Summary: Background: The petitioner, currently confined at Central Prison Rawalpindi, filed a Shariat Petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 21-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, claiming it contradicts Islamic injunctions. Additionally, the petitioner sought personal relief, which was deemed outside the jurisdiction of the court. ----Issues: 1- Whether Section 21-F of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 2- Whether the denial of remission to prisoners convicted under the Anti-Terrorism Act constitutes discrimination under Islamic law. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition, holding that: --Failure to Provide Specific Islamic References: The petitioner did not provide specific verses or Hadith that directly supported the claim that Section 21-F violates Islamic injunctions. The cited verses emphasized equity and justice but were not directly relevant to the legal issue at hand. --Differential Treatment for Terrorism Convicts: The court found that treating terrorism convicts differently from other criminals is consistent with Islamic law. The severity of terrorism, considered as "mischief on earth" (fasad fil arz), justifies harsher punishments. This differentiation aligns with the Quranic verse (Surah Al-Ma’idah, Verse 33) which prescribes severe penalties for acts of terrorism. --Legislative Authority: The parliament has the authority to enact laws that impose stricter punishments for terrorism to maintain public order and safety. The Anti-Terrorism Act’s provisions, including Section 21-F, were found to be within the bounds of Islamic jurisprudence. ----Citations/Precedents: Verses from the Holy Quran: Surah An-Nisa (Verses 58 & 65) Surah Al-Maida (Verses 38, 42, 44, 45, 47 & 49) Surah Sad (Verses 22 & 26) Surah Az-Zumar (Verse 46) Surah Al-Alaq (Verse 8) Surah Al-Qasas (Verse 77) Surah Al-Ma’idah (Verse 33) Judgments: PLD 2010 SC 1021 (Nazar Hussain Case) Order dated 30.09.2020 in CP No.4-P of 2020 The court concluded that the differentiation in remission policies under Section 21-F for terrorism-related offences is justified and not repugnant to the Islamic injunctions.

Summary: (a) Inheritance Law – Right of Heirs ----Inheritance rights in the estate of a deceased Muslim----Constructive possession----Limitation Act, 1908----Scope. The estate of a Muslim, upon his death, devolves upon his legal heirs by operation of law. Each heir retains constructive possession of their share in the estate until partition or lawful transfer. If an heir is deprived of their share in an inheritance mutation, the cause of action arises when they seek their share and it is denied. However, where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property, the limitation period becomes applicable, requiring the claimant heir to establish fraud or ignorance of their rights to invoke an exception under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Mohammad Boota (decd) v. Mst. Fatima (2023 SCMR 1901) Mst. Parveen (decd) v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) Noor Din (decd) v. Pervaiz Akhtar (2023 SCMR 1928) Ghulam Qasim v. Mst. Razia Begum (PLD 2021 SC 812) Tahsinullah v. Mst. Parveen (decd) (2022 SCMR 346) Lal Din v. Muhammad Ibrahim (1993 SCMR 710) Bashir Ahmad Anjum v. Muhammad Raffique (2021 SCMR 772) Nazir Ahmad v. Abdullah (1997 SCMR 281) (b) Limitation Act, 1908 ----S. 18----Effect of fraud in inheritance disputes----Exceptions to limitation period----Scope. Under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, a claimant heir alleging fraud must demonstrate that they were kept from knowledge of their right to sue due to fraudulent concealment. The limitation period begins from the date the fraud first became known to the “injuriously affected person.” However, if the affected heir does not initiate legal proceedings within the prescribed limitation period upon discovering the fraud, no fresh period of limitation is available to their legal successors. Cited Case: Mst. Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan (2022 SCMR 1009) (c) Limitation in Cases of Third-Party Rights in Inherited Property ----Applicability of limitation where third-party interests have been created----Doctrine of actual vs. constructive denial----Scope. A distinction is made between: (i) cases where an heir is deprived of their rightful share in inheritance at the time of mutation; and (ii) cases where third-party rights have been created in the inherited property. In the former, the limitation period starts when the heir is denied their share. In the latter, where land has been sold to third parties, the limitation period applies, barring claims after its expiration. In the present case, transactions affecting the disputed property took place decades ago, with sales occurring in 1994 and 1997, barring the claimants from seeking redress under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: Haji Muhammad Yunis v. Mst. Farukh Sultan (2022 SCMR 1282) Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) (d) Civil Procedure – Obligation of Courts to Consider Limitation ----S. 3, Limitation Act, 1908----Duty of courts to dismiss time-barred claims regardless of whether limitation is pleaded as a defense----Scope. Courts are bound to dismiss suits, appeals, and applications filed beyond the prescribed limitation period, even if the issue of limitation is not raised by the parties. The appellants’ claim, filed in 2007, was time-barred given that transactions creating third-party interests took place as early as 1994 and 1997. Disposition Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the concurrent findings of the lower courts that the appellants’ claim was barred by limitation. The Court reaffirmed that where concurrent findings of fact and law exist, it will not interfere unless exceptional circumstances warrant intervention, which were absent in this case.

