Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 (VII of 1990) ----S. 36(1), (2) & (3)–––Time limitation for passing order after issuance of show cause notice–––Scope and effect–––Mandatory nature of prescribed period–––Where statute provides that order-in-original shall be made within 120 days of issuance of show cause notice, extendable only by 60 days for recorded reasons, any order made thereafter would be time-barred–––No extension beyond 180 days permissible under law–––In present case, show cause notices were issued on 30.06.2000 and 12.12.2001, whereas orders-in-original were passed on 02.02.2001 and 20.04.2002 respectively–––Both orders made beyond statutory period–––Held, orders-in-original were barred by limitation and had no legal effect–––Provisions of S.36(3) being mandatory, non-compliance rendered proceedings void ab initio–––Larger Bench judgment in Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280) applied. (b) Central Excises Act, 1944 ----S. 33(3)–––Adjudication proceedings–––Time limit of 45 days for deciding matter after issuance of show cause notice–––Order passed beyond prescribed period–––Validity–––Held, order-in-original passed after expiry of statutory period was time-barred and without jurisdiction–––Observance of limitation is mandatory to ensure certainty and fairness in fiscal adjudication. (c) Fiscal statutes–––Mandatory nature of limitation provisions ----Interpretation–––Timeframes in taxing statutes must be strictly construed–––Non-compliance with statutory timelines deprives the authority of jurisdiction to act–––Corrigenda issued after expiry of limitation could not revive jurisdiction or cure the lapse–––Held, consequence of failure to pass order within prescribed period is nullity of entire proceedings–––Subsequent proceedings and demands, being consequential, also stood annulled. Cited Case: • Wak Limited Multan Road, Lahore v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax, Lahore (2025 SCMR 1280). Disposition: Appeals allowed–––Impugned judgments of the Lahore High Court set aside–––Orders-in-original declared time-barred and without lawful authority.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act, 1990 ---- S. 47 --- Reference Jurisdiction --- Question of Law --- Limitation --- Maintainability --- Primary question that came for consideration before High Court in referred Sale Tax Reference (STR No.14 of 2008) was whether adjudication vide Order-in-Original involved was hopelessly time barred and this prime fact which is also paramount question of law has been taken care of/adjudicated upon by foras below --- Follow up question which was decided was whether such question, if not raised in lower fora, could be raised and argued before High Court in reference jurisdiction --- Impugned judgment concluded above question in terms of its paragraph 15, whereby it was held that no doubt Court (reference jurisdiction) exercises special jurisdiction under section 47 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") however that jurisdiction merely extends to decide question of law, which arises out of order and not otherwise --- Court, in its order restricted itself not to go into any question of law raised for first time before it --- In paragraph 16 of impugned judgment, it concluded that "reference applications do not give rise to question of law to arise from orders of appellate tribunal and thus references were dismissed" --- Court held that reason that prevailed with High Court was of special jurisdiction being exercised under section 47 of Act which, according to judgment could only be extended to question of law that arises out of order --- Court held that perhaps view in impugned order was that it is restricted to question "raised" before lower fora and "decided" and that new question of law (even if arises out of order) cannot be framed and that in terms of paragraph 16 (referred above) reference application devoid of such order --- Court held that in its understanding this concept/principle was completely alien, as order gives rise to question and not reference application --- Court held that as to scope of reference jurisdiction under relevant statute, matter came up for consideration with reference to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 --- Court held that there was no cavil to proposition that scope of reference is now extended to extent of appeal, which is continuation of main lis and in consequence thereof such principles, considering statutory frame of reference jurisdiction are also attracted --- Court held that in terms paragraphs 49 and 50 of Messrs Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2017 SCMR 1006), this Court has held that independent interpretation of section 133 of Ordinance, 2001, as it stands today, on plain language of law, liberated from burden or benefit of earlier judgments, would make position very clear --- Court held that subsection (1) confers right on any person or Commissioner aggrieved by final order of Appellate Tribunal to file application before High Court along with statement of case stating any questions of law arising out of Tribunal's order --- Court held that there is direct right to approach High Court in similar manner as in appeals, revisions, reviews etc --- Court held that order being challenged is final order but challenge is limited to questions of law only --- Court held that statement must set out facts, Tribunal's determination and questions of law which arise out of its order in terms of subsection (3) --- Court held that questions of law which may be referred are only those which "arise" out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that on plain language of law, this would include any question which can be made out from order of Tribunal --- Court held that there is nothing in scheme of section to impute