Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 218(1) & 218(2), clause (d) [as introduced through Finance Act, 2018]---Income Tax Rules, 2002, R. 74---Service of notice and other documents---Modes---Electronic Service of assessment order---Propriety---Electronic service for purpose of filing appeal against assessment order---Scope---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') concluded in favour of taxpayer that the electronic mode of service provided in S. 218(1)(d) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') was a secondary method of service and that the limitation period started only upon receiving an attested copy---Whether the service of assessment order upon the assessee in any of the modes under S. 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 could be treated as a proper service upon the assessee in respect of the period limitation for the purpose of appeal?---Held, that service on the individual electronically in the prescribed manner as in clause (d) in Ss. 218[1] & 218[2] was introduced through Finance Act, 2018---Notably, after sub-clause (c) in both [subsection (1) as well as subsection (2)] punctuation (;) and (or) were also inserted---For construction of S. 218 of the Ordinance, 2001, principles of statutory interpretation and effect of punctuation in the Statutes denotes that the word "or" was a disjunctive and it gaves an alternative impression, indicating independent alternatives that were sufficient in themselves, reflecting the legislative intent to treat each mode of service as valid and effective ; which was further reinforced by the punctuation used in S. 218, where semi-colons separate clauses (a), (b), and (c), while clause (d) was preceded by both a semi-colon and the word "or"---Thus, while drawing the distinction between these clauses, the Tribunal wrongly concluded that the electronic mode of service provided in S. 218(1)(d) was a secondary method of service---Punctuation may lend support to statutory interpretation but cannot override the clear legislative intent or the plain meaning of the text---Provisions of S. 218 of Ordinance, 2001 establish that service of orders/judgments via any mode, when completed in the prescribed manner, is sufficient service upon the taxpayer of the Ordinance 2001---Rule 74 of the Rules, 2002 complements this by deeming electronic service valid if confirmation receipt is obtained---The Tribunal recognized electronic service as sufficient, yet its stance (that the limitation period started only upon receiving an attested copy) created inconsistency---Such an approach could undermine the legislative intent of modernizing and streamlining service methods---The interpretation of the Tribunal failed to align with the legislative framework, as it overlooked the intent behind recognizing electronic service as an independent and efficient method, thereby causing unnecessary procedural delays contrary to the law's purpose---In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') had erred in condoning the delay for filing the appeal, as it failed to adequately apply the statutory framework that clearly defined the commencement of the limitation period---By not strictly adhering to the service requirements stipulated under S. 218 of Ordinance, 2001, the Tribunal's decision undermined the legislative intent of ensuring timely appeals and introduced inconsistency in the procedural timeline, leading to unnecessary procedural leniency that was not supported by the provisions of the Ordinance, 2001---Thus, the proposed question was answered in affirmative ; consequently, High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal---Tax Reference Application, filed by Department , was allowed. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.127(5) & 218---Electronic service of assessment order---Propriety---Electronic service for purpose of filing appeal against assessment order---Scope---The language of the provisions of S.127(5) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance, 2001') explicitly defines the limitation period for filing an appeal, leaving no room for alternative interpretation due to the clarity of the statutory wording---Moreover, the use of the word "shall" following "appeal" conveys a mandatory obligation, requiring the aggrieved party to file the appeal within the prescribed statutory timeframe---Consequently, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating valid and sufficient reasons to justify any request for condonation of delay, in line with established principles of statutory interpretation and procedural fairness---Therefore, the limitation period for filing an appeal against assessment order under S. 127(5) of the Ordinance 2001 begins from the date the assessee receives the assessment order through any of the prescribed modes of service---Said interpretation stems from the explicit language of S. 127(5)(a) of the Ordinance 2001, which ties the commencement of the limitation period to the "date of service of the notice of demand " for cases involving assessments or penalties, and in other cases, to the date on which the order to be appealed against is served---The repeated reference to "service" in both instances underscores that the limitation period hinges on the proper and timely service of the relevant documents, as governed by S. 218 of the Ordinance, 2001 , which details the modes and manner of service---In the present case, the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue ('Tribunal') had erred in condoning the delay for filing the appeal, as it failed to adequately apply the statutory framework that clearly defines the commencement of the limitation period---By not strictly adhering to the service requirements stipulated under S. 218 of Ordinance, 2001, the Tribunal's decision undermined the legislative intent of ensuring timely appeals and introduced inconsistency in the procedural timeline, leading to unnecessary procedural leniency that was not supported by the provisions of the Ordinance, 2001---Thus, the proposed question was answered in affirmative ; consequently , High Court set-aside the impugned order passed by the Tribunal---Tax Reference Application , filed by Department, was allowed. Ghulam Shoaib Jally along with Siraj Muhammad, Assistant Commissioner-IR for Petitioner. Ghulam Haroon for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th November, 2024. (a) "document" means any notice, order or requisition under the Ordinance; and (b) in any other case, the date on which the order to be appealed against is served.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 202, 203 & Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Order IX, Rules 8 & 9—Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution—Restoration of suit—Sufficient cause—Scope of judicial discretion—Case management system—Need for procedural efficiency. The respondent's civil suit was dismissed for non-prosecution under Order IX, Rule 8, C.P.C., after failing to produce documentary evidence despite multiple opportunities. However, the suit was restored under Rule 9 upon the respondent's application, which was filed within the prescribed limitation period under Article 163 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The Supreme Court held that sufficient cause for non-appearance on the specific date must be established independently of prior procedural failures. The restoration application highlighted administrative confusion due to the transfer of the case, disorganized court records, and subsequent miscommunication, all of which constituted sufficient cause. The Court emphasized that past conduct of non-appearance cannot solely dictate the outcome of a restoration application if sufficient cause is established for the specific day of dismissal. Procedural rules under the C.P.C. must serve justice rather than obstruct it. The judiciary must aim for substantial justice and avoid technical hurdles that defeat the rights of litigants. The Court further underscored the need for a Case Management System in both civil and criminal laws to address delays, ensure timelines for each stage of litigation, and impose consequences for non-compliance. Cited Cases: Rai Muhammad through legal heirs v. Ejaz Ahmed (PLD 2021 SC 761) Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munawar Khan (2023 SCP 368) SKB-KNK Joint Venture Contractor v. Water and Power Development Authority (2022 SCMR 1615) Zulfiqar Ali v. Lal Din (1974 SCMR 162) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Ghulam Ali (PLD 1963 SC 382) (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Order IX, Rules 8 & 9—Dismissal of suit for non-prosecution—Restoration of suit—Principles governing judicial discretion. The dismissal of a suit for non-prosecution under Rule 8 requires the absence of the plaintiff on the date of hearing, while Rule 9 provides a remedy for restoration if sufficient cause for non-appearance is shown. The Court reiterated that sufficient cause must be assessed specifically for the day of non-appearance, independent of past conduct. Restoration is not a matter of right but judicial discretion, which must be exercised judiciously and in alignment with the principles of substantial justice. (c) Administration of Justice—Substantial Justice vs Procedural Technicalities—Role of judiciary in minimizing delays. Justice must not be sacrificed at the altar of procedural technicalities. The judiciary must interpret procedural laws liberally to serve the cause of justice. Courts must strive to minimize delays through proper docket management and timely interventions to ensure fair trials. The Supreme Court emphasized the introduction of a Case Management System in both the C.P.C. and Cr.P.C. with stage-wise timelines and accountability mechanisms for non-compliance. (d) Case Management System—Judicial Efficiency—Legislative Reforms. The Court highlighted the urgent need for dedicated Case Management Chapters in the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.) and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) to streamline litigation, enforce timelines, and hold parties accountable. Proper implementation of such reforms would reduce backlog, enhance transparency, and restore public confidence in the judiciary. (e) Justice Delayed vs Justice Hurried—Balancing Judicial Expediency and Fair Trial. The maxim "Justice delayed is justice denied" underscores the importance of timely justice, but equally, "Justice hurried is justice buried" serves as a caution against rushed proceedings. The Court stressed maintaining a balance between expeditious disposal of cases and adherence to the principles of due process and fair trial. Disposition: Civil Petitions dismissed; leave to appeal refused. Trial Court directed to decide the civil suit expeditiously within six months. Recommendations made for incorporating a Case Management System in both C.P.C. and Cr.P.C.

