transfer from one Basic Health Unit to another on administrative ground---High Court held that employer/competent authority has power to transfer an employee from one place to another in accordance with exigencies of service and administrative requirements. (b) Contract employment---- ----Appointment letter---Clause declaring appointment “post specific and non-transferable”---Interpretation---Clause 10 of appointment letter stated that appointment was post specific and non-transferable and employee shall not claim transfer from one place to another---Held, such clause placed embargo on employee’s right to demand transfer of her own choice; it did not oust administrative power of employer to transfer employee where service exigency required. (c) Service law---- ----Transfer/posting---No vested right to remain at place of choice---Employee cannot claim as matter of right to remain posted at a particular station indefinitely---Department/employer is best judge of where employee’s services are to be utilized---Transfer order ordinarily does not violate any vested right unless mala fide, extraneous consideration or absence of administrative requirement is established. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Mansha Javed v. Secretary to Government of Punjab and others 1998 SCMR 263 • Tahir Mehmood Abbasi and another v. District Coordination Officer, Rawalpindi and another 2009 PLC (C.S.) 320 • Asadullah Memon v. Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) and others 2010 PLC (C.S.) 662 • Dr. Imtiaz Ellahi Piracha v. Government of Punjab and others 2004 PLC (C.S.) 705 • Muhammad Alam Jan v. Government of N.W.F.P. through Secretary, Home and Tribal Affairs, Peshawar and 3 others 2005 SCMR 442 (d) Service law---- ----Transfer order---Administrative ground---Judicial review---Scope---Petitioner failed to establish that transfer order was passed mala fide, for extraneous consideration, or without administrative requirement---Order did not affect her designation or salary---High Court declined interference in constitutional jurisdiction. (e) Contract employment---- ----Transfer order---Effect on designation and salary---Where impugned transfer order did not alter designation, salary or essential service benefits of contract employee, and was issued against vacant post on administrative grounds, no enforceable right of petitioner was shown to have been infringed. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art. 199---Contract employment---Writ petition against transfer under contract terms---Maintainability---Grievance of contract employee relating to transfer/posting falls within terms of contract employment---Contract employee cannot ordinarily agitate contractual service grievance through constitutional petition; remedy, where breach of contract is alleged, lies in damages and not reinstatement/continuation through writ. Cited Cases: • Qazi Munir Ahmed v. Rawalpindi Medical College and Allied Hospital through Principal and others 2019 SCMR 648 • Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Azam Chattha 2013 SCMR 120 • Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Health, Peshawar and others v. Jawad Ali and others 2021 SCMR 185 • Vice Chancellor, Bacha Khan University Charsadda, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others v. Tanveer Ahmad and others 2021 SCMR 1995 (g) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Violation of contractual obligation---Remedy---Even if any contractual stipulation is breached, contract employee may claim damages, if legally available; writ petition is not maintainable merely for enforcement of contractual terms against transfer. (h) Comparative precedent---- ----Transfer/posting---Employer’s prerogative---Indian jurisdiction---Court also referred to Indian authorities for principle that employee cannot insist upon being transferred or not transferred to a particular place; transfer is employer’s decision based upon requirement. Cited Cases: • Namrata Verma v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No.36717/2017, order dated 06.09.2021 • State of Madhya Pradesh and others v. S.S. Kourav and others AIR 1995 SC 1056 • M/s Pearlite Liners Pvt. Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi AIR 2004 SC 1373 • Rekha Chandra v. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development 2013 (1) AD (Delhi) 764 • Naresh Kumar v. Scholastic India Pvt. Ltd., W.P. No.2886/2019, High Court of Delhi, order dated 16.12.2021 • Naresh Kumar v. Scholastic India Pvt. Ltd., W.P. No.441/2021, High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital, order dated 30.09.2021 (i) Service law---- ----Incidence of service---Transfer---General principle---Transfer is an incidence of service and competent authority may utilize employee at suitable place to secure maximum benefit of employee’s capabilities and smooth running of official business. Disposition: Writ Petition No.5653 of 2022 was dismissed as misconceived and devoid of merit; transfer order dated 22.07.2022 issued by Chief Executive Officer, District Health Authority, Bahawalpur transferring petitioner from Basic Health Unit Jamal Channer to Basic Health Unit Rasoolpur was maintained.