any extraordinary limitations on type of questions which may be posed --- Court held that facts as stated in Tribunal's order have to be taken as recorded and any question which can be made out from those facts may be raised in application under section 133 ibid, regardless of whether it was previously urged or not --- Court held that there is absolutely no reason for confining questions which may be referred to only those which were argued before Tribunal on hypothesis that this is advisory jurisdiction as that is not what language of law contemplates --- Court held that law, as it stands, allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that section 133 ibid clearly states that upon hearing case, High Court is obligated to decide question of law raised by reference and pass judgment thereon and Tribunal's order automatically stands modified by order of High Court --- Court held that this is extremely significant aspect as it is essence of appellate order that it per se modifies order of lower forum, or, in other words, merges into it --- Court held that this particular aspect of section 133 ibid was introduced for first time by way of 2005 amendment and was not present in section 66 of Act, 1922 during brief period between 1971 and 1974 when law was similar to present one --- Court held that it is therefore clear beyond any doubt that remedy under section 133 ibid is appellate in nature and must be construed and applied as such --- Court held that language of law must be given effect to, rather than unnecessarily restricting scope of jurisdiction on basis of judgments from era when law and circumstances were completely different --- Court held that civilized world, including our own country, has been moving towards greater rights for citizens over last century to extent that privilege of fair trial has now become constitutional right --- Court held that in these circumstances, it is not appropriate to restrict scope of legal remedy available to citizens on basis of old decision, especially when language of law is clearly pointing in opposite direction --- Court held that question of limitation is always considered as integral part of main lis and can never be isolated, be it special/appellate or regular plenary jurisdiction etc --- Court held that limitation ought to have been decided as it is always betrothed with litigation --- Court held that it is attached with litigation in such way that it becomes court's duty to look into it as priority, on its own --- Court held that matter of treating reference as appeal came for consideration in another case of Messrs Rafeh Limited which to large extent reiterated principles laid down in case of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd --- Court held that it is not case of respondents that orders in all cases, were not passed beyond period mandated under law --- Court held that only contention was that question of limitation was never raised in lower fora hence cannot be agitated in reference jurisdiction, which question was set at rest in light of aforesaid judgments of Squibb Pakistan Pvt. Ltd. and Messrs Rafeh Limited --- Court held that it is thus not only those questions which have been pleaded and raised before lower fora which could be agitated in reference jurisdiction but would also include those which arise out of order of Tribunal --- Court held that order of Tribunal talks about passing of order-in-original and thus its validity, in terms of timeframe as contoured by relevant statute is to be adjudged and should have been adjudged, which indeed arises out of order --- Court held that there is thus nothing in referred provision of reference jurisdiction to prevent appellants from raising such question of law which can be made out and seen from contents of order, impugned in reference jurisdiction --- Court held that conclusion of paragraph 49 of Squibb case judgment has overriding effect and that is law, as it stands which allows all questions "arising" out of order to be referred and not just questions "argued" or "raised" before Tribunal --- Court held that thus, learned High Court erred in special jurisdiction under section 47 (which is pari materia to section 133 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001) by not allowing appellants to raise questions of law that could be seen flowing and arising out of order --- Court held that therefore, instant bunch of civil appeals are allowed and impugned judgment/orders are set aside --- Appeals were allowed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 40B---General Clauses Act (X of 1897), S. 24A---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises---Back to back extension of such posting---Reasons for extension, absence of---Effect---Consecutive orders were issued under S.175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’), whereby officers of Inland Revenue had been posted at various business premises of the Company, being engaged in the manufacturing and sale of poultry feed, in order to monitor for successive periods of thirty days, extended back-to-back without reasons---Whether the repeated extensions of thirty days each under the S.175C of the Ordinance, 2001, without assigning reasons or disclosing material, can be sustained in law---Petitioner (Taxpayer/Company called into question the validity of consecutive orders contending that the authority could not be exercised arbitrarily or indefinitely, and that monitoring under such provision must necessarily be time-bound and justified by cogent reasons---Validity---Pertinently, S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 is pari material S.40B of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (‘the Act, 1990’) in both language and purpose; and the doctrine of pari materia permits courts to interpret two provisions in harmony where they are couched