Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Fiscal taxation laws---Authority seeking to impose a tax must first establish that the individual is liable to taxation through clear language of the statute. Muhammad Uneeb Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, Islamabad and others 2019 MLD 1347; Mir Shabbir Ali Khan Bijarini and 3 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2018 Sindh 603; National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited 2016 SCMR 550; Sunbiz Private Limited (7 News TV Pakistan) through Abbas Ali Khan v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Information and 3 others 2018 YLR 1785; Ahmad Mehmood v. Government of Punjab through Chief Secretary and others PLD 2019 Lah. 206; Whitney v. IR Commissioners (1926) 10 TC 88 and H.M. Extraction Ghee and Oil Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and another v. Federal Board of Revenue and another 2019 SCMR 1081 rel. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991--- ----R.10---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions Reforms Act (IV of 2015), S. 3---Professional tax---Deduction at source---Quantum of tax---Petitioners were aggrieved of deduction / withholding of professional tax directly from their salaries and had also assailed quantum of the tax so deducted---Validity---Professional tax is not tax on income but a tax on profession---Wisdom of Legislation quantifying tax cannot be substituted by High Court, which is otherwise not confiscatory---Two different modes were provided under R. 10 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991, for deduction / withholding of advanced tax; one from civil servant and the other from the person who were in employment of companies or statutory bodies---One petitioner was an employee of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Medical Teaching Institutions, whereas the other two were civil servants---Petitioners were liable to impost of professional tax and the same had been rightly recovered from their salaries in the manner as provided under Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Professions, Trades and Callings Tax Rules, 1991---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise and Taxation. Government of Punjab and others v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd., Sargodha and others PLD 2005 SC 988; Pearl Continental Hotel and another v. Government of N.W.F.P. and others PLD 2010 SC 1004; Collector of Customs, Sales Tax and Central Now Federal Excise Quetta v. Messrs Haji Mehmood Essa Co. and another 2017 SCMR 884; Shahtaj Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others 2024 SCMR 1656; Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), page 1329; Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Revised Edition), page 1145; Black's Law Dictionary (Ninth Edition), page 1629; Concise Oxford English Dictionary (Eleventh Revised Edition), page 199 and Black's Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition), page 566 rel. (c) Words and Phrases--- ----Profession---Meaning. Employees State Insurance Corporation cum Medical Officers Association v. Employees State Insurance Corporation and another AIR 2014 SC 1259 rel. Qazi Jawad Ehsanullah for Petitioner. Adnan Ali, A.A.G. along with Yasir Ali for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th November, 2024.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969, Ss. 2(s), 16, 139, 156(1)(8)(i)(d)(70), 157, 178 & 187 Import & Export (Control) Act, 1950, Ss. 3(1) & 3(3) Bail—Post-arrest bail of a woman accused—Scope and considerations under section 497(1), Cr.P.C. Petitioner was accused of smuggling 26 foreign-made iPhones valued at PKR 7,846,798/- through the green channel of the International Arrival Hall at Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore. She was arrested after failing to produce documents proving ownership or import authorization. Lower courts denied her bail, citing the prohibitory clause of section 497 Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court, however, held that the petitioner’s case should have been considered under the first proviso to section 497(1), Cr.P.C., which allows special consideration for women. It was noted that the petitioner had no prior criminal record, no likelihood of abscondence, and was not required for further custodial interrogation as the prosecution had gathered all necessary evidence. Denying bail solely based on the gravity of the prescribed sentence was deemed unjust, particularly given precedents allowing bail in similar circumstances. The Supreme Court converted the petition into an appeal, set aside the lower courts' order, and granted bail to the petitioner. Cited Cases: 2023 SCMR 887 (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, S. 497(1)—First proviso Women accused—Considerations for bail The court emphasized the importance of considering the special provisions under section 497(1), Cr.P.C., for women accused, particularly when there is no likelihood of abscondence or tampering with evidence. Courts should assess the petitioner’s background, the nature of the offence, and the likelihood of recidivism. The Supreme Court observed that travel history alone is insufficient to presume engagement in illegal activities, especially when the accused lacks a prior criminal record. (c) Fundamental rights—Presumption of innocence—Custodial interrogation Keeping an accused in jail without a court verdict, when custodial interrogation is no longer required, is equivalent to convicting the individual without due process, violating the presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court reiterated the principle that bail is a rule, and jail is an exception, particularly in cases involving women under section 497(1), Cr.P.C. This judgment reinforces the principle that judicial discretion must align with legislative safeguards and established precedents when determining bail for women accused under the Customs Act, 1969, and other penal laws.