Summary: The case concerns a dispute over a land transfer through Gift Mutation No.708, attested on 21.01.1987, involving 42-Kanals & 14-Marlas in Kasur. The respondents, heirs of Bashiran Bibi and Zohran Bibi, filed a suit claiming the mutation was fraudulent and demanded its cancellation. The petitioners argued that the land transfer was a legitimate sale, not a gift. The Trial Court dismissed the suit, but the Appellate Court reversed this decision, leading the petitioners to seek a revision in the Lahore High Court. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the Gift Mutation No.708 was a result of fraud and forgery. ------ 2) Whether the Appellate Court was correct in reversing the Trial Court’s decision without addressing specific issues. ------ 3) Whether the case was affected by procedural errors, including non-framing of essential issues, especially on limitation, and failure to address an application for expert comparison of thumb impressions. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Lahore High Court set aside the Appellate Court's judgment, citing procedural lapses and remanded the case for fresh adjudication. Key findings include: ------ Issue Framing and Limitation: The High Court held that the Trial Court failed to frame specific issues, particularly concerning limitation, which should have been fundamental to the case. Under Order XIV CPC, courts are required to frame precise issues to provide clarity on points of dispute. The omission affected the fairness of the trial. ------ Procedural Errors in Evidence and Applications: The High Court noted that the Appellate Court failed to address the respondents’ application for expert comparison of thumb impressions before deciding the main appeal. Courts are bound to resolve such preliminary applications before reaching a final decision, as established in relevant precedents. ------ Duty of the Appellate Court: The High Court emphasized that as the Appellate Court is an extension of the original suit, it held powers to summon additional records or frame new issues. The Appellate Court’s failure to either summon additional evidence or remand for further inquiry was an error in exercising its jurisdiction. ------ Remand for Proper Issue Framing: The High Court remanded the case to the Appellate Court for re-evaluation, including reframing issues such as limitation, and granted the Appellate Court the liberty to record additional evidence for a comprehensive resolution. ------ Citations/Precedents: Rustam and others v. Jehangir (deceased) through L.Rs (2023 SCMR 730) Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others (PLD 2021 SC 715) Sikandar Hayat and another v. Sughran Bibi and 6 others (2020 SCMR 214) Mian Zafar Ali and another v. Mian Khursheed Ali (2020 SCMR 291) Sakhi Jan and others v. Shah Nawaz and another (2020 SCMR 832) Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Abdullah through L.Rs (2009 SCMR 326) Mst. Imtiaz Begum v. Mst. Sultan Jan and others (2008 SCMR 1259) Mst. Rasheeda Bibi and others v. Mukhtar Ahmad and others (2008 SCMR 1384) Province of Punjab through District Collector, Jhang and another v. Allah Bakhsh and others (2024 CLC 1193) Khawaja Javed Mehmood v. Punjab Small Industries Corporation through Regional Director, Rawalpindi and 2 others (2024 CLC 1503) Shehwaar and 2 others v. Muhammad Riaz and others (2018 YLR 1938) Muhammad Asia Begum and 2 others v. Muhammad Alam and 3 others (2015 CLC 54) Muhammad Zamin Mian and 4 others v. Shamshad and 16 others (2015 MLD 1384) Shah Bahadar through Legal Heirs v. Sherin Bahadar and others (2014 YLR 1855) PLD 1965 Dhaka 65 Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-Ur-Rehman (2015 SCMR 1708) Muhammad Umer v. Muhammad Qasim and another (1991 SCMR 1232) Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastgir (PLD 1978 SC 220)