Summary: (a) Islamic Inheritance Law--- ----Concept of Takharuj---Relinquishment of Sharai share---Burden of proof and evidentiary requirements. The petitioner failed to prove that the defendant voluntarily relinquished her Sharai share in inheritance through takharuj. The court held that takharuj, as recognized under Islamic inheritance law, requires clear evidence of voluntary relinquishment, free from coercion, undue influence, or fraud. Furthermore, the alleged relinquishment must be reduced into writing or substantiated through credible evidence. In this case, neither the alleged relinquishment nor the related deed satisfied the evidentiary standards, and the customary practice of depriving women of their inheritance was deemed invalid. -----Cited Precedents: Ghulam Ali v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1) Mst. Parveen (deceased) through LRs v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2022 SCMR 64) (b) Customary practices vs. Islamic inheritance law--- ----Relinquishment of inheritance rights by women---Public policy considerations. The court reiterated that the enforcement of Islamic inheritance laws, particularly in favor of female heirs, is a matter of public policy. Any purported relinquishment of inheritance rights by women, even if proven, is void if it contravenes public policy or Islamic jurisprudence. The practice of denying women their Sharai shares under cultural or social pretexts is expressly rejected by courts in Pakistan, as emphasized by the Supreme Court in multiple judgments. (c) Evidence Law--- ----Documentary and oral evidence---Standard for proving relinquishment in inheritance disputes. Relinquishment of inheritance rights must be established through clear and credible evidence. In this case, oral testimony failed to corroborate the alleged relinquishment, as witnesses provided inconsistent statements and failed to prove the essential elements of takharuj. The court also noted that the deed presented as evidence did not bear the defendant’s signature or consent, further invalidating the claim. -----Disposition: Revision dismissed. The petitioner's claim of relinquishment was held to be unproven and devoid of merit. The defendant's Sharai share in the inheritance remains intact, with costs imposed on the petitioner.

Summary: Judgement on Khulla --- The central issue revolved around the legality of Khula (dissolution of marriage initiated by the wife) and whether the Family Court's judgment was in accordance with Islamic law. The petitioner argued that the Family Court's decision was influenced by a provision, Section 10(5) of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 2015, which had been declared null and void by the Federal Shariat Court in a previous judgment.The court clarified several key points related to Khula in Islamic law:Khula is an absolute right granted to women by Islamic law, allowing them to seek the dissolution of their marriage through a court.A wife can claim Khula without the necessity of proving mistreatment or ill-treatment. She only needs to state her inability to continue living with her husband within the limits set by Allah.The amount of compensation (Badl-e-Khula) to be paid by the wife to her husband should not exceed the total amount of Mahar (dower) received at the time of marriage. However, this amount can be reduced depending on the circumstances of the case.The court can grant Khula even if the husband does not agree to it, provided that the wife meets the necessary conditions.The court emphasized that Khula is a fundamental right for women and cannot be denied. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes binding on high courts and all subordinate courts.Ultimately, the Shariat Petition was dismissed because it was not maintainable. The court's decision was based on the principles of Islamic law and the assertion that the right of Khula for women is absolute and protected by the Quran and Sunnah. The court provided a detailed analysis of Khula and its legal implications within the framework of Islamic jurisprudence.