Summary: Background: The Pakistan Housing Authority Foundation (P.H.A.F.) launched a housing scheme in 2012 for officers of federally constituted occupational groups at Kurri Road, Islamabad. Respondent No.2, a retired BPS-20 officer, was allotted a house in the project, but faced penalties for delayed payments. The P.H.A.F. imposed delayed payment charges (DPC) amounting to Rs.2,605,799, which Respondent No.2 paid at the time of transferring the house. Respondent No.2 sought a refund of the DPC, citing that the P.H.A.F. had suspended work on the project for a period, and during that time, no DPC should have been charged. The Wafaqi Mohtasib and later the President of Pakistan ruled in favor of Respondent No.2. The P.H.A.F. challenged this in the Islamabad High Court. -----Issues: 1- Whether the decision to charge the DPC from Respondent No.2 for the period during which construction work on the project was suspended is valid. 2- Whether the Wafaqi Mohtasib has the jurisdiction to address issues stemming from a contractual dispute. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Waiver of DPC: The court held that the P.H.A.F.’s Board of Directors had already decided in earlier meetings to waive the DPC for the period during which work on the project was suspended. There was no valid reason to differentiate between allottees who had sold their houses and those who had not, in terms of charging the DPC. Such a distinction was deemed unreasonable and discriminatory. Refund Eligibility: Since Respondent No.2 was charged DPC for the period when construction was halted, the court ruled that he was entitled to a refund. The P.H.A.F.’s refusal to refund the DPC to those who sold their houses was considered irrational. Jurisdiction of Wafaqi Mohtasib: The court referred to a precedent from the Supreme Court in C.D.A. vs. Zahid Iqbal (PLD 2004 S.C. 99), stating that the Wafaqi Mohtasib has jurisdiction over contractual disputes involving public agencies. The petitioner's argument that the Wafaqi Mohtasib lacked jurisdiction was dismissed. Dismissal of Petition: The court found no merit in the P.H.A.F.’s petition and dismissed it, affirming the decision to refund the DPC to Respondent No.2. -----Citations/Precedents: C.D.A. vs. Zahid Iqbal (PLD 2004 S.C. 99)

Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984: ----Arts. 17(2) & 79—Specific Performance of Contract—Proof of Agreement to Sell—Requirement of Two Attesting Witnesses—Failure to Prove Agreement—Role of Scribe and Stamp Vendor.** The petitioner filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property, claiming that the respondent had agreed to sell land and received earnest money. The respondent denied the existence of the agreement, alleging fraud and asserting that the agreement was merely a lease deed misrepresented as an agreement to sell. Both the trial court and appellate court dismissed the suit for failure to prove the agreement to sell in accordance with Articles 17(2) and 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. The court held that under Article 79, if a document is required by law to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence unless at least two attesting witnesses are called to prove its execution. The petitioner produced only one attesting witness and failed to examine the scribe and the stamp vendor, both of whom were essential witnesses to establish the validity of the agreement. The court emphasized that the testimony of one attesting witness is insufficient to meet the mandatory requirements of Article 79. The argument that the agreement was admitted by the respondent in the written statement was rejected, as the respondent had unequivocally denied the agreement, terming it fraudulent. ----Cited Cases: Farzand Ali v. Khuda Bakhsh (PLD 2015 SC 187) Farid Bakhsh v. Jind Wadda (2015 SCMR 1044) Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2011 SC 241) Muhammad Andleeb Raza v. Muhammad Nazar (2019 YLR 1974) Mst. Rasheeda Begum v. Muhammad Yousaf (2002 SCMR 1089) Muhammad Shafi v. Aamir Hameed (2013 CLC 131) ----Disposition: Revision petition dismissed; concurrent findings of lower courts upheld for failure to meet the evidentiary requirements of Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984.

Summary: (Allowed) The petitioner argued that the jurisdiction for the dispute was exclusively with the civil courts in Lahore, as stated in Clause 25 of the agreement. The respondents contended that the inclusion of Clause 25 was without their consent and alleged fraud. The Supreme Court, considered the arguments and examined the relevant law. While not discussing the merits of the case, the Court focused on the issue of whether Clause 25, conferring exclusive jurisdiction to the civil court in Lahore, was binding on the parties. The Court cited precedent and established that parties can select a particular court through mutual agreement for the determination of their dispute. Given that the agreement was signed in Lahore and related documents were executed and registered there, the Court concluded that the civil court in Lahore had jurisdiction over the matter. Therefore, the Court allowed the petition, converted it into an appeal, and set aside the orders of the lower courts. The petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 10 of the CPC was also allowed, and the plaintiffs were directed to file their case in the civil court at Lahore.