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure—Burden of Proof and Onus to Prove: ---- Onus probandi—Challenge to mutation—Burden of proof—Plaintiff challenged mutation on the ground of coercion, abduction, and undue influence but failed to provide clear, convincing, and admissible evidence—Revenue officials who entered and attested the mutation testified in favor of its validity—Where a party alleges coercion or fraud in a transaction, the burden to prove such allegations lies on that party—Failure to discharge this burden renders the claim untenable—Findings of lower courts set aside, and suit dismissed. ----Cited Cases: Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor (PLD 1991 SC 957) (b) Limitation Act, 1908—Barred Claims and Delay in Filing Suit: ----S. 3—Suit for cancellation of mutation—Limitation—Mutation attested in 2008—Suit filed in 2013—Plaintiff failed to challenge mutation before revenue authorities in a timely manner and only approached the civil court after exhausting revenue remedies—Delay in filing suit without valid justification renders the claim time-barred—Principle of timeliness applies where revenue orders are not promptly challenged—Suit dismissed as barred by time. (c) Civil Law—Fraud, Coercion, and Undue Influence—Requirement of Proof: ----Plaintiff alleged abduction and coercion for the execution of a sale mutation—Failure to produce substantive evidence to establish these claims—Contradictions in plaintiff's own statement regarding abduction period—Judicial principle: Mere allegation of fraud or coercion is insufficient; it must be proved through cogent and admissible evidence—Defendant successfully proved regularity of mutation by producing revenue officials—Suit dismissed. (d) Evidence Law—Standard of Proof in Civil Cases: ----Admissibility of evidence—Credibility of witnesses—Plaintiff relied on a witness (PW-1) who contradicted his case by stating a longer period of abduction than alleged—In contrast, defendant produced three revenue officials who affirmed the validity of the mutation—In civil litigation, the standard of proof requires clear, consistent, and reliable testimony—Contradictory or vague evidence does not meet the threshold to invalidate a legally attested transaction. (e) Civil Courts—Concurrent Findings and Appellate Intervention: ----Three lower courts concurrently ruled in favor of the plaintiff—However, Supreme Court held that all three courts misapplied legal principles by disregarding burden of proof and evidence standards—Where concurrent findings are based on misapplication of law and improper appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court can intervene and set aside such findings—Appeal allowed, judgments of lower courts set aside, and suit dismissed with costs. ----Disposition: Civil petition converted into appeal—Appeal allowed—Findings of three lower courts set aside—Suit dismissed with costs throughout.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Scope of Judicial Review ----S.100, Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Second appellate jurisdiction—Interference with concurrent findings of fact—Held, that the High Court, in second appellate jurisdiction, would not disturb concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial and first appellate courts unless there is a flagrant misreading, non-reading of evidence, or violation of settled legal principles—Where the lower courts have correctly analyzed the evidence and reached consistent conclusions, the second appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion unless manifest errors are present—Appellants failed to establish any misreading or legal infirmity in the impugned judgments—Appeals dismissed. Cited Cases: • 2022 SCR 416 (b) Evidence Law – Proof of Sale Transactions – Mandatory Requirements ----Art.79, Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 Proof of sale transaction—Necessity of marginal witnesses—Held, that under Article 79 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, any document required by law to be attested must be proven by the testimony of its attesting witnesses—In the present case, the appellant relied on a sale receipt (Exh.PA) as proof of purchase, but failed to produce the marginal witnesses or the writer of the receipt—No explanation was provided for their absence—Held, that the absence of required witnesses rendered the document legally inadmissible—Lower courts correctly found that the sale transaction was not legally proven. Cited Cases: • PLD 2010 SC 906 (c) Registration of Sale Transactions – Legal Effect of Non-Registration ----S.17(2)(v), Registration Act, 1908 Effect of non-registration of a sale transaction—Held, that under Section 17(2)(v) of the Registration Act, 1908, any document purporting to transfer an interest in immovable property valued at Rs.100 or more must be registered—In the present case, the alleged sale receipt (Exh.PA) was