Summary: Background: A Shariat petition was filed challenging Section 10(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and Section 10(3) of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (as amended for Punjab). The petitioners argued that these sections, which give discretionary power to Family Courts to attempt reconciliation between conflicting spouses during pre-trial proceedings, are un-Islamic. They contended that reconciliation should be mandatory, citing Ayat 35 of Surah Nisa and relevant Hadiths. ----Issues: Whether Section 10(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, and the corresponding section of the Family Courts Act, 1964 (as amended for Punjab), are repugnant to the injunctions of Islam, specifically concerning the mandatory nature of reconciliation efforts in family disputes. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioners' interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah in relation to Section 10(3) was misconceived. The Court emphasized that while Islam places significant importance on the protection of the family unit and encourages reconciliation in the event of marital disputes, the relevant sections of the Family Courts Act already provide for reconciliation efforts. The Court noted that Ayat 35 of Surah Nisa addresses the responsibility of family members and elders, not the legal obligation of the courts. The Court affirmed that the discretionary power given to Family Courts to attempt reconciliation is consistent with Islamic teachings and does not require amendment. ----Citations/Precedents: Sh. Petition No. 20-I of 1999 titled "Muhammad Zoonnoon Khan Vs. Federal Government of Pakistan & another" Sh. Petition No. 06-I of 2010 titled "Muhammad Shah, etc. Vs. The State"

Summary: Background: The Petitioner asserted her biological maternity and sought to reclaim custody from the adoptive parent. The case was heard in the context of an increasing focus on adoption within Pakistan and its implications under Islamic and Pakistani Law.---Issue:1. Legal Status of Adoption in Islam and Pakistani Law: Whether the adoptive relationship established by respondent has legal precedence over the biological connection in the context of custody.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The central legal question was whether the adoptive relationship established by the third respondent should take precedence over the biological connection between the plaintiff and the child, especially in the context of custody rights. This issue probes deep into the legal fabric of Pakistani law and Islamic jurisprudence concerning the recognition and implications of adoption.The court determined that the biological connection between the plaintiff and the child was paramount, overriding the legal relationship established through adoption by the third respondent. The judgment explicitly stated that, under Islamic and Pakistani law, adoption does not confer the same legal rights as biological parenthood, especially regarding custody and inheritance rights. The judge noted:"According to the NADRA (National Database and Registration Authority) Registration procedure, the parentage of the adopted child with known parentage must be entered as that of natural/biological parents, whereas parentage of the children with unknown parentage can be entered with some fictitious names to avoid social stigmas but there must be evidence provided by the adoptive parents that the child is with unknown parentage to avoid any confusion or controversy over the rights or duties of the adopted child as a biological child." ----The court ruled in favor of Mst. Arzoo, granting her custody of Muhammad Ans after the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore, confirmed her maternity through DNA analysis. The judgment highlighted the lack of legal consequences of adoption in Islamic and Pakistani law regarding custodial rights. The court emphasized the welfare of the child as the paramount consideration, overriding procedural custody claims under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.----Citations/Precedents:-Mirjam Aberras Lehdeaho v. S.H.O., Police Station Chung, Lahore and others (2018 SCMR 427)-Ahmed Sami and 2 others v. Saadia Ahmed and another (1996 SCMR 268)Shaukat Masih v. Mst. Farhat Parkash and others (2015 SCMR 731)-Muhammad Khalil-ur-Rehman v. Mst. Shabana Rahman and another (PLD 1995 SC 633)-Mst. Nadia Perveen v. Mst. Almas Noreen and others (PLD 2012 SC 758)Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973Section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898Guardians and Wards Act, 1890Succession Act, 1925

Summary: Issues:Whether the succession to Din Muhammad's tenancy is governed under Section 20 of the Colonization Act or Sharia law.The relevance of the dates of the Deputy Commissioner's orders and inheritance mutations in determining the applicable law for succession.---Holding:The Supreme Court dismissed the civil appeals, upholding the High Court's judgments that recognized the rights of Gohar Ali's daughters under Sharia law, despite the appellants' arguments favoring the Colonization Act's provisions.---Reasoning:The Court found that Sharia law was applicable to Muslims in Bahawalpur for matters of succession even before the 1951 amendment to the Colonization Act, based on the Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1948, and subsequent legislative acts.The Court rejected the appellants' alternate plea to be treated as original tenants, as the record depicted them as legal heirs of Din Muhammad, and succession devolved upon them under Section 20 of the Colonization Act.Limitation objections raised by the appellants were dismissed, considering the established principle that no limitation runs against a co-sharer in matters of inheritance where they have been denied their rightful share.Rule: The Supreme Court reaffirmed the precedence of Sharia law for Muslim succession matters in Bahawalpur, even prior to the 1951 amendment of the Colonization Act, and clarified the non-applicability of limitation in cases of inheritance rights disputes among co-sharers.