Summary: Background: A joint venture (JV) between a Chinese company and a local engineering firm was awarded a contract by a national highway authority for constructing an additional carriageway. Disputes arose between the parties regarding the delay and performance of the project, leading the JV to file a suit for specific performance, declaration, permanent, mandatory, and temporary injunction against the national highway authority. The trial court issued a status quo order and appointed a Local Commission to inspect the site. The national highway authority then filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, seeking to stay the court proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration, as stipulated in the contract's arbitration clause. The trial court granted the application and stayed the proceedings, which led the JV to file the present appeal. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court erred in staying the proceedings and referring the matter to arbitration under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. 2- Whether the national highway authority's conduct caused delays and impediments that justified the JV’s inability to complete the project on time. 3- Whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the interim injunction and directing the preservation of the project’s subject matter. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Islamabad High Court upheld the trial court's order to stay the proceedings and refer the matter to arbitration. The court emphasized the importance of honoring arbitration clauses in contracts and found no legal infirmity in the trial court’s decision. The court reasoned that: The arbitration clause in the contract required disputes to be referred to the Engineer first, and if unresolved, to arbitration. Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 aims to respect arbitration agreements and prevent parties from bypassing agreed arbitration procedures. The JV had the option to seek an extension due to COVID-19 but did not utilize it. The trial court’s order provided the parties with an opportunity to resolve their disputes through arbitration as agreed in the contract. ----Citations/Precedents: Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Vs. M/s Pak Saaf Dry Cleaners (PLD 1981 SC 553) Province of Punjab v. Ehsan Fazal & Company, Lahore (1986 CLC 2800) M/s Associates Construction Limited v. WAPDA (1989 MLD 206) Haji Soomar Haji Hajjan v. Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited (1981 SCMR 129) Messrs S.M. Qasim & Co. Vs. Messrs Ch. Azimuddin (PLD 1962 Lahore 95) Farid Virani Vs. Feroz Virani (PLD 2013 Sindh 386) Judgment dated 22.04.2016 in F.A.O. No.59 of 2013 titled "Infospan (Private) Limited Vs. M/s Telecom foundation and another"

Summary: The case involves a contract dispute resolved through arbitration, with multiple rounds of litigation and appeals. The Award was initially upheld but later set aside by the High Court, leading to the Supreme Court appeal.Supreme Court found that the Trial Court had properly considered the record and objections, and its findings were legally and factually sustainable. The respondents had participated in the arbitration proceedings without raising any objection to the extensions of time given to the arbitrators. The court also addressed the issue of serving notice under Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, stating that substantial compliance had occurred, as the parties were present when the award was filed in court. The court emphasized that the purpose of notice is to make parties aware of the proceedings, and formal compliance in this case would have been a mere technicality. The doctrine of substantial compliance was applied, as the procedural fault did not affect the essence of the dispute. The court concluded that the objections raised by the respondents were unfounded, and the Trial Court's actions were deemed appropriate.

Summary: Background: The case involves a dispute over a construction contract awarded to the plaintiff-petitioner by the AJK Council through its consultants, M/s Technica International. The plaintiff was awarded the contract on 04.10.2003 for the construction of the District Audit and Accounts Office and Income Tax Office at Bhimber. However, issues arose when the site handed over to the plaintiff on 06.01.2004 differed from the one initially shown, necessitating a revised layout plan provided on 21.01.2004. The plaintiff started work on the site on 21.01.2004 and submitted the first bill, which was paid on 05.07.2004. Later, the plaintiff faced penalties for delays in construction, leading to significant deductions from subsequent payments. The plaintiff filed a suit seeking declaration, settlement of accounts, and cancellation of an order dated 26.06.2007, arguing unjustified penalties. ----Issues: 1- Whether the penalties imposed on the plaintiff for delays in construction were justified. 2- Whether the trial court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff was correct. 3- Whether the High Court erred in remanding the case back to the trial court for a fresh decision. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, decreeing payment of Rs. 1,691,500/- and setting aside the order dated 26.06.2007. The defendants appealed to the High Court. The High Court accepted the appeal, remanding the case to the trial court for a fresh decision, noting that the trial court had not adequately addressed all the issues. The petitioner argued that the High Court's judgment was against the law and facts, and that the trial court's detailed findings on issue No. 6 should have been sufficient. The court examined whether issue No. 6 alone was sufficient for determining the parties' liabilities and found that it was not adequately addressed in light of both parties' versions. The court upheld the High Court's decision to remand the case, stating that findings on all issues were necessary for a comprehensive determination. The court emphasized that leave to appeal is granted only for questions of law of public importance, which were not present in this case. ----Citations/Precedents: Azmat Bibi & another vs. Muhammad Laal, [2008 SCR 300]: Courts are not bound to record findings on all issues, but must ensure sufficient findings on key issues for case resolution. Allah Diwaya vs. The State, [PLD 1969 SC 98]: Special leave to appeal is not granted as a matter of routine and must involve significant questions of law or exceptional reasons.