in substantially similar terms, address the same issue and seek to achieve a common object---Section 175C of the Ordinance, 2001, in essence, replicates the scheme of S. 40B of the Act, 1990 by empowering the Board or Chief Commissioner to post officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises of a taxpayer to monitor production, supply of goods, rendering of services and stock position---Though the S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 does not, in express terms, prescribe a limitation of time for such postings, however, the law does not recognize unfettered and unbridled discretion and monitoring cannot be indefinite; rather must be for a defined period and for a lawful purpose contemplated by the statute---Once that purpose is achieved or exhausted, the monitoring must come to an end, and the authority cannot be left at large to extend the period in its unfettered discretion---All statutory powers must be exercised within lawful limits, which must be exercised for a reasonable and time-bound period to achieve the legitimate object of the statute---In the present case, while the initial orders (of 03.05.2025 and 13.05.2025) can be regarded as valid exercises of power under S. 175C of the Ordinance, 2001, the subsequent orders (dated 02.06.2025 and 29.06.2025) extending the posting of at the petitioner’s hatcheries suffered from a conspicuous absence of reasons---No material had been disclosed as to why continued monitoring was necessary, what object remained unachieved, or what irregularity justified prolongation---The extensions, being unreasoned and indefinite in effect, were arbitrary and fell foul of S. 24A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which obliged every public authority to act reasonably, fairly and in accordance with the purpose of law---Such action also fail the test of proportionality embodied in the constitutional guarantees of due process and freedom of trade---Thus, High Court set-aside office orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional petition, filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Pakistan Beverages Ltd. 2018 SCMR 1544 and Agha Steel Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 2119 ref. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), S. 40B---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises---Back to back extension of such posting---Reasons for extension, absence of---Effect---Consecutive orders were issued under S. 175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’), whereby officers of Inland Revenue had been posted at various business premises of the Petitioner (Manufacturer/Company) in order to monitor for successive periods of thirty days extended back-to-back without reasons---Respondents/Department, while placing reliance upon the judgment in case tilted “Kamalia Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan” reported as 2015 PTD 221 (‘Kamalia Sugar Mills case’), contended that the action was within the lawful competence of the tax authorities since the act of monitoring was not adverse in nature, therefore, the principle enunciated in Kamalia Sugar Mills case governed the present case---Validity---The case law i.e., Kamalia Sugar Mills case, cited by the Respondents/Department , does not advance their case beyond the initial posting of officers---Kamalia Sugar Mills case /judgment expressly observed that in order to prevent arbitrary exercise, the posting order must stipulate a reasonable timeframe, and that any extension should be made known to the taxpayer---Although it is correct that the Board or the Chief Commissioner is not under a statutory obligation to issue a show-cause notice or to record detailed reasons while appointing officers at the business premises for monitoring, this cannot be construed as a license to grant successive extensions in a mechanical or indefinite manner---Every extension of monitoring must be supported by cogent justification, demonstrating the necessity for continued oversight---Even where the orders are time-bound, such as thirty days consecutively in the present case, the power to extend cannot be exercised in such a way that it results in perpetual monitoring under the guise of renewal---The law requires that such exercise of discretion must be reasonable, proportionate, and must culminate at a definite point in time---Therefore, to treat Kamalia Sugar Mills case as an authority for approving back-to-back extensions without reasons would be to stretch the judgment beyond its ratio and to undermine its own cautionary observations---Thus, High Court set-aside office orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional Petition, filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Kamalia Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2015 PTD 221 ref. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 175C---Posting of officers of Inland Revenue at the business premises for monitoring---Issuance of order by competent / designated authority, absence of---Effect---Approval by the designated authority---Scope ---Objection of the Petitioner/Taxpayer being was the orders had not been issued by the Competent Authority (the Board or the Chief Commissioner) prescribed under S. 175C of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (‘the Ordinance, 2001’) but by the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue---Validity---When a statute vests power in a particular authority, such power must be exercised by that authority alone, unless there exists an express provision of delegation duly notified in accordance with law---Section 175C of the Ordinance, 2001 confers authority upon the Board or the Chief Commissioner only, to order the posting of officers of Inland Revenue to the business premises of a person or class of persons for the purpose of monitoring---The