Summary: Judgement on Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018 --- International Organization Resolution: The court highlights a resolution from the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which expresses a stance against gender reassignment, viewing it as a change of Allah's creation.Gender Identity and Biological Sex: The court asserts that, according to Islamic principles, a person's gender must align with their biological sex. It argues that a change in one's ability to reproduce does not alter their gender in the eyes of Islamic law.Definitions in Legislation: The court identifies issues with how the law defines terms like intersex, eunuch, transgender man, transgender woman, and KhwajaSira, grouping them under the umbrella term "transgender person." The court finds these definitions confusing and problematic.Legal Implications: The court discusses potential legal, religious, and social implications of the law, particularly concerning access to gender-specific spaces, privacy, and inheritance rights.Ruling: The court ultimately declares certain sections of the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2018, as being contrary to Islamic injunctions. These sections pertain to the definition of gender identity, the definition of transgender individuals, gender identity change on identification documents, and inheritance rights.

Summary: Background: A petitioner challenged the provisions of Order VII Rule 2 and Order XX Rules 12 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arguing that these provisions were contrary to the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The petitioner had initially lost a suit in the Civil Court and subsequent appeals, leading to the decree attaining finality. The petitioner, dissatisfied with the execution proceedings, filed a Shariat Petition seeking to have these legal provisions declared null and void, as they were alleged to be against Islamic principles. ----Issues: 1- Whether the provisions of Order VII Rule 2 and Order XX Rules 12 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, are contrary to the injunctions of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 2- Whether these provisions involve the concept of interest (Riba) and are thus impermissible under Islamic law. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the petition in limine, finding it non-maintainable. The reasoning provided by the court highlighted that the challenged provisions are procedural in nature and do not involve any elements of interest (Riba). The court noted that the petitioner failed to appear in multiple hearings, and the petition lacked substantial arguments to warrant further consideration. The court emphasized that the challenged provisions are meant for framing suits for money and do not confer any right to claim interest or involve any usury elements. Additionally, the court clarified that these procedural provisions do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Shariat Court as per Article 203B(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, which excludes procedural laws from the court's jurisdiction. ----Citations/Precedents: Order VII Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Order XX Rules 12 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 Article 203B(c) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Summary: Judgement on the Punjab Protection of Women against Violence Act 2016 (PPWVA) --- whether the Punjab Protection of Women against Violence Act of 2016 (Act XVI of 2016) is in accordance with the injunctions of Islam, particularly in relation to domestic violence. Here's a summary:The text begins by emphasizing that the Act is aimed at protecting women from domestic violence, and the focus is on the "aggrieved person" being a female, while the "defendant" could be male or female.It addresses various provisions of the Act, including protection orders, the use of GPS trackers, and the overall legal framework. The court concludes that these measures do not violate the teachings of Islam, as they are designed to protect the lives and dignity of women.The text also mentions the importance of reconciling disputes and amicably settling family issues, as encouraged by the Holy Quran and Sunnah. The Act includes provisions for mediation and reconciliation, which are in line with Islamic principles.Furthermore, the Act contains checks and balances to prevent its misuse, including penalties for filing false complaints and provisions for summary trials and appeals.The use of GPS trackers is discussed, and it is emphasized that such measures are taken in exceptional situations where a woman's life is at risk, and they are considered acceptable to protect life and dignity, which are primary goals in Islamic teachings.The text includes statistics on cases handled under the Act, showing a high percentage of successful resolutions, which underscores the Act's effectiveness.The text highlights that the Punjab Protection of Women against Violence Act aims to protect women from domestic violence while remaining in line with Islamic principles and values.