neither registered nor followed by a formal sale deed—Such an unregistered document could not confer ownership rights—Even if treated as an agreement to sell, it could not be the basis for a declaratory decree—Lower courts correctly held that the appellant had no legally enforceable title to the suit land. Cited Cases: • PLD 2014 SC 506 (d) Limitation Law – Delay in Asserting Ownership Rights ----S.120, Limitation Act, 1908 Time-barred suit—Failure to justify delay—Held, that where a plaintiff claims ownership based on an old transaction, they must explain why the claim was not pursued within the prescribed limitation period—In the present case, the appellant claimed to have purchased the land in 1963 but only filed suit in 2012—No plausible explanation was provided for this 50-year delay—Held, that the claim was prima facie barred by limitation and could not be entertained—Appeal rightly dismissed. Cited Cases: • PLD 2016 SC 267 (e) Possession and Ownership – Suit for Possession Based on Ownership ----Suits for possession—Ownership-based claims—Limitation not applicable Held, that where a plaintiff files a suit for possession based on ownership, no limitation period applies, provided that ownership rights are validly established—Respondent (Rauf Subhani) successfully proved ownership through valid mutation records and gift/sale deeds, whereas the appellant failed to establish his claim—Lower courts correctly held that a lawful owner has a continuous right to seek possession—Suit for possession decreed in favor of respondent. Cited Cases: • 2019 SCMR 689 (f) Concurrent Findings – High Court’s Power to Reappraise Evidence ----Concurrent findings of fact—Limited scope for interference Held, that when both the trial court and appellate court reach the same conclusion based on proper appreciation of evidence, the second appellate court cannot reappraise evidence merely because another view is possible—The principle applies unless there is patent illegality or gross misreading of material evidence—Appellants failed to point out any material defect in the judgments of the lower courts—Appeals dismissed. Cited Cases: • PLD 2017 SC 73 (g) Disposition Impugned judgments upheld—Appellants failed to prove ownership or to challenge the validity of the respondent’s title—Suit for declaration rightly dismissed as time-barred—Suit for possession rightly decreed in favor of the respondent—No legal infirmity in concurrent findings—Second appeal dismissed.

Summary: Background: This case concerns a civil revision filed by the petitioners challenging the concurrent judgments of the trial and appellate courts that upheld the arbitration award made in favor of respondent No. 1. The dispute began with an agreement where respondent No. 2 agreed to sell a property to respondent No. 1, but they failed to settle the property price. Subsequently, they appointed arbitrators, who could not resolve the dispute, leading to the court appointing an umpire to make an award. The trial court eventually ruled in favor of making the umpire's award the rule of the court, subject to a condition that respondent No. 1 deposit a higher amount within a specified time. -----Issues: 1- Whether the arbitration award was validly made in accordance with the Arbitration Act, 1940. -----2- Whether the umpire’s alleged misconduct or partiality affected the award. -----3- Whether the award was barred by the limitation period as stipulated in the Arbitration Act. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome --Validity of Award: The court held that the award was made in compliance with the Arbitration Act, 1940, as the umpire followed proper procedures, heard evidence from both parties, and made his decision based on the assessed market value at the time earnest money was paid. --Misconduct of the Umpire: The court found no evidence of misconduct or partiality by the umpire, as both parties had agreed to his appointment and actively participated in the proceedings without raising objections during the arbitration. --Limitation Period: The court determined that the award was submitted within the prescribed four-month period, thus, the award was not time-barred. The revision petition was dismissed, with the court affirming the findings of the lower courts and concluding that the petitioners failed to demonstrate any legal grounds for setting aside the award. -----Citations/Precedents M/s Joint Venture KG/RIST v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 108) Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Joint Venture Kocks KG/RIST (PLD 2011 SC 506) Premier Insurance Company v. Attock Textile Mills Ltd. (PLD 2006 Lahore 534) Sh. Saleem Ali v. Sh. Akhtar Ali and others (PLD 2004 Lahore 404) Khalid Abbas v. Hafiz Muhammad Farooq (2004 YLR 274)