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 15.02.2024 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar passed in Customs Reference No.36-P of 2021). Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----Ss.17, 181, 194-A & 196---Notification SRO 499 (I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Transporting smuggled goods---Confiscation of vehicle---Option to pay fine---Aggrieved person---Scope---Petitioner was driver of vehicle which was confiscated by authorities for transporting smuggled goods---Owner of vehicle did not come forward, instead the petitioner sought release of vehicle against payment of fine---Validity---Vehicle was seized in year 2020 and it was outrightly confiscated---Before insertion of proviso to Section 157(2) of Customs Act, 1969 it remained effective for a short period and was omitted through Finance Act, 2022---Proviso inserted in section 157 of Customs Act, 1969 generally explained the extent of confiscation and did not in any manner affect, limit or interfere with the powers conferred on Federal Board of Revenue under Section 181 of Customs Act, 1969---In the context of giving an option to release goods in lieu of payment of fine, provisions of Sections 157 and 181 were independent of each other and the former could not be construed as having an overriding effect on the latter---Inserted and then omitted proviso was not relevant or attracted in the matter, as the vehicle was found carrying smuggled goods and was used exclusively for transportation thereof, which was covered under clause (b) of Preamble to Notification SRO 499(I)/2009, dated 13-06-2009 and the option contemplated under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969 could not have been given for its release---Aggrieved person is the one whose legal right have been invaded, or whose pecuniary interest is directly and adversely affected---Expression aggrieved refers to a substantial grievance, denial of some personal pecuniary or property rights, or imposition upon a party for burden or obligation---Statutory right of appeal provided under Section 194A of Customs Act, 1969 is confined to an aggrieved person or an officer of customs---Petitioner was not owner of vehicle, nor had the latter sought benefit under section 181 of Customs Act, 1969---Petitioner was neither authorized by nor was acting as a lawful attorney on behalf of owner of vehicle---Supreme Court declined to interfere in the orders of confiscation of vehicle in question---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Collector of Customs, Peshawar v. Wali Khan and others 2017 SCMR 585; Director-General, Intelligence and Investigation-FBR v. Sher Andaz and others 2010 SCMR 1746 and Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation and others v. Al-Faiz Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2006 SCMR 129 ref. Naveed Akhtar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link from Peshawar). Shahid Qayyum, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (via video link from Peshawar). Date of hearing: 12th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 2(s), 17, 157, 168 & 181 ---- Smuggling of foreign origin goods ---- Confiscation of conveyance used for smuggling ---- Scope of Adjudicating Officer’s discretion under S. 181 ---- The petitioner, employed as a driver, was found transporting smuggled foreign origin betel nuts in a Hino LPG Gas Bowzer, a vehicle exclusively designed for transporting LPG ---- The vehicle was detained under S. 17 and later seized under Ss. 157 & 168 of the Customs Act, 1969 ---- The Adjudicating Officer ordered outright confiscation of both the vehicle and smuggled goods, without granting an option for release under S. 181 in light of SRO 499(1)/2009 ---- The Customs Appellate Tribunal granted an option for release of the vehicle upon payment of redemption fine, which was subsequently overturned by the High Court ---- Held, conveyances exclusively used for smuggling fall under the prohibition in clause (b) of SRO 499, making them ineligible for release under S. 181 ---- Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief. (b) Interpretation of SRO 499(1)/2009 & Amendments ---- Effect of amendment through notification dated 20.08.2024 ---- Whether the amendment affected the prohibition on release of smuggling vehicles ---- The petitioner relied on the amendment, which inserted clause (ba), providing that a conveyance seized for the third time would be ineligible for release ---- Held, clause (ba) did not override clause (b) of SRO 499, which categorically prohibits the release of vehicles exclusively used for smuggling ---- Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was not applicable in this case, as the vehicle fell under the original prohibition in SRO 499. (c) Application of Beneficial Legislation ---- Effect of insertion and subsequent omission of the second proviso to S. 157(2) ---- The petitioner argued that the proviso, inserted through the Finance Act 2021 and later omitted by the Finance Act 2022, should be applied retroactively ---- Held, the vehicle was seized in 2020 and outrightly confiscated before