wording of the provision leaves no room for ambiguity that the discretion has been consciously restricted to the Board or the Chief Commissioner---Therefore, the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, does not find mention in the statutory scheme, nor is there any enabling provision authorizing him to issue such orders independently or on behalf of the Chief Commissioner---When the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, then the same is to be done in that manner only---In the present case, although the office orders recited that “approval” had been obtained from the Chief Commissioner and that the Chief Commissioner was “pleased to appoint”, the operative parts in the orders were issued under the signature and seal of the Additional Commissioner, Inland Revenue, the act of signing and issuing an order was not a mere ministerial formality, it was the very exercise of statutory discretion---Unless the record demonstrated that the Chief Commissioner himself passed the order and consciously exercised his statutory discretion, an order issued by any other officer lacking jurisdiction was legally unsustainable---Approval or acquiescence, without direct exercise of power by the designated authority, does not cure the defect---Moreover, S.175C of the Ordinance, 2001 does not contemplate or authorize delegation of power to any officer other than the Board or the Chief Commissioner---Legislative intent is explicit in confining the power to said authorities alone, thereby excluding the possibility of delegation and or sub-delegation---Any attempt to vest such power in an Additional Commissioner or an officer subordinate would be contrary to the express mandate of the statute---Consequently, the issuance of such orders by the Respondent (Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue) without any valid delegation under the law, rendered them ultra vires and void ab initio---Thus, High Court set-aside Office Orders extending posting declaring the same to be without lawful authority while the initial posting orders stood spent by efflux of time---Constitutional petition , filed by taxpayer/company , was partly allowed accordingly. Agha Steel Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 2119 ref. Hafiz Muhammad Idris for Petitioner. Hafiz Ahsan Khokhar on behalf of FBR for Respondent. Dr. Khalid Malik, Director FBR. Khaleeq Ullah Khan, Deputy Director Law. Ms. Reema Masud, Commissioner Inland. Date of hearing: 30th July, 2025.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969— —Ss. 32, 80, 81 & 179—Jurisdiction—Recovery of short-levied taxes—Scope— Customs authorities retain jurisdiction, within five-year limitation, to recover sales tax and advance income tax at the import stage, even where discovered after clearance of goods due to wrongly granted exemption. Insertion of “taxes” in S.32 by Finance Act, 2014 and “including recovery” in S.6(1) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 by Finance Act, 2015, coupled with omission of S.11 Sales Tax Act by Finance Act, 2024, show legislative intent to vest post-clearance recovery jurisdiction in Customs. Sections 80 and 81 envisage assessment not concluded at clearance stage; S.179 provides adjudicatory machinery. (b) Sales Tax Act, 1990— —S. 6(1)—Collection and recovery at import stage—Extent— Import-stage sales tax is charged, paid, enforced and recovered in the same manner and time as customs duty. With omission of general recovery jurisdiction of Inland Revenue (earlier S.11), S.6(1) now stands as sole operative provision, incorporating Customs Act machinery for collection and recovery of sales tax at import. (c) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001— —S. 148(5) & (6)—Advance income tax at import stage— Sub-sections (5) and (6) synchronize collection of advance income tax with customs duty, borrowing Customs Act provisions “so far as they relate to collection”. Scheme envisages that Customs may recover unpaid advance tax discovered through post-clearance audit. (d) Fiscal statutes—Amendments—Retrospective application— Amendments by Finance Acts 2012, 2014 and 2015 to Customs Act and Sales Tax Act are procedural; they regulate forum and machinery for collection but do not create new liabilities. Being procedural, they apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded. (e) Constitutional law— —Art. 199—High Court jurisdiction— Sindh High Court erred in holding Customs lacked jurisdiction to recover import-stage sales tax and income tax post clearance; impugned judgments set aside. Dissent (Muhammad Shafi Siddiqui, J.) (f) Customs Act, 1969—Sales Tax Act, 1990—Income Tax Ordinance, 2001—Jurisdiction— Held, Customs’ jurisdiction limited to import stage only. Post-clearance recovery of sales tax or income tax lies exclusively with Inland Revenue authorities under respective statutes. Amendments inserting “taxes” (Customs Act) or “including recovery” (Sales Tax Act) do not confer adjudicatory powers to Customs absent express conferment. Import-stage jurisdiction ends once goods are cleared under S.80 of Customs Act; subsequent proceedings must be by Inland Revenue. Civil Petitions dismissed. Cited Cases Gulistan Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 393 (Lahore High Court) (distinguished) Banwari Lal v. Mahesh AIR 1918 PC 188 Siddique Khan v. Abdul Shakur Khan PLD 1984 SC 289 Other jurisprudence on court-fees and jurisdiction referred for analogy. ----Disposition: By majority (Afridi, C.J. and Shakeel Ahmad, J.)—Petitions converted into appeals—Allowed—Sindh High Court judgments/orders set aside—Customs authorities declared competent to recover short-levied sales tax and advance income tax post-clearance. Dissent (Siddiqui, J.)—Leave refused—Customs jurisdiction confined to import stage; post-clearance recovery lies with Inland Revenue.