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----Ss.13 & 14---Eviction of tenant---Default in payment of outstanding rent---Recovery by landlord---Possession of the tenant over the premises after expiry of period of tenancy---Disappearance of tenant from the proceedings before the Rent Controller---Partial acceptance of application to the extent of ejectment and dismissal of appeal of tenant for recovery of outstanding rent---Stance of the tenants was that after the expiry of tenancy possession of the premises was handed over to the landlord with payment of all dues---Validity---Possession of the tenants over the rented premises till January 2024 had been proved and they could not prove the payment of rent for the said period, thus, in such an eventuality it was not only unjustified to disentitle the landlord from recovery of the outstanding rent at admitted rate but also against the law and the findings of the Rent Controller that the landlord could not prove the outstanding rent against the tenants were also against the facts because once it was proved that the tenants were in possession of the shop even after the expiry of tenancy, then it was their obligation to pay the rent at the rate admitted by them---Payment of the rent of the rented property was the duty of the tenants to justify their possession otherwise their possession was illegal and their status would be of the trespasser because the possession of the rented premises could only be justified through payment of rent---Findings of the Appellate Court dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation was also against the law in juxtaposition with the possession of the tenants---Stance of tenants was required to be substantiated through cogent, reliable and convincing evidence, which was lacking on their part, thus, their submission to the extent of contents of the written reply for proof of handing over the possession of the rented premises was misconceived---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. Miss Akhtar Qureshi v. Nisar Ahmad 2002 SCMR 1292; Juma Sher v. Sabz Ali 1997 SCMR 1062; Mian Muhammad Fareed v. Khalid Wadood 2021 CLC 1093 and Muhammad Iqbal v. Syed Muhammad Tahir Zahoor and others 2020 MLD 522 ref. (b) West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959)--- ----Ss.13 & 14---Eviction of tenant---Default in payment of outstanding rent---Solitary statement of landlord on oath not cross-examined by the tenants---Evidentiary value---Solitary statement of the landlord had not been cross-examined and whatever was deposed by him had gone unrebutted---In such circumstances, sole statement of the landlord could be considered if it was inspiring confidence---Constitutional petition was allowed. Messrs F.K Irani and Co. v. Begum Feroze 1996 SCMR 1178 rel. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Art. 30---Evidence---Admission---Portion of a statement not cross-examined is deemed to have been admitted by the other side. Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700; Haji Din Muhammad through legal heirs v. Mst. Hajira Bibi and others PLD 2002 Peshawar; Mrs. Akbar Brothers v. M. Khalil Dar PLD 2007 Lahore 385 and Mst. Zargoon and others v. Mst. Shadana and others 2002 CLC 1539 rel. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VI, R. 1---Pleadings---Scope---Pleadings itself is not evidence at all, and pleadings without evidence cannot be taken into consideration as proof of a particular fact nor the evidence without pleadings can substantiate a particular version. Inayat Ali Shah v. Anwar Hussain 1995 MLD 1714; Pir Wali Khan v. Niaz Badshah 2013 MLD 1106; Mir Laiq Khan v. Sarfraz Jehan 2013 MLD 1449; Mst. Ghazala Yasmeen v. Sarfraz Khan Durrani 2013 CLC 1406 and Messrs Choudhary Brothers Ltd., Sialkot v. Jaranwala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Jaranwala 1968 SCMR 804 rel. Aurangzeb for Petitioner. Hamid Ullah Khan for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2. Date of hearing: 11th October, 2024.