the proviso was introduced ---- The proviso was effective for a short duration and later omitted, thus it had no bearing on a case where confiscation had already been finalized ---- Supreme Court reaffirmed that beneficial legislation cannot be applied where statutory provisions have been expressly time-bound and subsequently repealed. (d) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal & Judicial Review ---- Limits of Tribunal’s powers in modifying orders under S. 181 ---- The Customs Appellate Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to grant an option for release when the Federal Board of Revenue has expressly prohibited it under SRO 499 ---- Supreme Court reaffirmed that judicial intervention is warranted only where there is misapplication of law, not where explicit statutory prohibitions exist ---- High Court correctly ruled in favor of the respondent department by applying the relevant provisions of the Customs Act, 1969 and SRO 499. (e) Locus Standi – Right of Appeal Under Customs Act, 1969 ---- Ss. 181 & 194-A ---- Whether a driver has the right to challenge confiscation of a vehicle ---- The petitioner was not the owner of the vehicle and admitted his employment as a driver ---- The registered owner neither contested the confiscation nor appeared during proceedings ---- Held, under S. 181, only the "owner" of confiscated goods or conveyance is entitled to seek relief ---- S. 194-A limits the right of appeal to an "aggrieved person," which in this case did not include the petitioner ---- Reference made to Sher Andaz v. Director-General, Intelligence & Investigation-FBR (2010 SCMR 1746) and Director, Directorate of Intelligence & Investigation v. M/s Al-Faiz Industries (2006 SCMR 129), where the Supreme Court held that only a person whose legal rights are directly affected can file an appeal ---- The Tribunal erred in allowing an appeal by a person without locus standi. Disposition: Leave to appeal dismissed. High Court's judgment upheld, confirming the outright confiscation of the vehicle and smuggled goods. The petitioner's arguments regarding SRO 499 amendments and the omitted proviso to S. 157(2) were found to be without merit. The petitioner, not being the owner of the vehicle, had no locus standi to challenge the confiscation.

Summary: (a) Taxation – Alternative Dispute Resolution for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): ----Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), S.134A---Sales Tax Act, 1990, S.47A---Federal Excise Act, 2005, S.38---Mandatory referral of tax disputes by SOEs to Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee (ADRC)---Scope and application---Petitioner, a State-Owned Enterprise (SOE), challenged coercive recovery proceedings initiated by the tax authorities despite applying for ADR under S.134A of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Held, as per the amendments introduced through the Finance Act, 2024, SOEs are required to apply for ADR before FBR in case of any tax dispute, and coercive recovery measures should not be adopted by tax authorities during the pendency of ADR proceedings---FBR issued a directive on 03.09.2024, instructing all tax departments to withdraw recovery notices against SOEs, confirming that no other legal remedy was available except ADRC---Court directed that all tax authorities must comply with these instructions to prevent unnecessary litigation and delays. ----Cited Case: • Civil Aviation Authority of Pakistan v. Federation of Pakistan (Constitution Petition No.D-1513 of 2024) (b) Judicial Review – High Court’s Role in Tax Matters: ----Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199---Judicial review of tax recovery measures against SOEs---Held, courts are burdened with excessive litigation due to coercive tax recovery measures taken by the Inland Revenue Department against SOEs, despite clear statutory provisions mandating ADRC for dispute resolution---Court noted that SOEs and FBR both fall under the Federal Government, making tax disputes between them a mere financial reallocation within the same entity, leading to unnecessary litigation costs and inefficiency---Court directed Inland Revenue officials to strictly comply with ADRC provisions and warned of legal action, including contempt of court proceedings, against non-compliant officials. ----Cited Case: • Province of Punjab Case (2024 SCMR ___) (c) Withdrawal of Recovery Notices – FBR’s Directive: ----Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 2024---FBR's Letter dated 03.09.2024 directing all tax offices to withdraw recovery notices against SOEs---Scope and application---Court acknowledged FBR’s corrective action and took its letter and newly issued SRO 1290(I)/2024 on record, confirming that SOEs must resolve tax disputes exclusively through ADRC---Court warned that future non-compliance by tax officials would invite contempt proceedings. -----Disposition: Petition disposed of in favor of the Petitioner (SOE). FBR's directive for withdrawal of tax recovery notices against SOEs to be strictly implemented. Failure to comply will result in legal action against delinquent officials.