Summary: Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act (XII of 2011)--- ----Ss. 3(1), 47 (1A), 63 & Second Schedule, Tariff Heading 98-13---Reference---Sales tax on services---Online services---Trading on Automated System---Taxpayers were stock brokers who had been facilitating sale and purchase of shares through their offices in Karachi and Lahore---Dispute was with regard to recovery of sales tax on earning of commission against services provided by stock exchange brokers to their clients in Lahore---Validity---"Stockbroker" and a "foreign exchange broker" does not come within the definition of any of the services as indicated in chapter of Tariff Heading 98-13 of Second Schedule to Sindh Sales Tax on Services Act, 2011, nor is it a person "dealing in any such services" so as to bring it within the purview of that Tariff Heading---Such service also does not come within Heading 9813.8000 as it is admittedly not a "banker to an issue" and also cannot fall within the definition of the expression "others" as contained in Sub-Heading 9813.8100, which having to be read in the context of Heading 9813.8000 must be read as other persons who are acting as "bankers to an issue"---Economic activity that was being offered by the taxpayers was not to act as "banker to an issue" and hence the activity undertaken did not fall with the perimeters of such Tariff Heading either---High Court decided the questions in favour of taxpayers and against the authorities---Reference was disposed of accordingly. Pakistan Stock Exchange Limited through Duly Authorized Officer v. Province of Sindh through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and 3 others 2024 CLD 580; Habib Safe Deposit Vault (Private) Ltd. v. The Province of Sindh through Secretary Finance and others 2016 SCMR 484; Commissioner of Income Tax Lahore v. Ferozedin Allah Rakha M. Ramzan PLD 1990 SC 115; Muhammad Deen Malik v. Second Additional District Judge, Karachi 1982 SCMR 1223; Ihsan-ur-Rehman v. Najma Parveen PLD 196 SC 14; Cooperative Insurance Society of Pakistan Limited, Karachi v. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan, Karachi 1999 SCMR 2779; Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and another v. Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 SCMR 1166; Messrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan PLD 2005 SC 373; Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. 2005 PTD 1933; Aftab Shahban Mirani v. Muhammad Ibrahim PLD 2008 SC 779; Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan 2015 SCMR 1303; Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2017 SC 718; Pakistan Television Corporation Limited v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (Legal) LTU, Islamabad 2017 SCMR 1136; Searle IV Solution (Pvt.) Ltd v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 SCMR 1444; Haji Tooti v. Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad 2023 SCMR 1980; 2014 PTD 284 and 2019 PTD 484 rel. Hyder Ali Khan, Barrister-at-law for Applicant (in SSTRA No.68 of 2016, Application in SSTRA No.40 of 2018 and Respondent in SSTRA No.93 of 2016). Malik Naeem Iqbal for Applicant (in SSTRA No.93 of 2016, Respondents in SSTRA No.68 of 2016). Miss Summiya Kalwar for Respondent (in SSTRA No.40 of 2018). Date of hearing: 25th February, 18th March and 20th May, 2025.