Summary: -----Quote: West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The sole statement of the landlord could be considered if it is inspiring confidence as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mesesrs. F.K Irani & Co’ case that “statement of landlord on oath, if consistent with the application for ejectment and not shaken in cross-examination or disproved in rebuttal is sufficient to prove that requirement of landlord is bona fide.”. The possession of the respondents has been proved on record, they remained in possession but have not paid any rent, thus, the evidence of the PW-1 alone was sufficient to hold him entitled for the recovery of the outstanding rent. It appears from the order sheet of the learned Appellate Court dated 28.01.2022 that the respondents through their counsel Mr. Hamid Ullah Khan, Advocate appeared but even then, they have not questioned the validity of the judgment and findings of the learned Rent controller to the extent of the possession of the respondents after expiry of the tenancy period and even before this court no such petition was filed by the them which is an admission on their part for which the landlord is entitled for the outstanding rent from the date of expiry of the tenancy till January 2024 @ Rs 50,000/- per month. The petitioner appeared before the learned Rent Controller, his statement was recorded on oath and same went unrebutted, whatever was deposed by the petitioner in his examination-in-chief has not been cross-examined by the respondents. It is an established law that when a portion of a statement has not been cross examined, that is deemed to have been admitted by the other side. Reliance in this regard is also placed on the cases of “Muhammad Akhtar Vs Mst. Manna and three other (2001 SCMR 1700) and Haji Din Muhammad through legal heirs Vs Mst. Hajira Bibi and others (PLD 2002 Peshawar). Mrs Akbar Brothers vs. M. Khalil Dar (PLD 2007 Lahore 385), Mst. Zargoon and others Vs Mst Shadana and others (2002 CLC 1539). ------Background: The petitioner filed an application for the ejectment of respondents (tenants) from a rented shop in Mingora, Swat, due to non-payment of rent since 2016 after the expiration of the lease agreement. The Rent Controller partially granted the application, ordering ejectment but dismissing the claim for outstanding rent recovery, as the petitioner failed to substantiate it. The petitioner appealed, but the Additional District Judge upheld the Rent Controller's decision. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a constitutional petition challenging the appellate court's order. ------Issues: 1- Whether the respondents retained possession of the shop post-lease expiration without paying rent. -----2- Whether the petitioner is entitled to recover outstanding rent from 2016 onwards. -----3- Whether the petitioner’s claim for outstanding rent is time-barred. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court dismissed the petition, reasoning that: The respondents had vacated the shop, and there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the petitioner’s claim for outstanding rent. The petitioner delayed filing the application for rent recovery, weakening the claim and making it time-barred. The petitioner's unchallenged affidavit alone was insufficient to overcome the procedural and substantive legal hurdles in proving rent arrears, especially given the lapse in time since the lease expiration. -----Citations/Precedents: Messrs F.K Irani and Co. Vs. Begum Feroze (1996 SCMR 1178) Miss Akhtar Oureshi Vs. Nisar Ahmad (2002 SCMR 1292) Juma Sher Vs. Sabz Air (1997 SCMR 1062) Mian Muhammad Fareed Vs. Khalid Wadood (2021 CLC 1093) Muhammad Iqbal vs. Syed Muhammad Tahir Zahoor and others (2020 MLD 522)

Summary: This case concerns a dispute over the mutation of inheritance that was executed in 1982. The petitioner challenged the mutation, arguing that a certain share of the property was wrongly assigned to the respondent. The petitioner claimed that the property belonged to the petitioner’s father, and the respondent, as the son of a predeceased sibling, was not entitled to inherit. The case was initially decided in favor of the petitioner, but this decision was reversed by the appellate court, which found that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The High Court subsequently upheld this decision, and the petitioner brought the case before the Supreme Court. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the suit filed was barred by the statute of limitations. ------ 2) Whether the law of limitation applies to inheritance matters. ------ 3) Whether the delay in filing the suit could be justified due to the petitioner’s claimed lack of awareness of the mutation. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, affirming the lower courts' rulings that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations. ------ Reasoning: The mutation in question occurred in 1982, but the petitioner did not file the suit until 2009, a delay of more than 27 years. The petitioner did not provide an adequate explanation for this delay. The court rejected the petitioner's argument that they were unaware of the mutation because they were residing abroad. The petitioner’s pleadings did not mention any such facts, and no request for exemption from the limitation law was made under Rule 6 of Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure. While the petitioner argued that limitation laws do not apply in inheritance matters, the court clarified that the law of limitation can indeed be relevant in inheritance cases, particularly when there has been undue delay in filing. The court cited precedents where limitation had been applied to inheritance cases, emphasizing that such laws are designed to encourage timely litigation and prevent stale claims. The court found no merit in the petitioner’s claim and ruled that the suit was rightly dismissed by the lower courts due to the lapse of time. The concurrent findings of the trial court, the appellate court, and the High Court were upheld. Outcome: The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. ------ Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Ali (PLD 1990 SC 1) – Limitation in inheritance matters can be subject to exceptions. Mst. Grana (PLD 2014 SC 167) – Limitation laws may apply to inheritance cases under certain circumstances. Mst. Phaphan vs. Muhammad Bakhsh (2005 SCMR 1278) – Delay in inheritance claims can lead to the suit being barred by time. Lal Khan vs. Muhammad Yousaf (PLD 2011 SC 657) – Inheritance claims delayed for decades were dismissed as time-barred. Atta Muhammad vs. Maula Bakhsh (2007 SCMR 1446) – Emphasizes the importance of the law of limitation in legal proceedings to prevent undue delay.