Summary: Background: The case involves a set of Special Customs Reference Applications (SCRAs) concerning the levy of duties and taxes on petroleum consignments that were in transit to Afghanistan. The central issues revolved around whether duties and taxes could be levied on losses of consignments due to transit evaporation beyond 1% and on consignments lost due to terrorism. The references were filed by both the Collector of Customs, challenging the facilitation of non-payment of duties beyond 1%, and by carriers/importers, contesting the imposition of duties for goods lost due to terrorism. ----Issues: 1- Whether duties and taxes could be levied in respect of loss of consignment due to transit evaporation beyond 1%. 2- Whether duties and taxes could be levied on consignments allegedly lost due to terrorism. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Transit Evaporation Loss (Beyond 1%): The court held that the concession allowing for a 1% loss due to evaporation under CGO 12/2002 (amended by CGO 6/2010) remains valid. However, losses beyond 1% due to evaporation must be subject to duties and taxes. The statutory exemption of 1% applies irrespective of the total loss or damage to the goods. --Loss Due to Terrorism: The court concluded that the act of terrorism does not absolve carriers from liability to pay duties and taxes for goods lost in transit. Despite claims of terrorism being the cause of non-delivery, the tribunal found no factual incidents to support these claims. Therefore, the carriers remained responsible for paying duties and taxes on lost consignments. ----Citations/Precedents: Al-Haj Enterprises v. Collector of Customs (2017 SCMR 1598): The Supreme Court held that consequences of short supply beyond 1% are not provided in Rule 564(4) of the Customs Rules 2001, thus supporting the dismissal of petitions challenging duties and taxes beyond 1%.

Summary: Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)--- ----S. 11---Customs Act (IV of 1969), Ss.19A & 33, 'proviso'---Excess paid Federal Excise Duty (FED)---Refund, claim for---Entitlement---Excess paid duty passing onto the consumer, incidence of---Effect---Refund of excess duty not admissible if incidence has passed on to consumer---Scope---Refund justified where the excess duty was not passed on to the consumer---Collector Customs challenged the decision of the Customs Appellate Tribunal, which had upheld the refund of 1% excess Federal Excise Duty (FED) to respondent---The respondent imported edible oil and was charged 17% FED during a period when the applicable rate was 16%---The collector had denied the refund, arguing the burden had been passed to the consumer---However, the respondent proved through sales records that product prices remained unchanged, hence the burden was not transferred---Validity---Only controversy between the parties was as to "whether the excess recovered FED was refundable to respondent or not?"---Held: Careful perusal of S. 11 of Federal Excise Act, 2005 (the Act, 2005) revealed that the refund claim for excess payable/paid duty was not admissible if the incidence of such excess paid duty had passed on to the consumer---The petitioners took the stance that under S. 19A of the Customs Act, 1969, it would be presumed that the incidence had been shifted to consumer---Presumption under S. 19A ibid only prevailed when the person paying duty had failed to prove that the incidence of excess paid duty was not passed on to buyer---In the present case, the situation was, however, different---The Collectorate of Customs (Appeals), Islamabad, during hearing of appeal, required the respondents to produce their Sales Tax Register for the month of relevant period wherein it was found that the sale price of the final product was not enhanced by them---Accordingly, it was rightly held by the Collectorate of Customs (Appeals) that the respondent had not passed on the excess paid duty to consumer---In the present case, there was no proof that the excess paid duty was passed on to the buyer, rather it was proved that the duty was recovered on raw material before manufacturing of final product and it was paid by the manufacturer himself and the rates were not enhanced as a consequence of payment of such excess duty---Secondly the proviso to S. 33 of the Customs Act, 1969 would become redundant when the refunds becomes due in consequence of any decision by the appropriate officer of Customs or Board, or the Appellate Tribunal or the Court---Refund in question became due upon order passed by the Collectorate of Customs (Appeals), Islamabad, as such benefit could not be claimed by the petitioners under Proviso to S. 33 of the Customs Act, 1969---Excess duty recovered by the petitioners from respondents was refundable because its burden was not passed on to intermediary or end consumer---Present tax reference was dismissed, in circumstances. Collector of Customs Appraisement, Collectorate, Customs House Karachi v. Messrs Gul Rehman, Proprietor Messrs G.Kin Enterprises, Ghazali Street, Nasir Road, Sialkot 2017 SCMR 339 rel. Syed Waqas Naqvi for Petitioners. Hassan Idrees Mufti for Respondent. Date of hearing: 3rd April, 2024.