Summary: (Against the impugned consolidated judgment dated 16.01.2023 in C.P. No. D-3105 of 2017, C.P. No. D-8295 of 2018 and C.P. No. D-4321 of 2020, rendered by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi). (a) Employment--- ----Employees of Pakistan Steel Mill (PSM)---Vires of amendment in Gratuity Rules---Withholding of financial benefits/gratuity---Doctrine of sub silentio---Scope---Decision of High Court on the basis of financial constraints of PSM instead of legal/constitutional grounds---Legality---Every employee is entitled to the payment of his full and final settlement on his superannuation---Non-payment of gratuity has nothing to do with losses or financial crunch, quite the reverse, the amount of gratuity, provident fund and pension is an inherent/vested right of every retired employee which is deep-seated in the Industrial Relations and Civil Service Laws---Every employer without any pretext or deferment is bound to pay off this liability immediately on the eve of retirement rather than delaying or shelving this vested right for an indefinite period or putting this obligation in a state of uncertainty---Many crucial questions of law were raised by the petitioners which were not considered by the High Court but the substrata of decision paid attention only to the alleged financial crunch rather than adverting to the spectrum of plea of vires of amendment in the Gratuity Rules including the other claims/benefits on the touchstone of applicable laws, thus, the judgment of High Court was also hit by the doctrine of "sub silentio"---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed. Inspector General of Police, Quetta and another v. Fida Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 1583; Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 568; Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652; Sheikh Fazal Ahmed v. Raja Ziaullah Khan PLD 1964 SC 494; Works Cooperative Housing Society and another v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1969 SC 430; Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Azizuddin Industries PLD 1970 SC 439; Commissioner of Sales Tax (West) Karachi v. Kauddsons Ltd. PLD 1974 SC 180 and Muhammad Suleman and others v. Abdul Ghani PLD 1979 SC 190 rel. (b) Words and phrases--- ----Expression “Gratuity”---Meaning and scope---Expression “gratuity” delineates a lump-sum/consolidated amount of money remunerated by an employer to an employee leading up to formal retirement, which is always regarded as significant milestone that marks the end of employee's career and starting of a new chapter in his life---Gratuity is a financial benefit provided as a token of gratitude for an employee's loyalty, efficient service and completion of certain years of service and depending upon the terms and conditions of employment, it becomes a legal obligation rather than a voluntary benefit---Sometimes it may be classified as bounty but if its payment obligation is structured and regulated by legal provisions/rules or regulations, then its payment turns into indispensable and mandatory rather than considering it a mere bounty. (c) Precedent--- ----“Sub silentio”---Meaning and scope---“Sub silentio”, a Latin term, literally translates to "under silence" or "in silence"---In legal milieus, it points towards an incidence where the Court decides a lis without appreciating or deliberating the particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs the precedential value of the judgment---Such doctrine often denotes that if the court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with a crucial point of law raised before it, then the precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed---Decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to the critical terms of the law and without citation of authority and such a decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight. Syed Saad Ali and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry and others 2025 SCP 318 and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 rel. (d) Administration of justice--- ----Each case has to be decided on its own facts---Each litigant ought to be provided a fair chance of hearing to present and plead his case and the decision of the court must be founded and structured on the merits of the case. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Vires of law, rules or regulations can be challenged if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is also a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739 rel. Muhammad Haseeb Jamali, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Mohsin Qadir Shahwani, Additional Attorney General Pakistan and Agha Zafar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd September, 2025.

Summary: (Against the impugned consolidated judgment dated 16.01.2023 in C.P. No. D-3105 of 2017, C.P. No. D-8295 of 2018 and C.P. No. D-4321 of 2020, rendered by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi). (a) Employment--- ----Employees of Pakistan Steel Mill (PSM)---Vires of amendment in Gratuity Rules---Withholding of financial benefits/gratuity---Doctrine of sub silentio---Scope---Decision of High Court on the basis of financial constraints of PSM instead of legal/constitutional grounds---Legality---Every employee is entitled to the payment of his full and final settlement on his superannuation---Non-payment of gratuity has nothing to do with losses or financial crunch, quite the reverse, the amount of gratuity, provident fund and pension is an inherent/vested right of every retired employee which is deep-seated in the Industrial Relations and Civil Service Laws---Every employer without any pretext or deferment is bound to pay off this liability immediately on the eve of retirement rather than delaying or shelving this vested right for an indefinite period or putting this obligation in a state of uncertainty---Many crucial questions of law were