Summary: (a) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935 & 1962 ----Inheritance---Limited ownership of widow under custom---Devolution of property on death of widow---Scope and effect---Widow shown as full owner in revenue record---Reversion of property to legal heirs of deceased husband---Petitioners, being legal heirs of deceased Muhammad Ayub, filed a suit claiming that his widow, Mst. Bibi Hawa (later shown as Mst. Hashmat Bibi), was entered as a limited owner under prevailing custom and that upon her death, property should have devolved upon Ayub’s legal heirs under Islamic law---Mutation No. 2844 (dated 05.06.1983) had transferred full ownership to legal heirs of the widow, to the exclusion of other legal heirs of Muhammad Ayub---Held, under prevailing Riwaj before the promulgation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, a widow inherited as limited owner, and on her death, the property reverted to the husband’s legal heirs---After promulgation of the Shariat Act, the widow became full owner only to the extent of her Islamic share---Property in dispute was wrongly mutated to her legal heirs as though she owned the entire share of her deceased husband, which was contrary to law. (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of courts below---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference justified---Trial court and appellate court concurrently dismissed petitioners’ suit without appreciating material on record, including entries in Jamabandis and the implications of customary and Islamic inheritance laws---High Court held that both lower courts misread the evidence and wrongly applied estoppel and limitation, necessitating revisional interference. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 112(2)---Judicial notice of custom---Court may take judicial notice of well-established custom having the force of law---No need to prove customary limitation of widow’s rights in each case where settled precedent exists. **(d) Estoppel---Scope---Petitioners not estopped from asserting legal entitlement merely due to non-objection to compensation received by legal heirs of widow---Such acquiescence did not negate their claim under Islamic law, particularly when only 16 marlas of property were acquired, and petitioners admitted entitlement of respondents to widow’s Shari share. (e) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 120---Continuous possession---Refreshing cause of action---Wrong entries in revenue record---Effect---Where plaintiffs remain in continuous possession and only a portion of the land is acquired or claimed adversely, recurring entries constitute continuing wrongs and refresh the cause of action---Petition held not barred by limitation. **(f) Relief---Correction of mutation---Declaratory relief---Civil court and revisional court have jurisdiction to mould relief even if mutation is not specifically challenged, where necessary to give effect to declaratory findings---Earlier inheritance mutation (No. 2844) in favour of legal heirs of widow set aside and direction issued for fresh mutation as per Shariah shares. Cited Cases: • Maqbool Ahmad v. Fazal-i-Haq 2012 SCMR 917 • Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 SC 791 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Haji Jan Muhammad 2018 SCMR 698 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353 • Saadat Khan v. Shahid ur Rehman PLD 2023 SC 362 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 • Samar Gul v. Mohabat Khan 2000 SCMR 974 Disposition: Revision allowed. Judgments of trial and appellate courts set aside. Mutation No. 2844 declared void to the extent of excess inheritance. Petitioners declared entitled to Shari shares. Revenue record to be corrected accordingly. Preliminary decree passed with liberty to seek final decree.