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): ----Ss. 156(1)(89), 157(1), 157(2), & 181---- Smuggling of foreign-origin diesel oil—Concealment under liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cover load—Confiscation of vehicle and goods—Adjudicating authority ordered confiscation of smuggled diesel oil while granting the vehicle owner the option to redeem the vehicle upon payment of 20% redemption fine under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969—Appellant Collectorate challenged the redemption option on grounds of an altered vehicle design for smuggling—Held, no evidence of false cavities or repeated use of the vehicle for smuggling was provided—Order of adjudicating authority upheld by the Tribunal. ----Cited Cases: Nazir Ahmed v. Chairman Customs Appellate Tribunal Customs Reference No. 52 of 2015 (Lahore High Court) Faiz Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan & Others Civil Petition No. 4580 of 2021 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) (b) Customs Act, 1969 (IV of 1969): ----S. 168---- Seizure of smuggled goods—Recovery of 49,770 liters of foreign-origin diesel oil concealed under LPG cover load—Customs staff intercepted vehicle based on prior information—Goods seized under Sec. 168 for violation of Customs Act, 1969, including misuse of altered vehicle design—Adjudicating authority confiscated the goods due to lack of proof of legal importation and imposed a personal penalty on the vehicle owner. (c) S.R.O. 499(I)/2009: ----Clause (b)---- False cavities and exclusive use for smuggling—Appellant Collectorate argued that the vehicle fell under S.R.O. 499(I)/2009, which prohibits redemption of vehicles used exclusively or with false cavities for smuggling—Tribunal observed that the photographs and case record did not substantiate the existence of false cavities or exclusive smuggling use—Vehicle allowed to be redeemed under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969. (d) Principles of Evidence: ----Burden of Proof---- Claim of altered vehicle design—Collectorate failed to provide sufficient evidence such as photographs, diagrams, or expert analysis to support allegations of false cavities or engineered designs for smuggling—Tribunal held that unsubstantiated claims could not form the basis for denying redemption—Reliance placed on Supreme Court judgment in Faiz Muhammad v. FOP & Others. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Order of adjudicating authority upheld, allowing vehicle redemption upon payment of 20% fine under Sec. 181 of the Customs Act, 1969, and maintaining confiscation of smuggled diesel oil.

Summary: Background: The appellant, the Additional Collector of Customs, filed an appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, which favored the respondent, M/s K. S. Sulemanji Esmailji & Sons Pvt. Ltd. The dispute arose over the classification of goods imported by the respondent, specifically “BOPP” Printed Laminated Packaging Film (Metalized). The respondent sought a refund on customs duties, claiming that an incorrect classification had led to an overpayment of customs duty at 25% instead of 20%. After referring the matter to the Classification Committee of the Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), the committee classified the goods under a heading that maintained the 25% duty rate. Both the Tribunal and the High Court rejected the committee's ruling, favoring the respondent's classification, which attracted a 20% duty rate. The appellant challenged this decision in the Supreme Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the classification ruling of the Classification Committee under PCT Heading 3920.2040 was correct. 2- Whether the Tribunal and the High Court erred in substituting their own classification of the goods without considering the ruling of the Classification Committee. 3- Whether the High Court and the Tribunal failed to properly interpret Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgments of the Tribunal and the High Court. The Court held that the Classification Committee’s determination under PCT Heading 3920.2040, which attracted a 25% customs duty, was correct and in accordance with the applicable rules. The Committee had relied on the Customs House Laboratory’s analysis and the Explanatory Notes to the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System, issued by the World Customs Organisation. The Court emphasized that the Classification Committee, established by the FBR, has technical expertise in determining the correct classification of imported goods. It further ruled that the Tribunal and the High Court had overstepped their bounds by disregarding the Committee's ruling without demonstrating that the Committee’s decision was arbitrary or in violation of the relevant rules and guidelines. The Supreme Court noted that Rule 3(c) of the Rules of Interpretation had been correctly applied by the Committee, and the classification under the heading "Others" was inappropriate as it pertained to films other than BOPP. Thus, the rejection of the respondent’s refund application was restored, and the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellant. ----Citations/Precedents: Rule 3(c) of the General Rules for Interpretation of the First Schedule to the Customs Act, 1969. Explanatory Notes of the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding System (World Customs Organisation).

Summary: (a) Customs Act, 1969 – Sections 2(s), 16, 168, and 171: Seizure of Goods – Limitation for Issuance of Show-Cause Notice – Time-Barred Proceedings Appeal challenging the legality of proceedings initiated under the Customs Act, 1969, following the seizure of goods (foreign-origin cooking oil and ghee) on allegations of smuggling. The appellant contended that the show-cause notice was served beyond the time prescribed under Section 168(2) of the Customs Act, 1969, rendering the proceedings illegal. Held: Section 168(2) mandates that a show-cause notice must be issued within two months of the seizure, extendable by an additional two months for reasons recorded in writing. In the present case, the notice was issued after nearly ten months, exceeding the permissible time limit. Consequently, the show-cause notice and all subsequent proceedings were declared void ab initio. The appeal was allowed, and the impugned order was set aside. ----Cited Cases: Assistant Director Intelligence and Investigation v. M/s B.R Herman PLD 1992 SC 485 M/s. Skindar A. Kharim v. The State 1995 SCMR 387 PLD 1974 SC (sic) PLD 1988 Lahore 177 1991 SCMR 1753 ----Disposition: Appeal allowed. The proceedings and impugned order were quashed as being time-barred under the Customs Act, 1969.