raised by the petitioners which were not considered by the High Court but the substrata of decision paid attention only to the alleged financial crunch rather than adverting to the spectrum of plea of vires of amendment in the Gratuity Rules including the other claims/benefits on the touchstone of applicable laws, thus, the judgment of High Court was also hit by the doctrine of "sub silentio"---Civil petitions were converted into appeals and were allowed. Inspector General of Police, Quetta and another v. Fida Muhammad and others 2022 SCMR 1583; Annoor Textile Mills Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 1994 SC 568; Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652; Sheikh Fazal Ahmed v. Raja Ziaullah Khan PLD 1964 SC 494; Works Cooperative Housing Society and another v. Karachi Development Authority PLD 1969 SC 430; Collector of Central Excise and Land Customs v. Azizuddin Industries PLD 1970 SC 439; Commissioner of Sales Tax (West) Karachi v. Kauddsons Ltd. PLD 1974 SC 180 and Muhammad Suleman and others v. Abdul Ghani PLD 1979 SC 190 rel. (b) Words and phrases--- ----Expression “Gratuity”---Meaning and scope---Expression “gratuity” delineates a lump-sum/consolidated amount of money remunerated by an employer to an employee leading up to formal retirement, which is always regarded as significant milestone that marks the end of employee's career and starting of a new chapter in his life---Gratuity is a financial benefit provided as a token of gratitude for an employee's loyalty, efficient service and completion of certain years of service and depending upon the terms and conditions of employment, it becomes a legal obligation rather than a voluntary benefit---Sometimes it may be classified as bounty but if its payment obligation is structured and regulated by legal provisions/rules or regulations, then its payment turns into indispensable and mandatory rather than considering it a mere bounty. (c) Precedent--- ----“Sub silentio”---Meaning and scope---“Sub silentio”, a Latin term, literally translates to "under silence" or "in silence"---In legal milieus, it points towards an incidence where the Court decides a lis without appreciating or deliberating the particular point of law raised before it, which disturbs the precedential value of the judgment---Such doctrine often denotes that if the court, in its judgment, overlooked or dispensed with a crucial point of law raised before it, then the precedential value of such decision is seriously disturbed---Decision is not binding if it was reached at without argument, without reference to the critical terms of the law and without citation of authority and such a decision, taken as sub silentio, lacks authoritative weight. Syed Saad Ali and another v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry and others 2025 SCP 318 and Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd., (1941) 1 KB 675 rel. (d) Administration of justice--- ----Each case has to be decided on its own facts---Each litigant ought to be provided a fair chance of hearing to present and plead his case and the decision of the court must be founded and structured on the merits of the case. (e) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Vires of law, rules or regulations can be challenged if its provisions are ex facie discriminatory, in which case actual proof of discriminatory treatment is not required to be shown, but there is also a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of the enactments, unless it is ex facie violative of a constitutional provision. Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana and others 2015 SCMR 1739 rel. Muhammad Haseeb Jamali, Advocate Supreme Court and K.A. Wahab, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioners. Mohsin Qadir Shahwani, Additional Attorney General Pakistan and Agha Zafar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd September, 2025.

Summary: (a) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----Ss. 2(37)(g), (h) & (k), 37-A, 37-B & 50-A---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497---Tax fraud---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against accused were that, he uploaded fake returns and invoices regarding sales tax and the tax sought to be evaded by such fraud was estimated at Rs. 36 million---In this case, the tax fraud alleged in the FIR was not committed by persons registered under the Sales Tax Act or who were part of the supply chain, rather it was alleged to commit by persons who were not registered under the Sales Tax Act but were involved in theft of sales tax profiles for creating fake and flying sales tax invoices for onward sale to registered persons---Therefore, the allegation against the applicant was that he was provided a PSID (Payment Slip ID generated by FBR's WeBOC System) for Rs. 100/, which was the challan for submitting revised sales tax returns and on 30-09-2024 the applicant paid the same using his Easypaisa account---It was not alleged that applicant was one who misappropriated the computer ID and password of the steel mill, or the one who generated the PSID, nor was it alleged that he uploaded the fake sales tax invoices/returns onto the system---After investigation, the co-accused was also released from custody and it was then also acknowledged in the interim challan that the person who had sent the PSID to the applicant was still under investigation---Therefore, it had yet to be ascertained whether payment made by the applicant as was with knowledge that it was intended for committing sales tax fraud---In such circumstances, it was difficult to say that offences then punishable under clauses 11 and 22 of S. 33 of the Sales Tax Act would be attracted to applicant---As regards the offence punishable under clause 13(b) of S. 33 of the Sales Tax Act viz. abetment in tax fraud, even if that was made out, the tax implication was less than one billion rupees---Maximum imprisonment provided for that was five years which did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---Thus, bail became the rule and its refusal, an exception---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCP 235 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order are tentative and should not be construed to prejudice the case of either side at trial. Aqil Ahmed for Applicant. Syed Asif Ali for the State. Ms. Rabia Khalid, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Date of hearing: 13th August, 2025.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990), Ss. 2(37)(g), (h) & (k), 37-A, 37-B & 50-A---Tax fraud---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegations against accused were that, he uploaded fake returns and invoices regarding sales tax and the tax sought to be evaded by such fraud was estimated at R.36 million---In this case, the tax fraud alleged in the FIR was not committed by persons registered under the Sales Tax Act or who were part of the supply chain, rather it was alleged to commit by persons who were not registered under the Sales Tax Act but were involved in theft of sales tax profiles for creating fake and flying sales tax invoices for onward sale to registered persons---Therefore, the allegation against the applicant was that he was provided a PSID (Payment Slip ID generated by FBR's WeBOC System) for Rs. 100/, which was the challan for submitting revised sales tax returns and on 30-09-2024 the applicant paid the same using his Easypaisa account---It was not alleged that applicant was one who misappropriated the computer ID and password of the steel mill, or the one who generated the PSID, nor was it alleged that he uploaded the fake sales tax invoices/returns onto the system---After investigation, the co-accused was also released from custody and it was then also acknowledged in the interim challan that the person who had sent the PSID to the applicant was still under investigation---Therefore, it had yet to be ascertained whether payment made by the applicant was with knowledge that it was intended for committing sales tax fraud---In such circumstances, it was difficult to say that offences then punishable under clauses 11 and 22 of S.33 of the Sales Tax Act would be attracted to applicant---As regards the offence punishable under clause 13(b) of S.33 of the Sales Tax Act viz. abetment in tax fraud, even if that was made out, the tax implication was less than one billion rupees---Maximum imprisonment provided for that was five years which did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S.497, Cr.P.C.---Thus, bail became the rule and its refusal, an exception---Bail application was allowed, in circumstances. Directorate of Intelligence and Investigation FBR v. Taj International (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCP 235 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations made in bail order are tentative and should not be construed to prejudice the case of either side at trial. Aqil Ahmed for Applicant. Syed Asif Ali for the State. Ms. Rabia Khalid Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan. Date of hearing: 13th August, 2025.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.12--- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.VII, R.11(a)---Suit f or specific performance of agreement to sell--- Rejection of plaint--- Absence of cause of action---Arbitration clause---Wrong precedent, reliance on--- Effect--- Petitioners / defendants were aggrieved of dismissal of their application seeking rejection of plaint on the basis of arbitration clause available in the agreement to sell--- Plea raised by petitioners / defendants was that the precedent judgment relied upon by Trial Court was not applicable--- Validity--- Order in question was based solely by placing reliance on a judgment which did not discuss or lay down the principle(s) of law subject matter of the case in hand and was distinguishable on facts mentioned therein--- Trial Court had given no other reason for reaching the conclusion that how that case law was relevant, thus, making reference to such a case-law based on previous judgment to reach the conclusion was not sustainable--- Oder in question was devoid of plausible reasoning and patently ambiguous and there was no explanation in the same as to how the conclusion was reached in the matter and was also based on misreading or non-reading of judgment relied upon in the same, hence such reliance on the judgment was misplaced--- Jurisdiction vested in Trial Court had not been exercised properly--- High Court set aside order in question and the matter was remitted to Trial Courtfor decision afresh on the application filed by petitioners / defendants--- Revision was allowed accordingly. Mrs. Farkhanda Talat v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division, Islamabad and others 2007 SCMR 886 distinguished. Collector, Land Acquisition, Chashma Right Bank Canal Project, Wapda , D.I. Khan and others v. Ghulam Sadiq and others 2002 SCMR 677; Muhammad Mal Khan v. Allah Yar Khan 2002 SCMR 235; Tariq Mehmood and another v. The State 2002 SCMR 32; Director Housing, A.G’s Branch, Rawalpindi v. M/s. Makhdum Consultants Engineers and Architects 1997 SCMR 988; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Ghulam Sarwar through his L.Rs. v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Lodhran PLD 2025 SC 60; Mrs. Shamim Akhtar and others v. Mrs. Sultana Mazhar Baqai and 5 others 2003 CLC 1521 and Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise (RTO) v. Messrs Zeal Pak Cement Factory, Hyderabad 2010 PTD 147 ref. Liaqat Sami Khan, Faizan Naveed Khalil and Syed Rafaqat Hussain Bukhari for Petitioner. Jamshaid Iqbal Khakwani, A.A.G, Ahmad Hassan Khan Khichi, Syed Hassan Abbas Raza, Faisal Anwar and Dr. Muhammad Azeem Raja for the State. Muhammad Naveed Farhan, M. Karim Joiya and Muhammad Nasir Khan Pahor for Respondent No. 1.